Obama Presidency Illegal!

"It's illegal for Barack Obama to serve as America's President! That's what critics are saying after a government records official revealed Obama was NOT born in the U.S. and there is NO birth certificate in Hawaii to prove his claims that's he's a "natural born" citizen as required by the Constitution!"

FYI:

The 71st legal challenge to Obama’s eligibility was shot down today by the Third US Circuit Court of Appeals.
Not only did the US Circuit Court of Appeals rule against the plaintiffs, but they are threatening legal sanctions and the payment of court costs against attorney Mario Apuzzo for filing a “frivolous” appeal.

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 09-4209
CHARLES F. KERCHNER, JR.; LOWELL T. PATTERSON; DARRELL JAMES LENORMAND; DONALD H. NELSEN, JR.,
Appellants
v.
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, II, President Elect of the United States of America, President of the United States of America, and Individually; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES CONGRESS; UNITED STATES SENATE; UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; RICHARD B. CHENEY, President of the Senate, Presiding Officer of Joint Session of Congress, Vice President of the United States and Individually; NANCY PELOSI, Speaker of the House and Individually

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil No.1-09-cv-00253) District Judge: Hon. Jerome B. Simandle

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 29, 2010

Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges (Filed: July 2, 2010)

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Charles F. Kerchner, Jr., Lowell T. Patterson, Darrell J. LeNormand, and Donald H. Nelsen, Jr. (hereafter “Appellants”) filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that President Barack Obama is ineligible to hold his Office as President. They rely on Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution which provides that “No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President. . . .” U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 4.1 Appellants challenge the District Court’s order dismissing their complaint. We will affirm the order of dismissal and direct Appellants’ counsel to show cause why just damages and costs should not be imposed on him for having filed a frivolous appeal.

1 There is a dispute, among courts and commentators, as to whether the provision known as the “Natural Born Citizen” clause should be cited as clause 4 or clause 5 of Article II, § 1 of the Constitution. Compare Hollander v. McCain, 566 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D.N.H. 2008) (citing the provision as clause 4), Rhodes v. MacDonald, No. 4:09-CV-106, 2009 WL 2997605, at *1 n.1 (M.D.Ga. Sept. 16, 2009) (same), and Gerard N. Magliocca, Constitutional False Positives and the Populist Movement, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 821, 874 (2006) (same), with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 n.12 (1976) (citing the provision as clause 5), and Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1051 (2010) (same). In any event, the parties agree as to the substance of the Natural Born Citizen clause, and we use the same citation as we used in Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 237 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009).

Appellants, seeking to compel President Obama to “conclusively prove[ ]” that he is eligible to serve as President, Appellants’ Br. at 6, named as defendants President Obama, the United States of America, the United States Congress, the United States Senate, the United States House of Representatives, former Vice President and President of the Senate Richard Cheney, and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (hereafter “Appellees”). Appellants allege that President Obama violated their rights under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments when he assumed office without “conclusively” proving that he is eligible for the presidency and that the legislative branch violated Appellants’ right under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment when Appellants’ request to investigate the President’s birthplace and citizenship was ignored. Appellants also assert claims under the Fifth and Twentieth Amendments against Congress, former Vice President Cheney, and Speaker Pelosi, for failing to “properly vet and verify” Obama’s citizenship. Appellants’ Br. at 10. They moreover bring an equal protection claim on the ground that Congress “fully investigated . . . whether Republican Presidential candidate John McCain is an Article II ‘natural born Citizen,’” but made no such inquiry as to President Obama. Appellants’ Br. at 10-11.

At this procedural posture, we must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to [Appellants], and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, [Appellants] may be entitled to relief.” Byers v. Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Grammar v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 523 (3d Cir. 2009)). Nonetheless, “a complaint must . . . ‘state a claim . . . that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

The District Court concluded that Appellants lacked Article III standing.2 See Kerchner v. Obama, 669 F. Supp. 2d 477, 479 (D.N.J. 2009). We agree. It is axiomatic that standing to sue is a prerequisite to Article III jurisdiction. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). This constitutional mandate requires that Appellants show, inter alia, an “injury in fact.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “An ‘injury in fact’ is ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).

