Facts and Myths - an examination of McPherson's "Causes of the Civil War" essay

myself

[GOPcapitalist]

Some of the pro-north activists around here have been asking for a factual refutation of McPherson. Since I'm too cheap to purchase "Battle Cry" due to the fact that its revenues go into the pocket of an avowed Democrat with marxist political affiliations, I decided to examine his positions in one of those free articles on the web. Here goes...

The following is intended as a refutation and analysis of the main arguments found in James McPherson's article "The Civil War: Causes and Results." I've broken it down by section to address his arguments in detail. His statements are selected in order as they appeared in the original essay and presented in bold below:

I. "To be sure, conflicts of interest occurred between the agricultural South and the industrializing North. But issues like tariffs, banks, and land grants divided parties and interest groups more than they did North and South."

McPherson is using a red herring when he states that tariffs et al divided parties instead of the country's two regions as the inescapable partisan situation throughout the war revolved around an exclusively sectional northern political party. The Republican party of the north was indisputably protectionist and heavily emphasized protectionism in its 1860 platform. The remaining partisan divisions during the war consisted mostly of southern Democrats and northern Democrats. The former played a dominant role in the confederacy. The latter came to encompass the anti-war copperheads, the peace Democrats, the anti-draft Democrats, the McClellanites, and a number of other similar factions generally supportive of the idea that the war should be waged in greater moderation, in a more limited capacity, or not at all.

In short this created a war/political climate consisting of one group for the war as it was being waged (the Republicans) and two disapproving of the way the war was being waged - the confederates who were obviously opposed to the invasion and the northern democrats who sought a more restrained war or an end to it all together. Accordingly it can be accurately said that the sectional proponents of war against the confederacy as it was being waged were almost exclusively from the strongly pro-tariff Republican Party. Comparatively the southern confederates expressed solid opposition to the tariff. As the war itself was conducted between the northern Republicans and the southern Confederates, McPherson's implication that the tariff issue did not break on the same lines as the war is historically inaccurate, deceptively presented, and flat out absurd.

II. "The South in the 1840s and 1850s had its advocates of industrialization and protective tariffs, just as the North had its millions of farmers and its low-tariff, antibank Democratic majority in many states."

This is another red herring on McPherson's part. On any given issue of practically any nature it is typically possible to find an advocate opinion in the midst of a crowd of opponents. So naturally there were some pro-tariff southerners and anti-tariff northerners. What McPherson fails to concede though is that both were a minority among the two dynamically opposed entities at the center of the war itself - the northern Republicans and the southern Confederates. The Republicans were very pro-tariff and openly indicated so platforms. The Confederates opposed the tariffs being pushed by the north and cited it frequently among their grievances for secession. As for the northern Democrats McPherson mentions, that is well and good except that he conveniently neglects their differing view from the Republicans on how to wage the war.

III. "The Civil War was not fought over the issue of tariff or of industrialization or of land grants."

While it cannot in any reasonable manner be said that the war was fought exclusively on tariffs or any other issue, to deny this as McPherson does above is simply dishonest. Northern advocacy of the tariff had been an issue since the Spring of 1860 when the House took up the Morrill bill. Southern opposition to it, aside from dating back decades to the nullification crisis, appeared in both Congress and the conduction of secession by the states. Witness just a small sample of the historical record on the issue of protectionism and tariff collection from 1860-61, broken down here between northern and southern sides:
 

NORTH/REPUBLICAN:

"That, while providing revenue for the support of the General Government by duties upon imposts, sound policy requires such an adjustment of the imposts as to encourage the development of the industrial interest of the whole country, and we commend that policy of national exchanges which secures to the working men liberal wages, to agriculture remunerating prices, to mechanics and manufacturers an adequate reward for their skill, labor and enterprise, and to the nation commercial prosperity and independence." - Republican Party Platform of 1860

"According to my political education, I am inclined to believe that the people in the various sections of the country should have their own views carried out through their representatives in Congress, and if the consideration of the Tariff bill should be postponed until the next session of the National Legislature, no subject should engage your representatives more closely than that of a tariff" - President-Elect Abraham Lincoln, February 15, 1861
 

SOUTH/CONFEDERATE:

"Resolved, That in as much as the movements now made in Congress of the United States of North America, and the incoming administration thereof, threaten to blockade our ports, force revenues, suspend postal arrangements, destroy commerce, ruin trade, depreciate currency, invade sovereign States, burn cities, butcher armies, gibbet patriots, hang veterans, oppress freemen, blot our liberty, beggar homes, widow mothers, orphan children, and desolate the peace and happiness of the nation with fire and sword,-these things to do, and not to disappoint the expectation of those who have given him their votes. Now, against these things we, in the name of right, the Constitution, and a just God, solemnly enter our protest; and further, when that which is manifested shall have come upon the country, we say to Tennessee: Let slip the dogs of war and cry havoc!" - Resolution of Franklin County, Tennessee for secession, adopted unanimously at Winchester, February 25, 1861

"You suppose that numbers constitute the strength of government in this day. I tell you that it is not blood; it is the military chest; it is the almighty dollar. When you have lost your market; when your operatives are turned out; when your capitalists are broken, will you go to direct taxation?" - Louis T. Wigfall, United States Senate, December 1860

IV. "Nor was it a consequence of false issues invented by demagogues."

Contrary to McPherson's assertions, a strong argument may be made regarding the nature of the core issue upon which Lincoln waged his war. As Lincoln famously expressed in his letter to Horace Greeley, his public line was "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union." Lincoln was gifted with significant rhetorical skills and publicly alleged the theme of "The Union" as his basis for action throughout the war. His use of the issue of unionism is peculiar as it bears an uncanny resemblance to a thoroughly reasoned prediction made by Alexis de Tocqueville thirty years earlier regarding the event of secession itself:

"If it be supposed that among the states that are united by the federal tie there are some which exclusively enjoy the principal advantages of union, or whose prosperity entirely depends on the duration of that union, it is unquestionable that they will always be ready to support the central government in enforcing the obedience of the others. But the government would then be exerting a force not derived from itself, but from a principle contrary to its nature. States form confederations in order to derive equal advantages from their union; and in the case just alluded to, the Federal government would derive its power from the unequal distribution of those benefits among the states.

