Pleased to use a work of the British American artist, Benjamin West, who did some spectacular historical paintings.
Steal this meme. Send it to friends.
Posted on 07/11/2021 10:54:30 PM PDT by SoConPubbie
There’s not an “h” in that word.
Well of course but I wouldn’t be entirely apoplectic.
Even with an unprecedented level of fraud and a hostile media, a mere 42,921 more votes in AZ, GA and WI give Trump 269 electoral votes and change the outcome of the election. Here’s a thing I made of the closest elections in the 20th and 21st century in real terms. I calculated the smallest number of votes that would be needed to be gained (or deleted from the winner) to change the outcome and calculated what % of total national “popular vote” this number represented. Number of states needed to flip is in parenthesis.
2000 538 (1) 0.0005%
1916 3,774 (1) 0.0204%
2020 42,921 (3) 0.0270%
1976 25,581 (2) 0.0314%
1960 23,745 (5) 0.0345% or 40,859 (3) 0.0594%
2016 77,739 (3) 0.0567%
2004 118,602 (1) 0.0970%
1948 58,587 (3) 0.1201%
In terms of the total % of popular votes you see only ultra close 2000 and 1916 were closer. Despite all the fraud they succeeded by the skin of their goddamn commie teeth.
Note also how scant Carter’s victory really was, as close as Kennedy’s, 25K votes in Ohio and Mississippi. In Nixon’s case I aimed to give him a majority but it’s possible he could have made a deal with conservative dem electors if Kennedy hadn’t gotten a majority. GOP was actually crushed in 1948 but Dewey nearly won anyway because of Henry Wallace’s third party bid (he cost Truman NY and nearly CA and OH, though he wasn’t on the ballot in necessary Illinois).
Excellent, detailed analysis. Well done.
Very good analysis. My main quibble with “how many votes would we need?” analyses is that when one looks at raw votes needed to get the candidate to an Electoral College victory one may end up with a less likely scenario for flipping the election than would a scenario in which a few more raw votes were needed. You, however, did not fall into that trap (at least I don’t believe that you did).
For example, in 1976, Ford could have gotten to 270 EVs if he got 11,117 more votes in OH and 7,373 more votes in HI (which surely would have led that OR elector to cast his vote for Ford to get him to 270 instead of a protest vote for Reagan that would allow Carter to be elected by the House). That would be only 18,490 raw votes in two states, which are fewer than the 25,581 that you presented (you had Ford gaining 14,464 in MS instead of carrying HI), but it would be a far less plausible scenario than the one that you presented. Ford only needed 7,373 extra votes to carry HI, but he lost that state by 2.53%, so getting those extra votes would be far more difficult than it would have been for him to get enough extra votes to carry MS (where he lost by only 1.88%). So good call.
Personally, I prefer to assume that a vote gain would be equal in every state (if Ford gained votes in both OH and MS it is silly to pretend that he would not similarly gain votes in the other 48 states) and look at the overall vote percentage that would need to swing nationally to put the candidate over the top by at least 0.01% in the deciding state. For example, in 1976, Ford would have won had he carried both OH (which he lost by only 0.27%) and WI (which he lost by 1.68%, so it was 0.20% tighter than MS). So had Ford increased his vote percentage by 1.69% in every state, he would have carried OH and WI and exceeded 270 electoral votes. Similarly, had Trump increased his vote percentage by 0.64% in every state in 2020, he would have carried GA, AZ and WI and received 269 electoral votes, enough to throw the election to the House and been reelected. I think that showing Trump as being 0.64% away from winning in 2020 while Ford was 1.69% from winning in 1976 reveals how the 2020 election was far closer than was the 1976 election than what one would assume by looking at raw votes needed (even as a share of the national popular vote).
By the method that I described above (which basically looks at the percentage victory margin in the state that would put the second-place finisher over the top), the 2020 presidential election (0.64% increase needed) was the third closest since 1901, following only the 2000 (0.02% needed) and 1916 elections (0.39% needed) that also were 1-2 under the raw-votes method.
