Posted on 03/20/2011 6:47:46 AM PDT by ml/nj
Just wondering what people might have to say about this.
Both would say they tried to preserve their union. Both employed military might to do so and killed lots of their own citizens.
ML/NJ
Kadhaffi looks far better in hats and makeup and he never made a Geico commercial.
If Buchanan's intent was to forbid Anderson to make any move with any of his men, then you'll have to admit that the order of December 22 was very poorly written.
You're a big fan of "Days of Decision," and Klein goes into a great deal of detail about Anderson's rationale for moving his men out to Sumter. To his mind, and in the absence of the clear direction he repeatedly asked for, moving them to a safe place, where he could actually resist for a while, was precisely the correct thing to do, and the thing that most maintained the larger status quo of the United States holding the forts in Charleston Harbor.
This was exactly what Buchanan did not want him to do, and Floyd's order had made clear.
Except Floyd's order doesn't say that. It says that he shouldn't feel obliged to fight to the last man if faced with overwhelming force. Or was all that you say in "the penumbra" of the orders?
If Anderson was afraid of rumors of being attacked by a mob at Moultie before (despite assurances from Charleston leaders that they would disperse such a mob if one were to appear), what did he expect to result from sneaking past the SC picket ship at dusk, overpowering a SC ship's captain, hijacking his boat, and charging workmen at Sumter with fixed bayonets?He expected to be in a more secure place, where a mob couldn't get to him, while a political solution was worked out.
Here’s how South Carolinians reacted to Anderson's move to Sumter...
Like I said before, the hysterical reaction of South Carolinians to just about anything isn't exactly a news flash.
The word "invested" in Floyd's cable means enclosed or surrounded. Sumter quickly became surrounded by a determined, if not outright angry, superior force.
Anderson was no more "invested" in Sumter than he was in Moultrie. In either he was surrounded by a hostile force determined to take possession of the forts which he'd been ordered to hold.
Buchanan did not deny in those cabinet meetings that he had made those promises according to two of his Northern cabinet members.
On the other hand, Buchanan refused to give the South Carolina delegation anything in writing, and they were frustrated by the lack of hard assurances from him.
Sorry, I don’t watch Obama when he comes on TV. My blood pressure, which I have a problem with, gets out of hand.
The average Lybian rebel wants to be free from political oppression, just as the South did in 1860-61. In the South’s case the political oppression they wanted to be free of included sectional aggrandizement, protective tariffs benefiting the North at the expense of the South, protection by Northern governors of members of John Brown’s invasion party after the failed raid, nullification of the Constitution with impunity by some Northern states, and failure of the Federal government to fully reimburse Texas for its efforts fighting invasion by Mexicans and Indians inadequately handled by Federal troops.
The Lybian rebels want to be free of physical oppression. In some sense white Southerners did too, given things like the John Brown invasion that tried to create a slave insurrection and the burning of Texas towns by abolitionists in 1860. Many Southern slaves, of course, wanted to be free from physical intimidation themselves and just to be free in general. Who could blame them?
I worry that some of the Lybian rebel leadership may have Al Qaeda ties, meaning that the non-Muslim world may eventually be threatened or damaged by a terrorist harboring, future Lybian state worse than Qadaffi’s. Not that I like Qadaffi at all — I don’t. I once turned down a company transfer to Tripoli because of Qadaffi.
Part of the reaction of South Carolinians to Anderson’s Sumter move was that they thought the Federal government had ordered Anderson to move or given him leeway to violate Buchanan’s agreement with the South Carolinians. The South Carolinians had not sent their own troops to Fort Sumter because of the agreement with Buchanan not to change the military situation in the forts.
Another aspect of their reaction was that they believed they had the right to secede under the Constitution as had the ratifiers from New York, Rhode Island and Virginia when they ratified the Constitution. South Carolina believed they had legally seceded and did not want the troops of a foreign country occupying forts inside their boundaries. They did not want to be an occupied country. This was similar the the fledgling US wanting the British out of forts in the Western interior of the new country after the revolution.
Anderson’s words about how he held the city of Charleston in his power and could close the harbor and destroy lighthouses did not ease tensions. Who would want their city subject to such threats?
I really don't think much happened at Fort Sumter. It was provoked and an excuse for the North to invade the South. The anti-Qadaffi folks are killing people and breaking things.
ML/NJ
The book about Buell that I quoted from above indicated Anderson understood Buchanan's December 22 order as backing away from Anderson having the power to decide what to do. I'll admit though that Buchanan could have made the instructions even clearer.
