Posted on 10/13/2010 3:04:13 PM PDT by BuckeyeTexan
On consideration of the Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Mandamus and Application for a Stay of Proceedings, the petition is DENIED.
(Excerpt) Read more at caaflog.com ...
He will continue to do so, no matter how many times he is proved wrong....his BS has been slapped down so many times here but he continues to spread his lies and false notions....and wonders why he's called a troll.
Thanks Mano!
:)
Good ... may it grow.
Dear Lord, bless and protect our brave troops, and save
this great nation.
***
No, I’d stick around here so I could laugh at you some more
~~~~ Think about just how sick and perverted that statement is, and in the midst of some of the most horrificly dangerous security, economic and national stability risks this nation’s ever faced everywhere you look, and purposely at the hands of this despot.
So let me get this straight? It's okay for someone to go on a mindless screed accusing a member of the military (maybe retired, if I recall) of not caring about the Constitution to the point that would let it burn, watch its ashes being pissed on, and then knowingly participate in the murder of any fellow soldier who objected? It's okay to basically call someone a Nazi, a lurid and tired tactic of those who have no argument? But simply responding to such nonsense with pretty mild sarcasm is beyond the pale?
As near as I can tell, Non-Sequitur's only offense is to respect the law, to know what he's talking about from a legal perspective, and to have been proven right in his judgments by events time and again.
Any small contribution I can make is truly my pleasure.
I cannot give an answer to someone who refuses to read the most important decision on the subject, or who does so and then pretends it doesn’t mean what everyone else in the word says it obviously does.
The SCOTUS spent pages discussing it, and you reject their decision. So what? Courts will follow the Supreme Court, not you.
"That military commanders, in giving legal orders represent the Commander-in-Chief..." "That army regulations duly issued by the Secretary of War are in law acts and regulations of the President..." Military Law and Precedents http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/ML_precedents.html
Here you go:
IV. It was contended by one of the learned counsel for the United States that the rule of the Roman law, by which the citizenship of the child followed that of the parent, was the true rule of international law, as now recognized in most civilized countries, and had superseded the rule of the common law, depending on birth within the realm, originally founded on feudal considerations.
But at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States in 1789, and long before, it would seem to have been the rule in Europe generally, as it certainly was in France, that, as said by Pothier, “citizens, true and native-born citizens, are those who are born within the extent of the dominion of France,” and
mere birth within the realm gives the rights of a native-born citizen, independently of the origin of the father or mother, and of their domicil;
and children born in a foreign country, of a French father who had not established his domicil there nor given up the intention of returning, were also deemed Frenchmen, as Laurent says, by “a favor, a sort of fiction,” and Calvo, “by a sort of fiction of exterritoriality, considered as born in France, and therefore invested with French nationality.” Pothier Trait des Personnes, pt. 1, tit. 2, sect. 1, nos. 43, 45; Walsh-Serrant v. Walsh-Serrant, (1802) 3 Journal du Palais, 384; S.C., S. Merlin, Jurisprudence, (5th ed.) Domicile, § 13; Prefet du Nord v. Lebeau, (1862) Journal du Palais, 1863, 312 and note; 1 Laurent Droit Civil, no. 321; 2 Calvo Droit International, (5th ed.) § 542; Cockburn on Nationality, 13, 14; Hall’s International Law, (4th ed.) § 68. The general principle of citizenship by birth within French territory prevailed until after the French Revolution, and was affirmed in successive constitutions from the one adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1791 to that of the French Republic in 1799. Constitutions et Chartes, (ed. 1830) pp. 100, 136, 148, 186. [p667] The Code Napoleon of 1807 changed the law of France and adopted, instead of the rule of country of birth, jus soli, the rule of descent or blood, jus sanguinis, as the leading principle; but an eminent commentator has observed that the framers of that code
appear not to have wholly freed themselves from the ancient rule of France, or rather, indeed, ancient rule of Europe — de la vielle regle francaise, ou plutot meme de la vielle regle europienne — according to which nationality had always been, in former times, determined by the place of birth.
