Prove Evolution: Win $250,000!

Creation Science Evangelism ^ | N/A | Dr. Ken Hovind

[handk]

Dr. Hovind's $250,000 Offer
formerly $10,000, offered since 1990

I have a standing offer of $250,000 to anyone who can give any empirical evidence (scientific proof) for evolution.*  My $250,000 offer demonstrates that the hypothesis of evolution is nothing more than a religious belief.

 

Observed phenomena:

Most thinking people will agree that--
1. A highly ordered universe exists.
2. At least one planet in this complex universe contains an amazing variety of life forms.
3. Man appears to be the most advanced form of life on this planet.

Known options:

Choices of how the observed phenomena came into being--
1. The universe was created by God.
2. The universe always existed.
3. The universe came into being by itself by purely natural processes (known as evolution) so that no appeal to the supernatural is needed.

Evolution has been acclaimed as being the only process capable of causing the observed phenomena.

Evolution is presented in our public school textbooks as a process that:

1. Brought time, space, and matter into existence from nothing.
2. Organized that matter into the galaxies, stars, and at least nine planets around the sun. (This process is often referred to as cosmic evolution.)
3. Created the life that exists on at least one of those planets from nonliving matter (chemical evolution).
4. Caused the living creatures to be capable of and interested in reproducing themselves.
5. Caused that first life form to spontaneously diversify into different forms of living things, such as the plants and animals on the earth today (biological evolution).

People believe in evolution; they do not know that it is true. While beliefs are certainly fine to have, it is not fair to force on the students in our public school system the teaching of one belief, at taxpayers’ expense. It is my contention that evolutionism is a religious worldview that is not supported by science, Scripture, popular opinion, or common sense. The exclusive teaching of this dangerous, mind-altering philosophy in tax-supported schools, parks, museums, etc., is also a clear violation of the First Amendment.

 

How to collect the $250,000:

Prove beyond reasonable doubt that the process of evolution (option 3 above, under "known options") is the only possible way the observed phenomena could have come into existence. Only empirical evidence is acceptable. Persons wishing to collect the $250,000 may submit their evidence in writing or schedule time for a public presentation. A committee of trained scientists will provide peer review of the evidence offered and, to the best of their ability, will be fair and honest in their evaluation and judgment as to the validity of the evidence presented.

If you are convinced that evolution is an indisputable fact, may I suggest that you offer $250,000 for any empirical or historical evidence against the general theory of evolution. This might include the following:

1. The earth is not billions of years old (thus destroying the possibility of evolution having happened as it is being taught).
2. No animal has ever been observed changing into any fundamentally different kind of animal.
3. No one has ever observed life spontaneously arising from nonliving matter.
4. Matter cannot make itself out of nothing.

 

My suggestion:

Proponents of the theory of evolution would do well to admit that they believe in evolution, but they do not know that it happened the way they teach. They should call evolution their "faith" or "religion," and stop including it in books of science. Give up faith in the silly religion of evolutionism, and trust the God of the Bible (who is the Creator of this universe and will be your Judge, and mine, one day soon) to forgive you and to save you from the coming judgment on man’s sin.

* NOTE:
When I use the word evolution, I am not referring to the minor variations found in all of the various life forms (microevolution). I am referring to the general theory of evolution which believes these five major events took place without God:

1. Time, space, and matter came into existence by themselves.
2. Planets and stars formed from space dust.
3. Matter created life by itself.
4. Early life-forms learned to reproduce themselves.
5. Major changes occurred between these diverse life forms (i.e., fish changed to amphibians, amphibians changed to reptiles, and reptiles changed to birds or mammals).

[inquest]

I didn't forget about you - really ;)

I wasn't worried. I figured, it was Memorial Day, and you were probably a keynote speaker. (ba-DUM-BUM, *dingg*)

The consensus view is that most people agree with me in not wishing to be harmed. Therefore, we define causing pain to others as being off-limits, by defining the causing of pain to others to be "wrong".

What we have here is a failure to communicate.

If you accept, a priori, that life and human existence has some grand meaning, then your argument makes sense. But if it is not the case that we are particularly special, the rationale for morality in this sense falls by the wayside.

Our existence may not be for any "grand"er purpose than to give us an opportunity to experience existence. But either way, this gets us back into the "Where did morality come from?" routine. Not that that isn't a worthy question, but it's not necessary to answer that question in order to know that it exists.

