Does Lithuania Want To Start A War With Russia?

In NATO the smallest members tend to be the most aggressive. It’s probably because they know they wouldn’t be called on to fight any wars they caused. They simply are too small to make a difference.

So Lithuania, with an army of just 8,850 active-duty personnel and 5,650 reservists, is now enforcing a blockade of sorts against Russia through Kaliningrad. The latter was seized from Germany at the end of World War II and ended up separated from the rest of Russia after the Baltic States seceded from the Soviet Union. Vilnius is forbidding transport of coal, metals, electronics, and other E.U.-sanctioned products to Kaliningrad, whose governor said that roughly half of the territory’s typical imports were on the ban list. Lithuanian officials claimed to be only “following orders,” as it were, from a higher authority: “We just implement the sanctions, which were imposed on European Union level, and this has nothing to do with the bilateral relations between Russia and Lithuania,” announced Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda.

With Russian flights over E.U. territory also prohibited, resupply of the isolated oblast is possible only by sea. For Moscow, blocking internal transit, even transit conducted through a third country, could be a casus belli. Russian officials muttered darkly about retaliation and “serious consequences.” The Russian Foreign Ministry warned: “If in the near future cargo transit between the Kaliningrad region and the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation through Lithuania is not restored in full, then Russia reserves the right to take actions to protect its national interests.”

It seems strange for Lithuania to be waving a red cape at the Russian bear. The Baltic states have spent years wailing about their vulnerability to Russian attack, demanding that NATO and the U.S. do more for them. In fact, some Lithuanian officials have a sense of preemptive martyrdom. For instance, Laurynas Kasciunas, who handles national-security issues in Lithuania’s Siemas, or parliament, asserted: “We are in a sense a modern-day West Berlin.” That reflects a highly inflated sense of international importance—Berlin was a Cold War flashpoint because the U.S. and Soviet Union were sparring over the future of Germany, a once and future dominant continental power. Lithuania’s role? Not so much.

In fact, absent provocation, why would Russia attack any of the Baltics? What benefits would it expect to gain from overrunning three small nations, which lack the historical significance attributed to Ukraine? Especially considering they already are in NATO and an invasion likely would trigger full-scale war. Moreover, Moscow’s difficulties in Ukraine suggest that the Baltic states might not be the easy prey once assumed, though Russia has doubtless learned from its mistakes and likely would seek a decisive result.

Still, giving the Putin government cause for war is foolish. Alliance officials acknowledge that, given current deployments, the three states likely would be overrun before meaningful assistance arrived. The Rand Corporation reported:

As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours. Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad: a bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous consequences for the Alliance and, not incidentally, the people of the Baltics.

With its military deeply engaged in Ukraine, the Putin government is unlikely to open a new front, either by blasting through Latvia and then Lithuania, or using Belarus as a base to seize the 40-mile Suwalki Gap to link up with Kaliningrad. Absent full-scale mobilization, Moscow seems to lack the necessary troops. Still, most Western observers were surprised by Russia’s attack on Ukraine, and many believed that Moscow lacked sufficient forces for its ongoing offensive operations in the Donbas. More surprises could be in the offing.

At the very least, threats from Moscow are sure to increase. Kaliningrad already is heavily armed. Moscow recently ran military exercises that included a simulated missile attack on Estonia. Over the weekend Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and announced the transfer of nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles to Minsk. A Baltic war is an option no one should want to see exercised.

Perhaps Lithuania hopes to push NATO, meaning America, into a direct military confrontation with Russia. The timing is convenient, with the latest alliance summit occurring in Madrid this week. Some in Vilnius have advocated war. In March, the Siemas unanimously passed a resolution urging the imposition of a “no-fly” zone over Ukraine, which would entail an air war over Ukraine and require strikes against air defenses in Russia. Conveniently, only the U.S. could mount such an operation. Although Lithuania’s prime minister criticized the idea, Nauseda called the measure “a good declaration,” while expressing caution. Has Vilnius since grown impatient?

