Iranian officials have strongly criticized the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors seek to use the corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a declaration of intent on August 8 on a US-brokered peace deal that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27 mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region.[17] The agreed upon corridor is fundamentally the actualization of the Zangezur Corridor—a Turkish and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan. Iran has historically opposed the Zangezur Corridor and viewed it as an effort to economically sideline Iran and limit Iranian regional influence.[18] A senior adviser to the Supreme Leader emphasized Iran's strong opposition to the proposed transit corridor on August 9 and referred to it as a “political conspiracy” against Iran.[19] An Iranian analyst close to the regime similarly characterized the proposed transit corridor as an Iranian “containment belt” meant to isolate Iran and threaten Iran's security.[20] The corridor runs along Iran's only shared border with Armenia and would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia, which could exclude Iran from a new international transit route and hinder Iranian efforts to become a major transit hub. The corridor would enable Azerbaijan to circumvent Iran to access the Nakhchivan Autonomy Republic, which will likely deprive Iran of political leverage and any associated revenue along the transit corridor. Azerbaijan currently accesses its exclave and Turkey through Iran.
This proposed agreement would be an additional victory for Iranian adversaries at a time when Iran's relative ability to project power in its near abroad has diminished.[21] Iranian officials have expressed concern about Turkey's expanding influence as a rival in the Middle East and around Iran's borders, especially after Turkey replaced Iran as the primary backer of the new Syrian government following Assad's fall in December 2024. Turkey currently uses routes through Iran to trade with Central Asia, but a new route directly from Turkey to Azerbaijan through Armenia means that Turkey may be able to use the corridor to reach the Caspian Sea while circumventing Iran completely. Iran has similarly found itself at odds with Azerbaijan, which has taken steps to strengthen ties with Israel in recent months. Iran has historically accused Israel of using Azerbaijani territory to conduct operations in Iran, including during the Israel-Iran War.[22] Israeli government officials have recently called for including Azerbaijan in the Abraham Accords.[23]
Iran has taken some steps to deter the corridor from being established. Iranian President Masoud Pezeskhian warned Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during a phone call on August 11 to be wary of foreign attempts to use the agreement as a way to achieve “hegemonic goals,” likely referring to the United States.[24] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately held a phone call with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan on August 12 to discuss the US-brokered peace deal and the proposed transit corridor.[25] Pezeshkian is scheduled to visit Armenia on August 18.[26] The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Commission held a meeting with defense, military, and foreign policy officials on August 11 to discuss Iranian diplomatic and military efforts to block the passage of the transit corridor.[27] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media stated on August 12 that Iran will be forced to adopt a “multi-layered and measured response” to the corridor.[28] Iran has previously threatened to take military action to prevent the development of the Zangezur Corridor.[29] Iran has also previously conducted numerous provocative military exercises along the border designed to discourage the development of the corridor.[30]
Turkey pressured Syria to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris and encouraged Syria to strengthen ties with Russia to counterbalance US and partner influence in Syria, which undermines US policy objectives in Syria.[31] Unspecified Turkish sources told Syria in Transition that Turkey pressured the Syrian transitional government to withdraw from scheduled Paris negotiations with the United States, France, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), due to fears that the transitional government would be forced to concede to Kurdish autonomy demands because of its poor handling of security in Suwayda.[32] This demonstrates that Turkey's primary concern about the Syrian government's behavior in Suwayda is whether the Syrian government's behavior will strengthen the SDF, not the behavior itself or the crimes committed by government forces. However, the SDF’s decision to invite prominent Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri to a political conference in Hasakah City on August 8 likely made it easier for Turkey to successfully pressure Syria to abandon the talks in Paris and demand that the SDF negotiate in Damascus.[33] Hijri’s political movement declared an autonomous Suwaydawi government, and fighters close to Hijri have broken multiple ceasefires by attacking government forces and other Druze factions.[34] Turkey is simultaneously attempting to help Russia retain influence in Syria by encouraging the Syrian transitional government to strengthen diplomatic ties with Russia. Turkish sources said that the Turkish government had advised President Ahmed Shara to strengthen relations with Russia so that Russia, Turkey, and Syria can counterbalance US, European, Israeli, and Saudi interests in the country.[35]
These Turkish efforts undermine key US policy objectives, including maintaining Syrian stability and preventing Russia from re-establishing itself in Syria. The US effort to integrate the SDF into Syria would prevent future rounds of conflict between the Kurdish-dominated SDF and Turkish-backed factions, which could seriously imperil Syrian stability and provide openings for ISIS to resurge. Increased Russian military influence in Syria would be similarly deleterious to Syrian stability. Russian state media reported on August 11 that the Syrian transitional government sought renewed Russian military police patrols in southern Syria to curb Israeli activity, citing a Russian source at an August 1 meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani and the Syrian diaspora in Moscow.[36] The Russian military conducted a patrol in SDF-controlled Qamishli, Hasakah Province, on August 4 shortly after Syrian diplomats returned from Moscow to negotiate Russian basing in Syria.[37] Russian military operations in Syria, particularly in southern Syria, did not contribute to lasting stability during the civil war and, in some cases, supported Iranian operations in Syria.[38]