And it's interesting you should say that my argument would make sense if there was some deliberate purpose to our existence beyond ourselves - that Univ* wants us to live. Why would you say that that would validate my argument? Put another way, why would we be morally obliged to conduct ourselves in the way that Univ* demands? And if you can accept that we would be so obliged, why couldn't we be obliged to simply treat each other right, without worrying about all that other dazzling stuff?

Saying that if not for people's unwillingness it would have worked just fine may be true, but it doesn't mean much in the world as exists.

It means plenty. It means that if there were such a society that could rationalize itself into accepting that, you would then seem to be bereft of basis for saying that it's wrong. Well, I would still say that it's the wrong thing to do to those targeted for liquidation, regardless of how much their surviving neighbors would approve.

[inquest]

So, then, the question is why don't they accept such societies? Pure pragmatism? A sense of universal morality? Something that only appears to be a sense of universal morality, but is in fact based on pragmatic principles produced over millions of years of evolution?

Guess which one appeals to me ;)

Do I get a lifeline?

[general_re]

I figured, it was Memorial Day, and you were probably a keynote speaker. (ba-DUM-BUM, *dingg*)

Somethng like that ;)

What we have here is a failure to communicate.

How so? I read your post as not seeing how one could construct a pragmatic case to define causing pain to others as wrong, which I then attempted to do. Did I misread you?

And it's interesting you should say that my argument would make sense if there was some deliberate purpose to our existence beyond ourselves - that Univ* wants us to live. Why would you say that that would validate my argument?

Because when you cast life and existence as sacred and an end unto itself, the immediate questions I have are "sacred to whom? An "end" to whom?" If it's strictly sacred to us, then it's a purely subjective judgment. If our existence is only an end as a matter of perception by us, then there is no existence of such a concept independent of us.

IOW, when you say sacred, then if it is strictly sacred to us, either we just decided it arbitrarily, or we constructed some rational case for our sacredness, built on other axioms, or, "sacredness" came to us from somewhere else. And only the last option admits of the possibility that "sacredness" is a universal concept. What it seems to me that you've done here is derived the concept of "wrong" from notions of universal rightness. But that's just a one-off - calling the sacredness of our lives a universal truth suffers from the same limitations that calling infliction of pain a universal wrong does - you're still left with the choice that either we made it up, and therefore it's not universal at all, or it came from somewhere else, in which case it requires an originator to be true. In the absence of an originator external to ourselves, how else can we know that it is universal?

I'm trying to get this across, and I hope it's clearer now - I think that any notion of universal morality is inextricably bound up with some conception of a creator. But from that flows the other problems I've discussed - which creator? Who's got the inside scoop? Why is life sacred?

Put another way, why would we be morally obliged to conduct ourselves in the way that Univ* demands?

Well, fortunately, if we take a look at this conception of Univ*, it doesn't make proscriptive pronouncements about human behavior the way other concepts do. It doesn't tell you whether or not you should do something, it only insures that certain rules apply to determine what the consequences of your actions will be. In that sense, there are no laws of Univ* that you are morally obliged to follow - there are only certain rules that describe what happens in a given circumstance. You have no particular moral obligation to obey the laws of gravitation, but on the other hand, good luck violating them ;)

It means plenty. It means that if there were such a society that could rationalize itself into accepting that, you would then seem to be bereft of basis for saying that it's wrong.

How many societies based upon genocide have lasted and prospered? I'm having trouble thinking of one. It's because people have, at least, some sense of self-preservation that such societies are probably doomed from the beginning.

And for me to call it wrong, that's why it is critical to define base principles and "rights" from the start. Once we have those in place, we have some basis for saying it's wrong to slaughter Jews, because we recognize their desire to live as overriding someone else's desire to kill them.

Look at it this way - if the Jews have their way, nothing happens. The status quo is preserved and life continues on with no change. But if the Nazis have their way, the Jews die and are exterminated, and the status quo has changed. But because we have these rights in place, it becomes incumbent upon those who desire to change the status quo to demonstrate that this change is proper and necessary. And I have a sneaky suspicion that the Nazis couldn't have done that.

Do I get a lifeline?

Take as much time as you need ;)

[inquest]

Somethng like that ;)

Alright, what was her name?

What we have here is a failure to communicate.

How so? I read your post as not seeing how one could construct a pragmatic case to define causing pain to others as wrong, which I then attempted to do. Did I misread you?