Of course, sowing the wind risks reaping the whirlwind, so a more modest objective is possible. Vilnius might hope to spur a flurry of Russian threats, which would add pressure to the Baltic states’ pleas for permanent U.S. force deployments. What better way to advance Nauseda’s earlier proposal for a U.S. garrison, which he argued “would be the best boost to security and deterrence that NATO could provide not only to Lithuania but to the whole region”?

Indeed, in April Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also advocated establishing permanent bases in Eastern Europe. He suggested making U.S. forces rotational, but once facilities were established, a permanent presence would be the logical next step. Indeed, CNN reported that “the Pentagon recently announced replacement troops for those temporary rotations, signaling the increased U.S. presence will be maintained for some time to come,” noting that “The Pentagon announced that approximately 10,500 US Army personnel would be deployed to Europe in the coming weeks and months to replace forces that are already there.”

Others in Washington back this approach. For instance, last week the Brookings Institution’s Michael O’Hanlon contended: “NATO should establish enough combat punch in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that it could credibly fight to protect these countries’ territories in a future war against Russia, while awaiting reinforcement from points further west.”

Why should the U.S. provide these troops? Moscow’s attack on Ukraine caused the Europeans to announce that now, finally, after more than seven decades of cheap-riding on America, they would spend more on their own defense. But it turns out, Once a freeloader, always a freeloader! Apparently that is what even the Biden administration wants.

The U.S. continues to do more for the Europeans so the Europeans don’t have to. Since February, the Biden administration added 40,000 troops to Europe. Reported CNN: “The US is expected to keep 100,000 troops stationed in Europe for the foreseeable future…. The numbers could temporarily increase if NATO carries out more military exercises in the region, and the U.S. could add additional bases in Europe if the security environment changes, the officials added.”

Which proved to be only too true. Yesterday, during the NATO summit, the Pentagon announced numerous “long-term commitments to bolster European security,” including the installation of permanent forces in Poland, enhanced rotational units in the Baltics and Romania, and various personnel and materiel elsewhere around the continent. Moreover, the Defense Department stated that “All of these combat-credible forces and enablers are supported by significant investments in the long-term U.S. presence in Europe,” adding that the Department of Defense “continues to execute $3.8 billion in European Deterrence Initiative funding (with another $4.2 billion requested in FY23) for rotational forces, exercises, infrastructure (construction of storage facilities, airfield upgrades, and training complexes) and prepositioned equipment.”

That figure is for the U.S., which continues to hike its military outlays. In contrast, despite modest European expenditure increases after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas, most NATO members continue to lag badly in their military outlays. Last year, only one member state allocated a greater share of its GDP to the military than did America: Greece, which edged Washington by .02 percent, and focused its military efforts against fellow NATO member Turkey, not Russia. Overall, only seven European members hit the official 2 percent guideline.

Even that number is scandalously low for the Baltics and Poland, which have relentlessly lobbied for a greater American presence in their nations. Why would countries convinced that their independence was threatened spend only a couple cents out of every euro (or zloty) to protect themselves? Ukraine demonstrated the utility of a competent territorial defense. And anyone expecting someone else to come to their aid should exert their maximum effort at the start, not focus on political lobbying for increased subsidies from Uncle Sam.

Where does Europe stand on Lithuania’s incendiary ploy? The European Union’s foreign affairs “High Representative” Josep Borrell—someone with a great title but little useful to do—said he was “always worried about Russian retaliations,” but defended Lithuania, explaining that “it is not guilty, it is not implementing national sanctions, it is not implementing their will.”

However, behind the scenes, E.U. officials waffled nervously. Politico observed “a thinly veiled but pretty solid contradiction between Lithuania’s statement, which claims the E.U.’s sanctions include a ban on transit of metals and therefore Lithuania must block such transit to Kaliningrad, and the Commission spokesman, who said Lithuania merely has to perform ‘proportionate’ checks ‘while allowing free transit’.” Indeed, an unnamed “senior official” told Politico that “certain Balts profited to ramp up the pressure.”