As for the other elections since 1901, 2016 would be right behind 2020 with Hillary needing an increase of 0.77% to carry MI, PA and WI—the 2020 appeared to be twice as tight as 2016 under the raw-votes method because of the illusion created by one of the states that Hillary needed to win (PA) having such a large population, so the 0.73% of the vote that she needed there was a whopping 44,285 votes. After that would come 1960 (Nixon would need an extra 0.81% to get over 270 EVs—he couldn’t count on those segregationist Democrat electors to give him the election), 1948 (Dewey needed just 0.85% to win outright) and 2004 way behind (Kerry needed to gain 2.12%).
How about a Desantis/Trump ticket?...Desantis can put Trump to work where he would work best.
That would work too, but I kinda feel like President Trump is owed four more years.
Good question. No one knows what they don’t know, but are they even the tiniest bit suspicious or curious?
LS, I have a question for you about AZ specifically. Months ago I think you said their ballot tracking system was so robust that it would have been very difficult to manufacture votes there. Does your perspective change with the CN findings starting to come out? Can you help my pea brain understand how they could’ve possibly injected fake ballots into such a secure system?
Well, as you said in line 2. We just don’t know. No one knows where these ballots came from. And this is specifically why they were outed-—because there is a paper backup to the computer system.
Now, one of the problems with the audit so far is the BoS aren’t giving CyberNinjas the computer keys to finish the exam. I think they will be forced to and we’ll figure it out.
Yes, the actual margin of votes in a small state that wasn’t actually close might be smaller than some competitive states. But that wasn’t an issue in these examples.
The Nixon paths BTW were
3 State: IL, MO, MN (NJ was closer by %, the margin of votes was nearly the same, Leip uses NJ for his “Nixon Wins”)
5 State: IL, MO, HI, NM, NV (could use DE instead of NV)
Notice which election wasn’t on my list, 1968. It wouldn’t have taken much to deprive Nixon of a majority and force him to negotiate with Wallace for his electors (I don’t think a contingent election would have gone well if got to that point) but to give HHH a majority would have required a bit of work
1968 307,141 (4) 0.4196%
Here is 2012 for comparison, a smaller share of the total vote needed to swing it to Romney, despite the national popular vote being much closer in 1968.
2012 429,526 (4) 0.3324%
“Personally, I prefer to assume that a vote gain would be equal in every state “
Certainly a candidate generally “doing better” (or there being less fraud) would include gains everywhere. I’ve come to doubt they would necessary be even across the states though.
My math has the closest elections in terms of tipping point margin to total popular vote as 2000 Dubya 0.001%, 1876 Hayes 0.011% , 1884 Grover Cleveland 0.011% , 2020 Biden* 0.027% , 1960 Kennedy 0.028% , Truman 0.051% , and 1976 Carter and 2016 Trump at 0.057%.
When evaluated this way, Bidet's win* looks more like Kennedy's alleged win, and Trump's win was more broad and akin to Carter's win.
In 1968, even getting Nixon below 270 would have been very difficult. Nixon would have had to lose in MO (where he won by 20,488 votes, or 1.13%), NJ (where he won by 61,262 votes, or 2.13%) and AK (2.189 votes, or 2.64%) to get his to 269 EVs, and that assumes that that asshole elector from NC still would have betrayed his pledge to vote for the GOP ticket and voted for the Libertarian ticket (which wasn’t even on the ballot in NC) when it would have thrown the election to the House (it was a lot easier for him to do so when it was a meaningless vote that merely reduced Nixon’s EV total from 302 to 301). To make sure that Nixon dropped below 270 EVs, he would have had to lose MO, NJ and OH (where he won by 90,428 votes, or 2.28%). Those are not very close margins. And to get Humphrey to 270 it would have required him to carry not only MO, NJ and OH, but also IL (where Nixon won by 134,960 votes, or 2.92%). That would have required a considerable shift in votes.
