https://www.iranintl.com/en/202505027687
More pictures can be found in the article.
Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".
Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.
Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.
Iran has reportedly established ties with extremist groups to destabilize the Syrian transition, meaning that Saraya Ansar al Sunnah’s destabilizing activities could support Iranian objectives.[10] There is no evidence that Iran supports Saraya Ansar al Sunnah at this time. But Iran has previously engaged other extremist Salafi-jihadi groups, such as al Qaeda, in support of its objectives.[11]
Iran continues to expand its nuclear infrastructure near Natanz. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on April 23 that Iran is constructing a security perimeter around two underground nuclear tunnel complexes located within Mount Kolang Gaz La, south of the Natanz enrichment complex, citing commercially available satellite imagery.[12] The International Atomic Energy Agency has not visited either site. Imagery from March 2025 shows partially erected wall panels and road grading and leveling efforts to install a security perimeter. The security perimeter appears to encircle the base of the mountain and join with one side of the perimeter around Natanz. Iran announced in September 2020 that it was building a tunnel complex near Natanz to make advanced centrifuges after a former centrifuge production facility was destroyed in July 2020.[13] More advanced centrifuges enable Iran to enrich uranium at a faster rate.[14] These centrifuges may allow Iran to rapidly rebuild its nuclear program in the event that, after a nuclear deal, Iran decreases its amount of highly enriched uranium and then the nuclear deal collapses. The second, much smaller, tunnel complex located within Mount Kolang Gaz La was revealed in 2007 but was inactive until recently, according to ISIS.[15] ISIS reported that the complex may store enriched uranium stockpiles or centrifuge-related equipment. The report also stated that construction of the security perimeter has been ongoing at least since 2023, but has accelerated in recent months. The United States and Israel have repeatedly threatened to strike Iranian nuclear facilities.[16]
Iran continues to coordinate with China and Russia on nuclear issues ahead of talks with the United States, highlighting growing alignment between major US adversaries. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Chinese Vice Premier Din Xuexiang and Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, China, on April 23 to discuss nuclear negotiations and deliver a written message from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.[17] Araghchi emphasized Iran's intent to brief China, alongside Russia, on all nuclear-related developments, citing China's roles as a UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board member.[18] Unspecified diplomatic sources told anti-regime media that Araghchi also carried a written message from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Chinese President Xi Jinping, affirming that the any agreement with the United States ”solely intended to reduce tensions” and Iran will not alter its ”Look to the East” policy or the terms of its 25-year Sino-Iranian cooperation agreement.[19] The Look to the East policy aims to strengthen ties with non-Western countries, like China, to expand its global partnerships and boost its economic and political interests.[20] China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil. China's Iranian oil imports help Iran circumvent US sanctions.[21] Iran reportedly seeks to include provisions in a potential nuclear deal to guarantee oil exports—especially to China—and prevent future US “maximum pressure” sanctions that could disrupt its energy revenues.[22]
Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will very likely fail to secure weapon supplies from Russia as part of an emerging deal for military basing rights in Syria because Russia cannot spare military equipment for Syria. Shara alluded to procuring weapons from Russia or additional countries as part of developing new military basing agreements in an interview with the New York Times published on April 23.[23] Russia is currently facing a serious materiel shortage over the medium term, and its commitment to fighting in Ukraine will take priority over shipping arms and other military equipment to Syria. Russia will likely already face materiel shortages in 2026 and 2027 if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate, and many of these assets will be difficult to replace.[24] Russia and the Syrian transitional government have engaged in months-long talks over the future of Russian bases in Syria.[25] These talks have thus far not resulted in an agreement about Russian basing rights in Syria. Syrian and Western media have reported that Russian forces remain present at three military bases in Syria: Hmeimim airbase in Latakia, the naval base at Tartus, and Russia's former helicopter base in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[26]
Shara will likely pursue weapon supply agreements with alternative partners as it becomes clear Russia will not exchange arms for basing rights. The Syrian transitional government's armor, mechanized vehicles, and aircraft consisted predominantly of Russian-made models seized from the Assad regime.[27] Some of these systems were probably inoperable by the fall of the regime, though Israeli airstrikes have also destroyed a significant portion of Syrian stocks since December 2024.[28] It is unclear at this time how Shara would finance these arms purchases from other states, given the dire state of Syria's economy. Shara confirmed to the New York Times that he had not yet received offers from “other nations to replace Syrian arms.”[29]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-23-2025
Iran reportedly asked the United States during nuclear talks in Rome on April 19 to negotiate an interim deal, which is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran may calculate an interim deal would delay or prevent snapback sanctions or a strike.[1] Axios reported that Iran said it may not be possible to reach a final deal by US President Donald Trump's proposed 60-day deadline. Trump reportedly set a 60-day deadline to reach a new nuclear agreement and previously warned that ‘there will be a bombing’ if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[2] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly told Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi that he wants to focus on reaching a comprehensive deal within 60 days, but the two parties could reach an interim deal if both sides agree they need more time.[3] Axios previously reported on April 10 that Iran may propose that Iran and the United States first negotiate an “interim deal” prior to beginning negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement.[4] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that an interim deal with the United States could delay or prevent the imposition of snapback sanctions by European JCPOA signatories or a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[5] Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and Germany) reached an interim deal in 2013 that froze elements of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for temporary sanctions relief prior to further negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[6] Iran agreed to yield its 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile, refrain from operating any inactive centrifuges, halt the production and installation of new centrifuges, cease construction of the Arak heavy water reactor, and accept new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight measures.[7] It is unclear what concessions Iran would be willing to make for an interim deal in the current nuclear negotiations.
IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi continued to hold meetings on ongoing US-Iran nuclear talks. Grossi met with Witkoff on April 23 to discuss nuclear negotiations.[8] Grossi separately met with the Iranian, Russian, and Chinese permanent representatives to the UN on April 24 to discuss the Iranian nuclear program.[9] Iran, Russia, and China continue to present a unified position on US-Iran nuclear negotiations.
Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for possible US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited two air defense sites responsible for protecting Iranian nuclear facilities on April 24.[10] Sabahi Fard and Hajizadeh visited the Khondab Air Defense Group site near the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor in Markazi Province to inspect military units and defense capabilities at the site. The two commanders also inspected the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) air defense site in Esfahan Province.[11]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-24-2025
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei implied that Iran's recent cooperation with the United States to reach a nuclear deal is “temporary” during a speech to government officials on April 24.[6] Khamenei may have emphasized the temporary nature of US-Iranian cooperation to assuage the concerns of hardline officials who oppose negotiations with the United States. Khamenei’s main priority is preserving the Iranian regime. Khamenei may calculate that engaging in nuclear negotiations with the United States, at least temporarily, will help preserve regime stability by improving Iranian economic conditions and reducing the chance of a direct conflict with the United States.
CENTCOM Spokesperson Dave Eastburn stated on April 24 that CENTCOM has struck over 800 Houthi targets, including command-and-control sites, air defense systems, and advanced weapons production sites, since the start of the US air campaign on March 15. Eastburn said that the strikes have killed “hundreds of Houthi fighters and numerous Houthi leaders.”[7] Eastburn told CNN that “credible open sources” have reported “over 650 Houthi casualties” in CENTCOM airstrikes since March 15.[8] Eastburn stated that Houthi ballistic missile launches have decreased by 87 percent and Houthi drone attacks have decreased by 65 percent since the start of the CENTCOM airstrike campaign.[9]
Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad announced on April 25 that Iran and Russia signed an agreement for Russia to export 55 billion cubic meters of gas to Iran annually via Azerbaijan.[11] Russian President Vladimir Putin previously stated in January 2025 that Russian gas deliveries to Iran would start at 2 billion cubic meters per year and could increase to 55 billion cubic meters annually.[12] Paknejad added that Russia will finance the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Iran.[13] Iran and Russia will continue nuclear energy cooperation, including by completing the second and third phases of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Iran and Russia have also reportedly signed contracts worth four billion US dollars for the development of seven Iranian oil fields.[14] These agreements reflect Iranian efforts to deepen strategic cooperation with Russia under the framework of the January 2025 Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Agreement.[15] The import of Russian gas to Iran may help Iran address chronic energy shortages, which have previously sparked protests in northeastern Iran.[16]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-25-2025
Tthe US pursuit of a nuclear agreement with Tehran – likely permitting Iran some level of uranium enrichment – has emboldened other regional powers to accelerate their own nuclear programs. In Egypt, construction continues on a civilian nuclear power plant in El Alamein with Russian financing and technology, part of a broader strategic partnership with Moscow. Though officially non-military, the timing is notable. Egypt's growing comfort with alternative alliances is no longer subtle.
This was further underscored in April 2025 when Egypt and China conducted an unprecedented joint military training exercise on Egyptian soil. This marks the first time Beijing has engaged in direct military drills with a major Arab military power in the Middle East. While the stated objective was counterterrorism, the symbolism is unmistakable: Cairo is expanding its security relationships eastward, signaling to Washington that alternatives exist if American commitments waver.
