As I pointed out earlier, Anderson on December 22 said, "I could, however, were I to receive instructions so to do, throw my garrison into that work, but I should have to sacrifice the greater of my stores as it is now too late to attempt their removal." Why would Anderson say this if he thought he already had the power to move to Sumter under Buell’s verbal comments?
You mentioned Klein earlier. That is a really excellent book that I commend to everyone. You might have noticed that Klein noted on page 170 the responses of Assistant Secretary of State Trescot and Secretary of War Floyd to the news that Anderson had moved to Sumter. Trescot was stunned and said that Washington had not ordered the move. Floyd said there was no order for the move. Floyd cabled Anderson as follows [my emphasis below]:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Adjutant-General's Office, December 27, 1860.
Major ANDERSON, Fort Moultrie:
Intelligence has reached here this morning that you have abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned the carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not believed, because there is no order for any such movement. Explain the meaning of this report.
J. B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.
And here was Anderson's reply [my emphasis below]:
CHARLESTON, December 27, 1860.
Honorable J. B. FLOYD, Secretary of War:
The telegram is correct. I abandoned Fort Moultrie because I was certain that if attacked my men must have been sacrificed, and the command of the harbor lost. I spiked the guns and destroyed the carriages to keep the guns from being used against us.
If attacked, the garrison would never have surrendered without a fight.
ROBERT ANDERSON,
Major, First Artillery.
Anderson failed to follow his orders from Floyd. The orders clearly said that if attacked or surrounded by superior forces he was ordered to yield to necessity and make the best terms in his power, the honorable thing to do. Yet Anderson says that if attacked at Moultrie his men must have been sacrificed.
What the hey? Did he not understand what Floyd’s orders said to do if attacked by superior forces? If he followed Floyd’s orders his men would not be sacrificed, so his "my men will be sacrificed" rational for moving to Sumter basically ignored Floyd's orders. No wonder Floyd, Trescot, and Buchanan were pissed.
My conclusion is that Anderson understand Floyd’s orders alright, but he did not want to follow them. How might he have come to that decision? Klein notes on page 105 that Anderson paid a visit to Winfield Scott before he left for his assignment in Charleston. Scott grumbled about Floyd running the military and not seeking advice from Scott. Scott told Anderson that it might be necessary to concentrate his men at Sumter.
I think a plausible case could be made that this was a case of military men, Anderson in particular, ignoring orders from his civilian bosses and doing what he thought right from a military perspective. Your April 4th comment of Anderson that he didn't want to abandon a post puts his feeling above an order by his civilian bosses.
Here is part of Anderson's logic defending his move [Link]
It is certain, too, that the moment a telegram was received announcing the failure of the mission, an attack would have been made and my command sacrificed, for there can be no surrender with these men, if attacked, without a serious fight.
In other words, Anderson did not have control of his men.
[me]: Anderson's statement that he held Charleston in his power and could block the harbor and put out the lighthouses was not tending to provoke aggression?
[You]: I've been looking for this. Do you have a link?
Here's a link to that statement: http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?page=113&dir=001
I see now that he did not make that particular statement public, but he did make a somewhat similar threat to the Governor on January 9 following the Star of the West incident:
I shall not, after a reasonable time for the return of my messenger, permit any vessels to pass within range of the guns of my fort.
There's a strong argument that the south DID want hostilities, as a way to force Virginia and a few other states into the confederate fold.
That probably became true in early April 1861 when they realized the Lincoln Administration had been lying to them about evacuating Sumter. I don't think it was true before then. The South repeatedly asked to negotiate about everything at issue between North and South. They allowed Anderson to buy groceries in Charleston after Anderson turned down their offer of supplying food to his garrison beginning in January.
The South did not attack Fort Sumter right after Anderson moved there when it would have been fairly easy to take Sumter. But, but, this was right after Anderson had said they were ready to attack him in Moultrie. If the South was so poised to attack him, why didn't they attack him in Sumter before he could make it defensible?
Here's Anderson's opinion of the defensibility of Sumter:
We are engaged here to-day in mounting guns and in closing up some of the openings for the embrasures-temporarily closed by light boards, but which would offer but slight resistance to persons seeking entrance. If the workmen return to their work, which I doubt, we shall be enabled in three or four days to have a sufficient number of our guns mounted, and be ready for anything that may occur. [Anderson, Official Records, December 27]
I must confess that we have yet something to do before, with my small force, I shall feel quite independent, as this work is not impregnable, as I have heard it spoken of. [Anderson, Official Records, December 28]
On pages 124-125, the book, "Allegiance, Fort Sumter, Charleston, and the Beginning of the Civil War," by David Detzer, comments about the defensibility of Sumter when Anderson moved his force there.
The book points out that 15 guns were mounted at Sumter at that, but only one was not pointing at the Atlantic Ocean and none of the guns could defend the wharf. Few of the guns could be depressed enough to fire at an attacking force at the base of the fort. The window-like openings for the lower level guns were covered with simple wooden shutters that could easily been knocked out by an attacking army. There were no covers on the gun windows for the guns on the next highest level and those openings could be easily reached by ladders from outside. The book points out that Anderson’s men would be stretched more thinly at Sumter than at the smaller for Moultrie.
And yet, South Carolina did not attack the fort. If they had been so ready to attack Moultrie as Anderson feared, why wouldn't they have attacked Sumter when it was most vulnerable?
The orders also told him to exercise his "sound military judgement." And I think that even you will have to agree that there's a large area between "giving up without a fight as soon as the enemy shows themselves" and "dying to the last man." You seem intent on proving that Anderson should have understood that his real orders were to surrender immediately, but that language is simply not there.
In other words, Anderson did not have control of his men.
Anderson compliments the fighting spirit of his men and you spin it as "they're out of control." Nice.
I see now that he did not make that particular statement public, but he did make a somewhat similar threat to the Governor on January 9 following the Star of the West incident:
In the letter to Washington you cite, Anderson immediately says "These things, of course, I would never do, unless compelled to do so in self-defense." And his letter to Pickens makes it clear that he's telling what he can do in the case of war, and asking Pickens if there's a state of war or not. Pickens essentially tells him that there is, but for some reason Anderson doesn't make good his threat.
If the South was so poised to attack him, why didn't they attack him in Sumter before he could make it defensible?
I doubt that an assault on Sumter would have been as easy as all that, being an island and all, but as for why the South Carolinians didn't attack, I'd guess that they felt that they were better off simply cutting off Sumter while building enough batteries all around it that they could shell it at their leisure with little risk rather than launch a logistically difficult and possibly bloody amphibious assault on an island fortress, even one with some weaknesses. Further, while the South Carolinians were certainly enthusiastic, I'm not sure how much real organization their military forces had in the few weeks between Anderson's move and his blocking up the easy access points to the fort. Could an amphibious assault against trained regulars have been organized in that time?
Or maybe it's just for the same reason that Anderson refrained from shelling every ship entering Charleston Harbor: none of the players wanted to escalate.