If one of the federated states acquires a preponderance sufficiently great to enable it to take exclusive possession of the central authority, it will consider the other states as subject provinces and will cause its own supremacy to be respected under the borrowed name of the sovereignty of the Union. Great things may then be done in the name of the Federal government, but in reality that government will have ceased to exist." - Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Book I, Chapter 18 (emphasis added)

In light of northern behavior as it occurred, Tocqueville's observation was largely proven valid. Economically, the north stood to face a competitive disadvantage in the event of southern secession. Simply speaking, secession posed to expose the northern industrial economy to european economic competition it had sought to escape by way of protectionist policies - if European goods could be purchased by southerners without tariffs their prices were often lower than northern substitutes, hence consumers shift to the cheaper European products. That situation is even further complicated if cheaper European goods brought in with low tariffs in the south make their way up north and compete on the market there with northern products. Accordingly on economic policy the north had a very clear advantage to be had from the continuance of the union as one. That is what Wigfall was referring to when he asked what the north would do when it lost its market.

It is also an evidenced very strongly in Lincoln's war policy. From the moment secession became an issue, Lincoln expressed a near obsessive desire to do one thing - enforce revenue collection in the south and seceded states. As early as December of 1860 he wrote private letters to his military commanders emphasizing the need to maintain or recapture southern forts to ensure revenue collection. When he instituted his blockage Lincoln explicitly legitimized it on the issue of revenue collection. When he spoke before safely pro-tariff northern audiences he pledged his dedication was to revenue collection. This was the sole issue of his letter to Salmon Chase on March 18, 1861 about what to do with secession:

"Sir I shall be obliged if you will inform me whether any goods, wares and merchandize, subject by law to the payment of duties, are now being imported into the United States without such duties being paid, or secured according to law. And if yea, at what place or places? and for what cause do such duties remain unpaid, or [un]secured? I will also thank you for your opinion whether, as a matter of fact, vessels off shore could be effectively used to prevent such importation, or to enforce the payment or securing of the duties." - Lincoln to Chase, March 18, 1861

In one speech to a northern audience from February 1861 Lincoln even admitted that "marching of an army into South California, for instance, without the consent of her people, and in hostility against them...would be invasion, and it would be coercion too." But he continued to argue that if he did was simply insisting on "the collection of duties upon foreign importations" among other things, it would not be "coercion." All of this differs significantly with the official line that he was acting only to preserve the union, suggesting that just as Tocqueville predicted, the use of the union's sovereignty was a "borrowed name." And if borrowing an attractive name to publicly promote as a whole while simultaneously arguing a less attractive one in private and among allies does not constitute the invention of an issue, I do not know what does. I will concede that even the degree of Lincoln's engagement in this tactic is a matter of wide debate, but for McPherson to deny its presence all together is yet another case of historical inaccuracy on his part.

V. "What lay at the root of this separation? Slavery. It was the sole institution not shared by North and South. The peculiar institution defined the South."

First off, McPherson's assertion that slavery was a solely unshared by North and South is historically inaccurate. A number of northern states on the borders openly practiced and permitted slavery until after the war and with Lincoln's full consent - Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, federal controlled regions of Kentucky and Missouri, and even New Jersey, where the slavery that had been abolished there about two decades earlier had grandfathered persons in slavery at the time of abolition.

Second, to suggest as McPherson does is to lie about the sentiments of large portions of the northern population, as the northern population was NOT an abolitionist body opposed to slavery in 1861 or anything even remotely of the sort. A majority of northerners were opponents of abolition at the time of the war, Lincoln included among them. The abolitionist crowd represented less than 10% of the northern population by most estimates. Among the remainder, divisions in treatment of slavery as it existed were widespread. Few statistics measure the exact breakdown of the population, though estimates based on candidacies, electoral data, and other sources of public sentiment were made at the time. The general range of northern opinion included a wide spectrum. Included were those who tolerated the institution entirely and those who tolerated it in a limited sense. One major division were those who favored its continuation so long as it was contained entirely to the south. Many since then have tried to claim that the non-extension belief was some sort of a principled long-term plan to kill off slavery where it existed (this interpretation of the non-extension position was popularized by Karl Marx in 1861). But evidence of the time suggests that the motives for the non-extension policy among many if not most of its proponents were much more political and economic based than principle oriented. Economically, a non-extension policy on slavery was believed to be an economic restriction on job competition for white northern laborers. That's right - the north of 1861 was full of bigots and racists who feared black people, slave or free and based solely on their skin color, to the extent that they did not even want them to labor in their company. Alexis de Tocqueville similarly noticed this about the north thirty years earlier. Lincoln had also noticed it in his 1858 senate debates where he consciously advocated racial supremacy before audiences he suspected to be composed of what have been termed "negrophobes," only to turn around and advocate racial equality to crowds perceived as more abolition-friendly. Lincoln also advocated the "white labor" position as a reason to oppose extension of slavery into the territories, including in one of the most famous speeches of his career:

"Whether slavery shall go into Nebraska, or other new Territories, is not a matter of exclusive concern to the people who may go there. The whole nation is interested that the best use shall be made of these Territories. We want them for homes of free white people. This they cannot be, to any considerable extent, if slavery shall be planted within them. Slave States are places for poor white people to remove from, not to remove to." - Abraham Lincoln, October 16, 1854, Peoria, IL

A second major reason behind the non-extension policy was purely political - control of the senate broke on sectional lines. By allowing slavery in the territories, southerners hoped to eventually create new states on the shared issue of slavery that would also vote with them on sectional disputes. By opposing slavery in the territories, northerners hoped to do the opposite and create a state that would vote with them on sectional disputes. This is evidenced repeatedly during the pre-1860 compromises pushed by Clay, Douglas, and others - they addressed the senate division by preserving an even split. To do so they simultaneously admitted a slave territory and a free territory as states.

Now, that having been said it is perfect proper to admit and consider slavery as a major and prominent issue during the war. To refuse it would be to deny history and engage in absurdity. But to do as McPherson, Marx, and other persons who advocate an historical view heavily skewered to the yankee side do and purport slavery to be the sole issue is similarly a violation of historical accuracy. Above all else the war was an inescapably complex issue with inescapably complex roots. In order to reduce the war to a single issue, one must reduce it from the complex to the simple. Since the war by its very nature consists of a point of irreducible complexity in its roots, to push beyond that point is to violate the irreducibly complex. That is McPherson's flaw as it is the flaw of the many others who share his position.