The SDF and the transitional government have nonetheless continued to make progress in negotiations over the integration agreement despite Turkish interference. Al Jazeera reported on August 11 that an SDF delegation arrived in Damascus to renew integration talks with the transitional government, but no updates have followed.[39] The SDF and the Syrian transitional government likely desire to avoid any major fighting between the government and SDF, given that major military operations would risk significant destabilization of Syria that could imperil the political positions of both sides.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo visited Iranian officials on August 12 to discuss Iran's cooperation with the IAEA.[51] This visit marks the first IAEA visit to Iran since the Israel-Iran War and since all IAEA inspectors left Iran due to safety concerns.[52] Iran approved on June 26 a bill that suspended cooperation with the IAEA. Iranian officials repeatedly stated ahead of Aparo’s visit that the IAEA delegation would not inspect Iranian nuclear facilities during the visit.[53] The IAEA’s visit comes ahead of the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) end-of-August deadline for Iran to make progress towards a nuclear deal before the E3 triggers the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism.[54] The E3 reportedly aims to engage Iran and secure verifiable steps, such as restoring Iranian cooperation with the IAEA and the removal of Iran's 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile, before the snapback deadline takes effect.[55]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025
Iran Update, August 13, 2025
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran still holds about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium, though Iran may still be unable to access this stockpile.[28] The size of the stockpile is consistent with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s estimate in June 2025 that Iran retained about 408.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium. The IAEA reported in May that Iran possessed a total enriched uranium stockpile of 9,247.6 kilograms, though this estimate includes uranium enriched to lower levels.[29] Netanyahu stated that Israel ”knew in advance” the strikes would not destroy the uranium, which is logical because uranium is an element and therefore cannot be destroyed, only scattered.[30] Netanyahu also argued that the stockpile alone is “insufficient to produce a nuclear weapon” without other key elements of Iran’s nuclear program.[31] Netanyahu is likely referring to assets damaged by Israel during the 12-day war, including research and development facilities, explosives manufacturing sites, and knowledge from key nuclear scientists.[32] Netanyahu said the strikes eliminated two “cancerous” threats to Israel’s existence: Iran’s nuclear weapons program and its planned production of 20,000 ballistic missiles.[33]
It is unclear whether Iran can access its 60 percent enriched uranium because some of the stockpile may be buried under rubble at Fordow or Esfahan.[34] US and Israeli airstrikes on Fordow and other enrichment facilities may have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material.[35] Iran cannot begin further enrichment or weaponization until it regains physical access to it. Western media reports after the initial strikes suggested that Iran may have transferred part of its enriched uranium from nuclear facilities to other sites before the Israeli and US strikes.[36] Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover the material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[37] Netanyahu stated that Israel continues to monitor Iran’s nuclear weapons program in coordination with the United States and will act with or without US approval.[38] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged on August 10 that Israeli strikes had damaged nuclear capabilities and warned that rebuilding them could prompt further attacks.[39]
Iran failed to respond to an offer from the E3–United Kingdom, France, and Germany– to extend the August 31 deadline for Iran to return to nuclear negotiations with the E3 before the E3 trigger snapback mechanism.[40] This ”limited extension“ would grant Iran more time to commit to a new nuclear agreement that would address the E3’s concerns before the snapback mechanism expires in October 2025.[41] The E3 has expressed that Iran needs to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to remove their 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile to avert the imposition of snapback sanctions.[42] Iran is unlikely to reverse its June 26 decision to officially ban cooperation with the IAEA. This continued ban leaves Iran-E3 negotiations at a standstill.[43] Iran notably did not allow an IAEA delegation to inspect Iranian nuclear facilities during its visit to Tehran on August 12.[44] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately told reporters on August 11 that Iran has not set a date for further talks with the E3.[45] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism–which re-imposes UN sanctions–requires up to 30 days to complete, which requires the E3 to start the process by September 2025 before the snapback mechanism expires in October.[46]
Iranian officials met with Armenian officials on August 13 to discuss their opposition to the proposed Zangezur Corridor.[47] Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati met with Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan on August 13 to discuss the recent US-brokered peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[48] The deal grants the United States exclusive development rights to the Zangezur Corridor, which is a Turkish- and Azerbaijani-proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. Iran opposes the proposed corridor because it would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[49] Velayati warned against foreign intervention in the region in the meeting and stated that any threats to Iran’s national security on its borders would prompt an Iranian response.[50] Kostanyan also met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi.[51] Araghchi separately met with the Russian Foreign Ministry‘s Special Representative for the Caucasus, Igor Khayev, to emphasize the importance of Russo-Iranian cooperation over the corridor.[52] Iranian officials have expressed concern in recent years that Russia’s preoccupation with its invasion of Ukraine has enabled Turkey, Israel, and the United States to increase their influence in the southern Caucasus.[53]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-13-2025