Except Floyd's order doesn't say that. It says that he shouldn't feel obliged to fight to the last man if faced with overwhelming force.
Floyd's order also says:
It is neither expected nor desired that you should expose your own life or that of your men in a hopeless conflict in defense of these forts.
But that is just what Anderson's move brought about. He did expose his own life and those of his men in an essentially hopeless battle. How many men did Scott calculate would be required to rescue Anderson from Fort Sumter? Was it 20,000 or 25,000?
He expected to be in a more secure place, where a mob couldn't get to him, while a political solution was worked out.
Anderson's officers were reported as saying to the press that Fort Moultrie could now withstand the actions of a mob should one come, but not the actions of an army. As I've posted before, Anderson and Anderson's predecessor had made a lot of improvements to the defensibility of Moultrie.
Moving to Sumter was a fundamental error that hiked tensions, shut down peace negotiations between Buchanan and the South Carolinians, and led to the war. It is a shame that Anderson could not see what his move would do in the larger scope of things.
Anderson was no more "invested" in Sumter than he was in Moultrie. In either he was surrounded by a hostile force determined to take possession of the forts which he'd been ordered to hold.
Charleston leaders had promised to stop mobs from attacking the fort, a fort which Anderson's officers said could withstand mobs. Instead of buying time for a negotiated solution, Anderson's move hardened attitudes on both sides, interrupted peace negotiations, caused a rupture of the cabinet, and made a shooting war inevitable unless Lincoln had been a man of peace. Nice move there, Anderson.
On the other hand, Buchanan refused to give the South Carolina delegation anything in writing, and they were frustrated by the lack of hard assurances from him.
Buchanan recognized his pledge even though it wasn't in writing. As I've posted to you before, here was Stanton's account of a Buchanan cabinet meeting where moving Anderson back to Moultrie was discussed (later confirmed by Holt who was also a participant in the cabinet meetings) [my emphasis below]:
For a considerable period during the pendency of the discussion, which continued several days, Mr. Buchanan manifested a determination to order Major Anderson back, upon the ground that it was essential to the peace of the country, and also that the movement was a violation of some pledge or promise of his, which he was bound to fulfill. Floyd and Thompson both stated repeatedly, in Mr. Buchanan's presence, that such a pledge had been given by him, and during three days debate I did not hear him deny it, although members of the Cabinet asked for a specification of the time and place, and insisted that it was impossible that such a pledge could have been made.
It was indeed "essential to the peace of the country."
And just how does one read that in the plain language of the order? The only 'backing away" in the order is in giving Anderson the discretion to surrender in the face of overwhelming force rather than die to the last man.
But that is just what Anderson's move brought about. He did expose his own life and those of his men in an essentially hopeless battle.
It wasn't a battle until the south started shelling. And do you really think that, if Anderson had stayed in Moultrie, refusing to surrender, and that if resupply was attempted, the south wouldn't have shelled it? That the position wasn't equally as "essentially hopeless"?
As I've posted before, Anderson and Anderson's predecessor had made a lot of improvements to the defensibility of Moultrie.
. Moultrie was essentially open to the land side, with houses that he couldn't move to open fields of fire and nearby high ground that allowed fire into the fort. It simply wasn't made to be defended from the land. More important, Anderson's attempts to get some small arms from the Charleston armory was directly overruled by Floyd.
Charleston leaders had promised to stop mobs from attacking the fort, a fort which Anderson's officers said could withstand mobs.
Per Klein, those same civic leaders also said that the forts would be theirs "one way or another."
It was indeed "essential to the peace of the country."
How? What would have been different had Anderson not moved? Would the south have moderated their position? Would they have allowed Anderson and the forts to stand unmolested? The south's end game was always the same--control of the forts and the removal of the US forces there. Nothing different was ever indicated.
“Things would be so much easier if you would just compromise with me and do things my way” LOL
Apparently Anderson did (according to the Buell book) and Buchanan did (according to Klein and according to Tilley). Anderson said that he made the move on his own responsibility and that he didn't know of the agreement not to change the military situation in the port. Apparently he was the only person in Charleston who didn't know, but his troops knew enough to pretend they were laborers so that they could slip past the patrol boat. The patrol boat's tasks were to prevent hostile action by Charlestonians against the Federal troops and to prevent Fort Sumter from being reinforced by Federal troops.
It wasn't a battle until the south started shelling.
A situation that was brought about by Anderson's move to Sumter.
