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Hey Ed,
No insult received...everything is fine. I respectfully have alternative viewpoints to yours.
1. I would not agree with you that the truth about one potential technological process to create improvised biological weapons should be delivered in a public format and therefore available to terrorists who would be likely to repeat that process. That would be irresponsible and potentially legally “complicatory” which is why I refuse to address technological issues on this blog. As far as conspiracy theories go, I wasn’t addressing them at all or promoting one view over another. My point is merely to say that if I see something on line that describes a process to create a weapon that can hurt people and that I know that process to not be of value, I am not going to correct it for the sake of “truth to the public”. I would hope that IF a terrorist was going to attack the people and couldn’t be stopped, that he or she would use such misinformation to develop his/her weapon. If people want to argue about conspiracy theories, that’s their right but I won’t engage in such discussions for the aforementioned reasons.

2. As an experienced scientist myself, I see your perspective when you are attempting to educate me as to the difference between theory and fact and will agree with you that there is a difference between the two. I will also provide the following though for your consideration. “Facts” are only as strong as the evidence upon which they are based and the people interpreting that evidence. A very, very important skill every scientist must develop is to analyze the methodology and results before agreeing or disagreeing with the conclusions. Quite well known scientists have had their conclusions “debunked” due to problems in their methodology...happens all of the time. One very public piece of information is that there was a very small amount of powder recovered for examination which means the sample size for the study was very small and subject to high degree of error and arguement. It’s like trying to draw conclusions on the lifestyles of the people of the world by only examing a couple of cultures. Sorry, I am not going to continue discussing the forensic conclusions or methodologies for the aforementioned security concerns.

Wish you the best, Ed. I’m very happy all of you are so dedicated to the investigation (we need to find the killer/killers) but I do just ask you to please keep in mind the security issues involved before you hit the “post” button. What you discover is important and hopefully the respective authorities are appreciative as you turn your information over to them.

Greetings everyone,
Just checking in before I have to go back to work. Very, very busy these days. Just one or two posts that I am going to address.

The first post actually I guess is in response to admin’s concern over the technological content on the blog. While I don’t believe it wise to be having that conversation in such an open forum, the first amendment allows you to do it unless you discuss classified information. I won’t go through and tell people what is correct and what is incorrect (when I am able to distinguish between them) simply because of the terrorism issue. Misinformation is a powerful ally that I won’t alienate.

With regards to Dr. Crockett, she is an excellent Biodefense expert with awesome mentors. I’m very happy to call her colleague and I very much respect her knowledge and opinions. I would not discard any theories to try and explain the different observations regarding the anthrax formulation as they are all just theories. No one except the attacker knows for sure how things were done and therefore which technique was effective. We haven’t been allowed to do the required testing (to support theory) in the USA since the end of the offensive component of our BW program in 1969.

Wow, you folks have been busy while I have been away. Here are some responses for you.

Post 56 - I most definitely am not saying in my dissertation that microbiologists are the people we need to turn to for our biodefense expertise. In fact I am saying the exact opposite, that though they are an important source of SOME types of information, there is an over-reliance upon them due to our own ignorance of biological weapons. We don’t know any better than to rely upon them, physicians, and public health experts. All of them are important BUT all of them have particular areas of expertise that only provide a small part of the picture. Biodefense is a highly eclectic science.

Post 65 Yes, faulty intelligence analysis occurs as a result of overreliance upon the people we incorrectly believe to be fully qualified. The example regarding growth in a mineral media was Burkholderia mallei (causative agent of glanders). Another example was Yersinia pestis (causative agent of plague). Just because an agent grows in a lab by a microbiologist under certain conditions does not mean that the requirements remain the same while production is scaled up. This would apply to growth of both harmful and beneficial organsisms.

Post 78 - Sorry, Dr. Alibek is completely engaged in building his biopharmaceutical production facility, the hospitals, hospice, and a whole host of other healthcare related endeavors. I choose not to distract him.

Take care, I’ll check back in next weekend.
Debra

I’m sure he was just playfully teasing TR. :)

Hey TR,
What I meant by “coating with resin” in the original post was in reference to how it was phrased in the document to which you directed my attention. What they said in that original article was incorrect.

