Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iran Update, August 11, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati discussed the threats that Iran perceives to its regional influence in an interview on August 9 that underscored Iran’s commitment to its strategic goals despite recent setbacks.[1] Velayati’s statements demonstrate significant continuity between Iran’s pre- and post-war approach to the region and its use of the Axis of Resistance. Velayati reiterated Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance but notably highlighted the Houthis as a “gem” within the Iranian proxy and partner network.[2] Velayati said that Iran will oppose US-supported efforts to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Lebanese government, which the United States has pressured to disarm Hezbollah, agreed on August 7 to disarm Hezbollah.[3] The United States has similarly pressured the Iraqi government to pass legislation that would disarm or reform the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which has been opposed by Iran’s Iraqi allies.[4] Velayati held a phone call with the Iraqi State of Law coalition head and Iranian ally in Iraq, Nouri al Maliki, on August 8, in which Maliki emphasized that Iraq will not allow the United States to disarm the PMF, which suggests the pair discussed recent US efforts to undermine the PMF.[5] Velayati also suggested that resistance groups will form in Syria to resist Israel.[6] Khamenei and other Iranian officials have previously framed the post-Assad Syrian landscape as an opportunity for Iran to shape events in Syria through grassroots mobilization, which is consistent with Iranian hopes before the Israel-Iran War.[7]

It remains unclear how Iran will attempt to oppose any of these US-supported efforts, but Velayati’s interview highlights the increased importance of the Houthi Movement within Iran’s Axis of Resistance. The Houthis remain the most unified and capable member of the Axis of Resistance after two years of war, having suffered relatively little damage compared to Hezbollah or Hamas.

Iran has taken steps to protect its nuclear scientists following the 12-day Israel-Iran War. Israel killed at least 14 nuclear scientists during the war.[20] The Telegraph reported on August 11 that Iran has sent its remaining nuclear scientists to safe houses in northern Iran, citing a senior Iranian official.[21] The official said Iran has replaced all the nuclear scientists teaching at universities with individuals who have no connection to Iran’s nuclear program. Iran reportedly assigned each key nuclear scientist at least one deputy in order to try to ensure knowledge continuity.[22] Israeli sources are concerned that some of these deputies have replaced the scientists whom Israel killed during the war. Some of the replacement scientists reportedly have expertise in explosives and warhead design. An Israeli intelligence and defense analyst stated that Iran still has scientists who have previously worked on nuclear weapons delivery systems, including efforts to adapt Shahab-3 missiles to hold nuclear warheads.[23] The senior Iranian official also said Iran has assigned multiple agencies to protect nuclear scientists as opposed to the single Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unit that handled the scientists’ protection previously.[24]

Iran likely assigned multiple agencies to protect its nuclear scientists to address counterintelligence concerns following the war.[25] The existence of multiple agencies providing security for the scientists enables each agency to ensure the compliance of the other agencies, but it will contribute to siloed organizations that hinder information sharing. Iranian authorities executed an Iranian nuclear scientist on August 6 for reportedly providing Israel with information about another nuclear scientist whom Israel killed during the war.[26]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-11-2025

Iran Update, August 12, 2025

Iranian officials have strongly criticized the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors seek to use the corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a declaration of intent on August 8 on a US-brokered peace deal that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27 mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region.[17] The agreed upon corridor is fundamentally the actualization of the Zangezur Corridor—a Turkish and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan. Iran has historically opposed the Zangezur Corridor and viewed it as an effort to economically sideline Iran and limit Iranian regional influence.[18] A senior adviser to the Supreme Leader emphasized Iran's strong opposition to the proposed transit corridor on August 9 and referred to it as a “political conspiracy” against Iran.[19] An Iranian analyst close to the regime similarly characterized the proposed transit corridor as an Iranian “containment belt” meant to isolate Iran and threaten Iran's security.[20] The corridor runs along Iran's only shared border with Armenia and would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia, which could exclude Iran from a new international transit route and hinder Iranian efforts to become a major transit hub. The corridor would enable Azerbaijan to circumvent Iran to access the Nakhchivan Autonomy Republic, which will likely deprive Iran of political leverage and any associated revenue along the transit corridor. Azerbaijan currently accesses its exclave and Turkey through Iran.