VI. "What explained the growing Northern hostility to slavery? Since 1831 the militant phase of the abolitionist movement had crusaded against bondage as unchristian, immoral, and a violation of the republican principle of equality on which the nation had been founded. The fact that this land of liberty had become the world's largest slaveholding nation seemed a shameful anomaly to an increasing number of Northerners. "The monstrous injustice of slavery," said Lincoln in 1854, "deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world - enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to taunt us as hypocrites." Slavery degraded not only the slaves, argued Northerners opposed to its expansion, by demeaning the dignity of labor and dragging down the wages of all workers; it also degraded free people who owned no slaves. If slavery goes into the territories, declared abolitionists, "the free labor of all the states will not.... If the free labor of the states goes there, the slave labor of the southern states will not, and in a few years the country will teem with an active and energetic population." The contest over expansion of slavery into the territories thus became a contest over the future of America, for these territories held the balance of power between slavery and freedom."

This entire passage of McPherson commits the same error of assumption made earlier about northern beliefs on slavery and non-expansion. McPherson severely overstates the size of the northern abolitionist population and illegitimately implies a shared affiliation between them and Lincoln. In reality, Lincoln was perfectly willing to permit the continuation of slavery to the point that he used his first inaugural address to endorse a recently passed but unratified constitutional amendment to protect the institution of slavery where it existed. Had it been ratified as Lincoln wanted, slavery's life would have been artificially extended in America beyond its natural decline worldwide. That is why true abolitionists including William Lloyd Garrison and Lysander Spooner publicly identified Lincoln as a fraud, even after the 13th amendment.

McPherson's statement above further neglects the presence of what has been accurately termed as northern "negrophobia" in 1861. Included are the economic motives asserted by Lincoln and others for non-extension that were noted earlier. The less than pure motives for northern opposition to slavery's expansion were well known in their day, including having been noticed by some of the greatest minds - and anti-slavery advocates - of western history. Alexis de Tocqueville readily observed that northerners did not oppose slavery for the benefit of the slaves, but rather for the benefit of themselves. Charles Dickens noticed the same was still the case thirty years later. Both men were prominent opponents of slavery.

VII. "Proslavery advocates countered that the bondage of blacks was the basis of liberty for whites.  Slavery elevated all whites to an equality of status and dignity by confining menial labor and caste subordination to blacks. "If slaves are freed," said Southerners, whites "will become menials. We will lose every right and liberty which belongs to the name of freemen."

His blatant generalizations aside, McPherson's statement above, as has been seen, perhaps better resembles the position taken by the northern "negrophobes" than any other faction in the country. Northern bigots saw the mere presence of persons of other skin colors as a threat to white livelihood and accordingly legislated blacks out of their towns, cities, and states. Many wanted blacks to be kept out of the territories for the reason Lincoln stated at Peoria in 1854 and sought to address the presence of blacks by restricting them out of white society all together through segregation, statute, and coercion - the exact type of bondage mattered little to these bigots, so long as they were "on top" and didn't perceive any economic threat posed by their labor. Lincoln took this very position in one of his debates with Stephen Douglas:

"I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races - that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of making voters or jurors of Negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race." - Abraham Lincoln, August 17, 1858

VIII. "A Northern antislavery party would dominate the future. Slavery was doomed if the South remained in the Union."

Untrue, and had Lincoln gotten his way and ratified his pro-slavery amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1861, the exact opposite would have been true. During his Inaugural Address, Lincoln made the following statement:

"I understand a proposed amendment to the Constitution?which amendment, however, I have not seen?has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal
Government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I
depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable." - Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861

The amendment he was referring to had passed congress with a 2/3rds majority less than a week earlier, owing its passage to what eyewitness Henry Adams described as the "direct influence" of Abraham Lincoln himself (Lincoln was fibbing when he claimed in his inaugural to have "not yet seen" the amendment). The amendment Lincoln got passed read:

Article Thirteen.
"No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic
institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State."

It would have effectively made slavery untouchable by any future constitutional amendment, thereby preventing at any time in the future what became the actual 13th amendment and prolonging the existence of slavery where it existed beyond a possible future abolition by peaceful means.

IX. "If the new Lincoln administration and the Northern people had been willing to accept secession, the two halves of the former United States might have coexisted in an uneasy peace. But most Northerners were not willing to tolerate the dismemberment of the United States."

McPherson is fibbing here, pure and simple. Most honest historians recognize the presence of a significant anti-war sentiment among the northern population and even a belief in "simply letting them go." This sentiment emerged at times throughout the war, especially in the early days when the north had suffered several glaring defeats by smaller sized confederate forces. Throughout much of his presidency Lincoln consciously worked tirelessly to achieve what McPherson dishonestly purports to have already been there. He did it both by persuasion and, in certain more dubious cases, coercion. The latter occurred when he unconstitutionally suspended habeas corpus among other things. Federal forces were similarly used to impede the properly seated legislatures of Maryland and Missouri, forcing many of the former state's into prison without cause and the latter's to flee south and reconvene in a rump session.

X. "Lincoln intended to maintain the federal garrison at Fort Sumter in Charleston Bay as a symbol of national sovereignty in the Confederate states, in the hope that a reaction toward Unionism in those states would eventually bring them back."

McPherson is fibbing again. Lincoln's private correspondence to military commanders over the issue of Fort Sumter were near obsessively concerned with the collection of revenue. Surviving from Lincoln's cabinet meetings on the subject of how to address Fort Sumter also include a lengthy list of the "pros and cons" of holding the fort. Clearly identified among them as a "con" is the statement recognizing the federal presence at Charleston as having the effect of exacerbating secessionist sympathies much like a thorn in the side of South Carolina. It states that "(t)he abandonment of the Post would remove a source of irritation of the Southern people and deprive the secession movement of one of its most powerful stimulants."