No doubt they did. And in doing so, Vilnius knowingly and recklessly stoked the fire burning in Europe’s East.

Ukraine has been wronged by Russian aggression. Americans rightly support Kiev’s defense of its independence and sovereignty. But a more important U.S. interest is preventing the conflict from spreading and escalating. Even if no one really wants that—at its worst a full-scale conventional war among major industrialized states topped by nuclear exchanges—the longer the current fighting continues the greater the chance of hostilities spinning out of control.

Washington should privately deliver a clear and tough message to Vilnius and other capitals throughout Europe, especially in the East: Inciting Moscow to strike would relieve the U.S. of any obligation to defend them, even if they are NATO members. It is vital for America and the rest of Europe to keep the dogs of war leashed if at all possible.

A blockade is an act of war...

It is not a blockade. A blockade is an international act of war wherein one state blockades the ports of an enemy state. A state cannot blockade itself. Lithuania is not blockading all the ports of Kaliningrad, much less Russia.

There are several candidate terms for what has been done, from least plausible to most plausible:

Blockade
A closing of the ports
An embargo
A sanction

In a blockade, as instituted in the American Civil War, all nations of the world are informed of its existence and are prohibited from running the blockade. Any ship detected running the blockade may be pursued and captured on the high seas. A blockade only happens at an enemy's coast.

The domestic act is a closing of the ports. That is where a nation prohibits ships entering or leaving its own ports. Near the end of the war, on April 11, 1865, Lincoln proclaimed a change from blockade to a closing of the ports.

An embargo is an economic policy to not trade with another state. An example would be the United States embargo against Cuba. All trade is prohibited.

A sanction is rather like a selective, limited or targeted embargo. It does not suspend all trade. The action by Lithuania is a sanction, an economic coercive measure taken against another state to force it to comply with international law.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade

A blockade is the act of actively preventing a country or region from receiving or sending out food, supplies, weapons, or communications, and sometimes people, by military force. A blockade differs from an embargo or sanction, which are legal barriers to trade rather than physical barriers. It is also distinct from a siege in that a blockade is usually directed at an entire country or region, rather than a fortress or city and the objective may not always be to conquer the area.

https://www.mei.edu/publications/blockade-and-embargo-have-different-meanings

MIddle East Institute
An embargo is when one nation establishes a policy not to trade with another nation and not to allow its own ports or territory to be used for commerce with that nation. Establishment of an embargo is the prerogative of any nation. For decades the United States has had an embargo on trade with Cuba. This is a policy decision which has been made by the Government. The policy may be wise or foolish, but nations are clearly within their rights to establish embargos.
Similarly, Israel and Egypt have a right to embargo trade with Gaza. If Egypt or Israel believes the Government in Gaza poses a threat to its stability or security, they have a right to place an embargo on Gaza. What that means is that trade with Gaza is restricted through Israeli and Egyptian ports and territory. Nations have the right to secure their borders and the Israelis and the Egyptians are exercising that right.
A blockade is totally different. A blockade is closing to international commerce by military force the coast of another entity. A blockade prevents third parties from undertaking normal commercial activity. A blockade is an act of war rather than merely exercising one’s own prerogatives.
In 1967, when the Government of Egypt closed the straits of Tiran to Israeli or third party commerce with the port of Eilat, they established a blockade. The Egyptians, thus, initiated a war with Israel. The Israelis were, therefore, justified in launching their military operations against Egypt in June 1967. The Egyptian blockade of the straits differed significantly from the Arab League policy of boycotting Israel. Blockading the straits crossed the line from a confrontational policy to an act of war.