This proposed agreement would be an additional victory for Iranian adversaries at a time when Iran's relative ability to project power in its near abroad has diminished.[21] Iranian officials have expressed concern about Turkey's expanding influence as a rival in the Middle East and around Iran's borders, especially after Turkey replaced Iran as the primary backer of the new Syrian government following Assad's fall in December 2024. Turkey currently uses routes through Iran to trade with Central Asia, but a new route directly from Turkey to Azerbaijan through Armenia means that Turkey may be able to use the corridor to reach the Caspian Sea while circumventing Iran completely. Iran has similarly found itself at odds with Azerbaijan, which has taken steps to strengthen ties with Israel in recent months. Iran has historically accused Israel of using Azerbaijani territory to conduct operations in Iran, including during the Israel-Iran War.[22] Israeli government officials have recently called for including Azerbaijan in the Abraham Accords.[23]

Iran has taken some steps to deter the corridor from being established. Iranian President Masoud Pezeskhian warned Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during a phone call on August 11 to be wary of foreign attempts to use the agreement as a way to achieve “hegemonic goals,” likely referring to the United States.[24] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately held a phone call with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan on August 12 to discuss the US-brokered peace deal and the proposed transit corridor.[25] Pezeshkian is scheduled to visit Armenia on August 18.[26] The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Commission held a meeting with defense, military, and foreign policy officials on August 11 to discuss Iranian diplomatic and military efforts to block the passage of the transit corridor.[27] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media stated on August 12 that Iran will be forced to adopt a “multi-layered and measured response” to the corridor.[28] Iran has previously threatened to take military action to prevent the development of the Zangezur Corridor.[29] Iran has also previously conducted numerous provocative military exercises along the border designed to discourage the development of the corridor.[30]

Turkey pressured Syria to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris and encouraged Syria to strengthen ties with Russia to counterbalance US and partner influence in Syria, which undermines US policy objectives in Syria.[31] Unspecified Turkish sources told Syria in Transition that Turkey pressured the Syrian transitional government to withdraw from scheduled Paris negotiations with the United States, France, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), due to fears that the transitional government would be forced to concede to Kurdish autonomy demands because of its poor handling of security in Suwayda.[32] This demonstrates that Turkey's primary concern about the Syrian government's behavior in Suwayda is whether the Syrian government's behavior will strengthen the SDF, not the behavior itself or the crimes committed by government forces. However, the SDF’s decision to invite prominent Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri to a political conference in Hasakah City on August 8 likely made it easier for Turkey to successfully pressure Syria to abandon the talks in Paris and demand that the SDF negotiate in Damascus.[33] Hijri’s political movement declared an autonomous Suwaydawi government, and fighters close to Hijri have broken multiple ceasefires by attacking government forces and other Druze factions.[34] Turkey is simultaneously attempting to help Russia retain influence in Syria by encouraging the Syrian transitional government to strengthen diplomatic ties with Russia. Turkish sources said that the Turkish government had advised President Ahmed Shara to strengthen relations with Russia so that Russia, Turkey, and Syria can counterbalance US, European, Israeli, and Saudi interests in the country.[35]

These Turkish efforts undermine key US policy objectives, including maintaining Syrian stability and preventing Russia from re-establishing itself in Syria. The US effort to integrate the SDF into Syria would prevent future rounds of conflict between the Kurdish-dominated SDF and Turkish-backed factions, which could seriously imperil Syrian stability and provide openings for ISIS to resurge. Increased Russian military influence in Syria would be similarly deleterious to Syrian stability. Russian state media reported on August 11 that the Syrian transitional government sought renewed Russian military police patrols in southern Syria to curb Israeli activity, citing a Russian source at an August 1 meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani and the Syrian diaspora in Moscow.[36] The Russian military conducted a patrol in SDF-controlled Qamishli, Hasakah Province, on August 4 shortly after Syrian diplomats returned from Moscow to negotiate Russian basing in Syria.[37] Russian military operations in Syria, particularly in southern Syria, did not contribute to lasting stability during the civil war and, in some cases, supported Iranian operations in Syria.[38]