XI. "To forestall this happening, the Confederate army attacked Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861"

McPherson's fibbing continues in the above statement, which immediately follows the statement he made in what I have identified as item X. The historical record shows the above statement to be bizarre, unusual, and largely fabricated out of thin air. The confederate attack was not made randomly on April 12th to stop some unknown resurgence of unionism in South Carolina. It was fired on in direct response to military maneuvers on the fort that had been launched by Lincoln earlier that week. On April 5 Lincoln notified Governor Francis Pickens of South Carolina that he would be attempting to peacefully reprovision Fort Sumter with supplies. Shortly thereafter he instructed his military to send out a fleet of federal warships containing the food as well as heavy reenforcements and weaponry. Explicit orders were to go to Sumter and if the Confederates refused to let them enter the fort, open fire and fight their way in. Confederate intelligence, knowing of Lincoln's earlier message to Pickens, caught wind of the operation by discovering the ships had been sent to sea. Beauregard was notified and opened fire on the fort to preempt the fleet's arrival, which turned out to be only a day away. Lincoln's fleet got there a day late, though just in time for Beauregard to allow the garrison safe passage to them and back up north. Needless to say, Abraham Lincoln did not consider the move in any way a failure as he had provoked the confederates into firing the first shot, even though it did not happen the way he anticipated. He openly admitted this in a personal letter to Captain Gustavus Fox, who he had tasked to lead the expedition:

"I sincerely regret that the failure of the late attempt to provision Fort-Sumpter, should be the source of any annoyance to you. The practicability of your plan was not, in fact, brought to a test. By reason of a gale, well known in advance to be possible, and not improbable, the tugs, an essential part of the plan, never reached the ground; while, by an accident, for which you were in no wise responsible, and possibly I, to some extent was, you were deprived of a war vessel with her men, which you deemed of great importance to the enterprize. I most cheerfully and truly declare that the failure of the undertaking has not lowered you a particle, while the qualities you developed in the effort, have greatly heightened you, in my estimation. For a daring and dangerous enterprize, of a similar character, you would, to-day, be the man, of all my acquaintances, whom I would select. You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort-Sumpter, even if it should fail; and it is no small consolation now to feel that our anticipation is justified by the result." - Abraham Lincoln, letter to Fox, May 1, 1861 (emphasis added)

XII. "The war resolved the two fundamental problems left unresolved by the Revolution of 1776, problems that had preoccupied the country for four score and nine years down to 1865. The first was the question whether this fragile republic would survive in a world of monarchs and emperors and dictators or would follow the example of most republics through history (including many in the nineteenth century) and collapse into tyranny or fragment in a dreary succession of revolutions and civil wars."

Here McPherson is exploiting the "experiment in democracy" myth to attach some legitimacy and purported good to what was an appallingly costly, brutal, and disastrous war. While he is correct to phrase the American nation's role in a world that was at the time dominated by empire and monarchy as well as to note the previous occurrence of republican failures elsewhere, he is incorrect to suggest that the fate of republican government rested on the preservation of the union. As any honest historian must concede, though it is often contrary to the Schlessingerian "experiment in democracy" and the neo-Hegelian "end of history" paradigms, the concept of republican government has been around in various forms throughout recorded history. It has had its successes, sometimes lasting for centuries, and it has also had its failures, but just the same so have empires and monarchies. On the greater spectrum of history itself I believe the evidence is clear that governments are cyclical developments and refinements. This is commonly thought of as a classical understanding of government. Alternative some hold governments to be evolutionary stage developments as McPherson does here and as some otherwise genuinely intelligent and even conservative persons believe America to be. This alternative is the Hegelian view, perhaps most famously adopted by Marx as the heart of communism. I will concede it is tempting for some conservatives to gravitate toward this latter position, but doing so entails what is ultimately an embrace of arrogance and perfectibility over all that preceded us when in reality we are the same inherently human, inherently flawed, yet readily redeemable human beings as those who came before us were. For that reason few will likely find the Hegelian position in the minds of conservatism's greatest thinkers (actually it is normally found among the left, such as McPherson demonstrates here). Therefore what some may falsely interpret to be a classical system that appears dismissive of the wisdom of the Constitution and the sorts may find themselves surprised to find it a position held by some of the Constitution's greatest defenders and conservatism's greatest minds.

[WhiskeyPapa]

The " 'i' before 'e' except after 'c' " rule does have exceptions; mastering the exceptions to the rule is one of the tests that separates the intelligent from the great unwashed stupid masses. You didn't make the cut Walt.

Thanks for the correction.

I take it you have no problem with the facts as presented then.

Walt

[WhiskeyPapa]

Term it any way you want, but in the end it was a rebellion. And the dogs of war were loosed by Davis at Charleston, not by Lincoln through blockade or any other action.

Preident Lincoln's message to Pickens put the ball squarely in the secessionist court. Jefferson Davis made a lot of maladroit decisions, but firing on Old Glory at Fort Sumter was maybe the worst.

Walt

[WhiskeyPapa]

And Hitler was never cruel to a dog.

If you check the record, you'll see that Hitler tested the cyanide he planned to take on one of his dogs.

You can look it up.

Walt

[Frumious Bandersnatch]

That's another debate entirely and completely ignores my correction of your erronious allegation that the whole of arizona and new mexico was part of the confederate territory. I will note however for the record that the right of self government supersedes statutory matters.

Say what?  Where did I so allegate?  I merely stated that wishes of the citizens of Albuquerque and Santa Fe were totally ignored by Baylor and the citizens of Tucson and Mesilla.  I also use "New Mexico" to describe the entire territory, since the Arizona territory wasn't created until 1863 - and then looked considerably different from the Confederate vision.  Only by twisting my words can one construe I meant differently.  Although after the fall of Santa Fe and Albuquerque, most of the territory was in Confederate hands for a short time.

Yeah - before secession when the federals were ignoring them. But the second they secede Lincoln's men suddenly find a need to be there and set up camp outside Mesilla to prepare for taking the town. It's funny how things work out like that.

Bull.  Get your facts straight.  Ft. Fillmore already had Union troops in it.  Col. Canby sent more troops to strengthen it when Baylor siezed Ft. Bliss in El Paso.

Sure there was. The only major military force in the region was a union command occupying a fort outside of Mesilla to counter the southern half of the region's confederate government. The leaders of Mesilla sent message to El Paso for relief. Baylor split his army in two, left half there to garrison it, and took the other half to relieve Mesilla in direct response to that request. Shortly after his arrival the larger yankee army attacked Mesilla and was repulsed by Baylor. Your complete ignorance of this event is laughable considering that you purport to know what you are talking about. As for Baylor's expedition, if that does not qualify as a relief expedition, I don't see what else could.