In legalese:

Black's Law Dictionary, 11th Ed.

blockade, n. (17c) Int’l law.
A belligerent’s prevention of access to or egress from an enemy’s ports by stationing ships to intercept vessels trying to enter or leave those ports. • To be binding, a blockade must be effective — that is, it must be maintained by a force sufficient to prevent access to ports. — Also termed simple blockade; de facto blockade.
“A blockade must be existing in point of fact; and in order to constitute that existence, there must be a power present to enforce it. All decrees and orders, declaring extensive coasts and whole countries in a state of blockade, without the presence of an adequate naval force to support it, are manifestly illegal and void, and have no sanction in public law.” 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law *144 (George Comstock ed., 11th ed. 1866).
“The word blockade properly denotes obstructing the passage into or from a place on either element, but is more especially applied to naval forces preventing communication by water. Unlike siege it implies no intention to get possession of the blockaded place. With blockades by land or ordinary sieges neutrals have usually little to do.” Theodore D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law § 202, at 351 (5th ed. 1878).
“The term ‘blockade’ is all too often used for measures that do not qualify as a blockade proper, such as sieges on land or the barring of passage through an international strait or an international canal. Sometimes the use of the term is cautiously avoided because states are unwilling to admit that they are indeed establishing and enforcing a blockade against another state. Neither the erroneous use of the term nor the refusal of its use [is] relevant to the legal concept of blockade. A blockade is a military operation to prevent all vessels and/or aircraft from entering or exiting specified ports, airports, or coastal areas belonging to or under the control of another state. Hence, a blockade by its very nature can only be established off the coast of another state and not within the territory of another state or within a sea area that is not geographically connected with land territory, that is, on the high seas.” Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Blockades and Interdictions,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law 925, 927 (Marc Weller ed., 2015).
• pacific blockade. (1887) Int’l law. A blockade that is established without a declaration of war.
• public blockade. (1865) Int’l law. An established blockade of which the blockading country gives formal notice to the governments of neutral countries.

- - - - - - - - - -

embargo
3. The unilateral or collective restrictions on the import or export of goods, materials, capital, or services into or from a secific country or group of countries for political or security reasons —Also termed trade embargo, economic-cure trade embargo.

- - - - - - - - - -

sanction
4. Int'l law An economic or military coercive measure taken by one or more countries toward another to force it to comply with international law. .

You must not be a lawyer, because the definitions you posted prove that your conception of a what a blockade must be is totally wrong.

Black's Law Dictionary, 11th Ed., 2019, quoting Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Blockades and Interdictions,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law 925, 927 (Marc Weller ed., 2015):

A blockade is a military operation to prevent all vessels and/or aircraft from entering or exiting specified ports, airports, or coastal areas belonging to or under the control of another state. Hence, a blockade by its very nature can only be established off the coast of another state and not within the territory of another state or within a sea area that is not geographically connected with land territory, that is, on the high seas.”

Black's Law Dictionary, 11th Ed, 1019 proves beyond a doubt that you do not have a clue regarding what a blockade is.

You must not be a reader of things legal. Your ignorance of the law is no excuse after you have had the law quoted to you from the current edition of the foremost law dictionary in the United States. However, it does explain the complete lack of any significant content whatever in your reply. Do you usually get away with that sort of content free nonsense?

Pursuant to international law, only a belligerent party can blockade something, and that something must be another state. If Lithuania were to issue a blockade, it would make them a belligerent party to a war. Lithuania and Russia are not at war.

You are the one stating that the Lithuuanian denial of the use of Lithuanian land territory is a blockade. Your citation to any actual authority other than your imagination was sorely lacking.

https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/blockade/

The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law
« Calling things by the wrong name adds to the affliction of the world. » Albert Camus.
Blockade
A blockade is a military operation that blocks all maritime movement to or from a port or coast. Blockades may also be aerial. A military operation carried out on land that isolates or encircles an area is called a siege.
A blockade is an act of war that is regulated by international law—namely, by the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law and by Articles 1–22 of the 1909 London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War. It is important to distinguish between the terms blockade and embargo . An embargo is a type of economic sanction that may be adopted under the aegis of the UN or another international organization, to try to force a State to comply with a decision.
Regardless of whether the situation is a blockade or an embargo, humanitarian law clearly posits that States are under the obligation to allow the free passage of relief that is of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and is indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (GCIV Art. 23, API Art. 70, and APII Art. 18.2).