The SDF and the transitional government have nonetheless continued to make progress in negotiations over the integration agreement despite Turkish interference. Al Jazeera reported on August 11 that an SDF delegation arrived in Damascus to renew integration talks with the transitional government, but no updates have followed.[39] The SDF and the Syrian transitional government likely desire to avoid any major fighting between the government and SDF, given that major military operations would risk significant destabilization of Syria that could imperil the political positions of both sides.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo visited Iranian officials on August 12 to discuss Iran's cooperation with the IAEA.[51] This visit marks the first IAEA visit to Iran since the Israel-Iran War and since all IAEA inspectors left Iran due to safety concerns.[52] Iran approved on June 26 a bill that suspended cooperation with the IAEA. Iranian officials repeatedly stated ahead of Aparo’s visit that the IAEA delegation would not inspect Iranian nuclear facilities during the visit.[53] The IAEA’s visit comes ahead of the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) end-of-August deadline for Iran to make progress towards a nuclear deal before the E3 triggers the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism.[54] The E3 reportedly aims to engage Iran and secure verifiable steps, such as restoring Iranian cooperation with the IAEA and the removal of Iran's 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile, before the snapback deadline takes effect.[55]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025

Iran Update, August 13, 2025

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran still holds about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium, though Iran may still be unable to access this stockpile.[28] The size of the stockpile is consistent with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s estimate in June 2025 that Iran retained about 408.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium. The IAEA reported in May that Iran possessed a total enriched uranium stockpile of 9,247.6 kilograms, though this estimate includes uranium enriched to lower levels.[29] Netanyahu stated that Israel ”knew in advance” the strikes would not destroy the uranium, which is logical because uranium is an element and therefore cannot be destroyed, only scattered.[30] Netanyahu also argued that the stockpile alone is “insufficient to produce a nuclear weapon” without other key elements of Iran’s nuclear program.[31] Netanyahu is likely referring to assets damaged by Israel during the 12-day war, including research and development facilities, explosives manufacturing sites, and knowledge from key nuclear scientists.[32] Netanyahu said the strikes eliminated two “cancerous” threats to Israel’s existence: Iran’s nuclear weapons program and its planned production of 20,000 ballistic missiles.[33]

It is unclear whether Iran can access its 60 percent enriched uranium because some of the stockpile may be buried under rubble at Fordow or Esfahan.[34] US and Israeli airstrikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities may have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material.[35] Iran cannot begin further enrichment or weaponization until it regains physical access to it. Western media reports after the initial strikes suggested that Iran may have transferred part of its enriched uranium from nuclear facilities to other sites before the Israeli and US strikes.[36] Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover the material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[37] Netanyahu stated that Israel continues to monitor Iran’s nuclear weapons program in coordination with the United States and will act with or without US approval.[38] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged on August 10 that Israeli strikes had damaged nuclear capabilities and warned that rebuilding them could prompt further attacks.[39]

Iran failed to respond to an offer from the E3–United Kingdom, France, and Germany– to extend the August 31 deadline for Iran to return to nuclear negotiations with the E3 before the E3 trigger snapback mechanism.[40] This ”limited extension“ would grant Iran more time to commit to a new nuclear agreement that would address the E3’s concerns before the snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.[41] The E3 has expressed that Iran needs to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to remove their 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile to avert the imposition of snapback sanctions.[42] Iran is unlikely to reverse its June 26 decision to officially ban cooperation with the IAEA. This continued ban leaves Iran-E3 negotiations at a standstill.[43] Iran notably did not allow an IAEA delegation to inspect Iranian nuclear facilities during its visit to Tehran on August 12.[44] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately told reporters on August 11 that Iran has not set a date for further talks with the E3.[45] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism–which re-imposes UN sanctions–requires up to 30 days to complete, which requires the E3 to start the process by September 2025 before the snapback mechanism expires in October.[46]

Iranian officials met with Armenian officials on August 13 to discuss their opposition to the proposed Zangezur Corridor.[47] Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati met with Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan on August 13 to discuss the recent US-brokered peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[48] The deal grants the United States exclusive development rights to the Zangezur Corridor, which is a Turkish- and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. Iran opposes the proposed corridor because it would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[49] Velayati warned against foreign intervention in the region in the meeting and stated that any threats to Iran’s national security on its borders would prompt an Iranian response.[50] Kostanyan also met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi.[51] Araghchi separately met with the Russian Foreign Ministry‘s Special Representative for the Caucasus, Igor Khayev, to emphasize the importance of Russo-Iranian cooperation over the corridor.[52] Iranian officials have expressed concern in recent years that Russia’s preoccupation with its invasion of Ukraine has enabled Turkey, Israel, and the United States to increase their influence in the southern Caucasus.[53]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-13-2025