But I do not believe that Romney was closer to beating Obama in 2012 than Humphrey was to beating Nixon in 1968, despite the 429,526 raw votes over four states (FL, OH, VA and NH) needed by Romney being a lower percentage of the national popular vote than were the 307,141 raw votes over four states (MO, NJ, OH and IL) needed by Humphrey. Romney only lost FL by 0.88%, but he lost OH by 2.97% (higher than Humphrey’s margin of loss in any of the four states that he needed), VA by 3.87% (a fairly safe victory margin for Obama), and a whopping 5.58% in NH (which is not even competitive).
Romney had a path—albeit a difficult one—to 266 EVs, but those last 4 EVs were always going to be tough, and he didn’t come within 5.35% in any of the states that could have gotten him there (CO, PA, NH, IA, NV or WI). Getting an extra 5.37%+ in basically a two-person race is far beyond what one might speculate one could get in the most optimistic what-if scenario; heck, had Thomas Dewey received 5.02% more than what he got, he would have been elected president in 1944 against FDR! (FDR carried NY’s 47 EVs by 5.01%, and had Dewey carried NY plus the seven states that FDR carried by 3.70% or less he would have won in the Electoral College.) I’m not saying that Dewey actually came closer to winning in 1944 than Romney did in 2012, but that a 5.58% margin in a state is not something that one reasonably can expect to have made up in a contested presidential election.
I can appreciate your point that a rising electoral tide would not lift boats in all states equally, but merely adding the raw votes needed and then dividing by the total national popular vote does not reveal how difficult it would be for the losing candidate to gain those votes. Yes, getting an extra 30,000 votes in a state is easier today than it would have been back in 1968 because there are more voters today, but it’s only because 30,000 votes is a smaller percentage of the vote *in that state*, not because the total vote in CA is now 2.5 times what it was back then.
I just thought of a way to measure the votes needed as a percentage of the vote in the crucial states while not assuming that the vote would move in tandem in every state (which, I admit, does not take into account that picking up votes in four states is more difficult than picking up votes in two states). It’s really quite simple: just add up the percentages of the vote needed in the states needed to get them to the magic number of electoral votes.
So let’s take 1968: Humphrey needed 1.14% in MO, 2.14% in NJ, 2.29% in OH and 2.93% in IL, which adds up to 8.50%. In 2012, Romney needed 0.89% in FL, 2.98% in OH, 3.88% in VA and 5.37% in CO, which adds up to 13.12%, markedly higher than Humphrey’s deficit in 1968. And, to prove that this method does not merely look at the last state needed (which is the way I traditionally have looked at close elections), please note than in 1944 Dewey needed 1.03% in MI, 1.36% in NJ, 2.79% in PA, 2.95% in MO, 3.48% in IL, 3.71% in MD and 5.02% in NY in order to get to 267 EVs (266 being enough for election; Dewey came closer in ID, NH and OR than he did in NY, but he didn’t need those states to win), which adds up to 20.34%, much higher than for 2012.
In the really close elections since 1901, adding the required additional vote percentages per needed state gives us pretty much the same results as the other methods, but the margins are, IMHO, more reasonable. Here are the elections, with the additional vote percentage required by the second-place finisher in each state that he needed to win (in some races he only needed to win one more state, but in others he or she needed to win two or three more states) and then the sum of such percentages:
2000: 0.02% in FL = 0.02%
1916: 0.39% in CA = 0.39%
2020: 0.25% in GA + 0.32% in AZ + 0.64% in WI = 1.21%
1960: 0.20% in IL + 0.53% in MO + 0.81% in NJ = 1.54%
1948: 0.25% in OH + 0.45% in CA + 0.85% in IL = 1.55%
2016: 0.23% in MI + 0.73% in PA + 0.77% in WI = 1.73%
1976: 0.28% in OH + 1.68% in WI = 1.96%
2004: 2.12% in OH = 2.12%
This new method is not perfect, since if there’s an election in which a candidate would have won had he received an extra 3.00% in TX it would be deemed to have been closer than one in which he would have needed a mere 1.51% in each of WI and IA—getting an extra 1.51% is far easier than getting an extra 3%, and, while not all states move in tandem, WI and IA usually move together. But I think that it presents the closeness of elections in a more practical way, and with less statistical noise, than either the method that Impy used or the method that I used earlier in this thread.