https://www.britannica.com/topic/blockade-warfare

The common law of blockade rests mainly upon principles laid down by Anglo-U.S. prize courts. The more important of these are summarized in the judgments of British jurist Stephen Lushington and Privy Council in an 1854 decision regarding the Franciska, a Danish ship that was seized by the British during the Crimean War.

U.S. Supreme Court, Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 2 Black 635 (1862)

Syllabus

1. Neutrals may question the existence of a blockade, and challenge the legal authority of the party which has undertaken to establish it.
2. One belligerent, engaged in actual war, has a right to blockade the ports of the other, and neutrals are bound to respect that right.
3. To justify the exercise of this right, and legalize the capture of a neutral vessel for violating it, a state of actual war must exist, and the neutral must have knowledge or notice that it is the intention of one belligerent to blockade the ports of the other.
4. To create this and other belligerent rights as against neutrals, it is not necessary that the party claiming them should be at war with a separate and independent power; the parties to a civil war are in the same predicament as two nations who engage in a contest and have recourse to arms.
5. A state of actual war may exist without any formal declaration of it by either party, and this is true of both a civil and a foreign war.
6. A civil war exists, and may be prosecuted on the same footing as if those opposing the Government were foreign invaders, whenever the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection, so that the Courts cannot be kept open.
7. The present civil war between the United States and the so-called Confederate States has such character and magnitude as to give the United States the same rights and powers which they might exercise in the case of a national or foreign war, and they have, therefore, the right jure bello to institute a blockade of any ports in possession of the rebellious States.
8. The proclamation of blockade by the President is, of itself, conclusive evidence that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized recourse to such a measure.
9. All persons residing within the territory occupied by the hostile party in this contest are liable to be treated as enemies, though not foreigners.
10. It is a settled rule that a vessel in a blockaded port is presumed to have notice of a blockade as soon as it commences.
11. The proclamation of blockade having allowed fifteen days for neutrals to leave, a vessel which overstays the time is liable to capture although she was prevented by accident from getting out sooner.
12. To make a capture lawful, it is not necessary that a warning of the blockade should have been previously endorsed on the register of the captured vessel.

In Northcote v. Douglas—Franciska (The) [1855], E.R. XIV, P.C. III, 407-408; X Moore 51-52

These passages refer only to ingress and the importation of goods, but it is clear that the operations of the siege or blockade may be interrupted by any communication of the blockaded or besieged place with foreigners; and Lord Stowell, when he defines a blockade, always speaks of it as the exclusion of the blockaded place from all commerce, whether by egress or ingress. In The Frederick Molke (1 Rob. 87), he says:—“What is the object of a blockade? not merely to prevent an importation of supplies; but to prevent export as well as import; and to cut off all communication of commerce with the blockaded place.” In The Betsey (1 Rob. 93)—“After the commencement of a blockade a neutral cannot, I conceive, be allowed to interpose in any way to assist the exportation of the property of the enemy.” In The Vrouw Judith (1 Rob. 151)—“A blockade is a sort of circumvallation round a place, by which all foreign connexion and correspondence is, as far all human force can effect it, to be entirely cut off. It is intended to suspend the entire commerce of that place; and a neutral is no more at liberty to assist the traffic of exportation than of importation.” In The Rolla (6 Rob. 372)—“What is a blockade but a uniform universal exclusion of all vessels not privileged by law?” In The Succeed (1 Dods. 134)—“The measure which has been resorted to, being in the nature of a blockade, must operate to the entire exclusion of British as well as of neutral ships; for it would be a gross violation of neutral rights, to prohibit their trade, and to permit the subjects of this country to carry on an unrestricted commerce at the very same ports from which neutrals are excluded.”