In the end, the United States must decide whether it still seeks to be the anchor of stability in the Middle East or merely one player among many. If the former, it must restore trust with its traditional allies – not only through arms deals and summits but by aligning its strategic choices with their existential concerns.
Nuclear diplomacy with Iran may be necessary. But if pursued without carefully managing Arab perceptions and Israel's insecurities, it risks unintentionally accelerating a new Cold War in the Middle East, one where the US is neither feared nor fully trusted and where its allies are quietly building alternatives.
https://live.jpost.com/opinion/article-851442
Tehran: General Director of Crisis Management in Hormozgan Province in Iran Mehrdad Hassan Zadeh announced that initial investigations revealed the explosion at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas was caused by stored containers carrying hazardous and chemical materials.
Shahid Rajaee Port is recognized as Iran’s largest and most advanced container port, featuring 12 container berths and 30 cranes, and playing a key role in the country’s maritime economy.
Like in Beirut?
Iranian media reports that the fire at Shahid Rajaee Port reignited after multiple containers exploded.
https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/1916428866865844680
1.5 min video
A first look at the initial blast site at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas shows widespread devastation. Most fires have now been extinguished.
https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/1916432550660014483
13 s video
Iran Update, April 28, 2025
The presence of Chinese chemicals, regardless of whether the chemicals caused the explosion, further illustrates how China-based entities have likely helped Iran replenish its missile stockpile and restore key aspects of its defense capabilities. Western officials estimated that recent Chinese shipments of sodium perchlorate, if converted to ammonium perchlorate, can fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles.[19] That amount of ammonium perchlorate can also produce larger quantities of smaller munitions that require less solid fuel, including shorter-range ballistic missiles. China also remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, which undermines the US maximum pressure campaign aimed at driving Iranian oil exports to zero. Chinese assistance to Iran has likely exacerbated US military concerns with Iran and the Axis of Resistance.
The explosion at the port may further exacerbate Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions. Iran will reportedly lose approximately $25 million per day since it halted operations at the port on April 26.[20] Shahid Rajaee is Iran’s largest port and accounts for 85 percent of Iran’s shipping container traffic, including a significant portion of its oil exports.[21] The loss of the port—even temporarily—will likely worsen Iran’s economic conditions and could cause internal unrest. Iranian media reported 70 deaths and over 1,200 confirmed injuries on April 28, which may also further stoke anti-regime sentiment and unrest.[22]
The Houthis used a complex strike package combining ballistic and cruise missiles and drones to force the USS Harry S. Truman to take evasive action. It is unclear if the attack overwhelmed air defenses or how close the projectiles came to hitting the Truman. The Houthis claimed the attack on April 28, without specifying the number of systems they used in the attack.[23] The US Navy confirmed on April 28 that a US Navy F/A-18 and tow tractor aboard the USS Harry S. Truman fell overboard into the Red Sea.[24] An unspecified US official told CNN that the Truman made a “hard turn” to evade Houthi fire, which contributed to the F/A-18 and tow tractor falling overboard.[25] The US Navy confirmed that the Truman remains fully operational, and all crew are accounted for. The Houthis will continue to optimize their strike packages and implement lessons learned as part of an effort to target and ultimately impact US Navy vessels in the Red Sea.
The Iranian rial depreciated from 800,000 rials to one US dollar on April 25 to 814,000 rials to one US dollar on April 28.[57]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025
Iran Update, April 29, 2025
The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.[1] This network of entities and individuals has facilitated the procurement of sodium perchlorate and dioctyl sebacate from China to Iran. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[2] Chinese assistance to Iran could help Iran replenish its missile stockpile and circumvent US sanctions. It is unclear if the Chinese government is directly supporting the effort, but the government’s inaction against the entities involved enables continued Chinese support for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.
Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after an audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. The accused sheikh denied that he was responsible for the recording, and the Syrian Interior Ministry vowed to investigate and bring the real perpetrators to “justice.”[14] Syrians protested the video in at least nine Syrian provinces on April 28 and 29, and videos of armed men threatening to retaliate reportedly circulated on social media.[15] A group of gunmen entered Jaramana, a majority Druze town southeast of Damascus, on April 28 and opened fire on a residential area.[16] Security sources told Western media that the gunmen were reportedly from neighboring Sunni-majority towns, including Meliha.[17] The General Security Services (GSS) and the Defense Ministry (MoD) deployed to Jaramana and cordoned off the town.[18] A Ministry of Interior source said that armed militants launched an “organized attack” against security services when they arrived at the scene.[19] It is unclear if the fighters were from any organized group. Engagements between the militants, Druze fighters, and government forces resulted in the deaths of at least 12 people.[20] Unspecified gunmen also attacked a joint checkpoint between local Druze factions and the GSS at the entrance to Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya, a town southwest of Damascus that has a large Druze population.[21]
A fire broke out at the “Ava Nar Parsian” warehouse in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province, on April 29.[30] The explosion killed two individuals and injured two others.[31] Iranian authorities announced that the cause of the explosion remains under investigation.[32] The facility manufactures fireworks and gunpowder and operates under the supervision of the Iranian National Security Council (NSC), a sub-council of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[33] A similar explosion in May 2021 occurred at “Sepahan Nargostar,” a complex in the same district of Esfahan Province that was linked to the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA).[34] The incident follows a major explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port on April 26 and Iran’s thwarting of a “widespread” cyberattack on April 28.[35]
Iran continues to pursue defense and economic cooperation with Zimbabwe. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Zimbabwean Defense Minister Oppah Muchinguri-Kashiri in Tehran on April 28.[45] Nasir Zadeh stated that Iran can support Zimbabwe’s counterterrorism efforts. Iranian defense officials previously met with Zimbabwean officials in April 2024 to discuss defense cooperation, likely to pursue uranium or other minerals in Zimbabwe.[46] Nasir Zadeh and Muchinguri-Kashiri also criticized US sanctions on Iran and Zimbabwe and emphasized the importance of cooperation to circumvent sanctions.[47] Iran and Zimbabwe previously signed 12 bilateral economic agreements in July 2023.[48] These meetings are part of an ongoing Iranian effort to improve ties with African states as part of Iran’s broader neighborhood policy centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states to undermine the impact of international sanctions.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-29-2025
“The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, “
Maybe it blew up
Yes, the transport from China was monitored from the beginning.
Iran Update, April 30, 2025
Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will hold talks in Rome on May 2.[28] Iran likely aims to coordinate with the E3 on snapback sanctions ahead of the fourth round of US-Iran talks in Rome on May 3. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said on April 28 that the E3 will not hesitate to reinstate snapback sanctions against Iran if Iran’s nuclear program threatens European security.[29] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[30] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. The E3 reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.[31] This deadline is approximately consistent with US President Donald Trump’s 60-day nuclear deal deadline.[32] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that reaching a deal with the United States would delay or prevent snapback sanctions.
The United States sanctioned seven entities and two vessels on April 30 for facilitating Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products trade.[34] The sanctioned entities include an Iran-based cargo inspection company that helps obfuscate sanctioned Iranian oil and reduces the risk that sanctions violators face. These sanctions are part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.
General Security Services discovered a tunnel on the Syrian border that connects a former Iranian IRGC base in Syria to Iraq.[51] GSS forces reported that the tunnel extended approximately 500 meters into Syria and connected to the IRGC Imam Ali base in al Hari, Deir ez Zor Province.[52] The IRGC established the Imam Ali base in 2019 to facilitate weapons shipments to members of the Axis of Resistance and serve as a training ground for various Iranian-backed militias.[53] The Syrian army 66th Division deployed to the Syria-Iraq border near al Hari on April 29 to remain at border posts and checkpoints.[54] Iranian backed militias and smugglers controlled illegal border crossings on the Syria-Iraq border under the former Assad regime to support Axis military operations and generate funding.[55] The deployment of the 66th division to the Iraqi border marks another step that the Syrian transitional government has taken to combat smuggling of weapons and narcotics along Syria’s borders.
The 66th Division is led by Brigadier General Ahmed al Mohammad (Abu Mohammad al Shura), a former HTS Shura Council member.[56] The area near al Hari, which includes Albu Kamal Border Crossing, is valuable terrain due to the revenues the Syrian government could draw from the border crossing. The 66th Division, even if it does not control the crossing, could give Shara a trustworthy eye near the crossing to ensure it is properly functioning.