That seems odd. I thought Pence would be wildly popular.
/s
Very interesting.
I’m not much of a math guy but 2020 seems to be extremely close no matter what methods you use.
Fraud evidenced by the fact that GD Romney actually did better in the “popular vote” which doesn’t pass the smell test.
Maybe after you add that up, divide by the number of states to get the average? That would solve the Texas 3% vs. Iowa and WI 1.51% each issue.
If we divided by states to get the average, then it would reward candidates who would have to overcome deficits in a whole bunch of states, and pretty much go back to the assumption that all states would move exactly in tandem—and Dewey in 1944 would be deemed to be much closer to victory than would Romney in 2012.
Actually, it would make the analysis even less realistic than when I simply took the percentage deficit in the crucial state and went with that, since if a candidate needed, say, five states that he lost by only 1% and one state that he lost by 7%, he would be deemed to have been only 2% away from winning, while had he barely won those five states and been only one state away from winning (the one that he lost by 7%), he would be deemed to be 7% away from winning. So dividing by the number of required pickups would make things worse.
Given that each state that one must pick up is a separate burden, I think that the potential overweight on what the candidate needs to gain is not entirely misplaced.
I must say, if you aren’t “much of a math guy,” you sure fooled me with your anslysis of close presidential races. I thought that it was quite nuanced.
And, yes, no matter how you slice it, the 2020 presidential elections (I like to refer to them in the plural because there are 51 separate elections that lead to a single choice) were the third closest since 1901, and far closer than were the 2016 elections.
For the record, Trump's win in 2016 by 77,744 votes (the sum of the winning margin in the Tipping point states of PA, MI, and WI) as a percentage of the total popular vote was a narrow 0.0569%, but on par with Carter's winning percentage and higher than that for Truman and Bidet*.
By contrast, Bidet's winning* margin of 0.0277% was the 4th lowest since 1868, and on par with that of Kennedy's (also shady) win. By contrast, the biggest margin percentages were 1936-FDR, 1972-Nixon, 1964-Johnson, and 1984-Reagan. And for what it's worth, Obama and Wilson are the only Presidents (aside from FDR) who's second term winning margin was lower than that in the first term.
If you are a stats geek, I ran a regression line of popular vote margin % as a function of the tipping point margin %. Depending upon whether or not you remove some of the extreme values (e.g., FDR, Nixon etc), in general the popular vote margin % for the winner is about 4-5x that of the tipping point margin %. However, the r-square is about 0.75 - pretty healthy. In other words, the popular vote margin of victory % is inflated vs the tipping point popular vote margin of victory %, but it's a somewhat consistent gap of about 4-5x. Which, again, is why it's so important to focus on the state-level dynamics in all this stuff vs the national dynamics, and to combat fraud you'd need to do your homework to figure out which states they'll attack.