And do you really think that, if Anderson had stayed in Moultrie, refusing to surrender, and that if resupply was attempted, the south wouldn't have shelled it? That the position wasn't equally as "essentially hopeless"?
Both forts were essentially hopeless. South Carolina didn't want to be occupied by foreign troops. As Floyd's orders said:
If they [Anderson's troops] are invested or attacked by a force so superior that resistance would, in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be your duty to yield to necessity, and make the best terms in your power. This will be the conduct of an honorable, brave, and humane officer, and you will be fully justified in such action.
According to Anderson's orders, he should have surrendered. Buell's orders had told Anderson:
You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression ...
Anderson's statement that he held Charleston in his power and could block the harbor and put out the lighthouses was not tending to provoke aggression?
Per Klein, those same civic leaders also said that the forts would be theirs "one way or another."
They were correct.
Contrast this with General Twiggs' surrender of Federal facilities in Texas. Twiggs was surrounded by Texas militia that far outnumbered his troops in a city hundreds of miles from Federal help. Twiggs got no guidance from Washington despite multiple requests asking what to do. Twiggs was captured by a shotgun wielding militia group and taken into the city where he was able to negotiate that his troops could take their arms and some artillery out of state. Twiggs did not want to start the war and get his men killed in a useless heroic gesture.
Anderson put himself and his men at risk in a hopeless conflict in violation of his orders. Anderson was lauded for a foolish act against orders that ended up starting the war. Twiggs was reviled in the North despite the fact that he had been captured yet still managed to save his men and equipment for future use by the North without putting them in a hopeless situation.
How? What would have been different had Anderson not moved?
Perhaps peace could have been negotiated before Lincoln was sworn in. At least before Anderson's move Buchanan and the South Carolinians had been discussing the situation. Neither side wanted hostilities. After Anderson's move, the situation changed and a peaceful resolution was not as possible. I agree that Buchanan at some point decided to pass the problem to Lincoln, meaning in effect that peace was no longer possible.
As Lincoln, South Carolina, and rockrr have all said: "Things would be so much easier if you would just compromise with me and do things my way." Neither side was much for compromise.
I'm off the board until sometime tomorrow.
Abe didn’t think he was Moammar Qaddafi?
And Qadaffi probably doesn't think he is another Lincoln. What is that supposed to mean?
Has Qadaffi ordered any widows and orphans to be burned out of their homes?
ML/NJ
I don't find the Buell book's assertion of this particularly convincing, since I have yet to see anything Anderson said to indicate this understanding on his behalf.
Apparently he was the only person in Charleston who didn't know, but his troops knew enough to pretend they were laborers so that they could slip past the patrol boat.
Again, Anderson's orders were what they were, and you can talk all day about what he should have known, but unless you can show that he actually was informed of these things by official sources, it's a moot point. And, yes, Anderson did make the move to Sumter surreptitiously. That only means that he didn't want a confrontation, which even you will have to admit would have resulted if he hadn't done so.
According to Anderson's orders, he should have surrendered.
I realize that you think that Anderson should have surrendered back in December, but again, that's NOT what his orders said. Combined, the orders of December 11 and those of the 22nd tell him to hold the three forts, to put his men where he saw fit, and that he could use his discretion in surrendering if faced with overwhelming odds. And the communication he received on Feb. 23 back this up, telling Anderson, "Sir : It is proper I should state distinctly that you hold Fort Sumter as you held Fort Moultrie, under the verbal orders communicated by Major Buell, subsequently modified by instructions addressed to you from this Department, under date of the 21st of December, 1860." Anderson's own feelings can be found in his April 4 letter: "After thirty odd years of service I do not wish it to be said that I abandoned a post and turned over to unauthorized persons public property entrusted to my charge."
Anderson's statement that he held Charleston in his power and could block the harbor and put out the lighthouses was not tending to provoke aggression?
I've been looking for this. Do you have a link?
Neither side wanted hostilities.
There's a strong argument that the south DID want hostilities, as a way to force Virginia and a few other states into the confederate fold.
As I pointed out earlier, Anderson on December 22 said, "I could, however, were I to receive instructions so to do, throw my garrison into that work, but I should have to sacrifice the greater of my stores as it is now too late to attempt their removal." Why would Anderson say this if he thought he already had the power to move to Sumter under Buell’s verbal comments?
You mentioned Klein earlier. That is a really excellent book that I commend to everyone. You might have noticed that Klein noted on page 170 the responses of Assistant Secretary of State Trescot and Secretary of War Floyd to the news that Anderson had moved to Sumter. Trescot was stunned and said that Washington had not ordered the move. Floyd said there was no order for the move. Floyd cabled Anderson as follows [my emphasis below]:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Adjutant-General's Office, December 27, 1860.
