The continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which helped Assad's economy, demonstrates the economic interests that continue to animate internal conflict in Syria. These networks have the potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups throughout 2025.[27] Captagon and other smuggling networks long helped sustain the Assad regime during the war. The regime profited 3 to 5 billion USD annually from the Captagon trade.[28] Many of these networks continue to survive in Syria because, while Assad's collapse destroyed the regime, it did not destroy many of the disparate networks that helped the regime survive for as long as it did. The transitional government began a counter-narcotics campaign in January 2024 that has naturally spurred a violent reaction from many of these networks.[29] This campaign has reduced Captagon production by approximately 80%, according to the Financial Times on August 21.[30]
The Captagon trade and other Assad-era criminal enterprises are almost certainly driving some—but not all—of the violence in Syria. Some of the violence along the Syria-Lebanon border and in western Syria in early 2025 appeared to be part of efforts by smuggling networks to defend their ratlines.[31] Not all of these criminal enterprises were allied with Assad, of course. Local reporting suggests that three key groups—the Bedouin Sunni tribes, Druze militias, and networks loyal to the Assad regime—have competed for control of the smuggling networks in southwestern Syria.[32] The divisions between the three groups are not purely identity-based, but competition over economic interests can rapidly take on an intercommunal bent as Bedouin Sunni fighters kill Druze or vice versa. Many Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks persist, however, in areas that have little to no transitional government control, including within Suwayda Province, the Kurdish-controlled northeast, the Syrian coast, and the Syria-Lebanon border.[33] The Financial Times reported that Assad-linked criminal networks and Bedouin tribes sustain the drug trade in Suwayda Province by exploiting local poverty and the continued employment of Assad-era border guards on the Jordanian border.[34]
Iran continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its damaged nuclear facilities and highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile after the 12-day war. Iran's 409 kg HEU stockpile remains in one or several unspecified locations, and Iran's access to the stockpile is unclear. Unspecified diplomats told Bloomberg on August 21 that IAEA officials will confer with US officials next week after IAEA inspectors failed to secure Iran's approval to resume monitoring.[38] The unspecified diplomats added that Iranian officials told IAEA Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo during meetings in Tehran on August 12 that inspections could potentially occur at undamaged sites like Bushehr while Iran‘s main nuclear-fuel complex would remain closed.[39] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that the SNSC will decide whether inspections can resume.[40] Araghchi emphasized that Iran cannot cut cooperation entirely because activities like fuel replacement at Bushehr require IAEA oversight.[41] Araghchi stressed that any new cooperation must account for safety and security concerns after the recent strikes, however.[42] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran retains about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium.[43] This amount is consistent with the IAEA’s June estimate that Iran retains 408.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, though Iran may not have physical access to all of the uranium, which could be buried at Fordow or Esfahan.[44]
The United States imposed additional sanctions targeting Iranian oil trade networks and their international facilitators on August 21.[50] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Greek national Antonios Margaritis and five Marshall Islands-registered companies in Margaritis’ shipping network for facilitating the trade of Iranian oil products for “many years.”[51] The US Treasury Department previously sanctioned three shipping companies in Margaritis’ network in December 2024.[52] The United States separately sanctioned six entities and eight affiliated vessels outside of Margaritis’ network for transporting Iranian oil to China and conducting ship-to-ship transfers with vessels already sanctioned by the United States.[53]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-21-2025
Larijani reaffirmed Iran's commitment to support the Axis of Resistance and framed resistance groups as natural responses to “foreign aggression.”[9] Larijani stressed that Iran considers the Axis of Resistance a genuine and strategic asset.[10] Iran previously used the Axis as a key deterrent against the United States and Israel, but the Axis of Resistance has been badly degraded over the past two years of fighting with Israel. Larijani compared Iran's support for regional allies to US support for Israel and warned that abandoning them would be “political insanity.”[11] Larijani rejected the idea that Hezbollah or other groups burden Iran and insisted that they both assist Iran and rely on Iranian support.[12] Larijani characterized the relationship with Hezbollah and other partner groups as “brothers” rather than “subordinates.” This is consistent with CTP-ISW’s longstanding assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional alliance that Iran leads. Some groups in the Axis are proxies, while Iran exerts more limited influence over other groups.[13] Larijani’s inaugural visits to Lebanon and Iraq attempted to demonstrate that Iran has not abandoned its partners in the Axis, but Larijani offered very little visible, tangible support during those visits.[14]
