The orders also told him to exercise his "sound military judgement." And I think that even you will have to agree that there's a large area between "giving up without a fight as soon as the enemy shows themselves" and "dying to the last man." You seem intent on proving that Anderson should have understood that his real orders were to surrender immediately, but that language is simply not there.
In other words, Anderson did not have control of his men.
Anderson compliments the fighting spirit of his men and you spin it as "they're out of control." Nice.
I see now that he did not make that particular statement public, but he did make a somewhat similar threat to the Governor on January 9 following the Star of the West incident:
In the letter to Washington you cite, Anderson immediately says "These things, of course, I would never do, unless compelled to do so in self-defense." And his letter to Pickens makes it clear that he's telling what he can do in the case of war, and asking Pickens if there's a state of war or not. Pickens essentially tells him that there is, but for some reason Anderson doesn't make good his threat.
If the South was so poised to attack him, why didn't they attack him in Sumter before he could make it defensible?
I doubt that an assault on Sumter would have been as easy as all that, being an island and all, but as for why the South Carolinians didn't attack, I'd guess that they felt that they were better off simply cutting off Sumter while building enough batteries all around it that they could shell it at their leisure with little risk rather than launch a logistically difficult and possibly bloody amphibious assault on an island fortress, even one with some weaknesses. Further, while the South Carolinians were certainly enthusiastic, I'm not sure how much real organization their military forces had in the few weeks between Anderson's move and his blocking up the easy access points to the fort. Could an amphibious assault against trained regulars have been organized in that time?
Or maybe it's just for the same reason that Anderson refrained from shelling every ship entering Charleston Harbor: none of the players wanted to escalate.
I think the facts speak for themselves. I don't know what source the Buell book had for its comment that Anderson was furious at his new orders from Floyd, orders that backed away from giving him discretion about his moves, but it is consistent with his later asking if you ordered it I could move to Sumter.
If Anderson moved in response to orders (Buell's or Floyd's) he could have said I simply followed my orders. He didn't. He couldn't because Washington noted correctly that he didn't have an order to make that move. Washington said his move was against orders and "in the face of orders." Anderson said he made the move on his own responsibility. That turned out so well maybe we should make it standard practice to put an army major in charge of deciding whether to press the nuclear button in a confrontation with Russia or China. Millions might die in such a modern confrontation. However, in Anderson's case only 600,000 died, more or less.
Anderson compliments the fighting spirit of his men and you spin it as "they're out of control." Nice
Thanks for the compliment. (/sarc) Anderson was saying I can't surrender (Floyd's orders) because my men want to fight if attacked, and I can't stop them. A real leader, that. What were they going to do, frag him? Mutiny? I gather that some of his officers became upset with him and his actions/inactions. He'd only been there a little over a month at the time he moved. That's not enough time to gain the confidence of the men.
... Further, while the South Carolinians were certainly enthusiastic, I'm not sure how much real organization their military forces had in the few weeks between Anderson's move and his blocking up the easy access points to the fort. Could an amphibious assault against trained regulars have been organized in that time?
Or maybe it's just for the same reason that Anderson refrained from shelling every ship entering Charleston Harbor: none of the players wanted to escalate.
I think both of your reasons played a role. It took the South Carolinians a few days just to get Moultrie's cannons back in order, and they did not have all that much ammunition or training for a big assault.
I've enjoyed the chance to look deeper with you into what went on. Though we don't agree, I always learn from these discussions. Thanks.
One thing I've learned in this case was the book, "Allegiance," which I quoted from above, refers to the South Carolinians as "goons" at one point in the text. But the book was endorsed by James McPherson, so what can I say.