The Iranian rial depreciated from 813,000 rials to one US dollar on April 29 to 815,000 rials to one USD on April 30.[33]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025
Iran Update, May 1, 2025
The fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on May 3 was postponed.[32] The Iranian Foreign Ministry reported on May 1 that US-Iran talks were rescheduled at the suggestion of the Omani foreign minister.[33] Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi said the talks were rescheduled for “logistical reasons.”[34] Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized in recent months that Iran will not negotiate under military threat or economic pressure.[35] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth threatened military action against Iran in response to Iran’s support for the Houthis in an April 30 tweet.[36] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, who has led the US delegation in the first three rounds of US-Iran talks, retweeted Hegseth’s comments. The United States separately sanctioned several entities and vessels on April 29 and 30 that were involved in Iran’s ballistic missile program and Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products trade, respectively.[37] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on May 1 that US sanctions are not helping the US and Iran resolve nuclear disputes, and the next round of talks will be scheduled “depending on the US approach.”[38] An Iranian expert close to the regime stated on May 1 that talks were postponed due to what unspecified Iranian sources called “contradictory US positions.“[39] The sources also said that the United States was trying to change the general framework of the talks. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 26 that one of the key disputes between Iran and the United States is whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program, which Iran has repeatedly indicated it is unwilling to make concessions on.[40] Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) were also scheduled to hold talks in Rome on May 2 ahead of US-Iran talks.[41] It is unclear if Iran-E3 talks will also be postponed.
Iran continued to expand economic cooperation with China to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reported on May 1 that Iran exported 1.6 million barrels per day of crude oil in April 2025.[42] United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) estimated that Iranian oil exports to China made up 97 percent of Iran’s total oil exports in April.[43] Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS security summit in Brazil on May 1.[44] Both officials emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral economic ties to “challenge unilateralism in the international arena.” Iran’s participation in BRICS is part of its broader efforts to establish a parallel international order that challenges Western “dominance.”[45] UANI also reported that Iran increasingly used tankers previously involved in Russian oil trades, further illustrating cooperation between major US adversaries.[46]
Iran continues to strengthen economic ties with African countries, likely to bolster trade and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. Iran hosted the third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit from April 27 to May 1 in Tehran.[51] This summit focused on opportunities to bolster trade in the areas of oil, gas, petrochemicals, mining, and energy. Representatives from 38 African countries and senior Iranian political officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, attended the summit.
The Iranian rial depreciated from 815,000 rials to one US dollar on April 30 to 820,000 rials to one US dollar on May 1.[47]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202505027687
More pictures can be found in the article.
Iran Update, May 2, 2025
Iran is reportedly weighing a compromise to dilute part of its enriched uranium stockpile domestically while exporting the remainder—potentially to Russia—as part of ongoing nuclear talks with the United States.[32] Unspecified sources told Reuters on May 2 that Iranian officials proposed to cap uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent, expand International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to nuclear sites, and limit stockpile size and centrifuge types. Iran also reportedly offered to reduce its enrichment infrastructure to around 5,000 centrifuges—down from 15,000 centrifuges that are currently operational—dilute and export its 60 percent enriched uranium under IAEA scrutiny. The proposed cap for uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent is the same as the cap under the 2015 nuclear deal. Iran also reportedly floated the possibility of selling enriched uranium to the United States. An unspecified regional source told Reuters on May 2 that Iran plans to retain a diluted portion of its stockpile domestically while exporting the rest, likely to Russia.[33] Russia has positioned itself to mediate and store Iranian enriched uranium since March 2025.[34] Russia’s role in mediating US-Iran talks is unlikely to secure US interests, given Russia’s alignment with Iran. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov, for example, downplayed concerns by claiming that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium poses “no weapons risk.”[35]
Iran also suggested that it would not build a nuclear-capable missile as a “gesture of goodwill” but rejected halting its broader missile program.[36] Iranian officials repeatedly reaffirmed that Iranian missile program remains off the table in the ongoing nuclear talks with the United States.[37] Iran’s stance reflects that the missile program is essential to its defense strategy, especially due to the weakness of Iran’s conventional armed forces. The missile program’s centrality to Iran’s defense strategy makes it unlikely that Iran would agree to include missile restrictions in the ongoing negotiations.[38] Iran‘s refusal to compromise on its missile program could jeopardize the talks or force negotiations toward a less expansive agreement than the deal US President Donald Trump reportedly seeks.
