World Terrorism: News, History and Research Of A Changing World.

First in Europe and now in the United States, Muslim groups have petitioned to establish enclaves in which they can uphold and enforce greater compliance to Islamic law. While the U.S. Constitution enshrines the right to religious freedom and the prohibition against a state religion, when it comes to the rights of religious enclaves to impose communal rules, the dividing line is more nebulous. Can U.S. enclaves, homeowner associations, and other groups enforce Islamic law?

Such questions are no longer theoretical. While Muslim organizations first established enclaves in Europe,[1] the trend is now crossing the Atlantic. Some Islamist community leaders in the United States are challenging the principles of assimilation and equality once central to the civil rights movement, seeking instead to live according to a separate but equal philosophy. The Gwynnoaks Muslim Residential Development group, for example, has established an informal enclave in Baltimore because, according to John Yahya Cason, director of the Islamic Education and Community Development Initiative, a Baltimore-based Muslim advocacy group, "there was no community in the U.S. that showed the totality of the essential components of Muslim social, economic, and political structure."[2]

Baltimore is not alone. In August 2004, a local planning commission in Little Rock, Arkansas, granted The Islamic Center for Human Excellence authorization to build an internal Islamic enclave to include a mosque, a school, and twenty-two homes.[3] While the imam, Aquil Hamidullah, says his goal is to create "a clean community, free of alcohol, drugs, and free of gangs,"[4] the implications for U.S. jurisprudence of this and other internal enclaves are greater: while the Little Rock enclave might prevent the sale of alcohol, can it punish possession and in what manner? Can it force all women, be they residents or visitors, to don Islamic hijab (headscarf)? Such enclaves raise the fundamental questions of when, how, and to what extent religious practice may supersede the U.S. Constitution.

The Internal Muslim Enclave The internal Muslim enclave proposed by the Islamic Center for Human Excellence in Arkansas represents a new direction for Islam in the United States. The group seeks to transform a loosely organized Muslim population into a tangible community presence. The group has foreign financial support: it falls under the umbrella of a much larger Islamic group, "Islam 4 the World," an organization sponsored by Sharjah, one of the constituent emirates of the United Arab Emirates.[5] While the Islamic Center for Human Excellence has yet to articulate detailed plans for its Little Rock enclave, the group's reliance on foreign funding is troublesome. Past investments by the United Arab Emirates' rulers and institutions have promoted radical interpretations of Islam. [6]

The Islamic Center for Human Excellence may seek to segregate schools and offices by gender. The enclave might also exercise broad control upon commerce within its boundaries—provided the economic restrictions did not discriminate against out-of-state interests or create an undue burden upon interstate commerce. But most critically, the enclave could promulgate every internal law—from enforcing strict religious dress codes to banning alcohol possession and music; it could even enforce limits upon religious and political tolerance. Although such concepts are antithetical to a free society, U.S. democracy allows the internal enclave to function beyond the established boundaries of our constitutional framework. At the very least, the permissible parameters of an Islamist enclave are ill defined.

The greater American Muslim community's unapologetic and public manifestation of belief in a separate but equal ideology does not bode well. In September 2004, the New Jersey branch of the Islamic Circle of North America rented Six Flags Adventure Park in New Jersey for "The Great Muslim Adventure Day." The advertisement announcing the event stated: "The entire park for Muslims only." While legal—and perhaps analogous to corporate or other non-religious groups renting facilities, the advertisement expressly implied a mindset that a proof of faith was required for admission to the park. In his weblog, commentator Daniel Pipes raises a relevant and troubling question about the event: because it is designated for Muslims only, "Need one recite the shahada to enter the fairgrounds?"[7]

While U.S. law might give such Muslims-only events the benefit of the doubt, flexibility may not go both ways. There is precedent of Islamists taking advantage of liberal flexibility to more extreme ends. Canada provides a useful example into how Islamist groups can exploit liberal legal tolerance. In 1991, Ontario, Canada, passed a seemingly innocuous law called the "Arbitration Act."[8] This act permitted commercial, religious, or such other designated arbitrators to settle civil disputes outside the Canadian justice system so long as the result did not contradict Canadian law. Like U.S. authorities are beginning to do now, Canadian legislators decided to give religious groups the benefit of the doubt, assuming that they would still hold national law to be paramount.

In October 2003, under the auspices of the Ontario legislation, the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice created Muslim arbitration boards and stated its intent to arbitrate on the basis of Islamic law.[9] A national furor erupted, particularly among Canadian Muslim women's groups that opposed the application of traditional Islamic (Shari‘a) laws that would supersede their far more liberal and egalitarian democratic rights. After nearly two years of legal wrangling, the premier of Ontario, Dalton McGuinty, held that religious-based arbitrations "threaten our common ground," and announced, "There will be no Shari‘a law in Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one law for all Ontarians."[10] On November 15, 2005, McGuinty's provincial government submitted legislation to amend the arbitration act to abrogate, in effect, all religious arbitration.[11] Requests for Muslim enclaves within larger U.S. communities may signal that U.S. jurisprudence will soon be faced with a similar conundrum. Islamist exceptionalism can abuse the tolerance liberal societies have traditionally extended to interface between religious and secular law.

Prior to the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice demands to impose Shari‘a, the Arbitration Act worked well. Unfortunately for Canadian Jews, the repeal ended state-enforcement of agreements reached by the use of a millennia-old rabbinical court system called beit din (house of law) that had for decades quietly settled marriage, custody, and business disputes. Joel Richler, Ontario region chairman of the Canadian Jewish Congress, expressed his lament: "If there have been any problems flowing from any rabbinical court decisions, I'm not aware of them."[12] Canadian Catholics likewise were stopped from being able to annul marriages according to Canon Law and avoid undue entanglement in civil courts. Abuse of the spirit of the law, though, ended up curtailing local liberty. Rather than soften the edge between religion and state, the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice threatened to eliminate it with the imposition of Shari‘a. The Canadian experience demonstrates how flexibility can backfire when all parties do not seek to uphold basic precepts of tolerance. The Little Rock application raises the specter of a parallel situation. While The Islamic Center for Human Excellence may state it wants to create a clean-living community, might the community's extreme interpretation of Shari‘a force a reconsideration of just how much leeway the U.S. government gives religious communities?

As the Muslim community in the United States grows, an increasingly active Islamist lobby has submitted numerous white papers and amicus briefs to legislators and courts arguing for the religious right of Muslims to apply Shari‘a law, particularly in relation to family law disputes.[13] This looming jurisprudential conflict is significant for it raises issues about the rights of community members to marry outside the community, forced marriages, and the minimum age of brides, and whether wives and daughters may enjoy equal inheritance. In cases of non-family law, it raises the question about whether the testimony of women will be considered on par with that of men.

