Posted on 06/12/2008 8:37:47 PM PDT by neverdem
Order of Battle
War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism
by Douglas Feith
Harper. 688 pp. $27.95
"The stupidest f—ing guy on the planet” is how General Tommy Franks, the head of U.S. Central Command, summed up Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Pentagon from July 2001 until his resignation in August 2005. Franks was cruder than most, but Feith was under almost continuously hostile scrutiny and controversy throughout his tenure. As the third-highest ranking civilian official in Donald Rumsfeld’s wartime Pentagon, he oversaw the Defense Department’s relations with foreign governments at a time of unprecedented anti-Americanism abroad. More important, he headed both the Office of Special Plans, charged with analyzing prewar intelligence reports on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and, subsequently, the Pentagon groups that would eventually coalesce into the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, which oversaw much of the early rebuilding of postwar Iraq.
Of course, many other policy-makers in the Bush administration came in for their share of contumely after the lightning-fast victory of April 2003 turned into the long slog of the occupation and the rise of the Iraqi insurgency. But no one was quite so vilified as the Harvard- and Georgetown-educated Feith. He was variously charged with advocating torture, undermining the Geneva Convention, fronting for Israel’s Likud party, and sexing up the intelligence to exaggerate Saddam Hussein’s links with al Qaeda—not to mention sheer incompetence in failing to foresee the problems of the occupation.
Since 2005, journalists including Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Michael Gordon, George Packer, Thomas Ricks, Bernard Trainor, and Bob Woodward have published scathing accounts of administration policy. According to much of their common narrative, neoconservatives like Feith distorted prewar intelligence, brainwashing or tricking others into undertaking a unilateral, preemptive, and unnecessary war. They then subverted the postwar occupation by disbanding the Iraqi army, sending too few American troops, and ignoring the principled warnings of patriots like Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage, Generals Eric Shinseki and Anthony Zinni, and a host of former advisers to George Bush, Sr. The result was the loss of thousands of lives and a trillion dollars in a struggle that has left us less safe and the Iraqis worse off, and whose only solution is summary withdrawal.
Agreeing with a great deal of this critique, army officers like Franks, and civilian officials such as CIA director George Tenet and Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, have claimed that others, not they, were the real culprits for the botched operations and occupation. And once again at the center of the indictments has been Feith, the bespectacled neocon who is said to have imperiously nitpicked, second-guessed, and hobbled the more experienced men of action.
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In War and Decision, Feith offers a dispassionate counterresponse—the first, one can only hope, of others to follow from Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and George W. Bush. Feith is not interested in getting even, but rather in systematically exploring the accuracy of the entire pessimistic narrative that has grown up about Iraq. Although he does not question every detail, he subjects enough of the narrative to cross-examination to show that it is largely a myth. His tools are understated irony and extensive documentation—some 600 footnotes and dozens of reprinted documents. These bring forcefully to view what the Bush administration was actually thinking in the days, weeks, and months after 9/11.
As the record adduced by Feith clearly demonstrates, neither he nor Rumsfeld advocated a preemptive war for democracy. Feith was more interested in simply removing dictators like the Taliban and Saddam Hussein from power before they or their surrogates could trump the horrors of 9/11, while Rumsfeld was almost obsessive in his anxiety over mounting costs, unforeseen battlefield complications, and occupations with no predetermined end. Far from wanting an imperial American presence in Iraq, Pentagon officials wished to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis as quickly as possible—unlike their counterparts in the State Department, and unlike Paul Bremer, whose quest for the perfect constitutional government got in the way of implementing an interim governing body that would have been good enough.
Powell and Armitage—as the record also demonstrates—were neither critics nor supporters of the war, but had carefully situated themselves to be for it if it worked, and against it if it did not. Their studied triangulation meant that when things went well they were never enthusiastic advocates of the policies they were charged with overseeing, while when things turned bad they were ready to provide off-the-record quotes and background information to the growing chorus of antiwar critics.