No. I was just making a general comment about how I'm still apparently having a hard time saying what I'm trying to say.

In the absence of an originator external to ourselves, how else can we know that it is universal?

It's like I said before, I can't know for sure if others can feel pain the way I do, but I can know that if they do, it would be wrong for me to inflict it on them. And, also like I said before, that is the foundation, which we then use logic to proceed from (and a reasonably solid logical case can be made to determine that people by and large do feel pain in the same basic way).

I think a big part of the problem we're having is that we don't seem to know what exactly we agree upon. We may have to start some kind of checklist or something. For example, would you accept, for the sake of the discussion, my above statement about pain, so that we can have that as a reference point; or is there something you might dispute about that statement in and of itself, without getting into how we would apply it further?

Well, fortunately, if we take a look at this conception of Univ*, it doesn't make proscriptive pronouncements about human behavior the way other concepts do.

I was just using Univ* as a stand-in. You could substitute anything - Jesus, Jehovah, Ra, the Force, etc. My point is, if it's "moral" to do what a Creator says to do, then you're accepting that there is such a thing as morality, independent of any pragmatic concern.

You also seem to be suggesting that only a universal Creator could be responsible for universal moral law. Maybe that's true, in which case the existence of universal moral law would be evidence of a Creator. But my goal right now is to simply establish that this law exists, and then worry about its implications.

How many societies based upon genocide have lasted and prospered? I'm having trouble thinking of one. It's because people have, at least, some sense of self-preservation that such societies are probably doomed from the beginning.

But is it necessarily a rational sense of self-preservation? What if their policies can make the survivors more resistant to disease, invasion, natural disasters, etc., and that most of the people could see that they had a reasonably good chance of surviving the weeding-out process? Would that then make it right?

And for me to call it wrong, that's why it is critical to define base principles and "rights" from the start. Once we have those in place, we have some basis for saying it's wrong to slaughter Jews, because we recognize their desire to live as overriding someone else's desire to kill them.

How does this constitute even the slightest disagreement with what I've been saying (aside from the fact that these principles and rights have been fairly well recognized for quite some time now)? I mean, aren't you making a rather arbitrary moral judgement here?

[general_re]

BTW, nice thread about the 14'th amendment - it's good to find something else to discuss too ;)

I think a big part of the problem we're having is that we don't seem to know what exactly we agree upon. We may have to start some kind of checklist or something. For example, would you accept, for the sake of the discussion, my above statement about pain, so that we can have that as a reference point; or is there something you might dispute about that statement in and of itself, without getting into how we would apply it further?

The question I have to ask about that is your case looks like this. You go from A) "I feel pain," to B) "others feel pain," and then jump right to C) "therefore, it is wrong for me to inflict pain on them." And "why" is the part that's missing. Why is it wrong for you to inflict pain on them?

Because I can make the exact same case, just changing the details a bit, like this: A) I feel happiness, and B) others feel happiness, therefore C) it is wrong for me to make others happy. But I doubt you want to sign up for that particular argument, because we have some sense that pain is wrong, but happiness is (usually) good. So, we need to know why it's wrong to inflict pain on others, but okay to make them happy.

You also seem to be suggesting that only a universal Creator could be responsible for universal moral law. Maybe that's true, in which case the existence of universal moral law would be evidence of a Creator. But my goal right now is to simply establish that this law exists, and then worry about its implications.

Well, it seems to me that the existence of universal moral law certainly implies a universal creator, insofar as the opposite notion does not require one. Maybe you can make the case that universal moral law can exist even in the absence of a creator, which would certainly belie claims to knowing what that law is based on what someone's version of the creator says.

But then we have the problem of parsing out what that universal law is exactly - how do we measure it? How do we observe it? How do we know when we're right or wrong about what it is?

But is it necessarily a rational sense of self-preservation? What if their policies can make the survivors more resistant to disease, invasion, natural disasters, etc., and that most of the people could see that they had a reasonably good chance of surviving the weeding-out process? Would that then make it right?

Ah, but I cleverly anticipated this argument in advance, by suggesting that the ends cannot be used to justify the means. That may be seemingly arbitrary, but there are practical consequences of that decision that I think are generally beneficial.