No previous enclave in U.S. history has ever been so vigorously protected by agents of group identity politics or so adamantly defended by legal watchdogs; nor has any previous religious enclave possessed the potency of more than one billion believers around the world. Islamic-only communities may also benefit from the largess provided by billions of petrol dollars to finance growth. The track record of Saudi and other wealthy Persian Gulf donations and charitable efforts are worrisome. There is a direct correlation between Saudi money received and the spread of intolerant practices. In 2004, for example, the U.S. Treasury Department froze the assets of Al-Haramein Foundation, one of Saudi Arabia's largest nongovernmental organizations, because of its financial links to Al-Qaeda.[14] Additionally, American graduates of Saudi academies advance Wahhabist interpretations of Islam inside the U.S. prison system,[15] and Saudi-subsidized publications promote intolerance inside U.S. mosques.[16]

A Muslim enclave is uniquely perilous because there are few if any internal enclaves that adhere to a polity dedicated to the active abrogation of secular law and the imposition of a supreme religious law. The concept of Shari‘a is so fundamental to Islam, that even today, prominent Muslim jurists argue over whether a Muslim can fully discharge Shari‘a obligations while residing in a non-Muslim territory.[17] Yet, in spite of this apparent conundrum, Muslims have resided peacefully in non-Muslim lands since the seventh century. In the greater context, there may be a breach in the dike for Islamist groups residing in the United States because the Baltimore and Little Rock enclaves must acknowledge the U.S. Constitution as the paramount basis of civil law.

A dissident Islamic sub-community is filled with dichotomous propositions: from the presumed supremacy of Shari‘a-based law over secular law; the melding of religion and polity versus the constitutionally mandated separation of same; to the politics of group and factionalism, versus assimilation and pluralism. To deny the settlement of a Muslim-only community based solely upon prejudices formed after September 11 would be illiberal. But the alternative, opening the door to Islamic enclaves without scrutiny, is as dubious.

The Enclave under U.S. Law Existing U.S. legal precedent, though, may provide some grounds for handling expansive demands for Islamic enclaves. U.S. legal views of internal enclaves derive from the famous 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, in which the Supreme Court ruled the concept of separate but equal to be unconstitutional.[18] While the case revolved around the right of black children to attend white schools, it promulgated a concept that is anathema in today's world of multiculturalism: neither the state nor any constituent group could claim equality through separation.

Enclaves can exist, though. As courts have ruled on issues relating to equality under the law and upon the autonomy of religious practice, two distinctive features of internal U.S. enclaves have taken shape: first, the boundaries of the enclave should be recognized by local inhabitants. Second, the enclave cannot supersede the constitutionally protected rights of the citizens of a state.

Because most rights secured by the constitution are protected only against infringement by government action, the Supreme Court has avoided establishing a bright-line test as to the limits of religious liberty. Any religious group or individual seeking to establish an internal enclave has the right to limit residency, promulgate local rules, and perhaps even collect fees or taxes to support nominal community services.

Such enclaves do not hold final sway over the rights of non-residents, however. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company[19] and Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,[20] the court outlined constitutional protections for private citizens in which any entity, religious or otherwise, exercising governmental authority over private citizens remains subject to the provisions of the First and Fourteenth amendments. In both cases, the court affirmed that citizens of a state retain their right to "due process of law" under the Fourteenth Amendment, even when inside an enclave. These holdings, however, do not prevent enclaves from restricting the individual freedoms of their inhabitants.

The Supreme Court has ruled upon the limits of religious liberty. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the court outlined the circumstances in which the government could act to restrict religious independence. The court held that the free exercise clause "embraces two concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."[21]

Christopher L. Eisgruber, professor of law at New York University, explained. He argued that, "the Constitution permits government to nurture ideological sub-communities founded upon premises inconsistent with the constitution's own commitments."[22] He maintained that such dissident sub-communities can provide important "sources of dissent"[23] and asserted that even if an enclave embraced ideals contrary to constitutional ideals, it should still be granted the right to pursue its own vision of good. For example, he wrote:

[Though] it is regrettable that young women in Kiryas Joel [a Satmar Hasidic enclave] will grow up in a starkly sexist culture, and it is regrettable that the Amish children of Yoder will find it very hard to become astronomers or lawyers … it would also be regrettable if the United States were not home to any sub-communities which, like the Satmars or the Amish, rejected principles of justice fundamental to the American regime.[24]

According to Eisgruber, tolerance of the intolerant is fundamental to the freedoms espoused by Western liberal democracy. While Islamists might use such logic to argue for the permissibility of Shari‘a communities, such tolerance has limits. Enclaves do not have carte blanche to act. Both the state and national legislatures must retain control over the extent of accommodation, and there should be no subsidization of the enclave by the government.[25] Such limits ensure that the government can constrain those sub-communities that might espouse more radical, violent, or racist views.[26]

It is usually when the U.S. government moves to uphold the rule of law that most Americans first learn of an internal enclave. Few Americans knew of the philosophy espoused by anti-government activist Randy Weaver until 1992 when the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol and Firearms raided his compound at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, killing Vicki Weaver, their infant son, Sam, and the family dog.[27] Nor did many Americans know about David Koresh and his religious views until a raid the following year on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, in which a resulting fire killed fifty adults and twenty-five children under the age of fifteen.[28] While tragic, such events involved cults or political splinter groups. The growth of Muslim enclaves raises the specter of such conflicts occurring on a much larger scale.

While the court has interpreted the establishment clause to empower the government to constrain dissident sub-communities when necessary to protect public safety, it has been wary of addressing legal issues requiring intrusion upon the religious polity. Because the First Amendment provides for religious freedom, the court has confined itself to ruling upon three basic issues: property disputes between national religious hierarchical organizations with affiliated breakaway entities; accommodations under the free exercise clause; and the prohibition against the establishment of a state religion. New challenges, though, may lead to new interpretations.

The Antithesis to Democracy Is concern over internal Muslim enclaves justified? On their face, the fundamental principles of the internal Muslim enclave are no more invidious than any other religious enclave. But ideology matters. Many proponents of an Islamic polity promote an ideology at odds with U.S. constitutional jurisprudence and the prohibition against the establishment of a state-sponsored religion. The refusal to recognize federal law makes Islamist enclaves more akin to Ruby Ridge than to the Hasidic and Amish cases cited by Eisgruber.

Muslim theologians describe Islam not only as a religion but also as a system of state. The Qur'an—viewed by Muslims as the word of God—is replete with instructions about governance. An enclave promoting Islamic mores does not necessarily restrict itself to a social atmosphere but also one of governance. Traditional Islamic law controls the most basic aspects of everyday life and may make any Islamic enclave irreconcilable with the basic presumptions of Western liberal democracy and secular law.