1 Demolombe Cours de Code Napoleon (4th ed.) no. 146.
The later modifications of the rule in Europe rest upon the constitutions, laws or ordinances of the various countries, and have no important bearing upon the interpretation and effect o the Constitution of the United States. The English Naturalization Act of 33 Vict. (1870) c. 14, and the Commissioners’ Report of 1869, out of which it grew, both bear date since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and, as observed by Mr. Dicey, that act has not affected the principle by which any person who, whatever the nationality of his parents, is born within the British dominions, acquires British nationality at birth and is a natural-born British subject. Dicey, Conflict of Laws 41. At the time of the passage of that act, although the tendency on the continent of Europe was to make parentage, rather than birthplace, the criterion of nationality, and citizenship was denied to the native-born children of foreign parents in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway, yet it appears still to have been conferred upon such children in Holland, Denmark and Portugal, and, when claimed under certain specified conditions, in France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece and Russia. Cockburn on Nationality, 14-21.
There is, therefore, little ground for the theory that, at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, there as any settled and definite rule of international law, generally recognized by civilized nations, inconsistent with the ancient rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion. [p668]
Nor can it be doubted that it is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship.
Both in England and in the United States, indeed, statutes have been passed at various times enacting that certain issue born abroad of English subjects or of American citizens, respectively, should inherit, to some extent at least, the rights of their parents. But those statutes applied only to cases coming within their purport, and they have never been considered in either country as affecting the citizenship of persons born within its dominion.
The earliest statute was passed in the reign of Edward III. In the Rolls of Parliament of 17 Edw. III (1343), it is stated that,
before these times, there have been great doubt and difficulty among the Lords of this realm, and the Commons, as well men of the law as others, whether children who are born in parts beyond sea ought to bear inheritance after the death of their ancestors in England, because no certain law has been thereon ordained;
and by the King, Lords and Commons, it was unanimously agreed that
there was no manner of doubt that the children of our Lord the King, whether they were born on this side the sea or beyond the sea, should bear the inheritance of their ancestors; . . . and in regard to other children, it was agreed in this Parliament that they also should inherit wherever they might be born in the service of the King;
but, because the Parliament was about to depart, and the business demanded great advisement and good deliberation how it should be best and most surely done, the making of a statute was put off to the next Parliament. 2 Rot.Parl. 139. By reason, apparently, of the prevalence of the plague in England, no act upon the subject was passed until 5 Edw. III, (1350), when Parliament passed an act entitled “A statute for those who are born in parts beyond sea,” by which — after reciting that
some people be in doubt if the children born in the parts beyond the sea, out of the ligeance of England, should be able to demand any inheritance within the same ligeance, or not, whereof a petition was put [p669] in the Parliament
of 17 Edw. III, “and as not at the same time wholly assented” — it was (1) agreed and affirmed
that the law of the Crown of England is, and always hath been such, that the children of the Kings of England, in whatsoever parts they be born, in England or elsewhere, be able and ought to bear the inheritance after the death of their ancestors;
(2) also agreed that certain persons named,
which were born beyond the sea, out of the ligeance of England, shall be from henceforth able to have and enjoy their inheritance after the death of their ancestors, in all parts within the ligeance of England, as well as those that should be born within the same ligeance:
(3) and further agreed
that all children inheritors, which from henceforth shall be born without the ligeance of the King, whose fathers and mothers at the time of their birth be and shall be at the faith and ligeance of the King of England, shall have and enjoy the same benefits and advantages to have and bear the inheritance within the same ligeance as the other inheritors aforesaid, in time to come; so always, that the mothers of such children do pass the sea by the licence and wills of their husbands.