Keep in mind that an argument from the consequences is only a logical fallacy when you try to use it to argue that something is true, or must be true. IOW, the claim is often advanced that Darwinism cannot be true, since if it were, it would lead to teen abortions, gay marriage, rioting in the streets, and so forth. But this is fallacious - even if all those things are true, and Darwinism inevitably leads to those things, that doesn't affect the truth of it at all.

But, when we're talking about how things should be, how we want society to be, it's perfectly appropriate to evaluate the potential consequences of our decisions. And this is how we would decide which axioms and rights we wanted to base our society on.

How does this constitute even the slightest disagreement with what I've been saying (aside from the fact that these principles and rights have been fairly well recognized for quite some time now)? I mean, aren't you making a rather arbitrary moral judgement here?

Sort of - saying that the Jews preference for life should override is arbitrary in a sense, insofar as we have nothing to hang our hats on to justify that, a priori. But, when we consider the consequences, we have some sparklingly good a posteriori reasons why it should be so. We find that we do not care for the consequences that are likely to ensue if peoples' preference for life is overridden by someone else's desire to kill. So, given the potential negative consequences, we say that this thing is off-limits.

Alright, what was her name?

That's "Mrs. General_re" to you, buddy ;)

[inquest]

BTW, nice thread about the 14'th amendment - it's good to find something else to discuss too ;)

The 14th amendment? What's that, like the 5th element or something? I've never heard of such a thing in my life. I deny all knowledge.

The question I have to ask about that is your case looks like this. You go from A) "I feel pain," to B) "others feel pain," and then jump right to C) "therefore, it is wrong for me to inflict pain on them." And "why" is the part that's missing. Why is it wrong for you to inflict pain on them?

The only way the answer to that question can be understood is in the context of the experience of pain. It's because pain, unlike happiness, is such an awful experience. And I can't break down "awful" any further, so again, one would have to have a subjective experience of the word in order to know what I'm talking about. Do you have the necessary experience to know what I'm talking about?

And there's also something I want to re-address that you said earlier, that I don't think we dealt with properly. You suggested that my anti-pain morality is simply an elaborate means of preventing myself from being on the receiving end of the pain stick. And I asked what then propels people to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others - or more properly, what should propel them to do so. There's something more to it than self-interest, it seems.

But then we have the problem of parsing out what that universal law is exactly - how do we measure it? How do we observe it? How do we know when we're right or wrong about what it is?

Care to guess? ;-)

That's "Mrs. General_re" to you, buddy ;)

Whoaa! You even married her. That must've been quite a weekend!

[general_re]

The 14th amendment? What's that, like the 5th element or something? I've never heard of such a thing in my life. I deny all knowledge.

Ehhh, I saw you there, don't try to deny it. Wanna argue about that instead? ;)

The only way the answer to that question can be understood is in the context of the experience of pain. It's because pain, unlike happiness, is such an awful experience. And I can't break down "awful" any further, so again, one would have to have a subjective experience of the word in order to know what I'm talking about. Do you have the necessary experience to know what I'm talking about?

Hmmm. Maybe we're overcomplicating things just a bit. Instead of trying to analyze things in terms of my relationship to you, and your relationship to the world in terms of pain, let's break it down to a single case, if we can.

You say that you experience pain. I accept that and believe you - I take you at your word in this. Now, setting aside anyone else's experience of pain, or their feelings about pain (including me), why is it wrong for me to inflict pain on you? Nevermind whether I feel pain or not, or whether anyone else does - let's just put it in terms of the single case of you. Is it wrong for me to inflict pain on you? If so, why?

And there's also something I want to re-address that you said earlier, that I don't think we dealt with properly. You suggested that my anti-pain morality is simply an elaborate means of preventing myself from being on the receiving end of the pain stick. And I asked what then propels people to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others - or more properly, what should propel them to do so. There's something more to it than self-interest, it seems.

There's a potential answer for that in evolution as well, it turns out - Dawkins devotes much time to that very question of "why self-sacrifice?" in The Selfish Gene. Whether his answer is compelling or not, I leave up to you ;)

Care to guess? ;-)

Is it my turn to look for a lifeline ;)

Whoaa! You even married her. That must've been quite a weekend!

Must have been - I wound up with two kids and a house in the suburbs. Can't quite figure out how that happened...

[inquest]

Ehhh, I saw you there, don't try to deny it. Wanna argue about that instead? ;)

I did not have relations with that amendment. I just want the American people to know that.