While many American Muslims practice Islam and embrace the fundamental principles of the U.S. Constitution, others do not. There are consistent attempts by Islamist elements overseas to strengthen their own radical interpretation of Islam at the expense of moderation and tolerance. Saudi donors, for example, have propagated the ideology of Islamism, which seeks to interweave a narrow and often intolerant interpretation of religion into an all-encompassing political ideology. The number of imams and jihadists who have been outspoken in identifying the supremacy of Shari‘a to democracy underlines the incompatibility of Islamism and democracy. The late Saudi theologian, Sheikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Jubair, for example, stated,

Only one ambition is worthy of Islam, to save the world from the curse of democracy: to teach men that they cannot rule themselves on the basis of man-made laws. Mankind has strayed from the path of God, we must return to that path or face certain annihilation.[29]

Prior to Iraq's January 30, 2005 elections, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, released an audiotape in which he declared war upon democracy and denounced its tenets as "the very essence of heresy, polytheism, and error."[30] Nor is Islamist antipathy for democracy limited to popular elections. According to a Saudi publication distributed at a San Diego mosque, "[Democracy is] responsible for all the horrible wars … more than 130 wars with more than 120 million people dead [in the twentieth century alone]; not counting victims of poverty, hunger and disease."[31] Such sentiments reflect a common theme among Islamists: democracy is the antithesis to everything pious and pure in Islam; and, in truth, democracy is the direct and substantial causal effect of Muslim suffering and injustice in the world today.

This does not mean that Islamists are unwilling to use democracy for their ends. But while they accept the trappings of democracy, they continue to reject its principles because the Shari‘a, to them the perfect rule of law, cannot be abrogated or altered by the shifting moods of a secular electorate. Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, editor-in-chief of the pan-Arab weekly Al-Mustakillah, explained,

The heart of the matter is that no Islamic state can be legitimate in the eyes of its subjects without obeying the main teachings of the Shari‘a. A secular government might coerce obedience, but Muslims will not abandon their belief that state affairs should be supervised by the just teachings of the holy law.[32]

He could draw from plenty of examples. In 1992, for example, Ali Balhadj, a leader of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, declared, "When we are in power, there will be no more elections because God will be ruling."[33] While mayor of Istanbul, Islamist Turkish politician Recep Tayyip Erdoðan quipped, "For us, democracy is a streetcar. We would go as far as we could, and then get off."[34] As he eviscerates the judiciary, many Turks wonder about his sincerity.[35]

Experience abroad is relevant, as it goes to the heart of the sincerity of proponents of the Little Rock and Baltimore enclaves, an issue compounded by the willingness to accept donations from Persian Gulf financiers.

Conclusion How Muslims reconcile Islamic polity within the confines of Western liberal democracy is an unresolved issue. This process will take years to evolve and is likely to convulse in further violent episodes. Presently, many Muslims reject wholesale the notion of a dominant secular law and instead seek the imposition of a pan-Islamist state under the guidance of Shari‘a. These Islamists view secular modernity and the democratic practices of radical egalitarianism, individual rights, and free exercise of religion as a direct and substantial threat to their belief system, and they are intent on employing violence against the West for the foreseeable future. The remainder and majority of the Muslim world must reject nihilism and engage in widespread debate regarding Islam's role within the world community.

The local planning commission in Little Rock, Arkansas, might proceed with the proposed Muslim enclave, but the Arkansas courts and its legislature should not abdicate its responsibilities to ensure that Western liberal rights and protections remain supreme. The government should monitor both the rhetoric and behavior of these communities. As the Supreme Court stated in Cantwell: the freedom to believe is absolute, but the freedom to act, in the nature of things, cannot be, especially as to the safety and preservation of the American democracy.[36]

David Kennedy Houck is an attorney at Houck O'Brien LLC, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

[same traitors as my last post, different country]

Police: Anti-war protestors threw feces

Small group of anarchists goes wild at end of one-hour march in Tel Aviv street. According to police, protestors refused to evacuate road, hurled sticks, eggs and bags containing excrement at police officers
Avi Cohen

Two anarchist activists were arrested Saturday evening during a demonstration held in Tel Aviv in protest of the Israel Defense Forces operation in Lebanon .

The weekly demonstration of left-wing activists began at King George Street, near Dizengoff Center, and continued in a march on the road toward Nahalat Binyamin, with the protestors blocking the road for traffic.

In spite of the arrangement reached with the police, according to which only 1,500 protestors would take part in the march, twice the number of protestors arrived at the place, and it was anyway okayed by the police.

Police officers vs. demonstrators (Photo: Avi Cohen)

After a one-hour march, the protestors arrived at Allenby Street. They evacuated the road, continued toward the Nahalat Binyamin pedestrian mall, and traffic continued to flow. At a certain stage, the police said, dozens of anarchist activists, along with several left-wing protestors, began walking on the road again and blocking traffic.

According to the police, officers attempted to prevent the disruption to the traffic, and in response the protestors began going wild, throwing objects, sticks, eggs and bags containing excrement at the police.

The police arrested two protestors, and the demonstration continued quietly in Nahalat Binyamin.

Yonatan Pollak, an activists of the Anarchists Against The Fence movement, who took part in the demonstration, claimed that no bags containing excrement were thrown at the police and that the organization's activists did not go wild.

"There was no unruliness, apart from the unruliness on the part of the police, who were eager to fight with the demonstrators," he said.

Former Knesset Member Yael Dayan, who spoke at the demonstration, was applauded when she said that "the soldiers must be returned from Lebanon immediately." However, the crowd booed when she claimed that "the war was justified at its onset."

Hadash MK: War will not end in a military victory

Among the speakers at the demonstration was also Zohar Milgrom, an reserve soldier who was called by the army and told the crowd that he plans to announce his refusal to serve in Lebanon: "Under no circumstances am I ready to be a partner in the war crimes that the country is committing. The demonstration gives me and my friends a feeling that they still have something to belong to in this country."

Dr. Gadi Algazi of Tel Aviv University said that "this war is being committed on the back of the most poor, both in Israel and in Lebanon. Those who cannot escape are paying the heaviest price in this war."

Another speaker was Shaul Feldman, whose house in Haifa was destroyed after being hit by a rocket last week. Feldman told the crowd that on the first day of the war he took part in a demonstration against it, and the fact that a rocket fell on his house did not cause him to change his mind.

"I don’t think this is a war that should be supported," he said.

Knesset Member Dov Khenin (Hadash) congratulated the demonstration participants, saying that "a demonstration attended by thousands expressed the broadening of the front against the war."