Iran has continued to resupply the Houthis and provide intelligence on ship movements to improve Houthi targeting in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, according to unspecified US officials speaking to Saudi news outlets on May 2.[39] US forces intercepted a likely Iranian weapons shipment to the Houthis a few days prior to May 2, according to a US official speaking to Saudi news outlets on May 2.[40] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s statement on X on April 30, which called out Iran for providing ”lethal support to the Houthis.”[41] Other sources told the same Saudi news outlet that Iranian vessels in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden provided intelligence on ship movements to the Houthis.[42] Iran has previously deployed commercial vessels off the coast of Yemen to provide targeting intelligence for the Houthis’ attacks on commercial shipping and US military vessels transiting the Red Sea.[43] Former US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz also told ABC News on March 16 that the United States is prepared to target Iranian ships providing targeting intelligence to the Houthis.[44]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-2-2025
Or KSA signal that they are prepared to increase production if deliveries from Iran suddenly drop...
Production in Iran was 3.3 million bpd MAR2025 [2] i.e 12% of OPEC 27.43 million bpd. [3]
[1] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-arabia-signals-it-can-live-with-lower-oil-prices-sources-say-2025-04-30/
[2] https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/crude-oil-production
[3] https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/OPEC-Cuts-Oil-Production-in-March-Ahead-of-Ramp-Up-Plans.html
“they are prepared to increase production if deliveries from Iran suddenly drop...”
It’s going to drop. Trump is making sure of that
The Iranian Strategy in the Nuclear Talks and the Options Facing Israel
The main reason Iran seeks to become a nuclear state is to provide a nuclear umbrella for its proxies and to deter Israel, as well as Sunni Arab states, from acting against its proxies while they attack. All this is in line with the vision of destroying Israel by 2040, as Iran publicly declares, and overthrowing pro-Western regimes in the Middle East.
Therefore, the option of not acting is more dangerous.
https://israel-alma.org/the-iranian-strategy-in-the-nuclear-talks-and-the-options-facing-israel/
Iran Update, May 2, 2025
Iran unveiled a new solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile with electronic protective measures (EPM), new navigation and homing systems, and a maneuverable reentry vehicle on May 4.[1] The new missile, Qassem Basir, is an upgraded version of Iran’s Haj Qassem missile.[2] The new missile has a reported range of approximately 1,200 km.[3] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh stated that the missile is equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), infrared homing, an inertial navigation system, and EPM.[4] These features appear designed to address failures in Iran’s April and October 2024 missile attacks on Israel. The vast majority of the missiles in both strikes were either intercepted or malfunctioned and failed to reach their targets.[5] Both attacks ultimately failed to inflict serious damage due to the inaccuracy of the missiles. The attacks demonstrated that the Iranian missile and drone arsenals failed at present to provide the deterrent effect that Iranian leaders had envisioned. Nasir Zadeh told Iranian media that the Qassem Basir missile was developed to address those challenges. The infrared homing system improves accuracy by detecting and locking onto targets based on heat signatures. The MaRV allows the warhead to shift trajectory during the reentry phase, helping it evade missile defenses that rely on fixed-path predictions. The EPM protects the missile’s guidance system from jamming and other forms of electronic interference.
Iranian officials continued to threaten US bases, likely to try to shape Western decision-making and discourage a potential strike on Iran. Nasir Zadeh warned on May 4 during the unveiling of the Qassem Basir that Iran holds large missile stockpiles and will target US and Israeli assets in the region if necessary.[6] Speaker of Parliament Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf similarly stated on April 29 that any attack on Iran will “expose all US bases” in the region.[7] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh previously stated that Iran does not need to increase the range of its missiles because its missiles can already reach all US bases in the region.[8] Qassem Basir missiles, along with Iran’s other short- and medium-range systems, can reach Tel Aviv and US bases in Iraq and Syria. The Qassem Basir, which was designed after Iran employed other missiles against the US THAAD and Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defense systems, could be an important piece of future strike packages.