Major ANDERSON, Fort Moultrie:
Intelligence has reached here this morning that you have abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned the carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not believed, because there is no order for any such movement. Explain the meaning of this report.
J. B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.
And here was Anderson's reply [my emphasis below]:
CHARLESTON, December 27, 1860.
Honorable J. B. FLOYD, Secretary of War:
The telegram is correct. I abandoned Fort Moultrie because I was certain that if attacked my men must have been sacrificed, and the command of the harbor lost. I spiked the guns and destroyed the carriages to keep the guns from being used against us.
If attacked, the garrison would never have surrendered without a fight.
ROBERT ANDERSON,
Major, First Artillery.
Anderson failed to follow his orders from Floyd. The orders clearly said that if attacked or surrounded by superior forces he was ordered to yield to necessity and make the best terms in his power, the honorable thing to do. Yet Anderson says that if attacked at Moultrie his men must have been sacrificed.
What the hey? Did he not understand what Floyd’s orders said to do if attacked by superior forces? If he followed Floyd’s orders his men would not be sacrificed, so his "my men will be sacrificed" rational for moving to Sumter basically ignored Floyd's orders. No wonder Floyd, Trescot, and Buchanan were pissed.
My conclusion is that Anderson understand Floyd’s orders alright, but he did not want to follow them. How might he have come to that decision? Klein notes on page 105 that Anderson paid a visit to Winfield Scott before he left for his assignment in Charleston. Scott grumbled about Floyd running the military and not seeking advice from Scott. Scott told Anderson that it might be necessary to concentrate his men at Sumter.
I think a plausible case could be made that this was a case of military men, Anderson in particular, ignoring orders from his civilian bosses and doing what he thought right from a military perspective. Your April 4th comment of Anderson that he didn't want to abandon a post puts his feeling above an order by his civilian bosses.
Here is part of Anderson's logic defending his move [Link]
It is certain, too, that the moment a telegram was received announcing the failure of the mission, an attack would have been made and my command sacrificed, for there can be no surrender with these men, if attacked, without a serious fight.
In other words, Anderson did not have control of his men.
[me]: Anderson's statement that he held Charleston in his power and could block the harbor and put out the lighthouses was not tending to provoke aggression?
[You]: I've been looking for this. Do you have a link?
Here's a link to that statement: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?page=113&dir=001
I see now that he did not make that particular statement public, but he did make a somewhat similar threat to the Governor on January 9 following the Star of the West incident:
I shall not, after a reasonable time for the return of my messenger, permit any vessels to pass within range of the guns of my fort.
There's a strong argument that the south DID want hostilities, as a way to force Virginia and a few other states into the confederate fold.
That probably became true in early April 1861 when they realized the Lincoln Administration had been lying to them about evacuating Sumter. I don't think it was true before then. The South repeatedly asked to negotiate about everything at issue between North and South. They allowed Anderson to buy groceries in Charleston after Anderson turned down their offer of supplying food to his garrison beginning in January.
The South did not attack Fort Sumter right after Anderson moved there when it would have been fairly easy to take Sumter. But, but, this was right after Anderson had said they were ready to attack him in Moultrie. If the South was so poised to attack him, why didn't they attack him in Sumter before he could make it defensible?
Here's Anderson's opinion of the defensibility of Sumter:
We are engaged here to-day in mounting guns and in closing up some of the openings for the embrasures-temporarily closed by light boards, but which would offer but slight resistance to persons seeking entrance. If the workmen return to their work, which I doubt, we shall be enabled in three or four days to have a sufficient number of our guns mounted, and be ready for anything that may occur. [Anderson, Official Records, December 27]
I must confess that we have yet something to do before, with my small force, I shall feel quite independent, as this work is not impregnable, as I have heard it spoken of. [Anderson, Official Records, December 28]
On pages 124-125, the book, "Allegiance, Fort Sumter, Charleston, and the Beginning of the Civil War," by David Detzer, comments about the defensibility of Sumter when Anderson moved his force there.
The book points out that 15 guns were mounted at Sumter at that, but only one was not pointing at the Atlantic Ocean and none of the guns could defend the wharf. Few of the guns could be depressed enough to fire at an attacking force at the base of the fort. The window-like openings for the lower level guns were covered with simple wooden shutters that could easily been knocked out by an attacking army. There were no covers on the gun windows for the guns on the next highest level and those openings could be easily reached by ladders from outside. The book points out that Anderson’s men would be stretched more thinly at Sumter than at the smaller for Moultrie.