Iran Update, August 14, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reportedly approved the resumption of nuclear negotiations with the United States because the Iranian regime views negotiations as necessary for the regime’s survival, according to three Iranian insiders speaking to Reuters on August 14.[1] One source stated that Iranian leaders support negotiations because they have “seen the cost of military confrontation“ and seek to prevent further escalation with Israel and the United States. Moderate and pragmatic officials in the regime have recently signaled openness to resuming negotiations.[2] Moderate Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, for example, stated on August 10 that resuming negotiations with the United States ”does not mean we intend to surrender.”[3] The Iranian regime continues to reject the US demand for Iran to halt uranium enrichment, which was the main sticking point in negotiations before the Israel-Iran War.[4] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi recently told Japanese media on August 11 that Iran could agree to limit its uranium enrichment levels but will not agree to halt enrichment altogether.[5]

A senior Iranian official told The Telegraph on August 13 that Iran would not be able to “endure” the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] Iran’s concern about potential snapback sanctions could push Iran to resume negotiations with the United States, although it is very unlikely that Iran would accept a new nuclear agreement with the United States that requires it to halt uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. The Telegraph report comes after the E3 warned on August 13 that it would trigger the snapback mechanism unless Iran shows a commitment to negotiations before August 31.[7] The E3 has offered to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, which is currently set to expire in October 2025, in order to provide Iran more time to negotiate with the United States. The senior Iranian official also told The Telegraph that the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) instructed the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry in July to revive negotiations with the United States.[8] The official added that the SNSC asked the Iranian presidential office at an unspecified time to pursue nuclear negotiations with the United States before the window for talks closes.[9] It is unclear if the SNSC contacted the presidential office before or after President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed pragmatic hardliner Ali Larijani as SNSC secretary on August 5.[10] Larijani has historically supported negotiations and could accelerate the SNSC’s push for negotiations with the United States. Larijani supported the 2015 nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and defended it against hardliners in parliament while he was parliament speaker in the mid-2010s.[11]

Iran’s failure to meaningfully support its proxies and partners in recent conflicts may have weakened the Axis of Resistance’s trust in Iran as a reliable partner. Hezbollah notably did not participate in the Israel-Iran War, stating that it would “not unilaterally launch an attack on Israel in support of Tehran.”[34] An unspecified Israeli military official told Saudi media on August 13 that Hezbollah ignored calls from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force to respond militarily to Israel.[35] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. Hezbollah’s reported decision not to enter the Israel-Iran War may reflect that Hezbollah calculated that the cost of supporting Iran in the war outweighed the benefit of doing so. Hezbollah’s response to the Israel-Iran War differed from its response to the October 7 War, when Hezbollah joined Hamas in attacking Israel on October 8, 2023.[36] Iran’s other partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance, excluding the Houthis, similarly did not intervene to support Iran during the war.[37]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-14-2025

Iran Update, August 15, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati emphasized Iranian support for the Houthis during a meeting with the Houthi representative to Iran on August 14. Velayati denied that the Axis of Resistance has weakened and underlined the Houthis’ pivotal role in the Axis of Resistance’s war against Israel in a meeting with Houthi Representative to Iran Ibrahim al Dailami.[10] The Houthis are the only Axis of Resistance member that still regularly conducts attacks targeting Israel. The Houthis also continue to threaten international shipping.[11] Velayati separately criticized US pressure to disarm Lebanese Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.[12] This meeting comes after Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani reaffirmed Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance during his visits to Iraq and Lebanon between August 11 and 14.[13]

The Iranian, Chinese, and Russian permanent representatives to the UN met in Vienna on August 14, likely to continue coordinating diplomatic efforts in response to the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) warning that it may trigger the snapback mechanism by the end of August.[32] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Mikhail Ulyanov stated that the three officials coordinated “their positions and actions on the Iranian nuclear dossier.”[33] This meeting comes after the E3 warned on August 13 that it would trigger the snapback mechanism unless Iran shows a commitment to negotiations before August 31.[34] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[35] The snapback mechanism expires on October 18, 2025.[36] CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia could prevent the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[37]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-15-2025