2 Rot. Parl. 231; 1 Statutes of the Realm, 310.
It has sometimes been suggested that this general provision of the statute of 25 Edw. III was declaratory of the common law. See Bacon, arguendo, in Calvin’ Case, 2 Howell’s State Trials, 585; Westlake and Pollock, arguendo, in De Geer v. Stone, 22 Ch.D. 243, 247; 2 Kent Com. 50, 53; Lynch v. Clarke,1 Sandf.Ch. 583, 659, 660; Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356. But all suggestions to that effect seem to have been derived, immediately or ultimately, from one or the other of these two sources: the one, the Year Book of 1 Ric. III, (1483) fol. 4, pl. 7, reporting a saying of Hussey, C.J.,
that he who is born beyond sea, and his father and mother are English, their issue inherit by the common law, but the statute makes clear, &c.,
— which, at best, was but obiter dictum, for the Chief Justice appears to have finally rested his opinion on the statute. The other, a note added to the edition of 1688 of Dyer’s Reports, 184a, stating that, at Trinity Term, 7 Edw. III, Rot. 2 B.R., it was adjudged that children of subjects born [p670] beyond the sea in the service of the King were inheritable — which has been shown, by a search of the roll in the King’s Bench so referred to, to be a mistake, inasmuch as the child there in question did not appear to have been born beyond sea, but only to be living abroad. Westlake’s Private International Law (3d ed.) 324.
The statute of 5 Edw. III recites the existence of doubts as to the right of foreign-born children to inherit in England; and, while it is declaratory of the rights of children of the King, and is retrospective as to the persons specifically named, yet, as to all others, it is, in terms, merely prospective, applying to those only “who shall be born henceforth.” Mr. Binney, in his paper above cited, after a critical examination of the statute and of the early English cases, concluded:
There is nothing in the statute which would justify the conclusion that it is declaratory of the common law in any but a single particular, namely in regard to the children of the King; nor has it at any time been judicially held to be so. . . . The notion that there is any common law principle to naturalize the children born in foreign countries, of native-born American father and mother, father or mother, must be discarded. There is not, and never was, any such common law principle.
Binney on Alienigenae, 14, 20; 2 Amer.Law Reg.199, 203. And the great weight of the English authorities, before and since he wrote, appears to support his conclusion. Calvin’s Case, 7 Rep. 17a, 18a; Co.Lit. 8a, and Hargrave’s note 36; 1 Bl.Com. 33; Barrington on Statutes, (5th ed.) 268; Lord Kenyon, in Doe v. Jones, 4 T.R. 300, 308; I: ord Chancellor Cranworth, in Shedden v. Patrick, 1 Macq. 535, 611; Cockburn on Nationality, 7, 9; De Greer v. Stone, 2 Ch.D. 243, 252; Dicey Conflict of Laws, 17, 741. “The acquisition,” says Mr. Dicey, (p. 741) “of nationality by descent is foreign to the principles of the common law, and is based wholly upon statutory enactments.”
It has been pertinently observed that, if the statute of Edward III had only been declaratory of the common law, the subsequent legislation on the subject would have been wholly unnecessary. Cockburn on Nationality 9. By the [p671] statute of 29 Car. II, (1677) c. 6, § 1, entitled “An act for the naturalization of children of His Majesty’s subjects born in foreign countries during the late troubles,” all persons who, at any time between June 14, 1641, and March 24, 1660, “were born out of His Majesty’s dominions, and whose fathers or mothers were natural-born subjects of this realm” were declared to be natural-born subjects. By the statute of 7 Anne, (1708) c. 5, § 3, “the children of all natural-born subjects, born out of the ligeance of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors” — explained by the statute of 4 Geo. II, (1731) c. 21, to mean all children born out of the ligeance of the Crown of England
whose fathers were or shall be natural-born subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, at the time of the birth of such children respectively . . . . shall be deemed, adjudged and taken to be natural-born subjects of this kingdom, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever.
That statute was limited to foreign-born children of natural-born subjects, and was extended by the statute of 13 Geo. III, (1773) c. 21, to foreign-born grandchildren of natural-born subjects, but not to the issue of such grandchildren; or, as put by Mr. Dicey, “British nationality does not pass by descent or inheritance beyond the second generation.” See DeGeer v. Stone, above cited; Dicey, Conflict of Laws 742.