It should be obvious why I won’t go into detail on this topic but lets try it this way:

Yes, there were three main components in the Stepnogorsk anthrax formulation...I won’t identify them. We were only told about them during a discussion on the complexities of making a biological weapon so that we would understand how to evaluate someone else’s work and the level of threat their weapon posed. Even with this level of knowledge, we would not be able to reproduce the work as Dr. Alibek never gave us more than what we needed. “He was training biodefense experts, not bioterrorists” was a phrase that circulated around the students.

Aside from the fact that one could not just mix these three ingredients as one so chose and mix them at a time as one so chose, I’ll offer this last comment. None of the three primary ingredients was used to help anything stick to anything. The issues were completely different.

Next time I have a chemistry question, though, I’m asking you!

I’m trying to get geocities to help me with a website so that I can upload my dissertation for the public but am having problems with the page builder. I’ll let everyone know when I have the technical difficulties conquered. My new email address is Anderson51704@yahoo.com.

Interesting comment about Charlie Bailey’s knowledge of weaponization. Let me phrase this diplomatically because I see that there is a misconception about his area of expertise.

First - check and see how long Dr. Bailey was head of USAMRIID and under what circumstances he came to that position and left that position. When learning that, take into consideration how the military works (I used to be an MP so I can say that).

second - USAMRIID is a lab like any other lab except that they have some hot agents. Just because a person works there doesn’t mean they know ANYTHING about biological weapons. It only means that they know about biological agents. Be careful on that assumption.

third - for those of you who don’t work in academia, people who are not involved in research projects do sometimes get listed on publications just because of their administrative responsibilities rather than their scientific expertise and contribution. Always ask the authors to tell you their contributions. If they can’t explain, then you know they are only on there either out of courtesy (it does happen) or because they inserted themselves before publication (that happens too).

Dr. Bailey is an entomologist and studied Rift Valley Fever (I believe) and probably some other microbes too but you’d have to ask him what they were. It does not make him a BW expert anymore than being the senior Mason biodefense education program administrator makes him a BW expert. In some areas, he has far more knowledge than I do and he has my respect in those areas but I seriously doubt that he knows how to make anthrax biological weapon much less any biological weapon. Why would he?

TR - Lots of different Debra Andersons out there and this one was somebody else. My charitable donations go to supporting 4 children a month through CCF (Charity, Zachary, Supat, and Juan Carlos). That’s the extent of my generous spirit (financially)

Regarding the accident at Sverdlovsk - Dr. Alibek wasn't involved in that. Sverdlovsk was and still is a military facility. Dr. Alibek worked at civilian facilities only. It says in that same article you quote that he was just beginning his career at Biopreparat. Dr. Alibek worked at the Siberian branch of the Institute of Applied Biochemistry near Berdsk from 1976 to 1979 then transferred to the Eastern European scientific branch of the Institute of Applied Biochemistry near Omutninsk. After Omutninsk, he went to Stepnogorsk and then on to Moscow. He knows about the accident because of interactions with people from Sverdlovsk, not because he worked there. As far as the "improvements" to the Sverdlovsk anthrax formulation, the information you have listed is not correct. He did reduce the amount of formulation required as compared to the Sverdlovsk formulation but the way it was done has nothing to do with what you describe as far as plastic and resin. Enhancing "flyability" was something else he did but it isn't related to decreasing the amount of formulation required. As far as coating the spores in resin, that is incorrect too. Though for obvious common sense reasons I won't elaborate further, I'll just point out that coating spores in resin would increase their particle size and mass, decreasing their ability to "float". Sorry, don't know where you received your information but sadly much of what I have seen printed is incorrect. It is really frustrating to be somewhere, hear what he actually says, and then see how incorrect what actually gets printed is from what he said. jpl - thanks so much for that. I couldn’t agree with you more about the naivety within the university system as regards to foreign governments using our educational institutions to train their people. Iraq was especially guilty of this. One of our students actually wrote her dissertation about such vulnerability but during the defense, 2 of her committee members resigned from her committee allegedly due to fear of repercussions from the university administration. Regarding Dr. Alibek, it is natural that you don’t trust him because, as you volunteered, you don’t know him. Zacandpook - thanks for jumping in. All - I am having problems with my email address and will post a new one once they are resolved. Debra

Dear Reader,
Because I am so disappointed that more people don’t take the time to write pleasant and inspiring articles about people rather than write articles showing the darkness and despair within humanity, I am going to tell you in this very public format about Dr. Ken Alibek, a man who I am very honored and privileged to call mentor and friend. If you want to know the truth about this man, keep reading.

