Iran Update, September 8, 2025
Iranian officials are signaling openness to cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and negotiations with the United States, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati, reported on September 8 that the regime has decided to resume negotiations with the United States under the condition that the UNSC does not reimpose sanctions on Iran under the snapback mechanism during negotiations.[1] The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback mechanism on August 28, which means that UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on Iran on September 27 unless the UNSC extends sanctions relief for Iran.[2] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately published an op-ed in the Guardian on September 7 in which he stated that Iran is ready to accept limits on uranium enrichment and allow extensive international oversight of its nuclear facilities in exchange for sanctions relief.[3] Araghchi specifically directed his op-ed to the E3.
Iranian leaders have recently expressed openness to resuming cooperation with the IAEA. Iran and the IAEA held their third round of talks in Vienna on September 6.[4] Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated following the meeting that Iran and the IAEA are close to reaching a new cooperation agreement.[5] Grossi suggested that Iran and the IAEA have not, however, agreed on a timeline for the resumption of IAEA inspections and stated that it is also unclear what the IAEA would do when inspections resume.[6] Iran may calculate that expressing willingness to cooperate with the IAEA and the United States will help Iran deter potential snapback sanctions. It is unclear if Iran is willing to make meaningful concessions on its nuclear program in talks with the IAEA or the United States, however. Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months in exchange for Iran restoring full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[7] Araghchi and Grossi will reportedly meet in Cairo this week to finalize a new cooperation agreement.[8]
Iran is likely preparing for future conflicts with Israel and the United States by increasing funding for the Iranian armed forces and evaluating the combat readiness of armed forces units. The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved on September 7 a six-clause bill to increase the Iranian armed forces’ “defense capabilities.”[9] The IDF destroyed Iranian air defense systems and achieved air superiority over large parts of Iran during the Israel-Iran War, and Iran likely seeks to bolster its defensive capabilities in preparation for potential future conflicts.[10] The bill includes the following clauses.
1. The Planning and Budget Organization and Oil Ministry must pay the entirety of the funds allocated to strengthening the Iranian armed forces in the budget for the current Persian calendar year (March 2025-2026) and the previous Persian calendar year (March 2024- 2025).
2. The Planning and Budget Organization must fund the Supreme National Security Council’s defense allocations from public savings or the transfer of oil sales shares.
3. The Central Bank of Iran must provide the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) with up to two billion euros from blocked foreign assets or other overseas currency resources to implement emergency defense plans.
4. The Planning and Budget Organization, Central Bank of Iran, and Economy Ministry must provide the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry with two billion euros for “foreign purchases of major defense items.”
5. The Planning and Budget Organization and Oil Ministry are authorized to allocate $1.5 billion in oil revenues to the Iranian armed forces.
6. Iran will allocate 30 percent of its revenue from air transit fees to Artesh air defense systems annually.[11]
The clause to purchase “major defense items” is notable given that Iran has signaled interest in acquiring military equipment from foreign countries, such as China and Belarus, since the end of the Israel-Iran War.[12] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh, who is responsible for Iranian arms sales and purchases, traveled to China in late June 2025 in his first foreign visit after the 12-day war.[13] Iranian media expressed support for purchasing Chinese military equipment, such as J-10 aircraft, after the war.[14] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian recently traveled to Belarus, where he reportedly sought Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment that Israel damaged during the June 2025 war.[15]
The Institute for Science and International Security reported on September 7 that Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War destroyed a key Iranian centrifuge research and development site, the Kalaye Electric Company, in Tehran.[19] The Kalaye Electric Company is a subsidiary of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and manufactures advanced centrifuges for the Iranian nuclear program. Centrifuges are used to enrich uranium. The United States sanctioned the Kalaye Electric Company in February 2007 for its involvement in Iran’s weapons of mass destruction program.[20] The Institute reported that centrifuge design teams developed new centrifuge models and improved existing ones at the site.[21] Iran also reportedly previously tested advanced IR-8 centrifuges at the site.[22] There have been no repair efforts at the site following the war, according to the Institute.[23] US and Israeli airstrikes during the war targeted Iran’s centrifuge production facilities as well as active centrifuges, which will likely hinder Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.[24]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei outlined a series of economic recommendations on September 7, which highlights the regime’s concern about worsening economic conditions and their potential to undermine internal stability.[25] Khamenei delivered a speech during a meeting with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet on September 7 in which he called on the government to “discipline the market” and ensure Iranians’ access to essential goods.[26] Khamenei’s directive to “discipline the market” comes as the Iranian rial traded above one million rials per one US dollar on August 28.[27] Khamenei also ordered government officialsto build up reserves of essential goods, break import monopolies by diversifying suppliers, and guard basic goods against sudden price hikes.[28] The Iranian regime’s official data shows that Iranian household incomes have risen about 12.5 times since 2016, while the price of basic food items has increased more than 20 times.[29] Khamenei further emphasized that production is the key to economic progress and instructed officials not to cut electricity to factories except in emergencies.[30] Iranian media reported in late August that electricity shortages have forced about 50 percent of factories to go offline, which has created ripple effects across the economy.[31]
Khamenei also instructed Iranian officials and media outlets to emphasize Iran’s strengths and avoid portraying Iran as weak.[32] Khamenei’s directive comes after the Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry restricted “provocative” media coverage of potential snapback sanctions.[33] Iranian authorities directed outlets to frame the E3‘s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) recent decision to trigger the snapback mechanism as proof of European dependence on the United States and to emphasize Iran’s resilience.[34] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi similarly directed Iranian media on September 7 to present potential snapback sanctions as a political setback but not as an economic catastrophe and warned that exaggerating the impacts of potential sanctions could inflame public anxiety.[35] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent further public frustration about deteriorating economic conditions and reduce the risk of economic-related unrest.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-8-2025/