Yes, Lynde did attack Baylor - after Baylor invaded New Mexico.  And I will concede that Baylor knew of the Confederate sympathies of Mesilla.  But he went against Ft. Fillmore because it was a dangerous threat to him.  From www.civilwarhome.com/confederatearizona.htm we have the following:

Baylor quickly assessed the situation in nearby Arizona and determined that Federally-held Fort Fillmore, forty miles upriver, constituted a grave threat to his position.  Rather than wait for an attack, Baylor chose to be the aggressor, after digesting reports of Confederate sympathy in the area, especially in nearby Mesilla. On July 23, with 258 men, Baylor moved upriver and camped within 600 yards of the Federal fort. He had planned a surprise attack next morning, but fort commander Major Isaac Lynde was warned of Baylor's presence by a deserter. Learning of this, Baylor moved instead into Mesilla, where the Texans were greeted enthusiastically. On July 25, Lynde advanced his force of 380 from Fort Fillmore to demand Baylor's surrender.  Baylor's response was, "If you wish the town and my forces, come and take them!" Lynde resolved to do just that, ordering his infantrymen into line while his two mountain howitzers began to shell the town and his mounted troops prepared to charge. As the Federal horsemen approached, carefully aimed shots and volleys from the barricaded Texans and their Mesilla allies began to create confusion. One Yankee horseman was killed and four others were wounded as rifle and shotgun fire ripped into their ranks. As the survivors began to withdraw, the Federal cannoneers came under rebel fire and were soon forced back as well, followed by the Union infantry. The brief battle had resulted in Lynde's loss of three killed and nine wounded, while six Texans were wounded and twenty rebel horses died in the bombardment. Baylor's men carefully followed the Yankees to the fort and began preparations to attack. During the next day, as the Federals feverishly dug defensive trenches and prepared obstructions, Baylor sent riders to Fort Bliss for reinforcements and replacement horses. That evening, the Arizona Guards, a local militia unit that had assisted in Baylor's defense, infiltrated Fort Fillmore and made off with 85 cavalry horses and 26 mules. This loss so discouraged Lynde that he decided, instead of trying to defend the fort, to evacuate his command to the nearest concentration point, Fort Stanton, some 80 miles to the northeast.

The narrative goes on to talk about the disastrous retreat of Lynde, but the point is that Ft. Fillmore was attacked by the Texans from the direction of Mesilla.  The federals didn't attack Mesilla and apparently had no plans to do so.  Baylor attacked Ft. Fillmore because he saw it as a military threat and because he was assured that he wouldn't get any civilian opposition.

The yankees approached it on July 24, 1861 and demanded the town's surrender. Baylor, who had been welcomed there by the openly confederate town, refused and the yankees opened fire. Baylor repulsed them.  Read about it here http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/MM/qfm4.html

Yeah, but you were saying that Baylor went to help Mesilla because it was being threatened by Lynde at Ft. Baylor.  Lynde didn't threaten to attack the town until Baylor was already in it.  Furthermore Lynde didn't demand the town's surrender.  He demanded Baylor's surrender.  Please get your facts straight.  Your link says that Baylor invaded New Mexico and seized Ft. Fillmore.  That's it.  It doesn't support your contention that Mesilla was under threat of Union forces prior to Baylor's arrival.  But then that's typical.

It was a bold move, but by all indications Baylor's presence was welcomed with open arms by the people of Mesilla. They celebrated his arrival and added troops to his ranks to pursue the yankees after the city was saved.

So you condone that in Baylor which you would condemn in Lincoln.  Interesting.  And also, what did he save Mesilla from?  Until Baylor entered Mesilla, the town was in no danger from Union troops.

Nonsense. Baylor did see Fillmore's presence as a threat to his command at Bliss, which was one of the reasons he responded to Mesilla's calls. But his plans to attack it did not come through and he went to Mesilla to prepare it for a defense. Shortly after the federals arrived and demanded the city's surrender. Baylor said no and the yankees attacked the city, not the other way around as you suggest.

True.  This is a my bad.  This is what happens when my fingers outrun my brain, and for this I apologize.  The true order of events was that Baylor camped about 600 yards from Ft. Fillmore planning to attack it, but surprise was denied him due to a deserter.  So he occupied Mesilla instead.  Lynde called on him to surrender, which he refused.  Lynde then commenced a disastrous attack.  After failing in his attack, Lynde then ordered an evacuation in the night.  Baylor caught up with Lynde later and slaughtered his rather inebriated group of soldiers.  Satisfied?

The document expresses an intended neutrality, but it was not broken for the reason you allege and quite to the contrary. The Cherokees specifically listed a lengthy string of grievances against the North that had happened in the wake of secession.

That's my point.  Initially, the Five Civilized Tribes were nervous about situation and expressed a desire for strict neutrality.  Other tribal documents also express this desire (and no I don't have the links to them).  As the federal troop were withdrawn to the east and southern troops entered Indian territory, sentiment changed to favor the south - quite understandable, given the conditions.  When Captain Pike (a southerner) was sent to Oklahoma in may of 1861 to negotiate treaties with the 5 civilized tribes, the Choctaws, Chickasaws and Seminoles readily agreed, but only a fraction of the Creeks agreed (they were very much pro-Union) and Chief John Ross managed to keep the Cherokees officially neutral, only reluctantly signing on to the confederate cause October.  But during the war, the tension between Stand Watie (pro confederate) and Ross (pro union) was very much in evidence and culminated in the destruction of Ross' house by Stand Watie and in the death of several relatives of Stand Watie by Ross supporters.  As a matter of fact, many of the Indians fought on both sides at one time or another.

While I grant you that the North's Col. Phillips did not win any friends amongst the Indians by his tactics, neither did the south's Col. Cooper glorify his cause by his tactics against the Upper Creeks.  In fact, Col. Cooper's actions probably lead directly to the downfall of Confederate efforts much sooner than would have been otherwise due to the fact that Kansas and Wisconsins were so inflamed that they raised 6 Kansas regiments, 1 Wisconsin Regiment and 2 Indian Regiments to retake the Indian territory.  OTOH, If Col. Phillips had the sense that G-d gave an ant, the territory would have fallen much sooner.