Nevermind whether I feel pain or not, or whether anyone else does - let's just put it in terms of the single case of you. Is it wrong for me to inflict pain on you? If so, why?

Because it sucks. But really, I'm not sure if there's any way I can convincingly answer that unless you know what it is. Otherwise, if you can take my word that I feel it, I guess you can also take my word that it's wrong.

There's a potential answer for that in evolution as well, it turns out - Dawkins devotes much time to that very question of "why self-sacrifice?" in The Selfish Gene. Whether his answer is compelling or not, I leave up to you ;)

BWWAHH HA HA HA HAAA! [<-- evil, maniacal laughter] And I cleverly anticipated a response to that! The issue isn't what impels us to self-sacrifice, it's whether or not we should. Yeah, I'm sure Dawkins or Gould or any one of them could come up with some evolutionary, survival-of-the-species explanation for the instinct. But as intelligent beings, we have the ability to discard most of our instincts if it's our desire. Your point to me was that we have morals against inflicting pain and death so that we ourselves can be spared it. But the fact that people bring pain and death upon themselves, and will invariably explain that they do so simply because it's the right thing to do, pulls the rug out from under your assumption that their conception of morality is guided by their desire to avoid unpleasant consequences.

Is it my turn to look for a lifeline ;)

Does this mean I have to put it in a multiple-choice format?

[general_re]

Nevermind whether I feel pain or not, or whether anyone else does - let's just put it in terms of the single case of you. Is it wrong for me to inflict pain on you? If so, why?

Because it sucks. But really, I'm not sure if there's any way I can convincingly answer that unless you know what it is. Otherwise, if you can take my word that I feel it, I guess you can also take my word that it's wrong.

You're still thinking of how to express it in terms of your relationship to someone else. You say "you know that feeling when you hit your hand with a hammer?" and they say "yeah" and you say "THAT'S what I'm talking about." The problem is that you can only express it in terms of some relationship with someone who has some experience of the thing you're trying to describe.

And I could chase you around some more, but the point is that it's completely subjective. It's not that you can't convincingly answer if I don't know what pain is - that's true, but it's not the real problem. The problem is that there's no convincing answer at all.

Ultimately, if I chase you around long enough to pin you down, we'll discover one of two things. Either it's wrong for me to hurt you just because you don't like being hurt, and therefore it's basically a personal preference of yours about pain. Or, it's wrong for me to hurt you because someone else told you that it was wrong for me to hurt you. These are the only two possibilities - you may not think so, but you'd be forced into one of them sooner or later.

So, the problem you have is that, given the first choice, it ain't a universal moral imperative any more - it's just one of many preferences you have, for which you can articulate some sort of reason with varying degrees of success. I prefer chocolate, you prefer strawberry. I like wine, you prefer beer. I like painlessness, you like pain. And we don't call the first two sets of choices "moral imperatives", but we want to pretend that the last preference is.

And you can repeat that for any other thing you want to call a moral imperative. Ultimately, every single one of them is going to boil down to being wrong just because you don't like whatever it is, or because someone told you it was wrong.

So if it's just a personal, arbitrary preference, then we can write off any claims to the universal truth of the thing, whatever the issue at hand is. So let's look at the other option.

Now, if someone just tells you a thing is a universal moral imperative, you can believe them or not, of course. If I tell you a thing is a universal moral imperative, I might be right, or I might be wrong. But the question is, what makes me special about seeing universal moral imperatives? If I can see them, you should see them too, right? But we presume that there's nothing special about me, and I can't see things you can see. So it must be just my own personal preference that I'm trying to claim is a universal truth. But we've already noticed that there's no reason at all to think that. "Butter pecan is the best ice cream there is, as a matter of universal truth. We must have butter pecan, but not other flavors of ice cream," I tell you. But you, clever person that you are, see that this is not a universal truth at all - it's just my opinion.

But maybe I'm telling you what someone else has told me - someone told me that thus-and-such is a moral imperative, and now I'm telling you. After all, those are our only two options about moral imperatives - it's just a preference, or I heard it from somewhere else. I'm not special, so to claim universal truth about what I say, it has to be a bit more than just my preference, so I must have heard it from someone else. But if it's true, and whatever it is actually is a universal truth, then it must have come from someone a good deal more authoritative than you or I, someone for whom it's not a personal preference, and someone who didn't just hear it from someone else. It must have come from someone not like us, who can see and know universal truth in a way that we cannot.