Iranian officials continued to categorically reject full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program and zero uranium enrichment after statements from US officials about full dismantlement and zero enrichment. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on May 2 that Iran has the right to maintain a “complete nuclear fuel cycle”, including uranium enrichment, as a Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty signatory.[9] Armed Forces General Staff affiliated Defa Press similarly published an article on May 3 titled “Why is uranium enrichment Iran’s inalienable right.”[10] The article emphasized that Iran will not “surrender” its peaceful nuclear program and will continue to pursue nuclear energy and uranium enrichment. Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei echoed these statements and rejected any calls to dismantle Iran’s nuclear industry.[11] These statements come as senior US officials expressed support for full dismantlement and zero uranium enrichment. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on May 1 that Iran can retain a peaceful nuclear program if it “imports enriched uranium.”[12] US President Donald Trump stated on May 4 that “total dismantlement...is all [he] would accept.”[13]
The Houthis may have used multiple ballistic missiles in an attempt to overwhelm Israeli and US ballistic missile defenses on May 4. One Houthi ballistic missile struck near Israel’s sole international airport, forcing Israel to shut down flight operations.[14] Local sources said that the Houthis launched multiple systems towards Israel.[15] An analyst for a Saudi media outlet also claimed that the Houthis have multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.[16] Either tactic could improve the Houthis’ ability to penetrate ballistic missile defenses and would represent an effort by the Houthis to operationalize lessons learned from the success and failure of previous attacks. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claimed that the Arrow 3 interceptor missile experienced a technical failure that caused it to fail to shoot down the Houthi missile.[17] The missile crashed into a parking lot near Ben Gurion Airport. The impact injured eight people and shut down airport operations. The May 4 attack is part of the Houthis’ effort to blockade Israel and damage the Israeli economy. The Houthis have said that their maritime attack campaign targets shipping to damage Israel’s economy, and attacks on Ben Gurion Airport could similarly damage the economy.
The successful May 4 attack demonstrates the risks inherent in relying on ballistic missile defense and airstrikes to defend against and respond to Houthi attacks. The Houthis will almost certainly continue to attack Israel and maritime shipping unless the United States renders them unwilling or unable to do so.[18] Ballistic missile defense will not stop every missile, and a single Houthi missile could have outsized strategic effects if it is not intercepted. The Houthis are learning new lessons to improve their ability to bypass Israeli and Western air defenses that they can employ elsewhere in the region or share with their partners in Iran.
Israel responded to the May 4 attack with airstrikes on Houthi facilities in Hudaydah Port and a likely weapons production site in Bajil District, eastern Hudaydah Governorate, on May 5.[19] Houthi authorities also evacuated staff from Sanaa Airport immediately following their successful airstrike, anticipating Israeli retaliation even before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formally vowed a response on May 5.[20]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025
Iran Update, May 6, 2025
The United States reportedly deployed two B-52H bombers to Diego Garcia.[9] The deployment of two B-52Hs adds to the six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers already at Diego Garcia. The B-52H is not a stealth aircraft, though it has nearly double the payload of the B-2.[10] The United States previously increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island in March 2025.[11] Senior Iranian military officials threatened to target Diego Garcia in response to the initial US build-up in March 2025.[12] This suggests that Iran may perceive the US deployments as a threat. The military buildup comes amid US-Iran nuclear talks and Houthi attacks on Israel.
Iran is trying to expand security and economic ties to bolster its influence in Africa. Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 6.[31] Radan signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Ethiopian Federal Police to expand bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, cybercrime, drug and human trafficking, and arms smuggling. Radan separately visited Burkina Faso on May 6 to advance bilateral police cooperation and share security expertise.[32] Radan has led high-level security engagements since 2023 with Iraq, Vietnam, China, Malaysia, Tajikistan, and Russia, all of which resulted in agreements focused on intelligence sharing and training programs.[33] Iranian (LEC) commanders traditionally rarely traveled abroad, but Radan started increasing his foreign engagements as part of an effort that likely aligns with Iranian strategy to professionalize and modernize the Iranian law enforcement apparatus and to export Iranian military, defense, and enforcement technologies. This cooperation likely includes the exchange of expertise on oppressive policing tactics, crowd control, digital surveillance, and methods for suppressing dissent—capabilities that the Iranian regime has honed through decades of internal security operations. Cooperation with African countries would also allow Iran to build trust while simultaneously opening new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams. Iran previously pursued barter-style defense deals to gain critical resources, in which Iran received roughly 9 tons of Venezuelan gold in 2020 in exchange for technical support and refinery equipment.[34] These transactions reflect the Iranian strategy to leverage security exports to access hard currency and natural resources, alongside efforts to pair arms deals with economic outreach in Africa to secure uranium, expand influence, and mitigate sanctions pressure.[35]