As for the intelligence about Saddam’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, that came from the CIA, and it happened to coincide with the assessment of every pertinent foreign intelligence agency as well, including that of France. (This, quite apart from the fact that the CIA was a hotbed of political and ideological partisans with little sympathy for the Bush administration and less for its decision to go to war.) Arguments over proper troop levels were left largely to top generals. Franks adjudicated the size of the invading forces. He never requested additional troops, and summarily quit his command six weeks after the victory, just as the insurgency began.
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What then were the administration’s mistakes? Feith lists several. In his view, it was wrong to make Saddam’s arsenals into the main casus belli, especially since Congress had listed several other justifications for war that could have easily been given pride of place. Although there was prewar planning aplenty, in the euphoria that followed the three-week walkover of Saddam it was either poorly implemented—too many diverse agencies—or hijacked by the State Department and the often maverick Bremer. Among particular lapses, Feith lists Bremer’s failure to turn control over to Iraqi officials early enough and waiting too long to create an Iraqi security force.
It was Defense Department personnel who, Feith writes, had been largely responsible for the inspired American efforts against the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Had they been listened to, they might have mitigated at least some of the unfolding difficulties in Iraq. Richard Meyers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was hardly the weak facilitator he was sometimes portrayed as being. Donald Rumsfeld pressed his underlings too hard, but not as hard as he worked himself. His tragedy lay not in any failure to anticipate the mess of 2004-06—in fact, he uncannily forecast almost every mishap of the “long hard slog”—but his inability to convince the President or the State Department of the mounting dangers and his crippling worry that committing more troops would stretch U.S. forces too thinly elsewhere.
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There is much to be said about each of these points, and others one might name (like the debate over incorporating anti-Baathist “externals”—i.e., Iraqis who had fled Saddam’s regime—into the postwar government). Perhaps the first thing to be noted in assessing Feith’s version, however, is that even today we still do not have the final verdict on Iraq. The costly occupation/reconstruction seems one endless and bitter disappointment when set against the brilliant three-week removal of Saddam; but, on a longer-term view, if we defeat and humiliate al Qaeda in Iraq and ensure the stability of a constitutional government, even this will appear in retrospect to have been not so disastrous after all.
Similarly, it is worth bearing in mind that the choices facing Feith and others were usually of the bad-vs.-worse variety; there were no good ones. Should we cleanse the Iraqi government of Baathists who had blood on their hands, or retain valuable civil servants no matter their previous record or potential security risk? Such choices were predicated ultimately on the military situation: had we crushed the insurgency in its first few weeks, going with the worse of two bad alternatives would probably not have proved so catastrophic.
In any case, what is refreshingly and almost startlingly different about Feith’s account, in contrast to others, is that it provides a basis for disagreement. Feith does not rely on quotations from anonymous sources. Instead of the usual ploy of advancing pseudo-citations from “a senior Pentagon official” or “a high-ranking officer,” his footnotes refer to what actual people have said and have put their names to. Critics can fault his interpretation of the evidence, but at least they have a body of evidence over which to argue. In addition, Feith has provided a website (www.waranddecision.com) where readers can check his sources and ascertain for themselves the degree to which he has quoted fairly and argued honestly. All this is a huge vote in his favor.
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In light of this book’s virtues, it is somewhat regrettable that Feith does not address in detail the failure of the administration to apprise the American people adequately as to the difficulty of the task ahead or to counter the often untrue but sensational accusations of critics. That multi-agency failure constantly to set the record straight did terrible damage to the once-strong public support for the war. Administration officials might have explained over and over again what exactly were our choices after 9/11, what our aims were in Iraq, how the unexpected dilemmas of this war were materially no different from those of past wars, and how, even so, our blunders in Iraq nowhere approximated the scale of earlier disasters in Korea, in World War II, in World War I, or in the Civil War.
