In any event, the superiority of judicial factfinding in capital cases is far from evident. Unlike Arizona, the great majority of States responded to this Courts Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the jury. 6Of the 38 States with capital punishment, 29 generally commit sen-tencing decisions to juries. See Ark. Code Ann. §54602 (1993); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190.3 (West 1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a46a (2001); Ga. Code Ann. §171031.1 (Supp. 1996); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 720, §5/91(d) (West 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. §214624(b) (1995); Ky. Rev. 22 RING Although the doctrine of For the reasons stated, we hold that Stat. Ann. §532.025(1)(b) (1993); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. §905.1 (West 1997); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §413(b) (1996); Miss. Code Ann. §9919101 (19732000); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§565.030, 565.032 (1999 and Supp. 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §175.552 (Michie 2001); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §630:5 (II) (1996); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:113(c) (Supp. 2001); N. M. Stat. Ann. §3120A1 (2000); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §400.27 (McKinney Supp. 20012002); N. C. Gen. Stat. §15A2000 (1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.03 (West 1997); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §701.10(A) (Supp. 2001); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. §163.150 (1997); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9711 (Supp. 2001); S. C. Code Ann. §16320(B) (1985); S. D. Codified Laws §23A27A2 (1998); Tenn. Code Ann. §3913204 (Supp. 2000); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. §763207 (Supp. 2001); Va. Code Ann. §19.2264.3 (2000); Wash. Rev. Code §10.95.050 (1990); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §62102 (2001). Other than Arizona, only four States commit both capital sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to judges. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §1611103 (2001) (three-judge panel); Idaho Code §192515 (Supp. 2001); Mont. Code Ann. §4618301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. §292520 (1995). Four States have hybrid systems, in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determi-nations. See Ala. Code §§13A546, 13A547 (1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §4209 (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. §921.141 (West 2001); Ind. Code Ann. §355029 (Supp. 2001). U. S., at 647649. Because Arizonas enumerated aggra-vating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. *** The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. . . . If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendants sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to both. The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 7We do not reach the States assertion that any error was harmless because a pecuniary gain finding was implicit in the jurys guilty verdict. See
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 155156 (1968).
22 RING v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court Although the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law[,] . . . [o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct.
Except Roe....
Sadly true.
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