Since I mentioned my lack of appreciation for articles that just show the darkness and despair within humanity, I would first like to briefly address David Willman’s July 1, 2007 article about Dr. Alibek. Since I am quite familiar with most everything Mr. Willman described, it made me absolutely furious to see such a biased article full of “inaccuracies” (to use a more polite term). Though I would dearly love to discredit the author and the newspaper, I won’t. I won’t engage the author and the newspaper simply because Dr. Alibek asked me to join him in forgiving them for printing such a biased story full of “inaccuracies” and I agreed to try. It will be exceedingly difficult for me to forgive them as I lack the incredible strength of character required to forgive such a heinous crime. Dr. Alibek does not suffer from the same insufficiency of character…he has already forgiven them.

My husband and I have had the pleasure of knowing this man for three years and we both know him to be an extraordinary individual possessing many fine qualities not apparent to people distracted by his previous work for the former Soviet Army. In fact, I’m confident I know him rather well and that his humility is going to keep him from enjoying this exposition should he ever learn of its existence. Yet I will take the chance of incurring his displeasure in order to tell you about him, someone who is very special in this world. I will preface the rest of my comments by offering forgiveness at this time to those who respond negatively to this posting and just extend my apologies to them as they haven’t had the opportunity my husband and I have had to know such a fine individual.

Yes, Dr. Alibek was highly skilled at making biological weapons for the former Soviet Union but what does that really mean?
1. People gasp when they hear the words chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons but why do they respond that way? It is because they are conditioned to respond that way to weapons of mass casualty or weapons of mass destruction. My perspective is a little different as I view them less passionately along with all of the other weapons man has created to take the life of an adversary…they are all unfortunate innovations. Though I don’t like them, I understand that they are just natural progressions in the development of more effective weapons for war and it makes no sense to vilify their developers any more than the developers of any other weapon. I don’t see the criticisms of those people who invented tanks, grenades, or machine guns. An easy example would be the M249 Light Machine Gun used by troops in our military as it can fire up to 1000 rounds per minute. I have no idea who invented it probably because a weapon with the potential to kill 1000 adversaries/minute doesn’t make the headlines yet its destructive power is obvious.
2. People don’t understand that the process to manufacture biological weapons is very similar to the process to manufacture biopharmaceuticals (but with some important differences). To manufacture biological weapons requires great expertise in biotechnology that can be applied to a variety of products. Dr. Alibek made major improvements to mass production capabilities in the biotechnology field but instead of focusing on what innovative knowledge he has to offer our biotech industry, people focus just on the one product that was of the greatest interest to the former Soviet government, a government at war, and forget that he also produced sera, antibiotics, vaccines, and interferon. He performed a vast amount of work to improve the health of people during those times and he does an unbelievable amount of work to improve the health and welfare of people now. “Dr. Ken Alibek producing biopharmaceuticals that could save the lives of millions of sick children” isn’t nearly as attractive a headline to the masses as “Selling the Threat of Bioterrorism” so you will never see it published anywhere…yet it is the truth. Regardless, he works twice as hard as men half his age in order to ease the suffering of the world’s people. He is a physician not only by training but also by nature.

Instead of discussing events at George Mason University that have been called into question, I will direct you to the information posted online by Ann Workman and ask you to decide for yourself if there is more to the story than what Mr. Willman published. Though I don’t like the use of the term “fascinating”, the documents provided are genuine though I know the information that had the most potential to damage the reputation of the University was removed before posting. Regardless, I believe the documents demonstrate the extreme integrity and motivations of Dr. Ken Alibek and give the reader some insights into the man himself.

You have very patiently waited for me to tell you about Ken Alibek, the man. “What is he like?” is a very common question asked of me and my husband and I will tell you what I tell everyone. First, Dr. Alibek really isn’t going to like that I do this for you because he is a very humble man but I know that he will forgive me.

In addition to his great capacity for forgiveness, the man truly is brilliant and innovative. One misconception I want to clear up right now is about whether or not ironing letters can kill anthrax (B. anthracis) spores. This thoughtful suggestion to people who were really panicked about the possibility of receiving a contaminated letter was discredited, but later Marc Roberge (a high school senior and son of a prominent CDC scientist) conducted an experiment that supported Dr. Alibek’s statement. Mr. Roberge’s experiment and results were to be published in a peer reviewed journal but I haven’t looked for the publication.

