Iran Update, August 13, 2025
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran still holds about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium, though Iran may still be unable to access this stockpile.[28] The size of the stockpile is consistent with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s estimate in June 2025 that Iran retained about 408.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium. The IAEA reported in May that Iran possessed a total enriched uranium stockpile of 9,247.6 kilograms, though this estimate includes uranium enriched to lower levels.[29] Netanyahu stated that Israel ”knew in advance” the strikes would not destroy the uranium, which is logical because uranium is an element and therefore cannot be destroyed, only scattered.[30] Netanyahu also argued that the stockpile alone is “insufficient to produce a nuclear weapon” without other key elements of Iran’s nuclear program.[31] Netanyahu is likely referring to assets damaged by Israel during the 12-day war, including research and development facilities, explosives manufacturing sites, and knowledge from key nuclear scientists.[32] Netanyahu said the strikes eliminated two “cancerous” threats to Israel’s existence: Iran’s nuclear weapons program and its planned production of 20,000 ballistic missiles.[33]
It is unclear whether Iran can access its 60 percent enriched uranium because some of the stockpile may be buried under rubble at Fordow or Esfahan.[34] US and Israeli airstrikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities may have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material.[35] Iran cannot begin further enrichment or weaponization until it regains physical access to it. Western media reports after the initial strikes suggested that Iran may have transferred part of its enriched uranium from nuclear facilities to other sites before the Israeli and US strikes.[36] Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover the material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[37] Netanyahu stated that Israel continues to monitor Iran’s nuclear weapons program in coordination with the United States and will act with or without US approval.[38] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged on August 10 that Israeli strikes had damaged nuclear capabilities and warned that rebuilding them could prompt further attacks.[39]
Iran failed to respond to an offer from the E3–United Kingdom, France, and Germany– to extend the August 31 deadline for Iran to return to nuclear negotiations with the E3 before the E3 trigger snapback mechanism.[40] This ”limited extension“ would grant Iran more time to commit to a new nuclear agreement that would address the E3’s concerns before the snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.[41] The E3 has expressed that Iran needs to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to remove their 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile to avert the imposition of snapback sanctions.[42] Iran is unlikely to reverse its June 26 decision to officially ban cooperation with the IAEA. This continued ban leaves Iran-E3 negotiations at a standstill.[43] Iran notably did not allow an IAEA delegation to inspect Iranian nuclear facilities during its visit to Tehran on August 12.[44] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately told reporters on August 11 that Iran has not set a date for further talks with the E3.[45] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism–which re-imposes UN sanctions–requires up to 30 days to complete, which requires the E3 to start the process by September 2025 before the snapback mechanism expires in October.[46]
Iranian officials met with Armenian officials on August 13 to discuss their opposition to the proposed Zangezur Corridor.[47] Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati met with Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan on August 13 to discuss the recent US-brokered peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[48] The deal grants the United States exclusive development rights to the Zangezur Corridor, which is a Turkish- and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. Iran opposes the proposed corridor because it would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[49] Velayati warned against foreign intervention in the region in the meeting and stated that any threats to Iran’s national security on its borders would prompt an Iranian response.[50] Kostanyan also met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi.[51] Araghchi separately met with the Russian Foreign Ministry‘s Special Representative for the Caucasus, Igor Khayev, to emphasize the importance of Russo-Iranian cooperation over the corridor.[52] Iranian officials have expressed concern in recent years that Russia’s preoccupation with its invasion of Ukraine has enabled Turkey, Israel, and the United States to increase their influence in the southern Caucasus.[53]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-13-2025
Iran Update, August 14, 2025
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reportedly approved the resumption of nuclear negotiations with the United States because the Iranian regime views negotiations as necessary for the regime’s survival, according to three Iranian insiders speaking to Reuters on August 14.[1] One source stated that Iranian leaders support negotiations because they have “seen the cost of military confrontation“ and seek to prevent further escalation with Israel and the United States. Moderate and pragmatic officials in the regime have recently signaled openness to resuming negotiations.[2] Moderate Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, for example, stated on August 10 that resuming negotiations with the United States ”does not mean we intend to surrender.”[3] The Iranian regime continues to reject the US demand for Iran to halt uranium enrichment, which was the main sticking point in negotiations before the Israel-Iran War.[4] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi recently told Japanese media on August 11 that Iran could agree to limit its uranium enrichment levels but will not agree to halt enrichment altogether.[5]
A senior Iranian official told The Telegraph on August 13 that Iran would not be able to “endure” the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] Iran’s concern about potential snapback sanctions could push Iran to resume negotiations with the United States, although it is very unlikely that Iran would accept a new nuclear agreement with the United States that requires it to halt uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. The Telegraph report comes after the E3 warned on August 13 that it would trigger the snapback mechanism unless Iran shows a commitment to negotiations before August 31.[7] The E3 has offered to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, which is currently set to expire in October 2025, in order to provide Iran more time to negotiate with the United States. The senior Iranian official also told The Telegraph that the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) instructed the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry in July to revive negotiations with the United States.[8] The official added that the SNSC asked the Iranian presidential office at an unspecified time to pursue nuclear negotiations with the United States before the window for talks closes.[9] It is unclear if the SNSC contacted the presidential office before or after President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed pragmatic hardliner Ali Larijani as SNSC secretary on August 5.[10] Larijani has historically supported negotiations and could accelerate the SNSC’s push for negotiations with the United States. Larijani supported the 2015 nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and defended it against hardliners in parliament while he was parliament speaker in the mid-2010s.[11]
Iran’s failure to meaningfully support its proxies and partners in recent conflicts may have weakened the Axis of Resistance’s trust in Iran as a reliable partner. Hezbollah notably did not participate in the Israel-Iran War, stating that it would “not unilaterally launch an attack on Israel in support of Tehran.”[34] An unspecified Israeli military official told Saudi media on August 13 that Hezbollah ignored calls from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force to respond militarily to Israel.[35] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. Hezbollah’s reported decision not to enter the Israel-Iran War may reflect that Hezbollah calculated that the cost of supporting Iran in the war outweighed the benefit of doing so. Hezbollah’s response to the Israel-Iran War differed from its response to the October 7 War, when Hezbollah joined Hamas in attacking Israel on October 8, 2023.[36] Iran’s other partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance, excluding the Houthis, similarly did not intervene to support Iran during the war.[37]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-14-2025