| Winner | Total Popular Vote | Pop Vote Margin | Popular Vote Margin/Total Popular Vote | Tipping Point States | Sum of Pre-Tipping Point Popular Margins | Sum of Pre-Tipping Point Popular Margins to Total Popular Vote | Sum of Pre-Tipping Point Popular Margins to Total Tipping Point Popular Vote |
| 2020 Biden* | 158,383,935 | 7,052,120 | 4.453% | 3 | 42,918 | 0.0271% | 0.3673% |
| 2016 Trump | 136,669,237 | (2,868,691) | -2.099% | 3 | 77,744 | 0.0569% | 0.5577% |
| 2012 Obama | 129,085,410 | 4,982,291 | 3.860% | 4 | 527,737 | 0.4088% | 2.5770% |
| 2008 Obama | 131,313,820 | 9,550,193 | 7.273% | 7 | 994,143 | 0.7571% | 3.6067% |
| 2004 Dubya | 122,294,846 | 3,012,166 | 2.463% | 3 | 134,648 | 0.1101% | 1.7063% |
| 2000 Dubya | 105,405,100 | (543,895) | -0.516% | 1 | 537 | 0.0005% | 0.0090% |
| 1996 Clinton | 96,275,401 | 8,201,370 | 8.519% | 10 | 1,388,367 | 1.4421% | 5.8860% |
| 1992 Clinton | 104,423,923 | 5,805,256 | 5.559% | 11 | 613,637 | 0.5876% | 2.8642% |
| 1988 GHW Bush | 91,594,686 | 7,077,121 | 7.727% | 12 | 1,231,838 | 1.3449% | 4.0101% |
| 1984 Reagan | 92,653,233 | 16,878,120 | 18.216% | 17 | 5,947,627 | 6.4192% | 12.2299% |
| 1980 Reagan | 86,509,678 | 8,423,115 | 9.737% | 18 | 1,605,352 | 1.8557% | 4.2728% |
| 1976 Carter | 81,531,584 | 1,683,247 | 2.065% | 2 | 46,361 | 0.0569% | 0.7462% |
| 1972 Nixon | 77,744,027 | 17,995,488 | 23.147% | 16 | 6,812,738 | 8.7630% | 16.1019% |
| 1968 Nixon | 73,199,998 | 511,944 | 0.699% | 3 | 172,177 | 0.2352% | 1.9917% |
| 1964 Johnson | 70,639,284 | 15,951,287 | 22.581% | 24 | 4,653,332 | 6.5875% | 15.7769% |
| 1960 Kennedy | 68,832,482 | 112,827 | 0.164% | 3 | 18,953 | 0.0275% | 0.2756% |
| 1956 Eisenhower | 62,021,328 | 9,551,152 | 15.400% | 15 | 2,625,170 | 4.2327% | 10.8569% |
| 1952 Eisenhower | 61,751,942 | 6,700,439 | 10.851% | 14 | 1,896,387 | 3.0710% | 7.7873% |
| 1948 Truman | 48,793,535 | 2,188,055 | 4.484% | 2 | 24,972 | 0.0512% | 0.3589% |
| 1944 FDR | 47,977,063 | 3,594,987 | 7.493% | 10 | 720,296 | 1.5013% | 3.3634% |
| 1940 FDR | 49,902,113 | 4,966,201 | 9.952% | 11 | 1,145,860 | 2.2962% | 4.2824% |
| 1936 FDR | 45,647,699 | 11,070,786 | 24.253% | 17 | 4,873,549 | 10.6764% | 16.8014% |
| 1932 FDR | 39,751,898 | 7,060,023 | 17.760% | 14 | 2,003,798 | 5.0408% | 9.6534% |
| 1928 Hoover | 36,807,012 | 6,411,659 | 17.420% | 12 | 1,052,714 | 2.8601% | 8.0695% |
| 1924 Coolidge | 29,097,107 | 7,337,547 | 25.217% | 16 | 685,717 | 2.3567% | 9.6009% |
| 1920 Harding | 26,765,180 | 7,004,432 | 26.170% | 18 | 1,335,434 | 4.9894% | 16.0643% |
| 1916 Wilson | 18,536,585 | 578,140 | 3.119% | 2 | 28,016 | 0.1511% | 0.3517% |