The appeal in Berg presented us with a claim similar to the one here, in which the plaintiff challenged President-elect Obama’s eligibility to run for and serve as President. The district court in that case dismissed the suit on standing grounds because “the alleged harm to voters like [the Plaintiff] stemming from [Obama’s] failure to satisfy the eligibility requirements of the Natural Born Citizen Clause is not concrete or particularized

2 Appellants invoked the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3)-(4), 1346(a)(2), 1361, 1651(a), and 2201(a)-2202. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order of dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

enough to satisfy Article III standing. . . .” Id. at 238 (quotation, citation and original internal brackets and ellipses omitted). This court affirmed the order dismissing the suit, agreeing that “a candidate’s ineligibility under the Natural Born Citizen Clause does not result in an injury in fact to voters.” Id. at 239 (quotation and citation omitted).
In this case, Appellants seek to respond to the District Court’s dismissal on standing grounds by claiming that they have “suffered individual injuries . . . not shared by all members of the public,” Appellants’ Br. at 51, because they voted in the November 4, 2008 presidential election and because they, unlike the majority of voters, “perceive themselves to have suffered [a] violation of their constitutional rights regarding Obama’s eligibility to hold office.” Appellants’ Br. at 44. Additionally, Appellants Kerchner and Nelsen attempt to distinguish themselves from the public at large, pointing out that they took oaths to defend and support the Constitution as part of their past service in the Armed Forces and the National Guard. We stated in Berg that “[e]ven if . . . the placement of an ineligible candidate on the presidential ballot harmed [the plaintiff], that injury . . . was too general for the purposes of Article III [because the plaintiff] shared . . . his ‘interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws’ . . . with all voters. . . .’” 586 F.3d at 240 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573). That reasoning also controls our disposition here.

In their Reply Brief, Appellants assert that their case differs from Berg in several ways, including, among others, that the plaintiff in that case filed his claim against then-candidate Obama before the election and before the “Electoral College and Congress had . . . acted on Obama’s qualifications. . . .” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 25. On the contrary, the Berg court addressed standing based on those same assumed facts. Berg, 586 F.3d at 238-39. Just like the plaintiff in Berg, Appellants’ alleged injuries are too generalized to be cognizable in Article III courts. As the District Court found, the requirement that an injury be “concrete and particularized” precludes claims based on “harms that are suffered by many or all of the American people.” Kerchner, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74). The District Court further stated that:

The Supreme Court has held that “even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the Court has refrained from adjudicating ‘abstract questions of wide public significance’ which amount to ‘generalized grievances,’ pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982). Plaintiffs’ claims fall squarely into the category of generalized grievances that are most appropriately handled by the legislative branch. The Court acknowledges Plaintiffs’ frustration with what they perceive as Congress’ inaction in this area, but their remedy may be found through their vote.
Id. at 483 n.5. We agree.

Turning to the argument of Kerchner and Nelsen that their oaths to protect and defend the Constitution “increase[ ] their adversarial posture,” Appellants’ Br. at 56, no court has found that a plaintiff established “injury in fact” simply because s/he had once taken such an oath. Carving out an exception on that basis would still leave an impermissibly large class with unique ability to sue in federal court. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 502(a) (requiring all military personnel to take an oath “swear[ing] . . . [to] support and defend the Constitution of the United States.”). Kerchner’s assertion of standing on the ground that he, who has been retired from the Naval Reserves since 1995, may be required to serve the Commander in Chief as a combatant in the case of an “extreme national emergency,” Kerchner, 669 F.Supp.2d at 483 (quotation and citation omitted), is to no avail because it is conjectural. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

Appellants’ equal protection claim is likewise non- justiciable for failure to establish “injury in fact.” Their claims under the First Amendment are without merit because the individual right to petition does not “require government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals’ communications on public issues.” Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984).3 We therefore agree with the District Court that Appellants lack standing.4

III.

Because we have decided that this appeal is frivolous, we will order counsel for Appellants to show cause why just damages and costs should not be imposed. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides that “[i]f a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.” “The purpose of an award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 38 is to compensate appellees who are forced to defend judgments awarded them in the trial court from appeals that are wholly without merit, and to preserve the appellate court calendar for cases worthy of consideration.” Huck v. Dawson, 106 F.3d 45, 52 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Damages [under Rule 38] are awarded by the court in its discretion . . . as a matter of justice to the appellee.” Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation and

3 The District Court, as an alternate holding, found that Appellants’ claims are “barred under the ‘political question doctrine’ as . . . question[s] demonstrably committed to a coordinate political department.” Kerchner, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 483 n.5. In light of our decision that Appellants lack standing, we need not discuss that issue.