And yet, South Carolina did not attack the fort. If they had been so ready to attack Moultrie as Anderson feared, why wouldn't they have attacked Sumter when it was most vulnerable?
The orders also told him to exercise his "sound military judgement." And I think that even you will have to agree that there's a large area between "giving up without a fight as soon as the enemy shows themselves" and "dying to the last man." You seem intent on proving that Anderson should have understood that his real orders were to surrender immediately, but that language is simply not there.
In other words, Anderson did not have control of his men.
Anderson compliments the fighting spirit of his men and you spin it as "they're out of control." Nice.
I see now that he did not make that particular statement public, but he did make a somewhat similar threat to the Governor on January 9 following the Star of the West incident:
In the letter to Washington you cite, Anderson immediately says "These things, of course, I would never do, unless compelled to do so in self-defense." And his letter to Pickens makes it clear that he's telling what he can do in the case of war, and asking Pickens if there's a state of war or not. Pickens essentially tells him that there is, but for some reason Anderson doesn't make good his threat.
If the South was so poised to attack him, why didn't they attack him in Sumter before he could make it defensible?
I doubt that an assault on Sumter would have been as easy as all that, being an island and all, but as for why the South Carolinians didn't attack, I'd guess that they felt that they were better off simply cutting off Sumter while building enough batteries all around it that they could shell it at their leisure with little risk rather than launch a logistically difficult and possibly bloody amphibious assault on an island fortress, even one with some weaknesses. Further, while the South Carolinians were certainly enthusiastic, I'm not sure how much real organization their military forces had in the few weeks between Anderson's move and his blocking up the easy access points to the fort. Could an amphibious assault against trained regulars have been organized in that time?
Or maybe it's just for the same reason that Anderson refrained from shelling every ship entering Charleston Harbor: none of the players wanted to escalate.
I think the facts speak for themselves. I don't know what source the Buell book had for its comment that Anderson was furious at his new orders from Floyd, orders that backed away from giving him discretion about his moves, but it is consistent with his later asking if you ordered it I could move to Sumter.
If Anderson moved in response to orders (Buell's or Floyd's) he could have said I simply followed my orders. He didn't. He couldn't because Washington noted correctly that he didn't have an order to make that move. Washington said his move was against orders and "in the face of orders." Anderson said he made the move on his own responsibility. That turned out so well maybe we should make it standard practice to put an army major in charge of deciding whether to press the nuclear button in a confrontation with Russia or China. Millions might die in such a modern confrontation. However, in Anderson's case only 600,000 died, more or less.
Anderson compliments the fighting spirit of his men and you spin it as "they're out of control." Nice
Thanks for the compliment. (/sarc) Anderson was saying I can't surrender (Floyd's orders) because my men want to fight if attacked, and I can't stop them. A real leader, that. What were they going to do, frag him? Mutiny? I gather that some of his officers became upset with him and his actions/inactions. He'd only been there a little over a month at the time he moved. That's not enough time to gain the confidence of the men.
... Further, while the South Carolinians were certainly enthusiastic, I'm not sure how much real organization their military forces had in the few weeks between Anderson's move and his blocking up the easy access points to the fort. Could an amphibious assault against trained regulars have been organized in that time?
Or maybe it's just for the same reason that Anderson refrained from shelling every ship entering Charleston Harbor: none of the players wanted to escalate.
I think both of your reasons played a role. It took the South Carolinians a few days just to get Moultrie's cannons back in order, and they did not have all that much ammunition or training for a big assault.
I've enjoyed the chance to look deeper with you into what went on. Though we don't agree, I always learn from these discussions. Thanks.
One thing I've learned in this case was the book, "Allegiance," which I quoted from above, refers to the South Carolinians as "goons" at one point in the text. But the book was endorsed by James McPherson, so what can I say.
And this is why you're my favorite rebel. Have a good weekend.
And your impertinent behavior is important to you because?
Very good.
"His orders of December 11 told him that he need only "have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act"
So, where was the tangible evidence?
Why do you suppose the United States continued construction on Fort Sumter even after SC’s secession?
Because they could and/or the SC’s thought they would inherit or purchase a better prepared fort.
I’m leaving in a few minutes for a short trip. That’s a nice thing about retirement — I get to travel. See you when I come back.
Elvis is leaving the building.
Or maybe Anderson and the unionists were prescient about the the south’s inability to hold on to it. ;-)
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