Iran Update, August 18, 2025

The Iranian Reformist Front issued a statement on August 17 that called for political reforms and foreign policy shifts, which highlights how reformists in the Iranian regime may feel emboldened in the post-war environment to call for change.[36] The statement warned that Iran's fragile economy and potential E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) snapback sanctions could cause Iran to enter a deeper economic crisis.[37] The Reformist Front outlined eleven demands, including lifting restrictions on reformist leaders, freeing political prisoners, excluding the armed forces from non-military fields, allowing free elections, reforming women's rights laws, lifting censorship, and suspending uranium enrichment under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight in exchange for sanctions relief.[38] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency condemned the statement on August 18, criticizing the Reformist Front's call to suspend uranium enrichment and accusing reformists of pursuing policies that weaken Iran in favor of Iran's adversaries.[39] The Reformist Front statement comes after former President Hassan Rouhani urged the regime on August 13 to implement reforms, ease tensions with the West, and limit the Iranian armed forces’ involvement in politics and the economy.[40] Rouhani framed the post-war period as an opportunity to restore public trust and recalibrate Iran's trajectory.[41] The emergence of reformist and moderate elements in the Iranian regime likely reflects a political opening created by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s absence from the public view and the loss of hardliner leadership during the Israel-Iran War.[42]

Iranian security forces raided a house near Enghelab Square in central Tehran on August 17, where unspecified individuals were reportedly constructing drones for Mossad.[43] Iranian security forces seized several drones during the raid [44] This incident highlights Iranian officials’ heightened concern about Israeli infiltration following the Israel-Iran War.[45] Israel clandestinely built a one-way attack drone base in Iran that it used to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers at the beginning of the war.[46] This operation hindered Iran's ability to immediately respond to Israel.[47]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-18-2025

Iran Update, August 19, 2025

Hardline media and officials are negatively responding to recent reformist calls for change within the Iranian regime, which highlights how the post-war environment has deepened existing fissures between reformists and hardliners over how to govern Iran and engage the West. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s official website said in an August 18 article that recent remarks by reformists were similar to a “quiet multimedia influence campaign” conducted by the United States and Israel, and alleged that the reformists seek to promote division within Iran over issues such as nuclear policy and uranium enrichment specifically.[23] The article indicates that the Supreme Leader continues to reject any zero uranium enrichment demands.[24] This statement from the Supreme Leader’s office comes after reformists have called for political reform and foreign policy shifts. The Reformist Front published a statement on August 18 outlining eleven demands, including lifting restrictions on reformist leaders, allowing free elections, reforming women’s rights laws, lifting censorship, and suspending uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.[25] Former President Hassan Rouhani advocated on August 13 for reducing tensions with the West and expanding relations with European and neighboring countries.[26] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on August 19 that reformists are conceding to Western pressure, and Tasnim warned that “trusting the enemy“ could threaten regime stability.[27] Another IRGC-affiliated outlet dismissed the Reformist Front’s statement as a “blueprint” for selling Iran’s independence and accused reformists of spreading American and Israeli propaganda.[28] Assembly of Experts Secretary Abbas Kaabi similarly said that the statement repeated “the enemy’s narrative” and focused too narrowly on internal problems rather than external threats.[29]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Armenian officials in Yerevan, Armenia, on August 19 to discuss concerns about the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus.[42] Pezeshkian emphasized Iran’s concerns about ”the presence of third-party forces” near the Iran-Armenia border during his meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[43] Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a declaration of intent on August 8 for a US-brokered peace deal that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27-mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. Senior Iranian officials have strongly criticized the proposal due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors could use the transit corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. The Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee visited Iran’s northwestern border on August 19 to ”ensure decisions reflect national security interests.”[44]

Iranian officials emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral relations with Armenia during the visit, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to try to hedge against future US influence in the region.[45] Iranian ministers signed ten memorandums of understanding (MOU) focused on bilateral trade and transportation relations.[46] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 19 that Iran and Armenia agreed to finalize a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement soon.[47] Iranian Minister of Transport and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh discussed the reopening of the Jolfa–Yerevan–Georgia rail link with the Armenian territorial administration minister and mentioned the role the link could play in boosting regional transit.[48]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-19-2025