4 We need not discuss Appellants’ contention that “the original common law definition of an Article II ‘natural born Citizen’ . . . is a child born in the country to a United States citizen mother and father.” Appellants’ Br. at 18. That assertion goes to the merits of whether President Obama is in fact eligible to hold office, which we cannot address unless Appellants first establish Article III standing.

citation omitted). An “important purpose [of a damages award] is to discourage litigants from unnecessarily wasting their opponents’ time and resources.” Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1993).

“This court employs an objective standard to determine whether or not an appeal is frivolous” which “focuses on the merits of the appeal regardless of good or bad faith.” Hilmon Co. v. Hyatt Int’l, 899 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted). We have stated that “an appeal from a frivolous claim is likewise frivolous.” Beam, 383 F.3d at 108. Appellants had ample notice that this appeal had no merit. They should have been aware that we rejected almost identical claims in Berg, as have courts in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Barnett v. Obama, No. 09-0082, F. Supp. 2d , 2009 WL 3861788, at *4-*6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009) (holding that active and former military personnel lack Article III standing requirements to challenge President Obama’s eligibility for office); Cohen v. Obama, No. 08-2150, 2008 WL 5191864, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2008) (holding that a federal prisoner who alleged that then-Senator Obama was “an illegal alien impersonating a United States citizen” lacked standing under Article III), aff’d, Cohen v. Obama, 332 F. App’x 640 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

Examination of this precedent would have made it “obvious to a reasonable attorney that an appeal from the District Court’s order was frivolous, [as no] law or facts . . . support a conclusion that the District Court judge had erred.” Beam, 383 F.3d at 109. Moreover, other courts have imposed sanctions for similar reasons. See Hollister v. Soetero, 258 F.R.D. 1, 2-5 (D.D.C. 2009) (reprimanding an attorney under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) for signing and filing a complaint alleging that President Obama was ineligible to serve as president because he is not a “natural born Citizen”), aff’d, Hollister v. Soetoro, Nos. 09-5080, 09-5161, 2010 WL 1169793 (D.C. Cir. March 22, 2010); see also Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1373 (M.D.Ga. 2009) (imposing monetary sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(3) against counsel who filed similar claims on behalf of members of the military), aff’d, Rhodes v. MacDonald, No. 09-15418, 2010 WL 892848 (11th Cir. March 15, 2010).
In the past, “we cautioned counsel that a finding by a District Court that a lawsuit is frivolous should serve as notice to the parties and their attorney to exercise caution, pause, and devote additional examination to the legal validity and factual merit of his contentions.” Beam, 383 F.3d at 109 (quotation omitted). Although the District Court did not explicitly state that Appellants’ claims were frivolous, the finding of other district courts that plaintiffs who filed complaints based on similar legal theories violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 should have served as meaningful notice that the appeal here would be frivolous.5 We therefore will order Appellants’ counsel to show cause why he should not pay just damages and costs for having filed a frivolous appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 38.

IV.

For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal.

5 We also note with concern that Appellants failed to cite Berg in their opening brief. See, e.g., N.J. Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(3) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client . . . .”). Although Berg was filed only some two months before Appellants’ brief, it is unlikely it had not come to their attention given the identity of the issues.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/33824651/KERCHNER-v-OBAMA-Not-Precedential-Opinion-Transport-Room

How can a USURPER command our armed forces?
How can a USURPER sign any treaties with foreign governments?
How can a USURPER sign anything into law, let alone the health care monstrosity?

HOW CAN A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN'S STATUS BE "GOVERNED" BY GREAT BRITAIN?