Iran Update, September 9, 2025
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted several airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9.[1] Several IAF fighter jets dropped at least 10 munitionson a residential building in northern Doha.[2] Several Hamas Political Bureau members resided at the targeted building, according to the Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry.[3] Senior Hamas officials and ceasefire negotiators, including Hamas Shura Council and Leadership Council head Mohammad Darwish and senior Hamas official and negotiator Nizar Awadallah, were reportedly meeting at the residence to review a recent US ceasefire proposal at the time of the strikes.[4] The Israeli strikes reportedly killed several Hamas officials, including:
· Khalil al Hayya: Hayya was the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the leader of Hamas’ ceasefire negotiation team, and a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council.[5]
· Zaher Jabarin: Jabarin was the leader of Hamas in the West Bank, a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council, and a member of Hamas’ ceasefire negotiation team.[6]
· Khaled Meshaal: Meshaal was a member of Hamas’ Leadership Council.[7]
Hamas confirmed that the Israeli strikes killed five Hamas members, including the director of Hayya’s office, Jihad Labad (Abu Bilal), and Hayya’s son, Hammam al Hayya.[8] Hamas claimed that its negotiating team survived the Israeli strikes but did not specify if any officials sustained injuries.[9]
Three US officials told Axios that the US military detected Israeli fighter jets flying toward the Persian Gulf on September 9 and sought clarification from Israel.[10] The officials stated that “missiles were already in the air” by the time that Israel provided clarification to the United States. Axios reported that the Israeli strikes “infuriated” some of US President Donald Trump’s senior advisers because the US government was waiting for Hamas’ response to a recent US ceasefire proposal. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Israel’s strikes in Qatar, which is a major non-NATO ally of the United States, do “not advance Israel’s or America’s goals,” but added that eliminating Hamas is “a worthy goal.”[11] Qatar condemned the strikes and stated that it will not tolerate “reckless Israeli behavior.”[12] A Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson denied claims that the United States warned Qatar about the Israeli strikes in advance.[13] Qatar has reportedly suspended its role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas following the strikes.[14]
Iran appears to be trying to fulfill the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) demands to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, likely to try to avoid the reimposition of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. The E3 triggered the snapback mechanism on August 28.[15] The snapback process lasts 30 days, which means that UNSC sanctions will automatically be reimposed on Iran on September 27 if the UNSC does not extend sanctions relief for Iran. South Korea, which is the current president of the UNSC, finalized a UNSC resolution on September 8 to extend sanctions relief for Iran.[16] South Korea was required to table such a resolution 10 days after the E3 triggered the snapback mechanism if no other UNSC member did so. Any permanent UNSC member (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto the South Korean resolution. The E3 previously outlined three conditions to extend the expiration date of the snapback mechanism, which is currently October 18, 2025. The three conditions are that Iran must account for its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding inspections and verification of its nuclear sites, and resume negotiations with the United States. Iran rejected these conditions prior to August 28 but has since made progress toward fulfilling these conditions.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed an agreement in Cairo on September 9 regarding Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.[17] Some reports have indicated that the Iran-IAEA agreement would involve Iran submitting a report on the status of its HEU to the IAEA in one month, after which the IAEA and Iran would negotiate how the IAEA could verify the Iranian report. Neither Iran nor the IAEA has confirmed the details of the agreement at the time of this writing, however.[18] Araghchi stated after the signing of the agreement that “any hostile action against Iran,” including the reimposition of UNSC sanctions, would make the Iran-IAEA agreement “null and void.”[19] Araghchi similarly proposed an “interim deal” that would provide “more clarity” about the status of Iran’s HEU stockpile during a meeting with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas in Qatar on September 5.[20]
Iran has also indicated a greater willingness to negotiate with the United States on Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian hardline outlet Farhikhtegan, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati, reported on September 8 that the regime has decided to resume negotiations with the United States under the condition that the UNSC does not reimpose sanctions on Iran during negotiations.[21] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei reportedly asked Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to seek Qatar’s help in mediating with the United States and the E3 to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions.[22] UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported on September 8 that Oman is “re-engaging” with Iran about “possible renewed dialogue.”[23] Araghchi held a phone call with his Omani counterpart on September 8.[24] Oman mediated the five rounds of talks between the United States and Iran before the Israel-Iran War.[25]
US and Israeli airstrikes during the Israel-Iran War severely degraded Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on September 8 that Iran no longer has a clear path to produce weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched up to 90 percent) because US and Israeli strikes destroyed Iran’s gas centrifuge enrichment program.[26] The Institute assessed that US and Israeli strikes destroyed or rendered inoperable all of Iran’s 20,000 centrifuges that it had installed across its three declared enrichment facilities.[27] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently reported that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12.[28] Iran would need to further enrich its 60 percent enriched uranium to be able to build a nuclear weapon. US and Israeli strikes also targeted Iran’s centrifuge production and research and development facilities, which will almost certainly also hinder Iran’s ability to enrich uranium in the near future.[29]
The Institute also published information about Iran’s fourth enrichment facility and reported that the facility does not appear to be operational after the war. Iran announced on June 12 that it would launch a newly built enrichment facility in response to a non-compliance resolution that the IAEA Board of Governors had passed earlier that day.[30] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami stated that Iran would operationalize the facility by installing and activating centrifuges there.[31] Israel launched its first airstrikes targeting Iran on June 12, which suggests that Iran never installed centrifuges at the site. The Institute assessed that the new facility, known as the Esfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, is located within the tunnel complex at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center.[32] The Institute reported that US strikes damaged the site and assessed that the site is not currently operational.[33]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-9-2025/