And I responded that your claim of this was based almost entirely on Andy Jackson, the same man who put down the earliest beginnings of the drive for southern independence. As far as I'm concerned (and I believe many southerners would back me on this) you can have all of Jackson you want cause we certainly don't want him.

He was still a southerner.

[Frumious Bandersnatch]

Yeah, and the northerner's openly admitted among themselves at the time to intentionally framing the compromise debates around that issue for political reasons to their own advantage. Read their eyewitness histories and letters if you doubt me.

The south admitted that the basic problem was about extending slavery to the territories.  If northern politicians framed this to their advantage, it still doesn't change the fact that this was the biggest sticking point in north-south relations.  Lincoln framed the entire Lincoln-Douglas series of debates around slavery.  Certainly it was to his advantage.  And most assuredly it was the biggest hot-button issue by far in the entire country at the time.

No they didn't. Louis Wigfall, one of the first southern senators to take up the secessionist cause, identified the problem in a December 6 speech as strictly economics. He said that, despite their protests otherwise, the almighty dollar was driving the yankee cause at southern expense and that if it could be worked out there would be no problem. He then concluded that the yankees had made the situation unworkable and therefore secession had become the only course of action for the south. Then he issued one of the first serious calls for his colleagues to secede.

 If you are talking of his "Cotton is King" speech, that has got to be one of the more delusional and arrogant pieces of work of the period.   Basically, he is saying that cotton is far more important than food.   In fact, he goes so far as to say that if England has a famine in corn but plenty of cotton, there are few problems.  However, if the situation is reversed, there are riots.  Apparently, this guy never heard of the corn riots in England.

But to get to the text of the speech: He mentions that the strength of the government is the military chest and the almighty dollar.  He even talks a bit about one specific tariff (totally ignoring any others).  He also talks a bit about slavery and shows (indirectly) southern economics is based on it.  He never talks about yankees at all (although I grant you that it could be reasonably inferred that he was talking of northern interests in his speech).  His remarks are directed at the government - of which he is a member.  If economics were the overriding reason, the south would have split in the 1830s when taxes and tariffs were more onerous.  He also ignores the tariffs which were designed to help the south (such as the tariff on imported sugar - which was a boon to Louisiana).  Now contrast that with the comments of Lincoln and Alexander Stephens (vice-president of the Confederacy).  They both felt strongly that the entire issue hung on expansion of slavery to the territories (although Stephens also mentions other southern slavery-related greviences such as northern ordinances against slavery).

Show how any truncation of that quote changed Lincoln's meaning.

From your post #442 you say:

Also it was a southern fort insofar as it was in southern territory hundreds of miles away from any defensive interest of the north. Sumter was created as a federal fort by an act of South Carolina several years earlier but that act was rescinded during secession when South Carolina revoked all previous committments and ties to the northern government.

By this, I understand you to be saying that Ft. Sumter was no longer Federal territory.  Truncating the quote supports you supposition.  If, however, we read the entire text, we see that Lincoln feels that S.C. is invading federal land.

If you can substantiate your allegation of a fib on my part, please do so. Otherwise you shouldn't shoot your mouth off like that.

Well for one thing, you have contended that for purposes of secession, Ft. Sumter is a southern fort.  However, for purposes of invasion, it is not.  You can't have it both ways.  Please make up your mind.   For another very few of your references actually support many of your allegations.

Exactly what's to say about them? They don't change Lincoln's definition of invasion in any way not do they change the fact that by waging the war he met that definition of invasion.

Sure it does.  If Ft. Sumter was southern territory, then Lincoln was invading southern territory to keep it.  OTOH, if it was Union territory, then in order to maintain it, Lincoln was still invading southern territory, since he had to cross S.C. waters to get to it.  So by your definition, either way he was invading.  However, it is obvious that he felt (from the entire text) that it was S.C. doing the invading.  If we just read your posted text, a good case could be made that Lincoln was invading S.C. by trying to maintain Ft. Sumter - using his own words.  The fact is that Lincoln was accusing S.C. of invading federal territory.  By attacking and taking Ft. Sumter, S.C. declared war against the Union.  The south and north were officially (if uneasily) at peace at the time of the speech.  When the south declared war, the situation changed. To call Lincoln a liar for doing in war what he refused to do in peace is a bit over the top.

Uh, no. I don't believe I have. Show where if you think otherwise. I did say he invaded Virginia, and I did say he instigated hostility at Fort Sumter, but I don't believe I ever said he invaded Fort Sumter in the context of his own definition of invasion.

See my reference to your post 442 above.  If, as you assert, Ft. Sumter was no longer federal property when S.C. seceded, then Lincoln did indeed invade southern territory by trying to send troops to relieve it.  And how did he instigate hostility at Ft. Sumter - by being elected?

It was no more a _legitimate_ federal property than a british fort in Boston Harbor was legitimate English property circa 1777.

Lessee, S.C. cedes this property to the U.S. government, thus losing all rights to it.  It is not S.C. property any more.  Both the U.S. and S.C. agree.  Later, S.C. decides that it wants the fort back.  However, the U.S. doesn't agree.  It is still U.S. property.  Similarly, what if Mexico gives up a good chunk of its territory in the treaty of Hildago-Guadalupe then later claims it back?  The answer: "tough noogies bub."  Also the "British Fort in Boston Harbor" theory that you put forward doesn't help your argument one bit, because the U.K. had every right to do so at that time (their Carribean fleet was stationed out of New Orleans for years after the Napoleanic wars ended).  By the time of the treaty of Ghent, they had ceded such a right.

I will admit confusion by your comments.  OTOH it is not federal property, and OTOH it is.

[Frumious Bandersnatch]

A full scale hostile of invasion of the entire south is a bit drastic as a response to a zero-casualty siezure of a single fort, don't you think?

Lessee, the south declared war on the north when Lincoln tried to reinforce the fort.  The full-scale invasion was in response to that situation.  The fort was just the catalyst.

So you think invading 13 states and 2 territories with one of the largest armies ever assembled on the continent is "tit" for the "tat" of a single fort being siezed in a battle with no casualties and no prisoners?

