Iran Update, May 2, 2025
Iran unveiled a new solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile with electronic protective measures (EPM), new navigation and homing systems, and a maneuverable reentry vehicle on May 4.[1] The new missile, Qassem Basir, is an upgraded version of Iran’s Haj Qassem missile.[2] The new missile has a reported range of approximately 1,200 km.[3] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh stated that the missile is equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), infrared homing, an inertial navigation system, and EPM.[4] These features appear designed to address failures in Iran’s April and October 2024 missile attacks on Israel. The vast majority of the missiles in both strikes were either intercepted or malfunctioned and failed to reach their targets.[5] Both attacks ultimately failed to inflict serious damage due to the inaccuracy of the missiles. The attacks demonstrated that the Iranian missile and drone arsenals failed at present to provide the deterrent effect that Iranian leaders had envisioned. Nasir Zadeh told Iranian media that the Qassem Basir missile was developed to address those challenges. The infrared homing system improves accuracy by detecting and locking onto targets based on heat signatures. The MaRV allows the warhead to shift trajectory during the reentry phase, helping it evade missile defenses that rely on fixed-path predictions. The EPM protects the missile’s guidance system from jamming and other forms of electronic interference.
Iranian officials continued to threaten US bases, likely to try to shape Western decision-making and discourage a potential strike on Iran. Nasir Zadeh warned on May 4 during the unveiling of the Qassem Basir that Iran holds large missile stockpiles and will target US and Israeli assets in the region if necessary.[6] Speaker of Parliament Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf similarly stated on April 29 that any attack on Iran will “expose all US bases” in the region.[7] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh previously stated that Iran does not need to increase the range of its missiles because its missiles can already reach all US bases in the region.[8] Qassem Basir missiles, along with Iran’s other short- and medium-range systems, can reach Tel Aviv and US bases in Iraq and Syria. The Qassem Basir, which was designed after Iran employed other missiles against the US THAAD and Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defense systems, could be an important piece of future strike packages.
Iranian officials continued to categorically reject full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program and zero uranium enrichment after statements from US officials about full dismantlement and zero enrichment. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on May 2 that Iran has the right to maintain a “complete nuclear fuel cycle”, including uranium enrichment, as a Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty signatory.[9] Armed Forces General Staff affiliated Defa Press similarly published an article on May 3 titled “Why is uranium enrichment Iran’s inalienable right.”[10] The article emphasized that Iran will not “surrender” its peaceful nuclear program and will continue to pursue nuclear energy and uranium enrichment. Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei echoed these statements and rejected any calls to dismantle Iran’s nuclear industry.[11] These statements come as senior US officials expressed support for full dismantlement and zero uranium enrichment. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on May 1 that Iran can retain a peaceful nuclear program if it “imports enriched uranium.”[12] US President Donald Trump stated on May 4 that “total dismantlement...is all [he] would accept.”[13]
The Houthis may have used multiple ballistic missiles in an attempt to overwhelm Israeli and US ballistic missile defenses on May 4. One Houthi ballistic missile struck near Israel’s sole international airport, forcing Israel to shut down flight operations.[14] Local sources said that the Houthis launched multiple systems towards Israel.[15] An analyst for a Saudi media outlet also claimed that the Houthis have multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.[16] Either tactic could improve the Houthis’ ability to penetrate ballistic missile defenses and would represent an effort by the Houthis to operationalize lessons learned from the success and failure of previous attacks. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claimed that the Arrow 3 interceptor missile experienced a technical failure that caused it to fail to shoot down the Houthi missile.[17] The missile crashed into a parking lot near Ben Gurion Airport. The impact injured eight people and shut down airport operations. The May 4 attack is part of the Houthis’ effort to blockade Israel and damage the Israeli economy. The Houthis have said that their maritime attack campaign targets shipping to damage Israel’s economy, and attacks on Ben Gurion Airport could similarly damage the economy.
The successful May 4 attack demonstrates the risks inherent in relying on ballistic missile defense and airstrikes to defend against and respond to Houthi attacks. The Houthis will almost certainly continue to attack Israel and maritime shipping unless the United States renders them unwilling or unable to do so.[18] Ballistic missile defense will not stop every missile, and a single Houthi missile could have outsized strategic effects if it is not intercepted. The Houthis are learning new lessons to improve their ability to bypass Israeli and Western air defenses that they can employ elsewhere in the region or share with their partners in Iran.