“When Barack Obama Jr. was born on Aug. 4,1961, in Honolulu, Kenya was a British colony, still part of the United Kingdom’s dwindling empire. As a Kenyan native, Barack Obama Sr. was a British subject whose citizenship status was governed by The British Nationality Act of 1948. That same act governed the status of Obama Sr.‘s children.

http://fightthesmears.com/articles/5/birthcertificate.html

Factcheck.org goes on to say this about Obama Sr., Jr. and the British Nationality Act of 1948:

In other words, at the time of his birth, Barack Obama Jr. was both a U.S. citizen (by virtue of being born in Hawaii) and a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (or the UKC) by virtue of being born to a father who was a citizen of the UKC.

http://www.factcheck.org/askfactcheck/does_barack_obama_have_kenyan_citizenship.html

Even the modern day State Department rules discusses the problems associated with dual citizenship:

7 FAM 081: U.S. Policy on Dual Nationality:
(e)While recognizing the existence of dual nationality, the U.S. Government does not encourage it as a matter of policy because of the problems it may cause. Dual nationality may hamper efforts by the U.S. Government to provide diplomatic and consular protection to individuals overseas. When a U.S. citizen is in the other country of their dual nationality, that country has a predominant claim on the person.
...
the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that dual nationality is a "status long recognized in the law" and that "a person may have and exercise rights of nationality in two countries and be subject to the responsibilities of both." See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86563.pdf

So, back to the question: "HOW CAN A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN'S STATUS BE "GOVERNED" BY GREAT BRITAIN?"
It can't. Of course not. Yet, right there, on his campaign web site F.T.S., it's stated that a foreign government "governed" Barry from birth and the reason it did, was that Barry inherited that foreign citizenship by way of his foreign national father (no matter where he was born), a fact backed up by Factcheck.org. Assuming, of course, that Sr. was his legal father at birth.
How, then, could he possibly be a "Natural Born Citizen" of the U.S.?
Barry Soetoro, the divided citizen at birth!

Barack Obama a/k/a Barry Soetoro *	NOT Obama / Soetoro

* This assumes HI birth. A citizen of 2 countries at birth.

http://www.jeffersonsrebels.blogspot.com

Furthermore: Hawaii's Territorial Law, Chapter 57 - "VITAL STATISTICS, I", shown beginning pg 23 of 29, (the law in effect in 1961) allowed the parents (or grandparents or other relative) of baby's born anywhere in the world to be eligible to apply for a Hawaiian birth certificate. A mailed-in form (without mention of a hospital, doctor, or midwife) signed by one of his grandparents (who forged the parent signature(s)) would have been enough to set up a birth record and a birth certificate at the Dept of Health. The Dept of Health would (presumably) then have automatically sent the names of the parents, their address as given on the mailed-in form , the gender of the child, and the date of birth to the Honolulu Advertiser and Star-Bulletin. The address given for the parents in the newspaper announcements is actually, however, the August 1961 home address of Obama’s maternal grandparents Stanley and Madelyn Dunham [6085 Kalanianaole Highway], and not the 1961 home address of Barack Obama, Sr. [625 11th Ave].) This notification would then have automatically generated the newspaper announcements. (This was the practice of the Honolulu Advertiser and Star-Bulletin at the time).

Bottom line: Even IF (big IF) he was born in HI, he inherited his father's foreign citizenship as well, making him a US citizen by US law and a subject to the crown of her majesty the Queen of England by inheritance, birthright and England's law. He could not be considered a Natural Born Citizen as known by and as intended by the framers.

==============================================================================

What follows, is a bit of information with regards to the Constitutional term "Natural Born Citizen" (specifically) and NOT about the entire makeup, functions, origins and influences that made/make up our form of government, a Constitutional Republic. Clearly, the framers relied upon many different sources to create our new form of government.

Who, or "what" constituted a natural born citizen was well known to the framers. Jay would not have made such a suggestion to the others (Washington & the rest of those in attendance at the Constitutional Convention) unless there was a clear understanding of what that term meant. The definition comes from a source that not only were the framers familiar with, but the founders (many who were both) as well. And yes, even though most could not speak French, most read French (except, notably, Washington who would defer to Jefferson when such interpretation was needed).

NBC in the Constitutional drafts:

June 18th, 1787 - Alexander Hamilton suggests that the requirement be added, as: "No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United States." Works of Alexander Hamilton (page 407).