No, S.C. refused to give up federal property - as did the other southern states.  A war was declared - in which the south thought that they would win.  The tit-for-tat comes in when the south strikes at Union interests, the Union strikes at southern interests.

You have yet to explain how anything he said about the forts was "critical" to his definition of invasion, which was my matter of concern. Care explaining yourself?

I would have thought it was rather obvious.  He basically tells S.C. that they have no fear of invasion, but then asks them why they are invading Ft. Sumter.  Remember that they are officially still at peace, even though S.C. has initiated hostilities.

Back off? Where? I firmly believe it is a people's right to remove a hostile garrison from their presence when they are no longer subject to that garrison and when that garrison has no business being there other than for hostile motives.

What hostile motives?  Were they planning on attacking S.C. with less than a hundred soldiers?  From a military standpoint, the fort was negligible (although from a political standpoint, it was quite a firebrand).  It was federal territory.  It did not belong to the state of S.C.  What right did S.C. have to attack territory which was not even theirs?  If S.C. can attack and remove a federal garrison from federal territory in S.C., then why can't they just as ethically attack and remove a federal garrison from N.Y.  For that matter, why can't they just attack any state?

If you don't want to be called a liar, don't fib about Lincoln's quotes by throwing out false allegations that I somehow denied their meaning by only quoting the sentence on the matter I was making a point about.

Lessee, you purposely exclude Lincoln's slamming of S.C. for attacking Ft. Sumter.  You claim that Ft. Sumter belongs to S.C., because S.C. seceded from the Union, therefore they can revoke all prior commitments to the Union.  As such, the Union, by retaining the fort and trying to resupply it is invading S.C.  But wait, you say that the Union is not invading S.C. by retaining the Island.  Sheesh, at least you could try for some consistency.

Since when did the US Government have the right to collect taxes for itself on the goods going into another political entity that has clearly indicated the termination of its political affiliation with that government? Lincoln had no more business collecting taxes there than King George did in Philadelphia circa 1780.

So, if I start a political entity (of two or more people), then if I clearly indicate our termination of our political affiliation with the government, does that mean that said government has any right to collect taxes on us?  I don't believe that your argument will get you very far as there was no constitutional right for any state to secede.

[Frumious Bandersnatch]

Nice try at evading that one. Too bad for you that you got it wrong again. Texas' admission to the confederacy was already addressed in Montgomery, which accepted the state contingent upon the referendum's passage and permitted for its delegation, which preceded the may 5th measure. Even then, your analogy fails you as the may 5th measure was enacted as a statutory response to the confirmation of Texas' seating in the confederate government just as the referendum itself was called for by a statutory measure passed by the convention.

Forgive me for thinking that Montgomery was in Alabama, not Texas.  I had no idea that the decisions in Montgomery were binding on the citizens of Texas.  FYI, all three documents were approved by the convention, only the secession document was approved by the voters.

Both these items were matters of legislative statute. The declaration of causes was not. It had no statutory effect, no legally binding qualifications, no requirement of a course of action to be taken, and no enaction of anything. It was a non-binding resolution that simply stated the arguments of delegates after the fact of secession had already been called for in a vote.

All three documents were passed by the convention.  All three documents were legislative acts.  Only the ordinance of secession was put to the voters.  The Declaration of Causes gives the reasons that Texas seceded.  It is a supporting document to the ordninance of separation.  Together, both documents are equivalent to the "Declaration of Independence."  It has legal status and was binding on the people of Texas as to the reasons concerning their secession.

And that has to be one of the most ignorant statements you've made yet on this matter. Have you no familiarity with legitlative processes? Have you no knowledge of the difference between a statute and a resolution? Your above statement indicates this to be the case.

So are you saying that the joint resolution of Congress admitting Texas into the Union on March 1, 1845 wasn't a statute or at least didn't have the force of law?



So Texas needed a popular referendum to leave the Union, but not one to join another one.  Interesting.  Even so noted an authority as Sam Houston felt that while secession was legal, confederation was not, because it had not been put to a popular referendum.  And BTW, where does it mention that it is a non-binding resolution?

A bill of statute enacts things into law - it mandates that a certain measure be executed, enforced, or implemented. An example would be for Congress to pass a bill overhauling the IRS and implementing a retail sales tax instead of the income tax.

Every state that has joined the U.S. has done so by congressional resolutions.  A resolution, by itself, is not necessarily non-binding.

Comparatively, a legislative resolution is little more than an expression of opinion on behalf of the legislative body. It does not make anything into law, it does not enact any measures, it doesn't do anything other than formally state a position of the legislature. An example would be for Congress to pass a resolution stating, as an opinion that "we as a body believe the IRS should be overhauled and the income tax replaced."

See above.  I presume that you don't know the difference between insider trading and illegal insider trading either.

The first is a binding statutory measure. The second is a non-binding resolution. In the case of Texas' secession, the ordinance requiring a secession vote and the may 5th measure were both statutory measures enacting various items contained within them. Comparatively the declaration of causes did nothing but state the opinion of the delegates who signed it in a non-binding, non-statutory form. They even say this in the resolution itself. It concludes stating basically 'these are some of the reasons we want to secede, we already support secession as a body, and we urge everyone to do the same when they vote.'

Even I, in my ignorance, know that there is a difference between binding and non-binding resolutions.  The Declaration of Causes was a resolution.  So were the secession ordinance and the confederate ordinance.  Under your rather selective interpretation, neither the secession ordinance nor the confederation ordinance needed to be submitted to a popular referendum.  However, even if the Declaration of Causes had been submitted to a referendum, it would have been non-binding (according to your logic).

By voting for the Ordinance of Secession, Texans accepted the Declaration of Causes as the reasons for seceding.  Both the causes and the ordinance were widely disseminated, so I hardly think that the reasoning contained in the Declaration of Causes was unpopular as you implied when this subject was originally broached.

That is the only reasonable interpretation that could be given to the matter in a plain text strict constructionist reading of the Constitution.  It is also the interpretation established by the supreme court in a decision written by John Marshall himself that was the precedent at the time Lincoln violated it. Further it was the interpretation clearly expressed by the sitting Chief Justice Roger Taney, who had reaffirmed Marshall's earlier decision in response to an act by Lincoln's men with a ruling he made while sitting on the federal circuit.