"Citizens who supported the wart understand today that the war will not end in a military victory. Therefore, we must immediately cease the fire and begin negotiations to release prisoners on both sides," Khenin said.

The weekly left-wing demonstrations began about a month and a half ago, when Corporal Gilad Shalit was kidnapped and the IDF began striking in Gaza. At first they took place opposite the home of IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz . This is the first time the police were forced to intervene and exert power.

http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3286773,00.html

Roee Nahmias contributed to the report

Why Hezbollah is proving so tough on the battlefield
Karby Leggett and Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal
Posted: Fri, 04 Aug 2006 07:00 | © Moneyweb Holdings Limited, 1997-2006

As Israel ended its 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000, its army left behind part of a strategic outpost known as Karqom. Concerned they might damage an ancient synagogue nearby, soldiers hesitated to level the outpost, as they did the rest of their military infrastructure.

When Israel's military returned to Karqom during the fighting in recent weeks, what was left of the outpost was gone. In its place was a fortified, 5,000-square-foot Hezbollah military base with a radio tower, secure satellite communications and a unit of more than a dozen guards. The Israelis ordered an airstrike, which detonated a huge cache of what they say were explosives and other weapons. The explosion, said a senior Israeli military official who was involved, "was like Independence Day in America."

Even the Israeli commanders who had watched the transformation of Karqom through spy equipment were surprised by the amount and variety of weapons stored there. It underscored the advances the onetime guerrilla militia had made to become the sort of potent military force usually associated with a national army.

A look at how Hezbollah has developed as a military and political force shows why Israel has been having a more difficult time than it expected in driving the group out of southern Lebanon. And it also shows how tough the road will be to permanently disarming Hezbollah and promoting long-term stability in Lebanon.

Yesterday, the Middle East war intensified as Hezbollah fired more than 200 rockets into Israel, some hitting as far south as the West Bank. Israeli troops, meanwhile, made their deepest penetration into Lebanon, snatching Hezbollah operatives stationed in the Bekaa Valley, near Syria. Israel's army chief, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, also threatened to resume strikes in Beirut. (See related article.)

Born in Beirut's southern suburbs in the 1980s as an Islamist militia determined to drive Israel and its Western backers out of Lebanon, Hezbollah at first specialized in crude, though effective, suicide attacks and kidnappings. The organization held little territory and drew marginal political support from a Lebanese society split along myriad sectarian and political lines. But as the group's popularity has swelled in Lebanon's Shiite Muslim community and beyond, so has the sophistication of its weaponry and the lock-step discipline of its core fighting force aimed at Israel.

By wedding that sophistication to its ideology of martyrdom for the cause, Hezbollah's relatively tiny army -- believed to number several thousand -- has become one of the most effective military forces in the region. Hezbollah cells fire long-range rockets at Israelis from within cities densely populated with its supporters. The group has also had a consistent helping hand in accomplishing all this: Iran, an enemy of Israel and the U.S. that is competing for influence in the region.

Dug In

While its fighters remain guerrillas, in the south of Lebanon they are dug in like a conventional military, operating from an extensive network of reinforced underground bunkers and tunnels. The architect of its military infrastructure is Imad Mugniyah, a figure so secretive that the only known photograph of him is more than 20 years old and was taken before he is believed to have changed his appearance with plastic surgery. He is said to run Hezbollah's terrorist arm, the Islamic Jihad Organization, as a virtually autonomous unit.

Despite the group's increasing sophistication and firepower -- its supply of various rockets was estimated at about 13,000 before the war -- it maintains a highly improvisational bent. It has designed drone aircraft that have little tactical importance but have become an unnerving presence in Israeli skies. It is also said to move its missiles and weapons on donkeys trained to deliver their payloads to launch sites and storage facilities without a human guide. Israeli officials say the only way to knock out the threat would be to kill every donkey in the country.

Back in the early 1980s, Hezbollah's entrance into Lebanon's sectarian battlefield presented the U.S. and Israel with a military challenge neither had encountered before. Israel had fought traditional armies of largely secular Arab governments. Palestinian militants often resorted to kidnappings and hijackings in its war against Israel, but back then they never took their own lives in pursuit of strategic goals.

So when Hezbollah employed suicide bombers in devastating attacks on the American Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 and the U.S. Marine Corps barracks there seven months later, U.S. and Israeli military strategists faced a wholly new threat. "It was a chilling signal to us" of Hezbollah's capabilities, said a former Central Intelligence Agency official, who was based in Beirut at the time. "It showed a level of discipline and devotion we'd never seen before -- a real desire to die."

Many Lebanese officials attribute this to the role Tehran played in nurturing Hezbollah. Iran's then-supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, sanctioned so-called martyrdom operations, citing the suffering of early Shiite clerics. The Reagan administration pulled its forces from Lebanon as a result of the attacks, say former U.S. officials, emboldening Hezbollah and its main benefactor, Iran, to engage in a string of terrorist strikes against the U.S. and Israel in the ensuing years.

After Israel assassinated Hezbollah's top leader, Abbas al-Musawi, in February 1992, the group staged massive suicide attacks on Israeli offices in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994. And elements in Hezbollah have been accused of working with Iran to conduct the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers, an American military housing complex in Saudi Arabia.

A 1989 agreement ending the Lebanese civil war called for all militias to disarm. But Hezbollah carved out an exception as the only force in the country proven capable of facing up to Israel, which still occupied the country's south.

Despite Iran's help, Hezbollah is credited with accomplishing much on its own. Timur Goksel, a former United Nations monitor in southern Lebanon, recalls Hezbollah militiamen experimenting with model airplanes outside a military encampment in the late 1990s. Only later did he realize the airplanes were the precursors of the military drones Hezbollah has flown over Israel in recent years. The noisy drones are one tool in Hezbollah's psychological war against Israel, though they are seen as having no real military applications. "They made them as noisy as possible," says Mr. Goksel. "This was a poor man's sonic boom."

After Israel pulled out of southern Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah announced Israel was still occupying a tiny parcel of land known as Shebaa Farms that it claims is part of Lebanon. (Though the United Nations certified the land as Syrian territory, Syria has never acknowledged its ownership, thereby allowing Hezbollah to claim Shebaa as Lebanese territory.) According to Hezbollah, that meant its military campaign to oust Israel was unfinished and it needed to retain its arms and special status in Lebanon as a resistance group.

By this time Hezbollah was popular among the area's Shiite majority, and not just for pushing Israel out. The group, whose name means Party of God, had become a pervasive social movement built on the twin pillars of religion and resistance to Israel and the West. The group delivered food to the poor, cared for orphaned children, provided heath-care services and brought a sense of meaning to a Shiite community long neglected by Lebanese society.