July 25, 1787 (~5 weeks later) - John Jay writes a letter to General Washington (president of the Constitutional Convention): "Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Commander in Chief of the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen." [the word born is underlined in Jay's letter which signifies the importance of allegiance from birth.] http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28fr00379%29%29:

September 2nd, 1787 George Washington pens a letter to John Jay. The last line reads: "I thank you for the hints contained in your letter"
http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&fid=600&documentid=71483

September 4th, 1787 (~6 weeks after Jay's letter and just 2 days after Washington wrote back to Jay) - The "Natural Born Citizen" requirement is now found in their drafts. Madison's notes of the Convention
The proposal passed unanimously without debate.

Original French version of Vattel's Law of Nations:

Emer de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou Principes de la loi naturelle, vol. 1 (of 2) [1758]

From Chapter XIX, 212 (page 248 of 592):
Title in French: "Des citoyens et naturels"
To English: "Citizens and natural"

French text (about citizens): "Les citoyens sont les membres de la societe civile : lies a cette societe par certains devoirs et soumis a son autorite, ils participent avec egalite a ses avantages."
-------------------
To English: "The citizens are the members of the civil society: linked to this society by certain duties and subject to its authority, they participate with equality has its advantages."
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
French text (about "natural" born citizens): "Les naturels, ou indigenes, sont ceux qui sont nes dans le pays, de parens citoyens"
-------------------
To English, gives this: "the natural, or indigenous, are those born in the country, parents who are citizens"

A detailed, historical, etymology of the term "Natural Born Citizen" can be found here: http://www.greschak.com/essays/natborn/index.htm

Prior to the Constitution

"This 1758 work by Swiss legal philosopher Emmerich de Vattel is of special importance to scholars of constitutional history and law, for it was read by many of the Founders of the United States of America, and informed their understanding of the principles of law which became established in the Constitution of 1787. Chitty's notes and the appended commentaries by Edward D. Ingraham, used in lectures at William and Mary College, provide a valuable perspective on Vattel's exposition from the viewpoint of American jurists who had adapted those principles to the American legal experience."

Vattel's Law of Nations, built upon "natural law - which has it's roots in ancient Greece, was influenced by Leibniz.
Even Blackstone affirmed the basis of natural law:
"This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original” (1979, 41). In this passage, Blackstone articulates the two claims that constitute the theoretical core of conceptual naturalism: 1) there can be no legally valid standards that conflict with the natural law; and 2) all valid laws derive what force and authority they have from the natural law."

Thomas Jefferson (for one example) had the 1758 version as well as a 1775 version in his own library:
Thomas Jefferson's Library: A Catalog with the Entries in His Own Order (under a section he titled "Ethics. Law of Nature and Nations."

In AUTOBIOGRAPHY by Thomas Jefferson, he states: "On the 1st of June 1779. I was appointed Governor of the Commonwealth and retired from the legislature. Being elected also one of the Visitors of Wm. & Mary college, a self-electing body, I effected, during my residence in Williamsburg that year, a change in the organization of that institution by abolishing the Grammar school, and the two professorships of Divinity & Oriental languages, and substituting a professorship of Law & Police, one of Anatomy Medicine and Chemistry, and one of Modern languages; and the charter confining us to six professorships, we added the law of Nature & Nations..." This was 8 years prior the the writing of the Constitution! [See the "Law of Nature & Nations" section of his personal library to get an idea of what he included in this curriculum in America's 1st law school].

Note: Vattel, is one of only 10 "footnotes" in Jefferson's Biography, from Yale.

Prior to Jay's famous letter to those in attendance at the Constitutional Convention, we see (one of many exchanges between the founders) a letter from Madison ("father" of the Constitution) to Jay:

"James Madison, as a member of the Continental Congress in 1780, drafted the instructions sent to John Jay, for negotiating a treaty with Spain, which quotes at length from The Law of Nations. Jay complained that this letter, which was probably read by the Spanish government, was not in code, and "Vattel's Law of Nations, which I found quoted in a letter from Congress, is prohibited here.[29]"
From: Life, Liberty, and The Pursuit of Happiness. How the Natural Law concept of G.W. Leibniz Inspired America's Founding Fathers.

The concepts of "natural law" and the phrase "Laws of Nature" (of which Law of Nations is built upon) are found within the Declaration of Independence itself:

When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed

Those (& others) are clearly NOT derived from English law, but rather from natural law concepts (which can be found in Vattel's Law of Nations for ex.).

The Constitution

The concepts of "natural law" continued in the Constitution:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union
...
Article 1. section 8, clause 10:
"To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations"

Again, those phrases are not from English common law, but rather from natural law and even mention Vattel's book by name, "Law of Nations."