Larijani criticized international pressure on Iran from Western countries and accused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of “partisanship” against Iran during the 12 Day War. Larijani accused IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi of giving a “blank check” to the United States and Israel during the 12 Day War.[15] Larijani claimed that Grossi “completely gave up and surrendered” and called the agency's silence after Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities “truly disgraceful.”[16] Larijani questioned the value of continued cooperation with the IAEA but stopped short of calling for withdrawal from the NPT, saying instead that the treaty has had “no value” for Iran. Iranian officials repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the NPT if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggers the snapback sanction mechanism at the end of August.[17] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[18] The snapback mechanism expires on October 18, 2025, but the E3 would need to initiate the snapback process at the end of August in order to meet the October 18 deadline.[19] Iran and the E3 previously discussed extending the snapback deadline during a July 25 Istanbul meeting.[20] An extension would require a new UNSC resolution with at least nine votes in favor of the resolution and no vetoes from permanent UNSC members. Larijani rejected European proposals to extend the UN Security Council snapback deadline, however. He said that the JCPOA fixed a ten-year limit to the snapback sanctions that cannot be altered. He added that any extensions are a form of “cheating.”[21] Larijani added that Iran will never abandon diplomacy but stressed that negotiations must be “real” and not a pretext for pressure. He also warned that Iran will not accept “submission.”[22] Iranian officials previously demanded preconditions, including assurances of no further strikes, to continue nuclear talks with the West.[23]
Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed Larijani’s position during a phone call with the foreign ministers of the E3 and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on August 22.[24] Araghchi insisted that only the UN Security Council can decide on an extension.[25] Araghchi stated that Iran will consult Russia and China on the implications of snapback sanctions.[26] Both sides agreed that Iran and the E3 will continue discussions at the deputy foreign minister level on August 26.[27] CTP-ISW assessed that Iran is very unlikely to accept any arrangement that restricts enrichment, even if the E3 extends the deadline.[28]
Larijani called on the regime to prioritize solving people's basic problems to preserve resilience in future conflicts. Larijani said citizens must have a minimum standard of living even in wartime so they can endure and remain steadfast, stressing that the state must meet essential needs in both war and peacetime. Larijani warned that energy shortages in electricity and gas, and factory closures, are unacceptable because they erode national wealth and weaken resilience. The regime may fear that if citizens grow dissatisfied, they will be less likely to support the regime in the next conflict. A recent energy shortage has forced Iran to shut schools, universities, and government offices across most provinces as authorities cut electricity and water amid extreme heat and war damage to infrastructure.[29] Larijani’s remarks follow a large protest in Shiraz, Fars Province, on August 21, where residents gathered outside the provincial governor's office to denounce repeated water and power outages and chanted “Not Gaza, not Lebanon - my life is for Iran.”[30] These chants are a criticism of the regime's decision to funnel resources to its regional partners while neglecting basic services for Iranians.[31] Energy shortages have triggered repeated unrest in recent months, including the May strike by iron market traders in Tehran and a large July demonstration in Gilan Province over water and electricity outages.[32]
Hezbollah officials have continued to warn the Lebanese government about potential confrontation if the Lebanese government attempts to disarm Hezbollah, which is likely an effort to leverage the government's concerns about internal conflict in Lebanon to delay or reverse the government's plan to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah Executive Council Head Ali Damoush said on August 22 that Hezbollah has acted calmly so far but that this approach will “not last long.”[45] Lebanese media recently reported on August 20 that Hezbollah vowed not to resort to protests and to keep things calm at least until the end of August.[46] Damoush added that Hezbollah may resort to escalation if the Lebanese government insists on implementing its decision to disarm Hezbollah.[47] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem also made an earlier threat on August 15 to ”confront” the government and incite protests against it.[48] Prime Minister Nawaf Salam criticized Qassem’s speech on August 15 for containing “a veiled threat of civil war,“ which he stated no one in Lebanon wants.[49]
Other elements of the Lebanese government have not replied with as much confidence as Salam, which suggests that Hezbollah's efforts to prevent its disarmament by threatening the government may be experiencing some success. A pro-Hezbollah media outlet reported on August 22 that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had rhetorically responded to this pressure, however, by telling senior Lebanese officials and Hezbollah that it will not take any action that could undermine internal stability.[50] LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal previously told Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri that the LAF will not “clash with a key component of the country.“[51] The LAF’s recent statements underscore the Lebanese government's ongoing concerns about internal conflict arising between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah.[52] Lebanese officials have raised concerns that the government's decision to disarm Hezbollah could spark communal tensions in Lebanon.[53] A delay or reversal of the Lebanese government's decision to disarm Hezbollah would provide Hezbollah with the time needed to reconstitute its forces and re-establish itself domestically.[54] Hezbollah is very unlikely to disarm on its own accord because it believes that its arms are central to its ability to challenge and ultimately destroy the Israeli state.[55]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-22-2025