Moreover, under those statutes, as is stated in the Report in 1869 of the Commissioners for inquiring into the Laws of Naturalization and Allegiance,
no attempt has ever been made on the part of the British Government, (unless in Eastern countries where special jurisdiction is conceded by treaty) to enforce claims upon, or to assert rights in respect of, persons born abroad, as against the country of their birth whilst they were resident therein, and when by its law they were invested with its nationality.
In the appendix to their report are collected many such cases in which the British Government declined to interpose, the reasons being most clearly brought out in a dispatch of March 13, 1858, from Lord Malmesbury, the Foreign Secretary, to the British Ambassador at Paris, saying:
It is competent to any country to confer by general or special legislation the privileges of nationality upon those [p672] who are born out of its on territory; but it cannot confer such privileges upon such persons as against the country of their birth, when they voluntarily return to and reside therein. Those born in the territory of a nation are (as a general principle) liable when actually therein to the obligations incident to their status by birth. Great Britain considers and treats such persons as natural-born subjects, and cannot therefore deny the right of other nations to do the same. But Great Britain cannot permit the nationality of the children of foreign parents born within her territory to be questioned.
Naturalization Commission Report, pp. viii, 67; U.S. Foreign Relations, 1873-1874, pp. 1237, 1837. See also Drummond’s Case (1834), 2 Knapp 295.
By the Constitution of the United States, Congress was empowered “to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.” In the exercise of this power, Congress, by successive acts, beginning with the act entitled “An act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,” passed at the second session of the First Congress under the Constitution, has made provision for the admission to citizenship of three principal classes of persons: First. Aliens, having resided for a certain time “within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States,” and naturalized individually by proceedings in a court of record. Second. Children of persons so naturalized, “dwelling within the United States, and being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of such naturalization.” Third. Foreign-born children of American citizens, coming within the definitions prescribed by Congress. Acts of March 26, 1790, c. 3; January 29, 1795, c. 20; June 18, 1798, c. 54; 1 Stat. 103, 414, 566; April 14, 1802, c. 28; March 26, 1804, c. 47; 2 Stat. 153, 292; February 10, 1854, c. 71; 10 Stat. 604; Rev.Stat. §§ 2165, 2172, 1993.
In the act of 1790, the provision as to foreign-born children of American citizens was as follows:
The children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural-born citizens: Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been [p673] resident in the United States.
1 Stat. 104. In 1795, this was reenacted in the same words, except in substituting for the words “beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States” the words “out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States.” 1 Stat. 415.
In 1802, all former acts were repealed, and the provisions concerning children of citizens were reenacted in this form:
The children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States, or who, previous to the passing of any law on that subject by the Government of the United States, may have become citizens of any one of the said States under the laws thereof, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of their parents’ being so naturalized or admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States, and the children of persons who now are, or have been citizens of the United States shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States: Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never resided within the United States.
Act of April 14, 1802, c. 28, § 4; 2 Stat. 155.
The provision of that act concerning “the children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States,” not being restricted to the children of persons already naturalized, might well be held to include children of persons thereafter to be naturalized. 2 Kent Com. 51, 52; West v. West, 8 Paige, 433; United States v. Kellar, 11 Bissell, 314; Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135-177.
But the provision concerning foreign-born children, being expressly limited to the children of persons who then were or had been citizens, clearly did not include foreign-born children of any person who became a citizen since its enactment. 2 Kent.Com. 52, 53; Binney on Alienigenae 20, 25; 2 Amer.Law Reg. 203, 205. Mr. Binney’s paper, as he states in his preface, was printed by him in the hope that Congress might supply this defect in our law.
In accordance with his suggestions, it was enacted by the [p674] statute of February 10, 1855, c. 71, that
persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided, however, that the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the United States.
