I think a big part of the problem we're having is that we don't seem to know what exactly we agree upon. We may have to start some kind of checklist or something. For example, would you accept, for the sake of the discussion, my above statement about pain, so that we can have that as a reference point; or is there something you might dispute about that statement in and of itself, without getting into how we would apply it further?
The question I have to ask about that is your case looks like this. You go from A) "I feel pain," to B) "others feel pain," and then jump right to C) "therefore, it is wrong for me to inflict pain on them." And "why" is the part that's missing. Why is it wrong for you to inflict pain on them?
Because I can make the exact same case, just changing the details a bit, like this: A) I feel happiness, and B) others feel happiness, therefore C) it is wrong for me to make others happy. But I doubt you want to sign up for that particular argument, because we have some sense that pain is wrong, but happiness is (usually) good. So, we need to know why it's wrong to inflict pain on others, but okay to make them happy.
You also seem to be suggesting that only a universal Creator could be responsible for universal moral law. Maybe that's true, in which case the existence of universal moral law would be evidence of a Creator. But my goal right now is to simply establish that this law exists, and then worry about its implications.
Well, it seems to me that the existence of universal moral law certainly implies a universal creator, insofar as the opposite notion does not require one. Maybe you can make the case that universal moral law can exist even in the absence of a creator, which would certainly belie claims to knowing what that law is based on what someone's version of the creator says.
But then we have the problem of parsing out what that universal law is exactly - how do we measure it? How do we observe it? How do we know when we're right or wrong about what it is?
But is it necessarily a rational sense of self-preservation? What if their policies can make the survivors more resistant to disease, invasion, natural disasters, etc., and that most of the people could see that they had a reasonably good chance of surviving the weeding-out process? Would that then make it right?
Ah, but I cleverly anticipated this argument in advance, by suggesting that the ends cannot be used to justify the means. That may be seemingly arbitrary, but there are practical consequences of that decision that I think are generally beneficial.
Keep in mind that an argument from the consequences is only a logical fallacy when you try to use it to argue that something is true, or must be true. IOW, the claim is often advanced that Darwinism cannot be true, since if it were, it would lead to teen abortions, gay marriage, rioting in the streets, and so forth. But this is fallacious - even if all those things are true, and Darwinism inevitably leads to those things, that doesn't affect the truth of it at all.
But, when we're talking about how things should be, how we want society to be, it's perfectly appropriate to evaluate the potential consequences of our decisions. And this is how we would decide which axioms and rights we wanted to base our society on.
How does this constitute even the slightest disagreement with what I've been saying (aside from the fact that these principles and rights have been fairly well recognized for quite some time now)? I mean, aren't you making a rather arbitrary moral judgement here?
Sort of - saying that the Jews preference for life should override is arbitrary in a sense, insofar as we have nothing to hang our hats on to justify that, a priori. But, when we consider the consequences, we have some sparklingly good a posteriori reasons why it should be so. We find that we do not care for the consequences that are likely to ensue if peoples' preference for life is overridden by someone else's desire to kill. So, given the potential negative consequences, we say that this thing is off-limits.
Alright, what was her name?
That's "Mrs. General_re" to you, buddy ;)
The 14th amendment? What's that, like the 5th element or something? I've never heard of such a thing in my life. I deny all knowledge.
The question I have to ask about that is your case looks like this. You go from A) "I feel pain," to B) "others feel pain," and then jump right to C) "therefore, it is wrong for me to inflict pain on them." And "why" is the part that's missing. Why is it wrong for you to inflict pain on them?
The only way the answer to that question can be understood is in the context of the experience of pain. It's because pain, unlike happiness, is such an awful experience. And I can't break down "awful" any further, so again, one would have to have a subjective experience of the word in order to know what I'm talking about. Do you have the necessary experience to know what I'm talking about?
And there's also something I want to re-address that you said earlier, that I don't think we dealt with properly. You suggested that my anti-pain morality is simply an elaborate means of preventing myself from being on the receiving end of the pain stick. And I asked what then propels people to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others - or more properly, what should propel them to do so. There's something more to it than self-interest, it seems.
But then we have the problem of parsing out what that universal law is exactly - how do we measure it? How do we observe it? How do we know when we're right or wrong about what it is?
Care to guess? ;-)
That's "Mrs. General_re" to you, buddy ;)
Whoaa! You even married her. That must've been quite a weekend!