Israel responded to the May 4 attack with airstrikes on Houthi facilities in Hudaydah Port and a likely weapons production site in Bajil District, eastern Hudaydah Governorate, on May 5.[19] Houthi authorities also evacuated staff from Sanaa Airport immediately following their successful airstrike, anticipating Israeli retaliation even before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formally vowed a response on May 5.[20]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-5-2025
Iran Update, May 6, 2025
The United States reportedly deployed two B-52H bombers to Diego Garcia.[9] The deployment of two B-52Hs adds to the six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers already at Diego Garcia. The B-52H is not a stealth aircraft, though it has nearly double the payload of the B-2.[10] The United States previously increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island in March 2025.[11] Senior Iranian military officials threatened to target Diego Garcia in response to the initial US build-up in March 2025.[12] This suggests that Iran may perceive the US deployments as a threat. The military buildup comes amid US-Iran nuclear talks and Houthi attacks on Israel.
Iran is trying to expand security and economic ties to bolster its influence in Africa. Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan visited Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 6.[31] Radan signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Ethiopian Federal Police to expand bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, cybercrime, drug and human trafficking, and arms smuggling. Radan separately visited Burkina Faso on May 6 to advance bilateral police cooperation and share security expertise.[32] Radan has led high-level security engagements since 2023 with Iraq, Vietnam, China, Malaysia, Tajikistan, and Russia, all of which resulted in agreements focused on intelligence sharing and training programs.[33] Iranian (LEC) commanders traditionally rarely traveled abroad, but Radan started increasing his foreign engagements as part of an effort that likely aligns with Iranian strategy to professionalize and modernize the Iranian law enforcement apparatus and to export Iranian military, defense, and enforcement technologies. This cooperation likely includes the exchange of expertise on oppressive policing tactics, crowd control, digital surveillance, and methods for suppressing dissent—capabilities that the Iranian regime has honed through decades of internal security operations. Cooperation with African countries would also allow Iran to build trust while simultaneously opening new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams. Iran previously pursued barter-style defense deals to gain critical resources, in which Iran received roughly 9 tons of Venezuelan gold in 2020 in exchange for technical support and refinery equipment.[34] These transactions reflect the Iranian strategy to leverage security exports to access hard currency and natural resources, alongside efforts to pair arms deals with economic outreach in Africa to secure uranium, expand influence, and mitigate sanctions pressure.[35]
Iran has also intensified its economic engagement with African countries through expanded trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives. The Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit, held in Iran from April 27 to May 1, highlighted Iran’s focus on four priority sectors, including mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment.[36] Iranian officials announced plans to increase annual trade with Africa to 10 billion US dollars, backed by projects such as building industrial parks, refineries, and developing shipping lines and air routes to improve logistics.[37] Iran also signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners during the summit and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms, including a 2 billion Euro credit line and a new Iran-Africa development fund.[38]
ran and Russia continue to coordinate on US-Iran nuclear talks. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 6 to discuss the progress of US-Iran nuclear negotiations and the implementation of the January 2025 Russo-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Agreement.[39] Putin said Russia is ready to facilitate dialogue between Iran and the United States and provide “necessary technical assistance.”[40] Russia has positioned itself to mediate and store Iranian enriched uranium since March 2025.[41] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia’s role in mediating US-Iran talks is unlikely to secure US interests, given Russia’s alignment with Iran.[42] Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, echoed Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s comments and stated on May 3 that Iran has the right to possess the “full nuclear fuel cycle,” including uranium enrichment capabilities.[43] Ulyanov also previously downplayed concerns by claiming that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium poses “no weapons risk.”[44]
The Iranian rial appreciated from 842,000 rials to one US dollar on May 5 to 825,500 rials to one US dollar on May 6.[46]
Syria
Damascus has appointed influential armed group commanders accused of human rights abuses to Syrian army posts, which likely seeks to ameliorate influential armed groups in the short term but risks alienating minority communities over the long term. Syrian media reported on May 5 that the Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) appointed Brigadier General Ahmad al Hais (Abu Hatem Shaqra) to lead the newly-formed 86th Division.[13] Ahrar al Sham, a once-powerful Islamist group during the civil war, expelled Shaqra for banditry and other crimes.[14] Shaqra then founded and commanded Ahrar al Sharqiya in 2016, a faction within the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) comprised of fighters from eastern Syria who were close to Shaqra.[15] The United States sanctioned Ahrar al Sharqiya and Shaqra in 2021 for committing abuses against civilians, particularly Syrian Kurds, and integrating former ISIS members into its ranks.[16] Shaqra has limited experience commanding forces in combat, and it is unclear what practical qualifications he has as a division commander.[17] Shaqra does have a large number of fighters and a ”mafia-like network” that could benefit Shara.[18] This suggests that Shara is offering concessions to a powerful warlord rather than selecting a competent combat commander.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2025