High Court Overturns Death Sentences

WASHINGTON (AP) - The Supreme Court overturned the death sentences of dozens of convicted killers Monday, ruling that juries and not judges must make such life-or-death decisions.

The 7-2 ruling affects the way death sentences are imposed in at least five states and means that more than 150 death sentences must be reconsidered.

Monday's ruling concerned instances in which juries determined defendants' guilt or innocence and judges alone decided their punishment. The court held that such a sentence imposed by a judge violates a defendant's constitutional right to a trial by jury.

It was the second major Supreme Court ruling in less than a week affecting the ways that states sentence people to death. Last week, the justices divided bitterly in exempting mentally retarded people from execution.

The court has also agreed to hear an appeal in the fall from Tennessee death row inmate Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman. That case could have far-reaching effects if the justices decide to loosen the rules for when condemned inmates can get new evidence before a judge.

Nationwide, about 3,700 people await execution for crimes committed in the 38 states that allow the death penalty.

In some states juries determine guilt or innocence, but a judge then can base a death sentence on aggravating factors such as the heinous nature of a murder or whether it was committed for monetary gain.

Monday's ruling turned on the Constitution's guarantee of a jury of one's peers and a Supreme Court ruling two years ago that struck down another kind of sentence determined by a judge instead of a jury.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a majority that included an unusual alliance of conservative and liberal-leaning justices, said the court's 2000 ruling in a case called Apprendi v. New Jersey cannot be reconciled with the death penalty sentencing laws in Arizona and four other states in which one or more judges impose the sentence.

The Apprendi case concerned a judge's ability to lengthen a sentence by two years if a crime was determined to be a hate crime. The high court struck down that sentencing law.

"The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death," Ginsburg wrote. "We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to both."

Ginsburg was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter and Clarence Thomas. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote separately to agree with the outcome.

The case concerned an Arizona inmate, and the ruling will immediately apply in that state and in Idaho and Montana, where a single judge decides the sentence. It will also apply immediately in Colorado and Nebraska, where a panel of judges makes the sentencing decision.

It was not immediately clear what will happen to inmates in those states. Some lawyers have said death row inmates' sentences could be commuted to life in prison, as was done when the Supreme Court put a temporary halt to the death penalty in the 1970s. Or the inmates could be resentenced, with some receiving death sentences all over again.

Also unclear was whether the ruling will have a spillover effect in four other states in which juries only recommend whether a convicted murderer should receive the death penalty or life in prison: Florida, Alabama, Indiana, and Delaware.

A judge makes the final call in those states. Indiana, however, recently passed a law that will require judges to follow a jury's sentencing recommendations.

In dissent, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor predicted that many inmates in the additional four states will challenge their sentences now.

The earlier Apprendi ruling "had a severely destabilizing effect on our criminal justice system," O'Connor wrote in a dissent joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist "The decision today is only going to add to these already serious effects."

Arizona has 129 people on death row, Idaho 21 and Montana six. Colorado has five, and Nebraska seven. Florida has 383, Alabama 187, Indiana 39 and Delaware 20.

Timothy Stuart Ring was convicted of killing an armored car driver during a 1994 robbery in Phoenix.

Ring challenged his sentence and Arizona's law on grounds that his constitutional right to a jury was violated when a judge held a separate hearing after the jury that convicted Ring was dismissed.

The judge heard testimony at a sentencing hearing from an accomplice who said Ring planned the robbery and murdered the guard. The judge then determined that the aggravating factors warranted death.

"I was essentially given two trials," Ring said in an Associated Press interview earlier this year. "One before a jury and then one before a judge."

Ring's case put the court in an awkward position. The high court had already upheld the constitutionality of Arizona's law in 1990, but that was before its ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey.

Finding the two rulings irreconcilable, the high court took the rare step of overturning one of its own fairly recent decisions. The first decision was written by O'Connor, who defended it in her dissent Monday.

What is the keystone of a jury? That it is impartial.

The Supreme Court, by ruling that the jury must define the sentence to be handed down is in alignment with the impartial jury as stated in the Sixth Amendment. To remain consistent the Supreme Court needs to acknowledge that an impartial jury is to judge the facts of the case as well as judge the law as it applies to the case.

For when the Supreme Court acknowledges the fact as supported by the Sixth Amendment that the jury is to judge how the law is to be applied in the life or death of a person, surely the jury must be judging how the law applies to the person.

When a judge fails to inform the jury that it is to be impartial and judge both the facts and the law as it applies to the case is subverting honest justice. Honest justice cannot be attained void of an impartial jury and instead upholds political agenda "justice".

It makes me wonder why they understand some of the Constitution but not other parts.

Selective omission to support political ends/agendas.

IMHO anything that takes power away from activist judges = good.

Especially good at doing that is the impartial jury. That is why judges in 1893 stopped routinely telling the jury that they were to judge both the facts and the law as it applies to that case.

This looks like a "full employment for criminal defense lawyers" decision.

In any event, the superiority of judicial factfinding in capital cases is far from evident. Unlike Arizona, the great majority of States responded to this Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the jury.6

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6Of the 38 States with capital punishment, 29 generally commit sen-tencing decisions to juries. See Ark. Code Ann. §5–4–602 (1993); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190.3 (West 1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a–46a (2001); Ga. Code Ann. §17–10–31.1 (Supp. 1996); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 720, §5/9–1(d) (West 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. §21–4624(b) (1995); Ky. Rev.

22 RING v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court

Although “‘the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law[,]’ . . . [o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 494 (1987)). “[W]e have overruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established.” 491 U. S., at 172. We are satisfied that this is such a case.

For the reasons stated, we hold that Walton and Ap-prendi are irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment jurispru-dence cannot be home to both. Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. See 497

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Stat. Ann. §532.025(1)(b) (1993); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. §905.1 (West 1997); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §413(b) (1996); Miss. Code Ann. §99–19–101 (1973–2000); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§565.030, 565.032 (1999 and Supp. 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §175.552 (Michie 2001); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §630:5 (II) (1996); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:11–3(c) (Supp. 2001); N. M. Stat. Ann. §31–20A–1 (2000); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2001–2002); N. C. Gen. Stat. §15A–2000 (1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.03 (West 1997); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §701.10(A) (Supp. 2001); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. §163.150 (1997); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9711 (Supp. 2001); S. C. Code Ann. §16–3–20(B) (1985); S. D. Codified Laws §23A–27A–2 (1998); Tenn. Code Ann. §39–13–204 (Supp. 2000); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. §76–3–207 (Supp. 2001); Va. Code Ann. §19.2–264.3 (2000); Wash. Rev. Code §10.95.050 (1990); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §6–2–102 (2001).

Other than Arizona, only four States commit both capital sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to judges. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §16–11–103 (2001) (three-judge panel); Idaho Code §19–2515 (Supp. 2001); Mont. Code Ann. §46–18–301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29–2520 (1995).

Four States have hybrid systems, in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determi-nations. See Ala. Code §§13A–5–46, 13A–5–47 (1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §4209 (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. §921.141 (West 2001); Ind. Code Ann. §35–50–2–9 (Supp. 2001).

U. S., at 647–649. Because Arizona’s enumerated aggra-vating factors operate as “the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,” Apprendi, 530 U. S., at 494,

n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.

***

“The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. . . . If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.”

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 155–156 (1968).

The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to both. The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.7

It is so ordered.

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7We do not reach the State’s assertion that any error was harmless because a pecuniary gain finding was implicit in the jury’s guilty verdict. See Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 25 (1999) (this Court ordinarily leaves it to lower courts to pass on the harmlessness of error in the first instance).

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