And I'll give you about twenty seconds to think of who all that person is usually thought to be :^)

The issue isn't what impels us to self-sacrifice, it's whether or not we should. Yeah, I'm sure Dawkins or Gould or any one of them could come up with some evolutionary, survival-of-the-species explanation for the instinct. But as intelligent beings, we have the ability to discard most of our instincts if it's our desire. Your point to me was that we have morals against inflicting pain and death so that we ourselves can be spared it. But the fact that people bring pain and death upon themselves, and will invariably explain that they do so simply because it's the right thing to do, pulls the rug out from under your assumption that their conception of morality is guided by their desire to avoid unpleasant consequences.

Not at all. It's a false dichotomy - either they're guided by a desire to avoid unpleasant consequences, or they're guided by a desire to propagate the species. But of course, the true answer is that both drives are operating at any given moment. And mostly, they don't conflict with one another - I can usually assure the long-term survival of the species by assuring my own short-term survival, and thus preserving my ability to reproduce. But sometimes those drives do conflict with one another, and there's a mental calculus that comes into play, a rather (to our minds) cold and rational cost-benefit calculation that people make.

And if we were to set up an experiment to put those two desires into conflict with one another, I think we'd be surprised by how uneven and unpredictable people's responses were. I dangle you and your child over an abyss, and explain that I'll drop one and only one of you, and it's your choice who gets it - you, or the kid. But no matter what you choose, there's a rational basis for that choice. Some people will choose the "noble" self-sacrifice of dying so that their children will live. And some will choose the "base" option of their own personal survival, partly so that they might produce more offspring later on. And I think you'd be surprised at how many people would choose the second option, instead of the first.

And maybe that's why we cast self-sacrifice as "noble" and "good" and "worthy" and sing its praises and tout its virtues - because, in our heart of hearts, we know just how rare it really is, and that maybe it's not really the norm after all. After all, why cast it as noble and good if that's how everyone does it anyway? It's just the normal state of affairs.

What people "should" do in such a case begs the question - that there is a "right" answer to begin with. But people ignore ideas of what "should" be done in such situations all the time - look at how many people neglect or abuse their children because those children interfere with some other desire of theirs. "Should" just isn't a part of that calculation, unless, that is, we decide from the get-go to define a right answer for those situations. Or, if we think that someone else has told us what that right answer is, someone authoritative about such things.

And both choices allow you to start talking about what people "should" do, equally well. Either way, we have some basis for something to call "morality", whether it came from someone authoritative, or we bootstrapped it ourselves. Both options fill the need equally well......

[betty boop]

After all, those are our only two options about moral imperatives - it's just a preference, or I heard it from somewhere else.

Hi general_re! Or maybe the moral imperative is part of the structure of being itself, a part of the way things are that is discoverable by experience. Thus, neither a personal preference, nor primarily dependent on an authoritative source.

This hypothesis -- that the moral imperative is part of the structure of being -- would explain why so many various and separated human cultures down the ages have tended to report the same criteria for the moral imperative. C. S. Lewis used the term "Tao" for the moral imperative in this universal sense.

To change the subject, please a moment of silence in remembrance of Stephen Jay Gould, who recently succumbed to cancer at the young age of 60. R.I.P.

Best, bb.

[general_re]

Or maybe the moral imperative is part of the structure of being itself, a part of the way things are that is discoverable by experience. Thus, neither a personal preference, nor primarily dependent on an authoritative source.

Good morning, Betty - how are you today?

I did try to leave this possibility open somewhat in #765, that one might be able to advance a case that morality is itself a part of the natural order of things, and it has an existence independent of any sort of creator. This is close to Catholic dogma, as I alluded to some posts ago, which teached that morality is a fundamental aspect of God, and a fundamental aspect of the universe, but was neither created or invented by God - since it is thought to be an aspect of God, it is thought to be eternal and uncreated, much as God is thought to be.

Of course, by design, that dogma ties us to morality WRT to a creator still, but it's close to what you're getting at, and it's widely accepted by a billion Catholics or so - give or take a few like me ;)

So, then there's the other possibility, that it's just part of the natural fabric of the universe, in much the same way gravity is. And just as we can experimentally and empirically discover the nature of gravity, we can empirically discover the nature of the moral laws of the universe.

