Iran Update, August 14, 2025
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reportedly approved the resumption of nuclear negotiations with the United States because the Iranian regime views negotiations as necessary for the regime’s survival, according to three Iranian insiders speaking to Reuters on August 14.[1] One source stated that Iranian leaders support negotiations because they have “seen the cost of military confrontation“ and seek to prevent further escalation with Israel and the United States. Moderate and pragmatic officials in the regime have recently signaled openness to resuming negotiations.[2] Moderate Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, for example, stated on August 10 that resuming negotiations with the United States ”does not mean we intend to surrender.”[3] The Iranian regime continues to reject the US demand for Iran to halt uranium enrichment, which was the main sticking point in negotiations before the Israel-Iran War.[4] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi recently told Japanese media on August 11 that Iran could agree to limit its uranium enrichment levels but will not agree to halt enrichment altogether.[5]
A senior Iranian official told The Telegraph on August 13 that Iran would not be able to “endure” the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] Iran’s concern about potential snapback sanctions could push Iran to resume negotiations with the United States, although it is very unlikely that Iran would accept a new nuclear agreement with the United States that requires it to halt uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. The Telegraph report comes after the E3 warned on August 13 that it would trigger the snapback mechanism unless Iran shows a commitment to negotiations before August 31.[7] The E3 has offered to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, which is currently set to expire in October 2025, in order to provide Iran more time to negotiate with the United States. The senior Iranian official also told The Telegraph that the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) instructed the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry in July to revive negotiations with the United States.[8] The official added that the SNSC asked the Iranian presidential office at an unspecified time to pursue nuclear negotiations with the United States before the window for talks closes.[9] It is unclear if the SNSC contacted the presidential office before or after President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed pragmatic hardliner Ali Larijani as SNSC secretary on August 5.[10] Larijani has historically supported negotiations and could accelerate the SNSC’s push for negotiations with the United States. Larijani supported the 2015 nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and defended it against hardliners in parliament while he was parliament speaker in the mid-2010s.[11]
Iran’s failure to meaningfully support its proxies and partners in recent conflicts may have weakened the Axis of Resistance’s trust in Iran as a reliable partner. Hezbollah notably did not participate in the Israel-Iran War, stating that it would “not unilaterally launch an attack on Israel in support of Tehran.”[34] An unspecified Israeli military official told Saudi media on August 13 that Hezbollah ignored calls from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force to respond militarily to Israel.[35] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. Hezbollah’s reported decision not to enter the Israel-Iran War may reflect that Hezbollah calculated that the cost of supporting Iran in the war outweighed the benefit of doing so. Hezbollah’s response to the Israel-Iran War differed from its response to the October 7 War, when Hezbollah joined Hamas in attacking Israel on October 8, 2023.[36] Iran’s other partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance, excluding the Houthis, similarly did not intervene to support Iran during the war.[37]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-14-2025
Iran Update, August 15, 2025
Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati emphasized Iranian support for the Houthis during a meeting with the Houthi representative to Iran on August 14. Velayati denied that the Axis of Resistance has weakened and underlined the Houthis’ pivotal role in the Axis of Resistance’s war against Israel in a meeting with Houthi Representative to Iran Ibrahim al Dailami.[10] The Houthis are the only Axis of Resistance member that still regularly conducts attacks targeting Israel. The Houthis also continue to threaten international shipping.[11] Velayati separately criticized US pressure to disarm Lebanese Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.[12] This meeting comes after Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani reaffirmed Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance during his visits to Iraq and Lebanon between August 11 and 14.[13]
The Iranian, Chinese, and Russian permanent representatives to the UN met in Vienna on August 14, likely to continue coordinating diplomatic efforts in response to the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) warning that it may trigger the snapback mechanism by the end of August.[32] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Mikhail Ulyanov stated that the three officials coordinated “their positions and actions on the Iranian nuclear dossier.”[33] This meeting comes after the E3 warned on August 13 that it would trigger the snapback mechanism unless Iran shows a commitment to negotiations before August 31.[34] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[35] The snapback mechanism expires on October 18, 2025.[36] CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is unlikely that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia could prevent the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[37]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-15-2025