I already mentioned throughout this letter that Dr. Alibek is brilliant, innovative, humble, forgiving, strong, and hardworking. He is also very kind, generous, and thoughtful but as the saying goes - do not mistake his kindness for weakness. He is a consummate professional and a highly skilled businessman with noble intentions. He is absolutely dedicated to helping other people…a genuine philanthropist. Additionally, people who truly know him will tell you that he is a man of high integrity as well as a loyal and trustworthy friend. My husband and I are truly fortunate and proud to have him in our lives.

Dr. Debra Anderson
debra51704@yahoo.com

Very interesting reading but unfortunately I have no more facts to offer as most everything described was from before my arrival at Mason. Cheers.

In fact, after a few minutes consideration, I know there are a number of other fax machines distributed between at least the two buildings if not all three of the buildings.

I have absolutely no knowledge about Timimi or to what he had access.

ZacandPook,
You ask a lot of questions, most of which I can’t answer. I didn’t arrive at Mason until 2004 so have no direct knowledge regarding Timimi nor do I believe everything I read or hear. I only like to deal in facts which is why I despise the bag of lies and omissions written by David Willman.

So here are some facts for you. ATCC is across the street from George Mason University however they do have some additional space in Discovery Hall. I imagine they lease that space from either the University or the State but couldn’t tell you for sure.

Discovery Hall is a secure building but then again so is my apartment complex and my apartment. During business hours, the entry doors are unlocked and there is a security person at the front desk to check badges or student ID’s. After hours, people that have been granted authorized access by the Mason Police Dept (upon receipt of the appropriate documents) can use their card at the card reader to unlock the door and gain access to the building. It is not easy to establish one’s need to enter the building after hours however was granted such access due to the experiments I was conducting and my school schedule.

Once inside the building, there are additional security measures in place however it would be irresponsible for me to describe them in detail. What I will say is this...just because you have access to the building does not mean you have access to the Mason labs and certainly we had no access to the ATCC section. If we needed something from ATCC, we would order it just like any other company and it would actually be sent through UPS/FedEx just like for any other customer. I always thought that was very funny as it would have taken less time to walk across the street but we had no special access.

Now, why the security? The university has absolutely nothing of interest in the building except the standard lab supplies and equipment that could be found in any university laboratory. The bottom floor doesn’t even have any labs...just offices. I believe the security was mostly for theft control and such measures can be found even in a department store. You give the Center for Biodefense far too much mystery...it was just ordinary faculty offices and some BSL-2 labs...that’s it. The building was designed to have a BSL-3 lab suite however it was not used for that purpose...it wasn’t even completely set up for use at that level. I did general microbiology work on a vaccine strain (non pathogenic) of Francisella tularensis in that very suit and when I left, it was being used for extra storage space. I wouldn’t know if ATCC had a BSL-3 lab as we had no access to that area.

When talking about catalog rights in regards to students, we would be talking about a contract between the university and the students when the students are admitted to the program. Students agree to pay for the training specified in the catalog however were extremely displeased when the university changed things to the point where students could obtain the education for which they were paying. For my personal example, I was to earn a concentration in medical biodefense however they removed the courses I needed to take in order to do that other than “in name only”. There are many examples but they are not for this format. Suffice to say, students stopped receiving the education for which they were paying.

As far as security clearances go, it was just a standard university lab facility undeserving of such mystery and intrigue. Possession of security clearances were irrelevant. And as for access to the computer system, I had access too. It was nothing except access to the internet (just like at home) and whatever files you cared to save on your computer at work. Again, no mystery involved. Not even an intranet system.

I don’t wish to discuss my knowledge of any patents or publications having to do with Dr. Alibek, Dr. Bailey, or Dr. Morozov not because there is any intrigue about them but because I don’t have the full story regarding ownership or authorship. Without Dr. Bailey’s side of the story, I will keep my knowledge to myself as it is the responsible thing to do. You would have to ask Dr. Bailey for his level of involvement (contributions) regarding the patents and publications just as Mr. Willman should have asked Dr. Alibek for his side of the story.

I don’t understand what the big fuss is about regarding fax machines but at the time that I was there, I know of two different fax machines. One was in Occoquan Hall and one was in Discovery Hall. There may have been more but I know there were at least two of them.