Iran Update, August 20, 2025

The New York Times reported on August 20 that conclusive damage assessments of US strikes on Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant require more time, which is consistent with previous reporting.[14] The United States dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow in June 2025, targeting ventilation shafts at the site that led to a centrifuge cascade hall located at least 250 feet underground.[15] An unspecified US Department of Defense official said that the United States aimed to destroy the centrifuges with shock waves and other effects of the blasts because the bombs would probably not make direct contact with the centrifuge chamber itself.[16] International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi previously stated that the Fordow centrifuges are “no longer working” and emphasized that even small vibrations can destroy them.[17] The US bombs would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations. Several technical experts told the New York Times that a precise damage assessment requires advanced computer simulations, exact details of the bombs, and extensive knowledge of the geology of Fordow.[18] Iranian officials have emphasized that Iran cannot access the nuclear sites struck by US and Israeli airstrikes yet, which also prevents conclusive battle damage assessments.[19]

Several factors may have impacted the effectiveness of the US strikes on Fordow. A US defense official familiar with US decision-making said that the main targeted ventilation shafts had bends near the shaft entrances, which means the path to the underground facility through the shaft was not straight.[20] Several geologists also stated that the geology of Fordow almost certainly had an impact on the extent of damage. One expert said that Iran likely built Fordow using volcanic tuff, which may have helped cushion the site from the bombs due to its porosity.

Iran secured loans against tankers transporting Iranian and Iranian allies’ oil exports to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to circumvent Western sanctions between 2019 and 2023, according to the Financial Times on August 20.[21] A US-sanctioned Iranian broker set up one billion dollars’ worth of mortgages in Switzerland against at least 34 oil tankers, according to Panama Maritime Authority documents.[22] The United States has sanctioned 20 of these 34 tankers.[23] The Iranian broker used these mortgages as collateral, which allowed the broker to take ownership of the tanker if the buyer did not complete the payment once the oil arrived at its destination.[24] Buyers traditionally require official bank documents to prove their credit to traders.[25] These mortgages allow buyers to circumvent bank involvement in the process. Many banks have increasingly refused to work on transactions related to Iran’s illicit oil trade since the United States began to impose strict sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports in 2019.[26] Iran’s illicit oil export network has moved at least 130 million oil barrels worth $9.6 billion using mortgages to circumvent detection between 2019 and 2023. This network transferred sanctioned Iranian oil as well as sanctioned Russian and Venezuelan oil. The network exported the vast majority of this oil to the PRC, according to a research group focused on illicit networks.[27]

Iran’s use of mortgages on tankers to evade US sanctions is only one of the many strategies that Iran employs to obfuscate illicit Iranian and Russian oil trade to the PRC. Many companies affiliated with Iranian oil tankers use fake addresses and conduct ship-to-ship transfers.[28] The multi-national network controlled by Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani’s son, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, frequently changes vessel operators and managers to obscure ownership, falsifies cargo information, and turns off automatic identification systems (AIS) during loading. The United States sanctioned Shamkhani on July 30.[29]

Iran is deepening its economic and military cooperation with Belarus. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 20 in Minsk, Belarus, to discuss opportunities to expand bilateral relations.[30] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Belarus share common interests and want to combat US and European efforts to ”push unilateralism” in the region.[31] Pezeshkian emphasized that both countries can cooperate to mitigate the effects of international sanctions.[32] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding (MoU) focused on increasing bilateral trade, military-tech cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[33] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran plans to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with Belarus.[34] Iran and Belarus have increased defense and security cooperation over the past few years.[35] Iran showcased military equipment at a Belarusian military exhibit in May 2025.[36] Iran has reportedly worked to establish a drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[37]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-20-2025

Iran Update, August 21, 2025

The continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which helped Assad's economy, demonstrates the economic interests that continue to animate internal conflict in Syria. These networks have the potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups throughout 2025.[27] Captagon and other smuggling networks long helped sustain the Assad regime during the war. The regime profited 3 to 5 billion USD annually from the Captagon trade.[28] Many of these networks continue to survive in Syria because, while Assad's collapse destroyed the regime, it did not destroy many of the disparate networks that helped the regime survive for as long as it did. The transitional government began a counter-narcotics campaign in January 2024 that has naturally spurred a violent reaction from many of these networks.[29] This campaign has reduced Captagon production by approximately 80%, according to the Financial Times on August 21.[30]