Considering the fact that quite a lot is in the first, I would have to disagree with you.  Furthermore Taney was sitting on the Supreme Court prior to Lincoln, not on an inferior court as you imply.  I would also be careful about refering to Taney as an authority, since he had a bad habit of "cherry-picking" his sources.  But as usual, I ask for your sources, since you have a habit of reading volumes between the lines that is little better than fiction.

Not so. Any direct reading of the Constitution cannot escape Article I's opening statement: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives"

It also talks of states and the president.

Nowhere does it say that the powers granted herein are vested in the President. Nowhere does it say they are vested in the court. Nowhere does it say they are vested in the King of England. It says they are vested in the Congress. Moving on to section 9 of article I it is easily observed that every single one of those clauses pertains to the legislative power and a direct extension of that power. It says things like no ex post facto law can be passed, no direct tax can be imposed.  Every one of them is a matter of congress, unless you subscribe to some wierd "living breathing" loose constructionist theory of the constitution that permits the president to enact new tax codes on his own.  Same goes for habeas corpus - the only way you can get around the clear meaning that is found in the document itself, asserted by John Marshall writing for a the US Supreme Court majority opinion, and affirmed as a precedent by the circuit court in direct response to Lincoln's men's violation of it is to engage in a tortured and historically oblivious reading of the document.

You forget that legislative power does not reside exclusively with the houses of Congress.  In point of fact, the president also has legislative powers.

Article 1, sections 1 - 6 and 8 deal exclusively with congressional powers and limitations.   Sections 7 and 9 deal with congressional and executive powers.  Article 10 deals with state limitations.  While the president cannot enact new tax codes on his own, neither can congress (generally).  It takes both the executive and legislative branches to do this.  Every one of the examples that you mentioned (taxes, ex-post facto, etc.) is a matter of both congress and the president.  A law cannot come into being without both of them agreeing (or congress overriding a veto).  As such, section 9 does apply to the president as well as to congress.

However, given all this, I am still neutral about Habeus Corpus.  Your arguments reserving the suspension of Habeus Corpus are not convincing.  OTOH, I've not found arguments extending it to the president overly-persuasive either.

[Frumious Bandersnatch]

No, that isn't what Lincoln was doing. What Lincoln was doing, was preparing to levy civil war. The facilities he retained in the East, all had value if one were waging war -- or provoking one. The facilities that had no value in waging a war in the East, were stripped.

Ah now your are comparing apples and oranges.  His trying to maintain Ft. Sumter was from before the Civil War.  After the war started, he gathered all the troops he could to put down the rebellion.

[Frumious Bandersnatch]

I don't agree with you that GOPcapitalist has no case for deception on Lincoln's part. To talk about ensuring revenue collection and the integrity of the mails, while you are preparing a vast civil war to destroy slavery and recast the Union, could be construed by reasonable people as a Machiavellian exercise in expedience....and misdirection.

Lincoln had no intention of destroying slavery in the south - in fact, Alexander Stephens (the vice president of the confederacy) agreed.  The sticking point was on whether slavery was to be allowed in the territories or not.

The fact was that it was the south which forced the issue of war when Lincoln did all he could to avoid the issue.  The line beyond which Lincoln would not go was disunion and extension of slavery to the territories.

[Frumious Bandersnatch]

I don't agree with you that GOPcapitalist has no case for deception on Lincoln's part. To talk about ensuring revenue collection and the integrity of the mails, while you are preparing a vast civil war to destroy slavery and recast the Union, could be construed by reasonable people as a Machiavellian exercise in expedience....and misdirection.

Lincoln had no intention of destroying slavery in the south - in fact, Alexander Stephens (the vice president of the confederacy) agreed.  The sticking point was on whether slavery was to be allowed in the territories or not.  The fact that Stepens was a friend of Lincoln and knew him quite well kinda refutes your assertion of Lincoln as a Machiavellian schemer.

[stand watie]

while i know BOTH Kennedys, i would not class them as serious scholars, as NEITHER has an earned doctorate and/or credentials as a researcher, recognised by academic peers. BOTH are talented AMATUERS!

this is NOT to say that they are not CORRECT in their beliefs and/or research.

free dixie,sw

[stand watie]

walt has NO case. he is at his best when "cut & pasteing" long,boring, frequently off-point,irrelevant rants against southrons, our flags, heroes,martyrs,culture, etc.

mostly we southrons LAUGH AT him.

for the TRUE CAUSE,sw

[stand watie]

and the fact that the HATEFILLED,SELF-RIGHTEOUS,INTOLERENT,RACIST,ANTI-SEMITIC,IGNORANT,STATIST damnyankees said there was only a rebellion, rather than a war made their CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY & CRIMES AGAINST PEACE correct/excusable?

damnyankees fascinate me with their ARROGANCE & stupidity.

free the south,sw

[Non-Sequitur]

Are you even remotely aware of how ridiculous you sound?

[stand watie]

the best policy for the damnyankees would have been to say, "we celebrate your FREEDOM, southerners. and we look forward to trading with your new republic."

of course, that assumes that the damnyankees HAVE BRAINS & can THINK!

southrons KNOW BETTER than that!

free dixie,sw

[stand watie]

nobody can discredit lincoln, the tyrant & spiller of innocents blood, no more than you can make sewage clean by saying it is so.

free dixie,sw

[stand watie]

NOPE, lincoln was STUPID, so stupid as to try and perserve the union at the cost of war, which was to cost the lives of >1,000,000 citizens, many of them INNOCENTS. had he been smart, he would have traded with our new small, mostly agricultural republic, as we would have needed US-made goods for decades, if not permanently.

lincoln was JUST a cheap politician, nothing more, nothing less. and a DAMNFOOL as well.

free the southland NOW,sw

[stand watie]

are you remotely aware of how HATEFILLED you are against all things southron? especially against our hero-martyrs,flags, culture, mores, and seperate identity.

free dixie,sw

[Non-Sequitur]

Certainly less HATEFILLED than you are towards all things Northern.

[stand watie]

i hate NO ONE in the north except the damnyankees.

being northernborn no more makes you a damnyankee than it makes you a plumber!

damnyankees are HATERS, creeps,liars, statists, bigots and damnfools. the TRUE CAUSE will triumph!

free dixie,sw