10 Stat. 604; Rev.Stat. § 1993.
It thus clearly appears that, during the half century intervening between 1802 and 1855, there was no legislation whatever for the citizenship of children born abroad, during that period, of American parents who had not become citizens of the United States before the act of 1802, and that the act of 1855, like every other act of Congress upon the subject, has, by express proviso, restricted the right of citizenship, thereby conferred upon foreign-born children of American citizens, to those children themselves, unless they became residents of the United States. Here is nothing to countenance the theory that a general rule of citizenship by blood or descent has displaced in this country the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within its sovereignty.
So far as we are informed, there is no authority, legislative, executive or judicial, in England or America, which maintains or intimates that the statutes (whether considered as declaratory or as merely prospective) conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of citizens have superseded or restricted, in any respect, the established rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion. Even those authorities in this country, which have gone the farthest towards holding such statutes to be but declaratory of the common law have distinctly recognized and emphatically asserted the citizenship of native-born children of foreign parents. 2 Kent Com. 39, 50, 53, 258 note; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf.Ch. 583, 659; Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 371.
Passing by questions once earnestly controverted, but finally put at rest by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, it is beyond doubt that, before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the adoption of the Constitutional [p675] Amendment, all white persons, at least, born within the sovereignty of the United States, whether children of citizens or of foreigners, excepting only children of ambassadors or public ministers of a foreign government, were native-born citizens of the United States.
My son will not answer to an Indonesian president, and I’m proud of that. And that is honerable as well, thank you.
“no matter how many times he is proved wrong”
Odd, isn’t it, that my predictions of the last 7 months have all proved accurate, while none of yours have...
This thread has as its primary subject one of those predictions - that the judge’s ruling on the inadmissibility of Obama’s birth certificate would stand a challenge on appeal.
The fact that 6 or 7 posters on FreeRepublic are unable to comprehend basic law does not make your lack of understanding a refutation. That I am right has been proven multiple times, and will continue as Lakin is found guilty and his appeals fail.
Per established law, Obama’s eligibility does not matter to the case at hand: Lakin’s refusal to obey orders. By established law, Obama is a natural born citizen if born in Hawaii. And by established law, Obama does not have to PROVE to you his birthplace. As the accusers, the requirement for proof falls to you.
In sentencing, Lakin can argue his reasons for disobeying orders. I don’t think it will help him much, but I think the Board will conclude he has been duped by politically motivated legal advice that cares nothing for the client. And that may help reduce his sentence. Frankly, I think as much of his legal counsel as I do of the appropriately named Gloria Allred
No, it's not. What it means is that you and your son place your own personal sense of pride over the well being of the nation you would purport to serve. The honorable men and women are the ones serving their country, the ones who understand that the need for such service exists irregardless of who currently occupies the Oval Office. The ones who are currently fighting and dying for you.
Thanks Lucy
And you point with that is?
I never called my dear friend Seq a Nazi. He just follows orders.
Now, I would call running for president, when you know your an Indonesian, burning and pissing on the constitution. And some people do have no problem with an Indonesian man becoming president. The same people would in fact arrest a soldier who would object and refuse to fight for that reason. And, the ultimate punishment for desertion is hanging.
So, no. Seq is not a Nazi and I have never seen him write anything in German. I dont think he would feed an oven if orderd.
Good words worth repeating combat boots! Thanks for pinging
Only a nutjob argues that Obama is Indonesian. A statement like that is about as honest as Harry Reid was last night in debating Angle.
You cannot debate with two year olds or asylum inmates.
Our test here will become our testimony.
We shall be more than conquerors because we shall conquer this.
Then he should have taken the honorable course and resigned.
You can wish him well, here, publicly if you like.
I'll decline the opportunity, thanks. Lakin chose his path, he can deal with the consequences. While I do not rejoice in his self-destructive decision, I'm not wasting any sympathy on him either.
I could have predicted the same thing, it's doesn't take a genius to see the corrupt cabal we're up against....but I defy you to find out where and when I have ever made any predictions at all and is testimony to your desperation.
As far as law and your incessant use of WKA to make your case is just further evidence or your remedial comprehension skills as to my posts on this thread.
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