Hezbollah also embarked on a campaign to elevate its guerrillas to near-mythical status. On south Lebanon's dusty village streets and winding mountain roads, colorful -- and often ferocious -- Hezbollah posters sprang up by the thousands. Many featured photos of Hezbollah "martyrs" showered in rays of light.

With Israeli forces gone, Hezbollah quickly established control over the abandoned military facilities. Some, like the Al-Khiam detention center that Israel once helped operate, were converted into makeshift museums lauding Hezbollah's sacrifices and what it touted as its victory over Israel.

Other facilities retained a purely military purpose, such as Karqom, the fortified Hezbollah military base that Israel recently destroyed. Set about half a mile from Israel's border, Karqom was once the final buffer zone between Hezbollah and Israel proper. Under Hezbollah's control, it became the group's main operations base in the western sector of southern Lebanon -- and one of the launch pads for a far wider buildup, senior Israeli military and intelligence officials say.

That buildup included new training facilities in the Bekaa Valley area. Hezbollah fighters streamed through these bases, sometimes also traveling to Iran for additional training. In the training camps, they learned to fire more-advanced rockets and handle sophisticated explosive materials such as Semtex. They improved their ground fighting tactics, focusing intensely on ambushes and coordinated, multipronged attacks, Israeli officials say.

Aerial Cameras

Israeli military and security officials say they were able to keep abreast of some of the changes at Karqom and other Hezbollah strongholds via high-resolution aerial cameras. One thing that soon became clear about the buildup, they say, was the big role played by Iranian officials, particularly the country's elite Revolutionary Guards. Iran says it hasn't supplied Hezbollah with weapons or training.

Israeli officials say that monitoring with high-grade equipment from the air, they can identify Iranian officials and clerics by their expensive outfits and Toyota Land Cruisers, a contrast with the workaday attire and unremarkable cars of Hezbollah officials.

But the cameras couldn't record what was happening underground in southern Lebanon, Beirut and parts of the Bekaa Valley. There, Hezbollah's biggest plans for massive fortifications were unfolding -- the bunkers, tunnels and weapons storage facilities.

The man in charge of this building effort is Mr. Mugniyah, a longtime Hezbollah operative who at one point in the 1980s lived in Iran, according to Israeli, Lebanese and American intelligence officials. Today, Mr. Mugniyah, 44 years old, ranks near the top of the U.S. list of most-wanted terrorists and carries a $5 million bounty on his head. Israel has also targeted him for assassination.

Mr. Mugniyah has avoided capture thanks to a legendary penchant for secrecy -- including possible efforts to change his appearance. A Lebanese citizen who once served as a bodyguard for Yasser Arafat, Mr. Mugniyah also systematically erased all his personal records, including school-registration and other such documents, according to Lebanese and U.S. intelligence officials.

Senior Israeli military and intelligence officials say Mr. Mugniyah, who studied engineering at the American University of Beirut, worked with members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards to draw up the expansion plans for Hezbollah's armed wing. Along with an infusion of weapons, Iran also supplied engineering help, including designing tunnels and fortified underground operations rooms.

The extent of Hezbollah's underground construction is unknown. Last week, Israel's military discovered at least two extensive tunnels in southern Lebanon. Inside were large stores of weapons. Israeli security officials suspect there may be dozens if not hundreds more.

Most of Hezbollah's weaponry came from Syria and Iran, Israeli officials say, citing markings on some of the weapons they have discovered. As part of the buildup, Hezbollah took possession of sophisticated wire-guided antitank missiles, known as TOWs. Because that weapon can be fired from up to a mile away, it has forced Israel to be much more cautious in deploying its tanks on Hezbollah battlegrounds.

Another major component of Hezbollah's buildup was the arrival of the Zelzal, an Iranian-made missile that can travel up to 120 miles. Though Hezbollah has yet to fire the Zelzal at Israel, it has made clear that it now has the ability to strike Tel Aviv.

Explosives by the Ton

Perhaps the greatest shift for Hezbollah has been its increased use of Semtex, a material used to make roadside bombs, and other high-quality explosives. Once in limited supply, Semtex and other explosives have arrived by the ton in recent years, current and former Lebanese, Israeli and U.S. intelligence officials say.

That has allowed Hezbollah to turn parts of southern Lebanon into a patchwork of mines and booby-traps, including some that weigh as much as a ton. Last week, an 80-ton Israeli armored bulldozer was flipped over by such a mine.

As the international community pushes for a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, the future role of the Islamist organization has become the central issue dictating Lebanon's future. The U.S. and Israel are demanding that Hezbollah be completely disarmed, while Beirut is demanding in return Israel's withdrawal from the disputed Shebaa Farms.

Even if a cease-fire is reached, many Lebanese politicians and analysts question whether Hezbollah can be disarmed by force, especially by Prime Minister Fuad Siniora's fragile government. The Lebanese army is more than 60% Shiite, and many of its senior commanders were trained in Syria and sympathize with Hezbollah.

Without a broad agreement, many Lebanese politicians fear that Hezbollah could remain the only armed militia within a Lebanese state that is increasingly weakened by Israel's offensive. Or it could push other sectarian groups to reconstitute the militias that fed Lebanon's civil war through the 1970s and 1980s.

"A cease-fire without an international force to defend the South is useless," says Walid Jumblatt, a leader of Lebanon's Druze community and a former militia commander. "It could lead other communities to have their own private militias."

Gathering Storm

Events in Hezbollah's long-running clash with Israel and the U.S.:

1982 -- Israel begins occupation of southern Lebanon, fueling Shiite resistance via Hezbollah militia.

1983 -- Hezbollah bombs U.S. Embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, killing hundreds.

1985 -- It hijacks TWA airliner, kills a U.S. Navy diver.

1989 -- Taif Agreement ending Lebanese civil war calls for disarming all "militias." Hezbollah is exception as "resistance group."

1992-1994 -- Israel assassinates Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi; Hezbollah bombs Israeli Embassy and Jewish center in Argentina.

1996 -- Israel attacks Hezbollah bases in Lebanon. U.S. accuses Hezbollah of helping bomb Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.

2000 -- Israel withdraws troops from Lebanon.

2004 -- U.N. Security Council passes resolution 1559 demanding Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon and disarming of all militias, including Hezbollah.

2005 -- Hezbollah joins new Lebanese government.

July 2006 -- Israel launches attacks on Lebanon after Hezbollah captures two Israeli soldiers.
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/shares/international_news/868553.htm

The Current Middle East Crisis—An Orchestrated Performance
By Dr. Yohai Sela
Special to The Epoch Times Aug 04, 2006
To many observers it may seem like the latest round of fighting in the Middle East came out of nowhere, but if one glances behind the scenes at recent developments in Iran and Syria, a very different picture emerges.