| 1912 Wilson | 15,044,278 | 2,173,563 | 14.448% | 20 | 417,028 | 2.7720% | 6.7548% |
| 1908 Taft | 14,889,239 | 1,269,356 | 8.525% | 8 | 149,980 | 1.0073% | 4.2272% |
| 1904 T. Roosevelt | 13,525,095 | 2,546,677 | 18.829% | 8 | 445,961 | 3.2973% | 10.8031% |
| 1900 McKinley | 13,997,429 | 857,932 | 6.129% | 7 | 237,695 | 1.6981% | 6.2735% |
| 1896 McKinley | 13,938,674 | 601,331 | 4.314% | 5 | 70,914 | 0.5088% | 2.8443% |
| 1892 Grover Cleveland | 12,068,027 | 363,099 | 3.009% | 6 | 45,168 | 0.3743% | 1.9839% |
| 1888 B. Harrison | 11,383,320 | (94,530) | -0.830% | 2 | 16,721 | 0.1469% | 0.9006% |
| 1884 Grover Cleveland | 10,060,145 | 57,579 | 0.572% | 1 | 1,149 | 0.0114% | 0.0984% |
| 1880 Garfield | 9,219,477 | 9,457 | 0.103% | 3 | 28,339 | 0.3074% | 1.7543% |
| 1876 Hayes | 8,418,659 | (252,666) | -3.001% | 1 | 889 | 0.0106% | 0.4866% |
| 1872 Grant | 6,471,983 | 763,729 | 11.801% | 10 | 140,259 | 2.1672% | 5.9524% |
| 1868 Grant | 5,722,440 | 304,810 | 5.327% | 6 | 58,060 | 1.0146% | 3.7761% |
Sorted by Sum of Pre-Tipping Point Popular Margins to Total Popular Vote :
| Winner | Total Popular Vote | Pop Vote Margin | Popular Vote Margin/Total Popular Vote | Tipping Point States | Sum of Pre-Tipping Point Popular Margins | Sum of Pre-Tipping Point Popular Margins to Total Popular Vote | Sum of Pre-Tipping Point Popular Margins to Total Tipping Point Popular Vote |
| 2000 Dubya | 105,405,100 | (543,895) | -0.516% | 1 | 537 | 0.0005% | 0.0090% |
| 1876 Hayes | 8,418,659 | (252,666) | -3.001% | 1 | 889 | 0.0106% | 0.4866% |
| 1884 Grover Cleveland | 10,060,145 | 57,579 | 0.572% | 1 | 1,149 | 0.0114% | 0.0984% |
| 2020 Biden* | 158,383,935 | 7,052,120 | 4.453% | 3 | 42,918 | 0.0271% | 0.3673% |
| 1960 Kennedy | 68,832,482 | 112,827 | 0.164% | 3 | 18,953 | 0.0275% | 0.2756% |
| 1948 Truman | 48,793,535 | 2,188,055 | 4.484% | 2 | 24,972 | 0.0512% | 0.3589% |
| 1976 Carter | 81,531,584 | 1,683,247 | 2.065% | 2 | 46,361 | 0.0569% | 0.7462% |
| 2016 Trump | 136,669,237 | (2,868,691) | -2.099% | 3 | 77,744 | 0.0569% | 0.5577% |
| 2004 Dubya | 122,294,846 | 3,012,166 | 2.463% | 3 | 134,648 | 0.1101% | 1.7063% |
| 1888 B. Harrison | 11,383,320 | (94,530) | -0.830% | 2 | 16,721 | 0.1469% | 0.9006% |
| 1916 Wilson | 18,536,585 | 578,140 | 3.119% | 2 | 28,016 | 0.1511% | 0.3517% |
| 1968 Nixon | 73,199,998 | 511,944 | 0.699% | 3 | 172,177 | 0.2352% | 1.9917% |
| 1880 Garfield | 9,219,477 | 9,457 | 0.103% | 3 | 28,339 | 0.3074% | 1.7543% |
| 1892 Grover Cleveland | 12,068,027 | 363,099 | 3.009% | 6 | 45,168 | 0.3743% | 1.9839% |