Now, I could quibble at this point, and point out that there's no real theoretical basis for morality and universal moral laws, the way there is for gravity. But that's actually not all that important - gravity existed before Newton and Einstein, and it may be that universal morality exists now, before someone has discovered its theoretical nature.

So, that's not where I want to go. Instead, what I would say is that if that is the case, and morality exists independent of, and apart from, any particular conception of a creator, then it follows that no particular creator can be known to have a lock on what that morality is. IOW, you pretty much have to abandon claims of "it's right because that's what the Bible (Koran/Baghavadh Ghita/Torah/whatever) says" - we've explicitly allowed that morality does not require a creator at all now, and so the creator is no longer required to explain it, or to give us the straight dope on what it is.

So, we can abstract morality away from a creator, such that we can imagine morality even in the absence of a creator. But then we have to recgnize that we've abandoned the notion of a creator, so we can't appeal to the creator as a source of authority any more.

Sure, we can take the Catholic position, but then morality can't exist independent of a creator - he may not have made it, but its existence is still contingent on his, insofar as it's an aspect, a facet of the creator's existence.

Maybe it will turn out to be the case, that morality is as fundamental as gravity. But we certainly don't know that to be the case yet - it may be so, but in the absence of any way to objectively judge it, it comes down to differing interpretations of what it is, which are necessarily subjective. Maybe morality is objective, but if we can't objectively determine it, our perceptions of it are necessarily subjective.

But you know what? From my point of view, there's a practical benefit to behaving as though it were objective, whether it is or not, and whether we can know it or not. I can't disprove that universal morality exists - I can only try to show that it isn't necessary. But even for my purposes, it makes things go a lot smoother if we all behave as though morality is universal and objective - whether you believe it is, or just act like it is, it works for me equally well either way ;)

And there are some precepts of morality that are widespread, but few that I can think of that are universal, across all societies. This may be a result of the fact that people are unknowingly behaving in a accord with universal moral laws, or it may be because the world has produced within us something like universal moral laws. Hard to know cause and effect for sure here - the phenomenon is explained equally well either way, it seems to me....

[inquest]

So, the problem you have is that, given the first choice, it ain't a universal moral imperative any more - it's just one of many preferences you have, for which you can articulate some sort of reason with varying degrees of success. I prefer chocolate, you prefer strawberry. I like wine, you prefer beer. I like painlessness, you like pain. And we don't call the first two sets of choices "moral imperatives", but we want to pretend that the last preference is.

I also despise tomatoes, to the point where it's caused me to wretch if I find that those things are in my mouth. And so I can say with certainty that if the vast majority (or really, any number) of people react to tomatoes the same way I do, then it would be wrong to make them eat them (parental prerogative perhaps excepted, up to a point). Not as wrong as it would be to inflict pain on them (provided they feel pain the same way I do), but a certain wrong nonetheless.

So you see the point I'm making. I evaluate an experience (by which I mean, the end subjective result of the experience, as distinct from the stimuli which cause it, as the same stimuli might cause different experiences for different people) as being awful, and then say it would be wrong to subject others to that same experience (regardless of whatever stimuli are used to elicit it). Logic then tells me that in at least one case (pain), the vast majority of those around me are also capable of being subjected to that same experience, using much the same stimuli, and therefore it's wrong to inflict it on them. So I say, don't do it.

It must have come from someone not like us, who can see and know universal truth in a way that we cannot.

And I'll give you about twenty seconds to think of who all that person is usually thought to be :^)

Uhhh... Santa Claus? (I can see the cult forming already)

And maybe that's why we cast self-sacrifice as "noble" and "good" and "worthy" and sing its praises and tout its virtues - because, in our heart of hearts, we know just how rare it really is, and that maybe it's not really the norm after all. After all, why cast it as noble and good if that's how everyone does it anyway? It's just the normal state of affairs.

I never suggested it was commonplace. But it is a conscious decision people make. In many cases, it's a result of the right upbringing. People have to be brought up to know that there are others in this world who have needs and desires and dreams like they do. I know that for me (if I should ever have the cojones to sacrifice myself in such a way), my conscious motivation would be that I'm making a difference for someone else. You can try to tell me that that's just an illusion that evolution places on me, but I know that it's not. It's real, as real as anything could be.