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran in June 2005, the first leader to visit him was Syria's Bashar al-Assad. Assad stayed in Teheran for two days in August 2005 in order signal to the West that the two countries were further improving relations.

The two leaders found they had much in common, especially in terms of international isolation. The United States suspected Ahmadinejad of being involved in the 1979 kidnappings in the U.S. embassy in Iran. Assad has likely been suspected of orchestrating the February 2005 murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik El Hariri.

At the two leaders' first meeting, Ahmadinijad issued a very encouraging statement to Syria, but one that also showed the international isolation of "the leprous pact." "As countries under international pressure, we must strengthen our ties," the Iranian president said.

At the end of January 2006, Ahmadinejad reciprocated with a visit to Syria. Besides his provocative statement telling Europe to "Take the Jews back!" (which obviously caused a big stir in Israel), Ahamadinijad also dealt with more important issues.

Among these were meetings with heads of terrorist organizations from Syria and Lebanon, who operate under the patronage of Syria and Iran. Ahmadinejad likewise met with Palestinian organization leaders, such as Khaled Mash'al, chief of the Hamas Political Bureau and Ramadan Shalah, head of the Islamic Jihad.

The most important meeting, however, was between Ahamdinijad, Assad, Hezbollah's Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, and Muktada al-Sader, the leader of Iraq's Shiite militia that is killing Sunnis and Americans in Iraq. According to American intelligence sources, Imad Mugniyah, head of Hezbollah's military wing, also attended the meeting.

During these get-togethers, the leaders formed a radical "Islamic alliance," which began to carefully plan its next move regarding Iran's nuclear weapons, as well as Syria's status vis-à-vis the United States, Lebanon and Palestine. Mugniyah's attendance lit a red light among Western intelligence analysts, who began to look for signs of increased activity among Hezbollah cells in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East.

This "Islamic alliance" increased its clout on January 26, 2006, when the Hamas won a sweeping victory in the Palestinian Authority elections. Iran and Syria thus gained a powerful new player, which strengthened their resolve to try to thwart Western pressure on Syria and sanctions on Iran for the latter's nuclear project. Bush and Europe appeared humiliated, while Iran and Syria grew confident. Assad therefore decided to gamble and turned his country's capital into a central axis between Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories.

Signs of escalated Hezbollah activities were initially few, but they increased dramatically in April and May 2006. At the beginning of April, Israeli security sources told the London Telegraph that "soldiers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are in control of most of Hezbollah's posts alongside the Israeli-Lebanese border."

The following month, on May 22, the New York Post cited American intelligence personnel as saying that Hezbollah was planning attacks in the United States. The news was leaked in order to signal to the Iranians of U.S. awareness of their intentions and its monitoring of Hezbollah members in the United States.

A few days later the Saudi newspaper al-Wattan published an item quoting American intelligence sources as saying that Israel had passed on information about a series of terrorist attacks planned by Mugniyah for the run up to the 2006 World Cup.

Though the World Cup passed by peacefully, it was only a matter of time before the other shoe would drop. This happened on June 25, when Hamas abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. The operation had been planned weeks in advance and with the full knowledge of Hamas's political bureau in Damascus, including its head Khaled Mash'al. On July 12, another long-planned operation was carried out when Hezbollah abducted two more soldiers along Israel's northern border.

A few hours later, Western intelligence sources announced that the abduction had been inspired by Iran, which wanted to divert attention from its nuclear project during the G-8 summit that was to be held three days later.

Taking the above recent developments into consideration, one could describe the "division of labor" as follows: Iran composed the music, Syria conducted the orchestra, while Hamas and Hezbollah carried out the performance.

http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/6-8-4/44567.html

Cairo makes a U-turn
Dina Ezzat observes Egyptian diplomacy changing tactics on the Lebanese crisis

The arrival of Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit in Lebanon for talks with senior Lebanese political figures yesterday morning marked a growing shift in the Egyptian position on the Israeli war on Lebanon.

On the 21st day of the brutal Israeli aggression that has massacred innocent civilians, the top Egyptian diplomat, who has on the one hand criticised Hizbullah's miscalculations while rebuking Israel for its offensive on the other, announced unprecedented official sympathy with the Lebanese people who have until now expressed dismay with the stand taken by Cairo over their plight.

Cairo, Abul-Gheit told reporters in Beirut, was working hard to secure "an end to hostilities.

"Egypt has always been on the side of Lebanon and the Lebanese people," Abul-Gheit affirmed in a tone appealing to angry Lebanese journalists who volleyed questions about Cairo's weak support for Lebanon.

Coupled with a furious round of telephone consultations held by President Mubarak with Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Al-Siniora, Abul- Gheit's visit came three days after the Israeli massacre in Qana which prompted Mubarak to use strong language in condemning Israel, something he has steered clear of since the beginning of the Israeli assault on 12 July.

In a televised statement on Monday, Mubarak said, "The continued Israeli aggression has crossed all the red lines and has targeted the Lebanese people, its sovereignty, territorial unity and infrastructure." Mubarak added, "The horrific massacre committed by Israel in Qana is clear evidence of the shocking Israeli violations of international law."

The president, who has for over 10 days been shifting tones, openly criticised "the failure of the Rome conference" to reach a ceasefire, but stopped short of holding the US responsible. He criticised the inability of the UN Security Council to adequately address the situation in Lebanon, but again stopped short of making direct reference to the obstructive US role on that front.

Egyptian diplomatic sources say the continued and escalating Israeli aggression against Lebanon has forced Cairo -- which initially had reservations over the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by Hizbullah, an action which triggered the conflict -- to change its tone and even its position. They say that Cairo could not have overlooked the growing public anger in Egypt, Lebanon and elsewhere in the Arab world against the Egyptian stance described by many a commentator, and some Israeli officials, as "a cover" for the expanding Israeli hostilities against Lebanon

"It was due to these factors that Cairo turned down an American request to host the international conference that was held in Rome in Sharm El-Sheikh instead," commented one source.

However, Cairo is as determined as ever to steer clear of any confrontation with the US on this issue. So while it might be prepared to offend Washington a little by turning down a request to host a conference, Cairo has so far avoided what some say is the overdue step to recall its ambassador in Tel Aviv for consultations, in what would constitute an elementary diplomatic procedure, to protest the Israeli aggression on Lebanon.

Cairo last recalled its ambassador in the autumn of 2000 following the Israeli re-invasion of Gaza. In recent statements, accorded to the Egyptian weekly newspaper Akhbar Al-Youm, President Mubarak stressed it was "ineffective" to recall the Egyptian ambassador in Israel.

And while acknowledging their concern about an Israeli attempt to involve Syria in a military confrontation, Egyptian officials are making no threat to recall the head of the Egyptian diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv.

