Iran Update, April 29, 2025
The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.[1] This network of entities and individuals has facilitated the procurement of sodium perchlorate and dioctyl sebacate from China to Iran. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[2] Chinese assistance to Iran could help Iran replenish its missile stockpile and circumvent US sanctions. It is unclear if the Chinese government is directly supporting the effort, but the government’s inaction against the entities involved enables continued Chinese support for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.
Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after an audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. The accused sheikh denied that he was responsible for the recording, and the Syrian Interior Ministry vowed to investigate and bring the real perpetrators to “justice.”[14] Syrians protested the video in at least nine Syrian provinces on April 28 and 29, and videos of armed men threatening to retaliate reportedly circulated on social media.[15] A group of gunmen entered Jaramana, a majority Druze town southeast of Damascus, on April 28 and opened fire on a residential area.[16] Security sources told Western media that the gunmen were reportedly from neighboring Sunni-majority towns, including Meliha.[17] The General Security Services (GSS) and the Defense Ministry (MoD) deployed to Jaramana and cordoned off the town.[18] A Ministry of Interior source said that armed militants launched an “organized attack” against security services when they arrived at the scene.[19] It is unclear if the fighters were from any organized group. Engagements between the militants, Druze fighters, and government forces resulted in the deaths of at least 12 people.[20] Unspecified gunmen also attacked a joint checkpoint between local Druze factions and the GSS at the entrance to Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya, a town southwest of Damascus that has a large Druze population.[21]
A fire broke out at the “Ava Nar Parsian” warehouse in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province, on April 29.[30] The explosion killed two individuals and injured two others.[31] Iranian authorities announced that the cause of the explosion remains under investigation.[32] The facility manufactures fireworks and gunpowder and operates under the supervision of the Iranian National Security Council (NSC), a sub-council of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[33] A similar explosion in May 2021 occurred at “Sepahan Nargostar,” a complex in the same district of Esfahan Province that was linked to the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA).[34] The incident follows a major explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port on April 26 and Iran’s thwarting of a “widespread” cyberattack on April 28.[35]
Iran continues to pursue defense and economic cooperation with Zimbabwe. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Zimbabwean Defense Minister Oppah Muchinguri-Kashiri in Tehran on April 28.[45] Nasir Zadeh stated that Iran can support Zimbabwe’s counterterrorism efforts. Iranian defense officials previously met with Zimbabwean officials in April 2024 to discuss defense cooperation, likely to pursue uranium or other minerals in Zimbabwe.[46] Nasir Zadeh and Muchinguri-Kashiri also criticized US sanctions on Iran and Zimbabwe and emphasized the importance of cooperation to circumvent sanctions.[47] Iran and Zimbabwe previously signed 12 bilateral economic agreements in July 2023.[48] These meetings are part of an ongoing Iranian effort to improve ties with African states as part of Iran’s broader neighborhood policy centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states to undermine the impact of international sanctions.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-29-2025
“The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, “
Maybe it blew up
Iran Update, April 30, 2025
Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) will hold talks in Rome on May 2.[28] Iran likely aims to coordinate with the E3 on snapback sanctions ahead of the fourth round of US-Iran talks in Rome on May 3. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said on April 28 that the E3 will not hesitate to reinstate snapback sanctions against Iran if Iran’s nuclear program threatens European security.[29] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[30] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. The E3 reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.[31] This deadline is approximately consistent with US President Donald Trump’s 60-day nuclear deal deadline.[32] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may calculate that reaching a deal with the United States would delay or prevent snapback sanctions.
The United States sanctioned seven entities and two vessels on April 30 for facilitating Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products trade.[34] The sanctioned entities include an Iran-based cargo inspection company that helps obfuscate sanctioned Iranian oil and reduces the risk that sanctions violators face. These sanctions are part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero.
General Security Services discovered a tunnel on the Syrian border that connects a former Iranian IRGC base in Syria to Iraq.[51] GSS forces reported that the tunnel extended approximately 500 meters into Syria and connected to the IRGC Imam Ali base in al Hari, Deir ez Zor Province.[52] The IRGC established the Imam Ali base in 2019 to facilitate weapons shipments to members of the Axis of Resistance and serve as a training ground for various Iranian-backed militias.[53] The Syrian army 66th Division deployed to the Syria-Iraq border near al Hari on April 29 to remain at border posts and checkpoints.[54] Iranian backed militias and smugglers controlled illegal border crossings on the Syria-Iraq border under the former Assad regime to support Axis military operations and generate funding.[55] The deployment of the 66th division to the Iraqi border marks another step that the Syrian transitional government has taken to combat smuggling of weapons and narcotics along Syria’s borders.
The 66th Division is led by Brigadier General Ahmed al Mohammad (Abu Mohammad al Shura), a former HTS Shura Council member.[56] The area near al Hari, which includes Albu Kamal Border Crossing, is valuable terrain due to the revenues the Syrian government could draw from the border crossing. The 66th Division, even if it does not control the crossing, could give Shara a trustworthy eye near the crossing to ensure it is properly functioning.
The Iranian rial depreciated from 813,000 rials to one US dollar on April 29 to 815,000 rials to one USD on April 30.[33]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025