The precise dates, and the precise events, of the start and end of the American Civil War was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the case of The Protector, 79 U.S. 700 (1870).

It is necessary, therefore, to refer to some public act of the political departments of the government to fix the dates, and, for obvious reasons, those of the executive department which may be and in fact was, at the commencement of hostilities, obliged to act during the recess of Congress, must be taken.
The proclamation of intended blockade by the President may therefore be assumed as marking the first of these dates, and the proclamation that the war had closed as marking the second. But the war did not begin or close at the same time in all the states. There were two proclamations of intended blockade: the first of the 19th of April, 1861, embracing the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; the second of the 27th of April, 1861,

Brown v Hiatts, 82 U.S. 177 (1872) the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the matter again.

Opinion of the Court at 183-185:

It was held in the case of The Protector that the war began in that State at the date of the proclamation of intended blockade of her ports by the President. That was the first public act of the executive in which the existence of war in that State was officially recognized, and to its date the courts therefore look as the commencement of the war.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1012&context=ils

INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Modern Maritime Neutrality Law

James Farrant

90 INT’L L. STUD. 198 (2014)
Volume 90 2014

At page 251:

A. Blockade
In 1997, Captain Humphrey, then Chief Naval Judge Advocate of the UK Royal Navy, wrote:
The experiences and practices in the two world wars left the law of blockade devoid of most of its traditional characteristics and made its applicability and content post 1945 questionable. The practical effect may be that formal blockade in the sense of close visible investment has become obsolete and resort has to be had to other methods such as mine-laying and institution of war zones.²⁵²
Nonetheless, in recent years classic blockade has been twice employed by Israel—in 2006 in Lebanon and in 2009 in Gaza.²⁵³
253. Russian controls on Georgian trade at sea during the 2008 conflict were described as a “blockade” in some news sources. See, e.g., Russian Navy Blockade [sic] Georgia, CHINA VIEW (Aug. 10, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/10/content_ 9138604.htm#prof.
The 2009 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia instead described Russian Black Sea Fleet activity as enforcement of a “maritime security zone.” FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 144, at 212.

At page 252:

Blockade is the blocking of the approach to the enemy coast or ports for the purpose of preventing the ingress and egress of ships and aircraft of all States.²⁵⁵ It has been described as
a sort of circumvallation around a place, by which all foreign connexion [sic] and correspondence is, as far as human force can effect it, to be en-tirely cut off. It is intended to suspend the entire commerce of that place; and a neutral is no more at liberty to assist the traffic of exportation than importation.²⁵⁶
To be lawful, a blockade must comply with five requirements: notification, effectiveness, impartiality, proportionality and the preservation of access to neutral coasts.
255. NWP 1-14M, supra note 23, ¶ 7.7.1; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, at 176.
256. The Vrouw Judith (1799) 1 C. Rob. 150, 151–52, per Sir William Scott.

At page 254:

2. Effectiveness
A blockade must be effective.²⁶⁵ Effectiveness is a question of fact, determined by the risk of capture faced by vessels attempting to breach the blockade. There must be sufficient danger of capture before the blockade can be considered effective.²⁶⁶ Dangerousness does not necessitate interception of every blockade runner, but sufficient military resources must be committed to render it probable that vessels and aircraft will be prevented from entering or leaving the blockaded area. The dangerousness requirement has its origins in the protection of neutral rights. Found in Article 4 of the 1856 Declaration of Paris, it is grounded in the neutral desire that belligerent powers not be permitted to declare “paper blockades” without the means or motive to enforce them. In determining dangerousness, the distance of the blockading force from the coast and the nature of the blockading force will be relevant factors.