In closing, don’t think about the Center like a small version of USAMRIID with classified work being executed and mysterious characters lurking about. Nothing could be further from the truth. It was just the regular university lab space complete with lack of supplies, broken equipment, and hardworking faculty and students. Nothing special.

Hope this helps.

Thank you for your additions to this conversation. Timimi was no longer at Mason when I arrived on scene but I know everyone else you mentioned as I used to work with them and was a student of and assistant to Dr. Alibek. There are two points I wish to address:

1. Re: The limitations on technical education and training that were imposed without being communicated. There were no such limitations imposed. Students could do research alongside the Molecular and Microbiology Faculty at the Center if they had the appropriate biology backgrounds (many didn’t but I did) and they could take advantage of internships and other employment opportunities offsite. Additionally, Dr. Alibek worked hard to provide his students with a variety of important opportunities both inside the laboratory and outside the laboratory. Though he did these types of things for many students, I’ll give you just a few personal examples to illustrate then get back on point: He offered me and other students challenging jobs within his company; He used his contacts to help others find jobs in other companies; He took half a day to meet with an associate of his to try and help me get a position in his associate’s organization; He arranged for me to help him teach biodefense courses (he declined most of the compensation and arranged for it to be given to me instead); He has asked me to stand in for him at some professional events; He introduced me as an expert at a national conference and gave me his speaking time so that I could present my work and establish my career; He arranged for me to provide the background material and to be interviewed for a Discovery Channel special on biological weapons; He arranged for me and some other students to jointly write a series of books for publication (he declined all compensation); When I ran out of money, he offered me a summertime position in his company (I declined because the wages were too high for the amount of work...he knew I was in financial trouble); And the new animal research facility to be built was intended to be staffed by students and graduates of the biodefense program.

From personal experience and knowledge from working both at the Center in the labs and from working for Dr. Alibek, there were no limitations on technical knowledge and training imposed upon the biodefense students who had backgrounds appropriate to the type of work you describe. It is absolutely vital to remember that laboratory based science is but a small (yet critical) part of the eclectic science of biodefense but many opportunities were definitely available to the students. It is also important to mention that the Center did not have highly pathogenic agents nor did we have access to them through ATCC, a secure facility.

2. Re: Capability of his students to build a biological weapon in the garage. Dr. Alibek is an extremely educated and experienced individual with an extraordinarily high degree of expertise in medicine, biotechnology, microbiology, and immunology as well as other areas less pertinent to this discussion (his knowledge of history is amazing). While he is sufficiently skilled to produce anti-cancer and cardiovascular disease drugs without any effort, his students lack such capability.

He did provide his students with the very sophisticated knowledge required to understand biological weapons (much more complex than biological agents) however he withheld a sufficient amount of information to make it extremely difficult for us to “build biological weapons in our garages”. When he says the information is available, he means that the information is available to all members of the public willing to sift through a large number of publications to assemble a variety of details important to the process. Once all of the details are collected, the interested parties would still have to devote all of the time required to assemble what can be a very complicated puzzle depending upon the type of weapon and attack they had in mind. It could take many, many years of trial and error for a group to develop an effective biological weapon useful for a sophisticated, mass casualty attack or it could take a few weeks to months to develop a biological dispersion device capable of achieving fewer casualties but still terrorizing the public.

Dr. Alibek trained us to understand and defend against biological weapons, not to build them. As probably one of the most educated of his students, having helped him with his courses on numerous occasions and having helped him teach some of his courses elsewhere, even I lack sufficient capability, not to mention I completely lack the motivation, to build a sophisticated biological weapon. But I do understand them and the threat exceptionally well thanks to amazing mentors (Ken Alibek and Peter Leitner) who worked tirelessly to raise awareness and to prepare a generation of defense experts trained to understand the differences between biological agents and biological weapons, the threats posed by biological weapons, and how to mount a comprehensive and multi-layered defense against them.

Now graduated and working in national security, seeing first hand what little knowledge about biological weapons (again, more complex than biological agents) remains in the community and how this dilemma is driving misplanning, I can promise you that loss of the unique education program Ken Alibek and Peter Leitner developed at Mason isn’t helpful (to put it mildly). In order to fix the problem, I need the assistance of other people who have been trained by these experts in a program that was dovetailed to provide comprehensive knowledge yet there are only a handful of graduates. It is a tremendous amount of work for so few people, even with the crucial cooperation of the many fine experts in microbiology, medicine, public health, etc. The situation is in serious and immediate need of resolution.