| 2012 Obama | 129,085,410 | 4,982,291 | 3.860% | 4 | 527,737 | 0.4088% | 2.5770% |
| 1896 McKinley | 13,938,674 | 601,331 | 4.314% | 5 | 70,914 | 0.5088% | 2.8443% |
| 1992 Clinton | 104,423,923 | 5,805,256 | 5.559% | 11 | 613,637 | 0.5876% | 2.8642% |
| 2008 Obama | 131,313,820 | 9,550,193 | 7.273% | 7 | 994,143 | 0.7571% | 3.6067% |
| 1908 Taft | 14,889,239 | 1,269,356 | 8.525% | 8 | 149,980 | 1.0073% | 4.2272% |
| 1868 Grant | 5,722,440 | 304,810 | 5.327% | 6 | 58,060 | 1.0146% | 3.7761% |
| 1988 GHW Bush | 91,594,686 | 7,077,121 | 7.727% | 12 | 1,231,838 | 1.3449% | 4.0101% |
| 1996 Clinton | 96,275,401 | 8,201,370 | 8.519% | 10 | 1,388,367 | 1.4421% | 5.8860% |
| 1944 FDR | 47,977,063 | 3,594,987 | 7.493% | 10 | 720,296 | 1.5013% | 3.3634% |
| 1900 McKinley | 13,997,429 | 857,932 | 6.129% | 7 | 237,695 | 1.6981% | 6.2735% |
| 1980 Reagan | 86,509,678 | 8,423,115 | 9.737% | 18 | 1,605,352 | 1.8557% | 4.2728% |
| 1872 Grant | 6,471,983 | 763,729 | 11.801% | 10 | 140,259 | 2.1672% | 5.9524% |
| 1940 FDR | 49,902,113 | 4,966,201 | 9.952% | 11 | 1,145,860 | 2.2962% | 4.2824% |
| 1924 Coolidge | 29,097,107 | 7,337,547 | 25.217% | 16 | 685,717 | 2.3567% | 9.6009% |
| 1912 Wilson | 15,044,278 | 2,173,563 | 14.448% | 20 | 417,028 | 2.7720% | 6.7548% |
| 1928 Hoover | 36,807,012 | 6,411,659 | 17.420% | 12 | 1,052,714 | 2.8601% | 8.0695% |
| 1952 Eisenhower | 61,751,942 | 6,700,439 | 10.851% | 14 | 1,896,387 | 3.0710% | 7.7873% |
| 1904 T. Roosevelt | 13,525,095 | 2,546,677 | 18.829% | 8 | 445,961 | 3.2973% | 10.8031% |
| 1956 Eisenhower | 62,021,328 | 9,551,152 | 15.400% | 15 | 2,625,170 | 4.2327% | 10.8569% |
| 1920 Harding | 26,765,180 | 7,004,432 | 26.170% | 18 | 1,335,434 | 4.9894% | 16.0643% |
| 1932 FDR | 39,751,898 | 7,060,023 | 17.760% | 14 | 2,003,798 | 5.0408% | 9.6534% |
| 1984 Reagan | 92,653,233 | 16,878,120 | 18.216% | 17 | 5,947,627 | 6.4192% | 12.2299% |
| 1964 Johnson | 70,639,284 | 15,951,287 | 22.581% | 24 | 4,653,332 | 6.5875% | 15.7769% |
| 1972 Nixon | 77,744,027 | 17,995,488 | 23.147% | 16 | 6,812,738 | 8.7630% | 16.1019% |
| 1936 FDR | 45,647,699 | 11,070,786 | 24.253% | 17 | 4,873,549 | 10.6764% | 16.8014% |
Pleased to use a work of the British American artist, Benjamin West, who did some spectacular historical paintings.
Steal this meme. Send it to friends.
It wouldn’t display for me until I loaded it directly in a browser window.
http://freeper.org/fr/RINOS/judas_pence.jpg
Trump wins the CPAC straw poll by a whopping 49 points with 70% of the vote. DeSantis a distant second at 21%. Pence and Abbott got 0%.
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