The ambassador is partially entrusted with facilitating talks between Palestinians and Israelis that Egypt hopes would ultimately lead to the release of the Israeli soldier taken hostage by Hamas.

"We are working closely with Egypt to secure the release of this hostage and we hope that later, but not concurrently, we would get some Palestinian prisoners released. This is what Olmert [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] had promised to President Mubarak," Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said on Saturday in Alexandria following talks with Mubarak.

However, informed sources tell Al-Ahram Weekly that Egypt's intensive attempts to persuade Hamas to hand over the kidnapped Israeli soldier have all but reached an impasse.

Unable to make a breakthrough on the Palestinian front, hesitant on the nature of its political support to Lebanon, and confronted with an unexpected expansion of Israeli hostilities in Lebanon backed by an overt US support, Cairo has been forced to change tactics.

This said, the change of official discourse is yet to be matched with adequate action on the ground.

Like all Arab leaders, Mubarak has firmly excluded any military involvement by Egypt to contain the on-going violence or even to participate in the international force the US wants to create and implant in southern Lebanon to disarm Hizbullah on behalf of the Israeli army which has so far failed to achieve this objective.

"We have been pushing for a UN Security Council to demand a ceasefire and we will be pushing harder in this direction," said Egypt's Permanent Representative to the UN Maged Abdel-Fattah. Speaking to the Weekly on the phone from New York, Abdel-Fattah also highlighted Egypt's determination to get the US to establish an international fact-finding committee to be sent to Lebanon "and not just to Qana" to investigate the atrocities committed by Israel. Egypt, he added, is working hard with the Arab group and other delegations who share concern over Middle East developments, particularly France and Russia, to get the Security Council to issue a condemnation of the Israeli violation of international law during its war on Lebanon.

Today, when the Security Council is expected to meet at the ministerial level to discuss a joint American-British proposal to send an international force to Lebanon, the Egyptian delegation in New York will be working hard to make sure that the composition and mandate of such a force is compatible with what is acceptable to all Lebanese, Hizbullah included.

Yesterday, on his return from Beirut, Abul- Gheit told reporters that his consultations in Lebanon covered the possible Egyptian efforts to ensure that the Security Council should not overlook Lebanon's call for not forcefully disarming Hizbullah, especially not through NATO. "We are working to make sure that if we have a ceasefire within 48 to 72 hours, the UNIFIL already stationed on the ground in southern Lebanon will be able to handle the situation pending", whether letting it evolve or being replaced with a new international force.

"The fact of the matter is that we are against the use of force to disarm Hizbullah," commented one Egyptian diplomat who asked for his name to be withheld. "We want the state of Lebanon to exercise its full authority on all of Lebanon, the south included, and we are opposed to having two armies in one state because we are aware of the implications of dual military decision-making. But we are still opposed to attempts to use force to reach this objective."

A part of the post-Qana Egyptian diplomatic endeavor is to communicate this message to the Americans.

Meanwhile, Egypt is still trying to communicate a message of what officials in Cairo qualify as "realism" to Syria over what it could gain and lose from continued confrontation between Israel and the Damascus/Tehran-supported Hizbullah.

In Damascus for a brief encounter with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad earlier in the week, Foreign Minister Abul-Gheit stressed Cairo's wish that all concerned parties help bring an end to the current war against Lebanon.

One aim among the key regional players -- and Syria is most essential on this front -- is to agree on the nature of the international force that could be deployed in the south of Lebanon. Abul-Gehit, sources say, told Al-Assad that UNIFIL's mandate will not last beyond weeks and that it was better to reach a common understanding on a replacement to try to talk about it with the Americans and the other key international players.

Abul-Gheit had held similar talks in Saudi Arabia with his Saudi counterpart Saud Al-Faisal.

"Egypt is well aware that the crisis is entering a very serious phase and we are trying to get the international community to end its silence," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Alaa El-Hadidi.

Indeed, there is a growing realisation in Cairo, at the highest level, that the current Israeli war against Lebanon is not about Hizbullah as Israel had originally claimed, but about the destruction of Lebanon.

The question, however, is whether Cairo is still capable of sparing Lebanon from further destruction and improving the conditions under which the Lebanese government will have to negotiate with the US on the composition and the mandate of the international force whose arrival to the region has been made a precondition for a ceasefire on the part of Israel.

Egyptian and Arab diplomats are of two minds over this matter. Some believe that Cairo's change of attitude is too little, too late. They argue that Cairo's status as the unchallenged Arab leader is now seriously challenged. Cairo, they further add, is not in a position to influence the position of Hizbullah, not even through Damascus, nor can it influence the US or Israel.

However, for others, despite the current lapse in the Egyptian grip on Arab affairs, the image is not entirely bleak. Cairo, they say, may not be very effective but it remains an obvious mediator for future arrangements.

According to one Egyptian diplomat, at the end of the day any Arab capital that may wish to facilitate a deal between Lebanon and the US will have to have Cairo on board.

According to Abul-Gheit, during the last few days Egypt has been conveying a clear message to Hizbullah, Israel and the US concerning the urgent need for a ceasefire.

The one thing that seems to be subject to consensus is that the days and weeks ahead, irrespective of when a ceasefire is concluded, contain many challenges for Cairo's foreign policy.

© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved

Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/806/re71.htm

I almost missed this...

Today's Al Qaeda Tape: Ayman al Zawahiri and the "Islamic Group"
Laura Mansfield Strategic Translations ^ | August 5, 2006 | Ayman al Zawahiri

Posted on 08/05/2006 9:44:10 PM EDT by Calpernia

Today's announcement by Al Qaeda second in command Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri that the multinational terror conglomerate has been joined by a portion of the Egyptian group "Jamaa Islamiya" is both puzzling and not surprising.

It is unclear how large the faction is from Jamaa Islamiya that is aligning itself with Al Qaeda. Neither Zawahiri nor Mohamed Khalil Hukayma, who made the announcement for Jamaa Islamiya, was clear about how many members were involved in the merger, although Zawahiri did refer to of the large crowd and the majority of Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya, in the following statement:

Abu Jihad Al-Masri, Mohamed Khalil Hukayma who assures the Muslim nation in this message the steadfastness of the large crowd and the majority of Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya are on the true path of Jihad against the enemies of Islam, crusaders, Jews and their treacherous agents

Ayman al Zawahiri made his debut into the international terrorism arena as a member of Jamaa Islamiya. He served time in prison in Cairo for his role in the group's assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

In his book "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner", Zawahiri provides a comprehensive eyewitness history account of the group and its activities.

