Iran Update, August 20, 2025
The New York Times reported on August 20 that conclusive damage assessments of US strikes on Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant require more time, which is consistent with previous reporting.[14] The United States dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow in June 2025, targeting ventilation shafts at the site that led to a centrifuge cascade hall located at least 250 feet underground.[15] An unspecified US Department of Defense official said that the United States aimed to destroy the centrifuges with shock waves and other effects of the blasts because the bombs would probably not make direct contact with the centrifuge chamber itself.[16] International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi previously stated that the Fordow centrifuges are “no longer working” and emphasized that even small vibrations can destroy them.[17] The US bombs would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations. Several technical experts told the New York Times that a precise damage assessment requires advanced computer simulations, exact details of the bombs, and extensive knowledge of the geology of Fordow.[18] Iranian officials have emphasized that Iran cannot access the nuclear sites struck by US and Israeli airstrikes yet, which also prevents conclusive battle damage assessments.[19]
Several factors may have impacted the effectiveness of the US strikes on Fordow. A US defense official familiar with US decision-making said that the main targeted ventilation shafts had bends near the shaft entrances, which means the path to the underground facility through the shaft was not straight.[20] Several geologists also stated that the geology of Fordow almost certainly had an impact on the extent of damage. One expert said that Iran likely built Fordow using volcanic tuff, which may have helped cushion the site from the bombs due to its porosity.
Iran secured loans against tankers transporting Iranian and Iranian allies’ oil exports to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to circumvent Western sanctions between 2019 and 2023, according to the Financial Times on August 20.[21] A US-sanctioned Iranian broker set up one billion dollars’ worth of mortgages in Switzerland against at least 34 oil tankers, according to Panama Maritime Authority documents.[22] The United States has sanctioned 20 of these 34 tankers.[23] The Iranian broker used these mortgages as collateral, which allowed the broker to take ownership of the tanker if the buyer did not complete the payment once the oil arrived at its destination.[24] Buyers traditionally require official bank documents to prove their credit to traders.[25] These mortgages allow buyers to circumvent bank involvement in the process. Many banks have increasingly refused to work on transactions related to Iran’s illicit oil trade since the United States began to impose strict sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports in 2019.[26] Iran’s illicit oil export network has moved at least 130 million oil barrels worth $9.6 billion using mortgages to circumvent detection between 2019 and 2023. This network transferred sanctioned Iranian oil as well as sanctioned Russian and Venezuelan oil. The network exported the vast majority of this oil to the PRC, according to a research group focused on illicit networks.[27]
Iran’s use of mortgages on tankers to evade US sanctions is only one of the many strategies that Iran employs to obfuscate illicit Iranian and Russian oil trade to the PRC. Many companies affiliated with Iranian oil tankers use fake addresses and conduct ship-to-ship transfers.[28] The multi-national network controlled by Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani’s son, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, frequently changes vessel operators and managers to obscure ownership, falsifies cargo information, and turns off automatic identification systems (AIS) during loading. The United States sanctioned Shamkhani on July 30.[29]
Iran is deepening its economic and military cooperation with Belarus. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 20 in Minsk, Belarus, to discuss opportunities to expand bilateral relations.[30] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Belarus share common interests and want to combat US and European efforts to ”push unilateralism” in the region.[31] Pezeshkian emphasized that both countries can cooperate to mitigate the effects of international sanctions.[32] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding (MoU) focused on increasing bilateral trade, military-tech cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[33] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran plans to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with Belarus.[34] Iran and Belarus have increased defense and security cooperation over the past few years.[35] Iran showcased military equipment at a Belarusian military exhibit in May 2025.[36] Iran has reportedly worked to establish a drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[37]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-20-2025
The continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which helped Assad's economy, demonstrates the economic interests that continue to animate internal conflict in Syria. These networks have the potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups throughout 2025.[27] Captagon and other smuggling networks long helped sustain the Assad regime during the war. The regime profited 3 to 5 billion USD annually from the Captagon trade.[28] Many of these networks continue to survive in Syria because, while Assad's collapse destroyed the regime, it did not destroy many of the disparate networks that helped the regime survive for as long as it did. The transitional government began a counter-narcotics campaign in January 2024 that has naturally spurred a violent reaction from many of these networks.[29] This campaign has reduced Captagon production by approximately 80%, according to the Financial Times on August 21.[30]
The Captagon trade and other Assad-era criminal enterprises are almost certainly driving some—but not all—of the violence in Syria. Some of the violence along the Syria-Lebanon border and in western Syria in early 2025 appeared to be part of efforts by smuggling networks to defend their ratlines.[31] Not all of these criminal enterprises were allied with Assad, of course. Local reporting suggests that three key groups—the Bedouin Sunni tribes, Druze militias, and networks loyal to the Assad regime—have competed for control of the smuggling networks in southwestern Syria.[32] The divisions between the three groups are not purely identity-based, but competition over economic interests can rapidly take on an intercommunal bent as Bedouin Sunni fighters kill Druze or vice versa. Many Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks persist, however, in areas that have little to no transitional government control, including within Suwayda Province, the Kurdish-controlled northeast, the Syrian coast, and the Syria-Lebanon border.[33] The Financial Times reported that Assad-linked criminal networks and Bedouin tribes sustain the drug trade in Suwayda Province by exploiting local poverty and the continued employment of Assad-era border guards on the Jordanian border.[34]
Iran continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its damaged nuclear facilities and highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile after the 12-day war. Iran's 409 kg HEU stockpile remains in one or several unspecified locations, and Iran's access to the stockpile is unclear. Unspecified diplomats told Bloomberg on August 21 that IAEA officials will confer with US officials next week after IAEA inspectors failed to secure Iran's approval to resume monitoring.[38] The unspecified diplomats added that Iranian officials told IAEA Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo during meetings in Tehran on August 12 that inspections could potentially occur at undamaged sites like Bushehr while Iran‘s main nuclear-fuel complex would remain closed.[39] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that the SNSC will decide whether inspections can resume.[40] Araghchi emphasized that Iran cannot cut cooperation entirely because activities like fuel replacement at Bushehr require IAEA oversight.[41] Araghchi stressed that any new cooperation must account for safety and security concerns after the recent strikes, however.[42] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran retains about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium.[43] This amount is consistent with the IAEA’s June estimate that Iran retains 408.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, though Iran may not have physical access to all of the uranium, which could be buried at Fordow or Esfahan.[44]
The United States imposed additional sanctions targeting Iranian oil trade networks and their international facilitators on August 21.[50] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Greek national Antonios Margaritis and five Marshall Islands-registered companies in Margaritis’ shipping network for facilitating the trade of Iranian oil products for “many years.”[51] The US Treasury Department previously sanctioned three shipping companies in Margaritis’ network in December 2024.[52] The United States separately sanctioned six entities and eight affiliated vessels outside of Margaritis’ network for transporting Iranian oil to China and conducting ship-to-ship transfers with vessels already sanctioned by the United States.[53]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-21-2025