After the Constitution is penned

Founder and Historian David Ramsay Defines a Natural Born Citizen in 1789.
David Ramsay (April 2, 1749 to May 8, 1815) was an American physician, patriot, and historian from South Carolina and a delegate from that state to the Continental Congress in 1782-1783 and 1785-1786. He was the Acting President of the United States in Congress Assembled. He was one of the American Revolution’s first major historians. A contemporary of Washington, Ramsay writes with the knowledge and insights one acquires only by being personally involved in the events of the Founding period.

Ramsay REAFFIRMS the definition a Natural Born Citizen (born in country, to citizen parents (plural)) in 1789 A Dissertation on the Manners of Acquiring the Character and Privileges of a Citizen (1789)

The Naturalization Act of 1790, which states (in relevant part) "that the children of citizens [plural] of the United States that might be born beyond the sea, or out of the limits of the United States, should be considered as natural-born citizens"

Of course, the Act of 1790 was repealed by the Act of 1795 (which did NOT attempt to define or extend the definition for NBC). What the 1st Congress had tried to do in 1790 was to EXTEND the known definition (of born in country to citizen parentS) to those born outside of sovereign territory, to citizen parentS. Of course, they can't do that. Congress (by itself) doesn't have the Constitutional authority to define (or EXTEND) the Constitutional term "Natural Born Citizen." Only a SCOTUS decision on the intent of the framers, or an amendment to the Constitution can do that.

The same definition was referenced in the dicta of many early SCOTUS cases as well...some examples:

"THE VENUS, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 289 (1814) (Marshall, C.J. concurring) (cites Vattel’s definition of Natural Born Citizen)
SHANKS V. DUPONT, 28 U.S. 242, 245 (1830) (same definition without citing Vattel)
MINOR V. HAPPERSETT, 88 U.S.162,167-168 ( 1875) (same definition without citing Vattel)
EX PARTE REYNOLDS, 1879, 5 Dill., 394, 402 (same definition and cites Vattel)
UNITED STATES V WARD, 42 F.320 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1890) (same definition and cites Vattel.)"
http://www.scribd.com/doc/17519578/Kerchner-v-Obama-Congress-DOC-34-Plaintiffs-Brief-Opposing-Defendants-Motion-to-Dismiss

The New Englander, Volume 3 (1845) states: "The expression ‘citizen of the United States occurs in the clauses prescribing qualifications for Representatives, for Senators, and for President. In the latter, the term ‘natural born citizen’ is used and excludes all persons owing allegiance by birth to foreign states."
Note: the "New Englander" was NOT a student law review. The first student law review appeared 30 years later, in 1875/76 at the Albany Law School..

Vattel's definition for "natural born citizen" was read into the Congressional Record after the Civil War.
John Bingham, "father" of the 14th Amendment, the abolitionist congressman from Ohio who prosecuted Lincoln's assassins, REAFFIRMED the definition known to the framers by saying this:

commenting on Section 1992 said it means “every human being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a natural born citizen.” (Cong. Globe, 39th, 1st Sess., 1291 (1866))"

SCOTUS, in an 1887 case cites Vattel a number of times and reitterates that his work was translated into English in 1760:
"Vattel in his Law of Nations, which was first printed at Neuchatel in 1758, and was translated into English and published in England in 1760" U S v. ARJONA, 120 U.S. 479 (1887)

It's interesting to note that (non binding) Senate Resolution 511, which attempted to proclaim that Sen. John McCain was a "Natural Born Citizen" because he was born to citizen parentS, even they referenced the (repealed) Naturalization Act of 1790: "Whereas such limitations would be inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the `natural born Citizen' clause of the Constitution of the United States, as evidenced by the First Congress's own statute defining the term `natural born Citizen'".
Obama, himself, was a signatory of that resolution knowing full well (no doubt) the requirement has always been about 2 citizen parents.

The point is, with the exception of the repealed Act of 1790 which tried to EXTEND the definition, the meaning of the term "Natural Born Citizen" has ALWAYS been about being born within the sovereign territory or jurisdiction of the U.S. to 2 citizen parents (& therefore parents who do NOT owe allegiance to another, foreign, country).

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.