The Captagon trade and other Assad-era criminal enterprises are almost certainly driving some—but not all—of the violence in Syria. Some of the violence along the Syria-Lebanon border and in western Syria in early 2025 appeared to be part of efforts by smuggling networks to defend their ratlines.[31] Not all of these criminal enterprises were allied with Assad, of course. Local reporting suggests that three key groups—the Bedouin Sunni tribes, Druze militias, and networks loyal to the Assad regime—have competed for control of the smuggling networks in southwestern Syria.[32] The divisions between the three groups are not purely identity-based, but competition over economic interests can rapidly take on an intercommunal bent as Bedouin Sunni fighters kill Druze or vice versa. Many Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks persist, however, in areas that have little to no transitional government control, including within Suwayda Province, the Kurdish-controlled northeast, the Syrian coast, and the Syria-Lebanon border.[33] The Financial Times reported that Assad-linked criminal networks and Bedouin tribes sustain the drug trade in Suwayda Province by exploiting local poverty and the continued employment of Assad-era border guards on the Jordanian border.[34]

Iran continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its damaged nuclear facilities and highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile after the 12-day war. Iran's 409 kg HEU stockpile remains in one or several unspecified locations, and Iran's access to the stockpile is unclear. Unspecified diplomats told Bloomberg on August 21 that IAEA officials will confer with US officials next week after IAEA inspectors failed to secure Iran's approval to resume monitoring.[38] The unspecified diplomats added that Iranian officials told IAEA Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo during meetings in Tehran on August 12 that inspections could potentially occur at undamaged sites like Bushehr while Iran‘s main nuclear-fuel complex would remain closed.[39] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that the SNSC will decide whether inspections can resume.[40] Araghchi emphasized that Iran cannot cut cooperation entirely because activities like fuel replacement at Bushehr require IAEA oversight.[41] Araghchi stressed that any new cooperation must account for safety and security concerns after the recent strikes, however.[42] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran retains about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium.[43] This amount is consistent with the IAEA’s June estimate that Iran retains 408.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, though Iran may not have physical access to all of the uranium, which could be buried at Fordow or Esfahan.[44]

The United States imposed additional sanctions targeting Iranian oil trade networks and their international facilitators on August 21.[50] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Greek national Antonios Margaritis and five Marshall Islands-registered companies in Margaritis’ shipping network for facilitating the trade of Iranian oil products for “many years.”[51] The US Treasury Department previously sanctioned three shipping companies in Margaritis’ network in December 2024.[52] The United States separately sanctioned six entities and eight affiliated vessels outside of Margaritis’ network for transporting Iranian oil to China and conducting ship-to-ship transfers with vessels already sanctioned by the United States.[53]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-21-2025

Iran Update, August 22, 2025

Larijani reaffirmed Iran's commitment to support the Axis of Resistance and framed resistance groups as natural responses to “foreign aggression.”[9] Larijani stressed that Iran considers the Axis of Resistance a genuine and strategic asset.[10] Iran previously used the Axis as a key deterrent against the United States and Israel, but the Axis of Resistance has been badly degraded over the past two years of fighting with Israel. Larijani compared Iran's support for regional allies to US support for Israel and warned that abandoning them would be “political insanity.”[11] Larijani rejected the idea that Hezbollah or other groups burden Iran and insisted that they both assist Iran and rely on Iranian support.[12] Larijani characterized the relationship with Hezbollah and other partner groups as “brothers” rather than “subordinates.” This is consistent with CTP-ISW’s longstanding assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional alliance that Iran leads. Some groups in the Axis are proxies, while Iran exerts more limited influence over other groups.[13] Larijani’s inaugural visits to Lebanon and Iraq attempted to demonstrate that Iran has not abandoned its partners in the Axis, but Larijani offered very little visible, tangible support during those visits.[14]