In today's tape, Zawahiri addresses the 1996 decision by Jamaa Islamiya to cease operations in Egypt, saying:

A faction of Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya was influenced by unknown pressures. They went along with the Egyptian and American governments in their claims deviating from the true path of Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya's beliefs that are based on God's spoken word & the prophet's traditions.

In "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner", Zawahiri writes of the beginning of the no-violence initiative:

The beginnings of the no-violence initiative, or the halting of operations, began with an appeal made by Khalid Ibrahim, leader of the Islamic Group's Aswan branch, who was a defendant in the Islamic Group case in Aswan in April 1996. He notes that the Islamic Group made another appeal in July 1997 in the name of the Islamic Group's leaders who are still serving jail terms at the Turrah and al-Aqrab prisons. It called on the Islamic Group's members inside Egypt and abroad to halt military operations and to stop issuing statements inciting such operations.

One of the most intriguing portions of the book is where Zawahiri describes his split with the group, disagreeing with the cessation of Jamaa Islamiya's activities in Egypt. He describes the pressures more thoroughly in "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner", and makes clear his disagreement with the agreement:

Sayyid Qutb, the most prominent theoretician of the fundamentalist movements, said: "Brother, push ahead, for your path is soaked in blood. Do not turn your head right or left but look only up to heaven."

The objective has been somewhat shaken by the fact that the Islamic Group was dragged into a stance where it halted armed jihadist action under the name of (the initiative to halt military operations). This initiative has had serious repercussions. Because all persons, those who are and those who are not connected with the issue, have begun debating the initiative, I have decided to discuss it with some frankness and in some detail. I apologize to my brothers in the Islamic Group-whom I respect and love-for disagreeing with their view and criticizing their opinions. However, in my efforts to properly interpret shari'ah, I find that doing what is right is dearer to me than these brothers' love.

Both Zawahiri and Hekayma cite Egyptian cleric Omar Abdel Rahman as one of the leaders of the faction that is joining al Qaeda. This isn't surprising. Zawahiri says in his book that Abdel Rahman initially supported the cessation of activities, but later changed his mind. In "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner", Zawahiri writes:

in June 2000 Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman issued a statement from his jail that was relayed by his lawyer Lynn Stewart in which she said that Shaykh Omar was withdrawing his support for the no-violence initiative because it had not brought any positive results for the Islamists.

Zawahiri continues to write:

Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman's clear assessment of the situation is an eloquent reply to the third statement issued by the brother leaders in the Turrah jail in which they said that they "cling to their position on halting armed operations and any announcements that incite armed operations inside Egypt and abroad." They noted that this "announcement is not the product of negotiation with the security services or other government departments but is in line with Islamic shari'ah and serves the interests of the Muslims."

It appears that by joining forces with Al Qaeda formally and officially, that Jamaa Islamiya has ended it's ceasefire with the Egyptian government.

The threats of attacks against the United States and United States interests abroad by Jamaa Islamiya must also be considered.

In "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner", Zawahiri describes a plot to assassinate the delegation of United States Presidents attending Anwar Sadat's funeral:

Attacking the US Presidents

During Mujahideen's Funeral

Isam thought about attempting to hit the funeral of Anwar al-Mujahideen, including the (former) Presidents of the United States and the leaders of Israel. He also thought about seizing some tanks and using them to hit a vital target or attack Mujahideen's funeral.

However, the resources available were short of his ambitions and it was too late. Our meetings with Abbud al Zumur ended with an advice to him to try to leave Egypt at this stage to continue the attacks at another stage.

However, Abbud turned down our advice because he had promised the brothers to continue the battle. In prison, he admitted to me that he had been convinced by our opinion, but his promise to the brothers compelled him to turn it down.

Isam had a theory about jihad action that he tried hard to find the means to implement, but destiny would not permit him.

This theory continues to represent a suitable practical option, if the requirements for it are available, including:

· The security measures taken by our regimes are such that the only way to confront them is to deploy an armed force with a considerable firepower and armor enough to enforce its control of the capital, wage battles, and remain steadfast for one or two weeks.

· The Islamic movement possesses thousands of youths who are racing toward martyrdom, but these youths are not trained and lack combat experience.

· The Islamic movement's infiltration of the Army will always be countered by purging operations. It is difficult for the Islamic movement to recruit a large number of officers in the Army without getting discovered, in view of the tight security measures within the ranks of the Armed Forces.

· Isam's idea was to train hundreds of Muslim youths on weapons and how to use and drive tanks, even if it was a preliminary training.

· Isam looked lightly upon the police forces, the Central Security Forces, and the forces affiliated with the Interior Ministry.

· Isam criticized the Muslim youths for being preoccupied by the police and attacks on the police and for failing to examine the military situation from an analytical and practical perspective based on data.

· Isam had much confidence in the young Muslim trainees. He used to say: The police forces have the upper hand against us because our brothers are not trained. If we train them and give them some weapons, nobody could stand against them.

This theory continued to be the subject of long discussions between us before and in prison. Many of his expectations proved to be valid, I must say

.

His plan was a daring plan based on careful reconnaissance and scientific analysis of the realistic information. It suited Isam's personality, which had the same elements: Bravery, military knowledge, and hard work. This theory involveed many details and various aspects, but I just talked about its pivotal idea in passing.

Zawahiri lists the leaders of Jamaa Islamiya who are joining Al Qaeda:

But God willing, the principal core of Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya headed by the honorable sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman & Sheikh Rifaii Taha may God release them from their captivity.

Zawahiri describes Rifa'i Taha as the "Military Commander" of Jamaa Islamiya. He writes:

Brother Rifa'i Ahmad Taha also commented on the initiative. He rejected it when it was first made and later repeated his rejection after Shaykh Umar announced that he was withdrawing his support for it. He told Al-Sharq al-Awsat:

"Regarding the case of Umar Abd-al-Rahman, the Islamic Group's spiritual leader who is detained in a US jail, the policy of talking and making threats is over. We will address the United States in a language that it understands. We will break his shackles and release him from captivity. I believe that the time to do so is drawing near."

Asked if the Islamic Group might revise its past errors, Rifa'i Taha said: "In answer to your question-if I have understood it correctly--if the Islamic Group has altered its methods and is revising its past errors, my answer is this: The Islamic Group does not believe that it made errors in the past whether in its call to jihad, in its promotion of virtue and prohibition of vice, or in its call to God's religion."

It is indisputable that Ayman Zawahiri just reiterated the call to Egyptians loyal to Jamaa Islamiya to join the Islamic ummah in its jihad.

What remains to be seen is how many of Jamaa Islamiya's followers will heed this call.

Laura Mansfield is the author of "His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri", which includes a translation of Zawahiri's book Knights Under the Prophet's Banner. The book is available from Amazon.com at http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1847288804/002-5912291-5086445?redirect=true

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