The book about Buell that I quoted from above indicated Anderson understood Buchanan's December 22 order as backing away from Anderson having the power to decide what to do. I'll admit though that Buchanan could have made the instructions even clearer.
Except Floyd's order doesn't say that. It says that he shouldn't feel obliged to fight to the last man if faced with overwhelming force.
Floyd's order also says:
It is neither expected nor desired that you should expose your own life or that of your men in a hopeless conflict in defense of these forts.
But that is just what Anderson's move brought about. He did expose his own life and those of his men in an essentially hopeless battle. How many men did Scott calculate would be required to rescue Anderson from Fort Sumter? Was it 20,000 or 25,000?
He expected to be in a more secure place, where a mob couldn't get to him, while a political solution was worked out.
Anderson's officers were reported as saying to the press that Fort Moultrie could now withstand the actions of a mob should one come, but not the actions of an army. As I've posted before, Anderson and Anderson's predecessor had made a lot of improvements to the defensibility of Moultrie.
Moving to Sumter was a fundamental error that hiked tensions, shut down peace negotiations between Buchanan and the South Carolinians, and led to the war. It is a shame that Anderson could not see what his move would do in the larger scope of things.
Anderson was no more "invested" in Sumter than he was in Moultrie. In either he was surrounded by a hostile force determined to take possession of the forts which he'd been ordered to hold.
Charleston leaders had promised to stop mobs from attacking the fort, a fort which Anderson's officers said could withstand mobs. Instead of buying time for a negotiated solution, Anderson's move hardened attitudes on both sides, interrupted peace negotiations, caused a rupture of the cabinet, and made a shooting war inevitable unless Lincoln had been a man of peace. Nice move there, Anderson.
On the other hand, Buchanan refused to give the South Carolina delegation anything in writing, and they were frustrated by the lack of hard assurances from him.
Buchanan recognized his pledge even though it wasn't in writing. As I've posted to you before, here was Stanton's account of a Buchanan cabinet meeting where moving Anderson back to Moultrie was discussed (later confirmed by Holt who was also a participant in the cabinet meetings) [my emphasis below]:
For a considerable period during the pendency of the discussion, which continued several days, Mr. Buchanan manifested a determination to order Major Anderson back, upon the ground that it was essential to the peace of the country, and also that the movement was a violation of some pledge or promise of his, which he was bound to fulfill. Floyd and Thompson both stated repeatedly, in Mr. Buchanan's presence, that such a pledge had been given by him, and during three days debate I did not hear him deny it, although members of the Cabinet asked for a specification of the time and place, and insisted that it was impossible that such a pledge could have been made.
It was indeed "essential to the peace of the country."
And just how does one read that in the plain language of the order? The only 'backing away" in the order is in giving Anderson the discretion to surrender in the face of overwhelming force rather than die to the last man.
But that is just what Anderson's move brought about. He did expose his own life and those of his men in an essentially hopeless battle.
It wasn't a battle until the south started shelling. And do you really think that, if Anderson had stayed in Moultrie, refusing to surrender, and that if resupply was attempted, the south wouldn't have shelled it? That the position wasn't equally as "essentially hopeless"?
As I've posted before, Anderson and Anderson's predecessor had made a lot of improvements to the defensibility of Moultrie.
. Moultrie was essentially open to the land side, with houses that he couldn't move to open fields of fire and nearby high ground that allowed fire into the fort. It simply wasn't made to be defended from the land. More important, Anderson's attempts to get some small arms from the Charleston armory was directly overruled by Floyd.
Charleston leaders had promised to stop mobs from attacking the fort, a fort which Anderson's officers said could withstand mobs.
Per Klein, those same civic leaders also said that the forts would be theirs "one way or another."
It was indeed "essential to the peace of the country."
How? What would have been different had Anderson not moved? Would the south have moderated their position? Would they have allowed Anderson and the forts to stand unmolested? The south's end game was always the same--control of the forts and the removal of the US forces there. Nothing different was ever indicated.