Iran has also intensified its economic engagement with African countries through expanded trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives. The Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit, held in Iran from April 27 to May 1, highlighted Iran’s focus on four priority sectors, including mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment.[36] Iranian officials announced plans to increase annual trade with Africa to 10 billion US dollars, backed by projects such as building industrial parks, refineries, and developing shipping lines and air routes to improve logistics.[37] Iran also signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners during the summit and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms, including a 2 billion Euro credit line and a new Iran-Africa development fund.[38]
ran and Russia continue to coordinate on US-Iran nuclear talks. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 6 to discuss the progress of US-Iran nuclear negotiations and the implementation of the January 2025 Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Agreement.[39] Putin said Russia is ready to facilitate dialogue between Iran and the United States and provide “necessary technical assistance.”[40] Russia has positioned itself to mediate and store Iranian enriched uranium since March 2025.[41] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia’s role in mediating US-Iran talks is unlikely to secure US interests, given Russia’s alignment with Iran.[42] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, echoed Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s comments and stated on May 3 that Iran has the right to possess the “full nuclear fuel cycle,” including uranium enrichment capabilities.[43] Ulyanov also previously downplayed concerns by claiming that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium poses “no weapons risk.”[44]
The Iranian rial appreciated from 842,000 rials to one US dollar on May 5 to 825,500 rials to one US dollar on May 6.[46]
Syria
Damascus has appointed influential armed group commanders accused of human rights abuses to Syrian army posts, which likely seeks to ameliorate influential armed groups in the short term but risks alienating minority communities over the long term. Syrian media reported on May 5 that the Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) appointed Brigadier General Ahmad al Hais (Abu Hatem Shaqra) to lead the newly-formed 86th Division.[13] Ahrar al Sham, a once-powerful Islamist group during the civil war, expelled Shaqra for banditry and other crimes.[14] Shaqra then founded and commanded Ahrar al Sharqiya in 2016, a faction within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) comprised of fighters from eastern Syria who were close to Shaqra.[15] The United States sanctioned Ahrar al Sharqiya and Shaqra in 2021 for committing abuses against civilians, particularly Syrian Kurds, and integrating former ISIS members into its ranks.[16] Shaqra has limited experience commanding forces in combat, and it is unclear what practical qualifications he has as a division commander.[17] Shaqra does have a large number of fighters and a ”mafia-like network” that could benefit Shara.[18] This suggests that Shara is offering concessions to a powerful warlord rather than selecting a competent combat commander.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2025
The Syrian General Security Services (GSS) interdicted a weapons shipment in Izraa, Daraa Province, on April 21 that was en route from Damascus to Suwayda Province.[46] GSS forces seized 40 anti-tank missiles, around 60 Iranian-made 107mm rockets, and an unspecified number of heavy machine guns.[47] GSS forces arrested a driver who had transported the weapons.[48]
Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem stated on April 18 that Hezbollah will not disarm.[85] Qassem stated that Hezbollah will “confront” anyone who tries to disarm Hezbollah.[86] Qassem’s statement comes amid an Iranian-led information operation that aims to obfuscate Iranian support for its proxies. A senior Hezbollah official recently claimed as part of this information operation that Hezbollah would be willing to disarm.[87]
The IDF killed Hezbollah Unit 4400 Deputy Commander Hussein Ali Nasser in an airstrike in southern Lebanon on April 20.[88] Nasser worked with Iranian officials to facilitate Hezbollah reconstitution by smuggling weapons and funds into Lebanon, including through Beirut International Airport. Nasser facilitated the purchase of weapons from smugglers on the Syria-Lebanon border to Hezbollah.
Senior Iranian officials continue to be concerned about a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard assessed the operational readiness of the Siraf Air Defense Group and inspected the Shahid Bushehrian Air Defense Zone in Bushehr Province on April 20 and 21, respectively.[90] These visits are part of a series of inspections that Sabahi Fard has conducted to Iranian air defense sites in southern Iran in recent weeks.
The Iranian rial appreciated from 853,000 rials to one US dollar on April 18 to 828,000 rials to one US dollar on April 21.[89]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-21-2025 House Armed Services Committee hearing US European Commander Cavoli
Mike Rogers Asks Military Commander: Should The DoD Maintain Current Force Posture In Europe?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZJLw90exLg
Sherrill Asks Military Official: If The War In Ukraine Ended Today, Would Russia Still Be A Threat?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TVMGUCBWNpA
Mike Turner Emphasizes The Importance Of US Presence In Europe Through EUCOM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RvFMGXh9n70 Putin signed the law on ratification of the strategic partnership agreement with Iran
According to the document, if one of the parties is attacked, the other should not provide any assistance to the aggressor. Russia and Iran confirm their commitment to developing military-technical cooperation and conducting joint military exercises.
Putin also agreed with Iran on cooperation in order to create an independent payment infrastructure and on facilitating cooperation between the media of the two countries to “counter disinformation.” In total, the document consists of 47 articles regulating cooperation between the two countries in all key areas for the next 20 years.
Federal Law of 21.04.2025 No. 73-FZ "On Ratification of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran"
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202504210001
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