[inquest]

Hi again, betty. So have you been spying on us the whole time, or did you just come back to check on us to make sure we haven't started a new cult or something? :-D

[general_re]

So you see the point I'm making. I evaluate an experience (by which I mean, the end subjective result of the experience, as distinct from the stimuli which cause it, as the same stimuli might cause different experiences for different people) as being awful, and then say it would be wrong to subject others to that same experience (regardless of whatever stimuli are used to elicit it). Logic then tells me that in at least one case (pain), the vast majority of those around me are also capable of being subjected to that same experience, using much the same stimuli, and therefore it's wrong to inflict it on them. So I say, don't do it.

Ah, see, I thought we'd find something like common ground sooner or later. I cannot argue with this case you have laid out here. I can only add that, although it may be a personal preference of yours not to like experiencing pain, one of my starting precepts all along has been to accept such preferences as a priori valid. You say you don't like pain? Fine by me - who am I to countermand your own personal preferences in such things?

So, it may be the case that this is purely an arbitrary personal preference of yours not to eat tomatoes (and I'm with you all the way on that one), but we accept that preference of yours, and we take it as given. And we can build a system of "morality" upon that, in addition to some other basic precepts.

The end result is much like what I said to Betty - I can't prove or disprove the existence of universal morality, any more than I can prove or disprove the existence of God. I can only try to show that universal morality isn't necessary. This is nice to know in and of itself, because it renders morality as totally self-sustaining and self-contained - it's no longer contingent upon anything at all, and even if someone were to completely disprove God and universal morality tomorrow (good luck), we would still have something resembling a framework for civilized society.

Uhhh... Santa Claus? (I can see the cult forming already)

He's making a list, you know. And double-checking it. Santa punishes the immoral and rewards the moral. Let us pray to the great and powerful Claus.

:^)

I know that for me (if I should ever have the cojones to sacrifice myself in such a way), my conscious motivation would be that I'm making a difference for someone else. You can try to tell me that that's just an illusion that evolution places on me, but I know that it's not. It's real, as real as anything could be.

But it is real, very real - the impulse really exists. I don't want to tell you that this feeling is an illusion, because I don't think it is. So, I would agree that this pull from within is real, but the question is, who's doing the pulling? Does it come entirely from the inside, or does it come from the outside?

[betty boop]

So have you been spying on us the whole time, or did you just come back to check on us to make sure we haven't started a new cult or something? :-D

Nope. And nope.

Having been disengaged from this discussion for a while now; but just seeing general_re's reply to you fly by on the board, I figured it might be fun to tune in to see what mischief you two might have been up to in recent times. :^)

So go ahead and propagate a "new cult or something" if you feel like it. These days, that might actually be a good thing. In any event, it would have to stand the test of time; so I'm not too worried about that possibility.

Hey, the way things seem to be going with the official, established churches these days, maybe a hypothetical resymbolization of God's story might be in order. But then, God's story cannot divert from "true story." Which in turn becomes the measure of your story.... IMHO.

Supposing you were to reach a different conclusion, you'd have to be pretty good actually to make it stick...even for a "short" time.

Or so it seems to me. Nice to see you, inquest. You too, general_re. best, bb.

[inquest]

I cannot argue with this case you have laid out here.

OK, but part of the case I laid out was that was that there is a definite moral principle in what I was describing. Were you accepting that, too?

So, I would agree that this pull from within is real, but the question is, who's doing the pulling? Does it come entirely from the inside, or does it come from the outside?

Well, that is the question (or questions, I guess), isn't it? Something for another thread, I would say at this point.

[general_re]

OK, but part of the case I laid out was that was that there is a definite moral principle in what I was describing. Were you accepting that, too?

What, that it's wrong to hurt people? I've never (seriously) disputed that, though. I don't run around pushing over old ladies and looking for puppies to kick, you know ;)

The only thing I take issue with is the foundation of that statement, where the notion of the wrongness of it comes from in the first place. I can't disprove that morality is a universal truth, or that God is somehow responsible for the nature of what we call morality. All I can try to do is show that neither one is necessary, that alternate, perhaps more parsimonious, explanations exist.

[inquest]

All I can try to do is show that neither one is necessary, that alternate, perhaps more parsimonious, explanations exist.

And my dispute would be that if these alternate explanations rely exclusively on objective and pragmatic criteria (survival of the species, functionality of society, etc.), then they're seriously lacking.

[general_re]

Lacking what? Morality? ;-)

[inquest]

Yeah, that and reality. |-P