Larijani criticized international pressure on Iran from Western countries and accused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of “partisanship” against Iran during the 12 Day War. Larijani accused IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi of giving a “blank check” to the United States and Israel during the 12 Day War.[15] Larijani claimed that Grossi “completely gave up and surrendered” and called the agency's silence after Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities “truly disgraceful.”[16] Larijani questioned the value of continued cooperation with the IAEA but stopped short of calling for withdrawal from the NPT, saying instead that the treaty has had “no value” for Iran. Iranian officials repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the NPT if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggers the snapback sanction mechanism at the end of August.[17] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[18] The snapback mechanism expires on October 18, 2025, but the E3 would need to initiate the snapback process at the end of August in order to meet the October 18 deadline.[19] Iran and the E3 previously discussed extending the snapback deadline during a July 25 Istanbul meeting.[20] An extension would require a new UNSC resolution with at least nine votes in favor of the resolution and no vetoes from permanent UNSC members. Larijani rejected European proposals to extend the UN Security Council snapback deadline, however. He said that the JCPOA fixed a ten-year limit to the snapback sanctions that cannot be altered. He added that any extensions are a form of “cheating.”[21] Larijani added that Iran will never abandon diplomacy but stressed that negotiations must be “real” and not a pretext for pressure. He also warned that Iran will not accept “submission.”[22] Iranian officials previously demanded preconditions, including assurances of no further strikes, to continue nuclear talks with the West.[23]

Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed Larijani’s position during a phone call with the foreign ministers of the E3 and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on August 22.[24] Araghchi insisted that only the UN Security Council can decide on an extension.[25] Araghchi stated that Iran will consult Russia and China on the implications of snapback sanctions.[26] Both sides agreed that Iran and the E3 will continue discussions at the deputy foreign minister level on August 26.[27] CTP-ISW assessed that Iran is very unlikely to accept any arrangement that restricts enrichment, even if the E3 extends the deadline.[28]

Larijani called on the regime to prioritize solving people's basic problems to preserve resilience in future conflicts. Larijani said citizens must have a minimum standard of living even in wartime so they can endure and remain steadfast, stressing that the state must meet essential needs in both war and peacetime. Larijani warned that energy shortages in electricity and gas, and factory closures, are unacceptable because they erode national wealth and weaken resilience. The regime may fear that if citizens grow dissatisfied, they will be less likely to support the regime in the next conflict. A recent energy shortage has forced Iran to shut schools, universities, and government offices across most provinces as authorities cut electricity and water amid extreme heat and war damage to infrastructure.[29] Larijani’s remarks follow a large protest in Shiraz, Fars Province, on August 21, where residents gathered outside the provincial governor's office to denounce repeated water and power outages and chanted “Not Gaza, not Lebanon - my life is for Iran.”[30] These chants are a criticism of the regime's decision to funnel resources to its regional partners while neglecting basic services for Iranians.[31] Energy shortages have triggered repeated unrest in recent months, including the May strike by iron market traders in Tehran and a large July demonstration in Gilan Province over water and electricity outages.[32]

Hezbollah officials have continued to warn the Lebanese government about potential confrontation if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah, which is likely an effort to leverage the government's concerns about internal conflict in Lebanon to delay or reverse the government's plan to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah Executive Council Head Ali Damoush said on August 22 that Hezbollah has acted calmly so far but that this approach will “not last long.”[45] Lebanese media recently reported on August 20 that Hezbollah vowed not to resort to protests and to keep things calm at least until the end of August.[46] Damoush added that Hezbollah may resort to escalation if the Lebanese government insists on implementing its decision to disarm Hezbollah.[47] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem also made an earlier threat on August 15 to ”confront” the government and incite protests against it.[48] Prime Minister Nawaf Salam criticized Qassem’s speech on August 15 for containing “a veiled threat of civil war,“ which he stated no one in Lebanon wants.[49]

Other elements of the Lebanese government have not replied with as much confidence as Salam, which suggests that Hezbollah's efforts to prevent its disarmament by threatening the government may be experiencing some success. A pro-Hezbollah media outlet reported on August 22 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had rhetorically responded to this pressure, however, by telling senior Lebanese officials and Hezbollah that it will not take any action that could undermine internal stability.[50] LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal previously told Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri that the LAF will not “clash with a key component of the country.“[51] The LAF’s recent statements underscore the Lebanese government's ongoing concerns about internal conflict arising between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah.[52] Lebanese officials have raised concerns that the government's decision to disarm Hezbollah could spark communal tensions in Lebanon.[53] A delay or reversal of the Lebanese government's decision to disarm Hezbollah would provide Hezbollah with the time needed to reconstitute its forces and re-establish itself domestically.[54] Hezbollah is very unlikely to disarm on its own accord because it believes that its arms are central to its ability to challenge and ultimately destroy the Israeli state.[55]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-22-2025

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.