San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, Part IV, Section 2, 12 June 1994

METHODS OF WARFARE
SECTION II : METHODS OF WARFARE
Blockade
93. A blockade shall be declared and notified to all belligerents and neutral States.
94. The declaration shall specify the commencement, duration, location, and extent of the blockade and the period within which vessels of neutral States may leave the blockaded coastline.
95. A blockade must be effective. The question whether a blockade is effective is a question of fact.
96. The force maintaining the blockade may be stationed at a distance determined by military requirements.
97. A blockade may be enforced and maintained by a combination of legitimate methods and means of warfare provided this combination does not result in acts inconsistent with the rules set out in this document.
98 Merchant vessels believed on reasonable grounds to be breaching a blockade may be captured. Merchant vessels which, after prior warning, clearly resist capture may be attacked.
99. A blockade must not bar access to the ports and coasts of neutral States.
100. A blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels of all States.
101 The cessation, temporary lifting, re-establishment, extension or other alteration of a blockade must be declared and notified as in paragraphs 93 and 94.
102 The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if:
(a) it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects essential for its survival; or
(b) the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade.
103. If the civilian population of the blockaded territory is inadequately provided with food and other objects essential for its survival, the blockading party must provide for free passage of such foodstuffs and other essential supplies, subject to:
(a) the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted; and
(b) the condition that the distribution of such supplies shall be made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power or a humanitarian organization which offers guarantees of impartiality, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
104. The blockading belligerent shall allow the passage of medical supplies for the civilian population or for the wounded and sick members of armed forces, subject to the right to prescribe technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted.

An "economic blockade" only summons Black's Law Dictionary, “The term ‘blockade’ is all too often used for measures that do not qualify as a blockade proper, such as sieges on land or the barring of passage through an international strait or an international canal."

https://armenianweekly.com/2014/02/20/economic-blockades-and-international-law-the-case-of-armenia/

Economic Blockades and International Law: The Case of Armenia

February 20, 2014 Armen Sahakyan

[excerpt]

An economic blockade is a type of unilateral coercive measure. It is widely acknowledged that the term “unilateral coercive measure” is difficult to define. Nevertheless, these measures often refer to economic steps taken by one state to compel a change in the policy of another. The most widely used forms of economic pressure are trade sanctions in the form of embargoes and/or boycotts, and the interruption of financial and investment flows between sender and target countries. While embargoes are often understood as being trade sanctions aimed at preventing exports to a target country, boycotts are measures seeking to refuse imports from a target country. Frequently, however, the combination of import and export restrictions is referred to as a trade embargo.
Turkey and Azerbaijan have effectively been exercising an illegal unilateral economic blockade against Armenia, which has hurt the latter economically. The UN Security Council, the sole body to legally authorize sanctions against states, has not done so against Armenia.

Or as Black's Law Dictionary defined Sanction, "An economic or military coercive measure taken by one or more countries toward another to force it to comply with international law."

An "economic blockade" is a blockade in the same sense that the war on drugs was a war. It is just verbal pollution.

The nearest land-based equivalent to a blockade is a siege.

Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 2nd Ed., Cambreidge University Press, 2010, pg. 220

Siege warfare
539. Siege warfare is conducted by encircling an enemy military concentration, a strategic fortress or any other location defended by the enemy, cutting it off from channels of support and supply. The essence of siege warfare lies in an attempt to capture the invested location through starvation. When siege warfare is directed against a military stronghold, enemy combatants may be the only ones suffering from lack of adequate supplies. But on many occasions there would be a substantial civilian population in the surrounded area. This is especially the case when siege is laid to a defended town (see supra 265). While actual resistance to the investing force may be offered exclusively by the military garrison manning the bastions, the civilian inhabitants of the town - possibly joined by refugees from the adjacent countryside - will naturally share in the privations of a prolonged siege. Indeed, they are likely to be the first victims of any resultant famine.
The legality of siege as a method of warfare has not been questioned in the past. Even the diversion of the channel of a river supplying drinking water to the besieged used to be permitted. Siege was deemed a lawful method of warfare although most of the fatalities caused by food shortages tended to be civilians rather than combatants.

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