Early on, as Feith points out, administration officials stopped emphasizing the benefits—to the Iraqis, to us, to the world—of having Saddam gone from the scene, concentrating instead on the future advantages that would accrue from Iraqi democracy. This mixed message came at precisely the moment when the insurgency was growing, and when security, not idealism, was the chief concern of the American people. The result was that our successful effort to remove a genocidal dictator in the heart of the ancient caliphate—followed by the establishment of a constitutional government where none had previously existed in the Arab world, by the routing of al Qaeda, and by the recruiting and training of thousands of Iraqi fighters, all at the cost of fewer lives than most single battles of World War II—could be written off as the worst blunder in our nation’s history. It would be useful to have had not just Feith’s general views of this matter but an anatomy of who in the administration was responsible for the lapse and why and how it was never rectified.
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I have mentioned the campaign of near-character assassination waged against Douglas Feith. The supposedly unpardonable sins of which he has been accused—they amount to his being an unapologetic policy intellectual who could be haughty to his subordinates and colleagues and obsequious to his superiors—do nothing to obscure the fact that he served his country honorably in wartime and has written a candid and invaluable account of that service.
To no avail, it would seem. Recently, Georgetown University released Feith from teaching a class at its school of foreign service. A student paper at the university ran an editorial about his impending departure: “Feith can take his salary,” it thundered, “and the further thousands he will no doubt earn from his memoir, and try to justify his failures somewhere else.”
Here, however, is the final paragraph of the appendix to War and Decision:
With appreciation of the valor and sacrifice of the men and women of the U.S. armed forces, I have donated all of my revenues from this book to a charitable foundation that will use the funds exclusively for the benefit of veterans and their families.
This, too, needs to be entered into the record, and gratefully acknowledged.
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Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. His “Re-rethinking Iraq: Nothing Succeeds Like Success” appeared in the April COMMENTARY.
Let us know what you think! Send an email to editor@commentarymagazine.com
© Copyright 2008 Commentary. All rights reserved
A BTT for an interesting review. I have the book in hand and am about two chapters into it. It is certainly dispassionate. It may be one of the better books to come out of the war. More later as I learn it.
Georgetown rides its reputation but appears to have become the school of 'the liberal establishment' and those with sufficient monies to arouse the administration's greed (Islamic Center anyone?). I am certain that there are rigerous and worthwhile courses taught by engaged academics, but that can also be said of many other establishments costing orders of magnitude less. Liberal indoctrination, given the pervasiveness of the liberal media, should not come at a premium price in the education budget.
Left Was Wrong; Now Even More Angry About That
Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle: June 2008 Update
Return to Action Michael Yon
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Dunkirk was a disaster. D-day was a disaster (in terms of fatalities). The Battle of the Bulge was a disaster. Sure Iraq is a tough go, but a disaster? I think not.
I am so glad I am NOT a parent. If I were, I would DEMAND my hard earned after tax money back from the cesspool of left wing scum who claim to educate the young and inexperienced minds of America.
War and Decision:
Inside the Pentagon
at the Dawn of
the War on Terrorism
by Douglas J. Feith
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Thanks neverdem. A topic for the Pages sub-list. Just adding to the catalog, not sending a general distribution. |
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The Marxist Left tries mightily to discredit Douglas Feith with lies and distortions Because he is patriotic and brilliant and understands what the Left’s agenda. Heed the words of those the Marxists lie about and try to marginalize. Douglas Feith speaks the truth. The Marxists are afraid of what students learn from him.
Excellent article.
Excellent analysis.
I suspect the book is excellent, too. I will have to get it.
Thanks for posting this VDH essay.
I disagree with two of your three “disasters”.
D-Day was remarkably cheap. Battling for a foothold along so many miles of well defended coastline against a well-experienced enemy easily could have been far more costly.
The Battle of the Bulge, too, was cheap. The casualties sustained the Allies, almost exclusively US in this case, bought the complete emasculation and demoralization of the only strong elements that remained of the German war machine, and the subsequent total collapse of that machine.
Dunkirk was definitely a disaster with no redeeming qualities other to be able to say at least some soldiers escaped with their lives, instead of all captured and killed, which certainly could have occurred.
Whatever, though, this VDH article is definitely one of the best articles I’ve read in analysis of both a book, and as a side effect, the BASH* itself, that I’ve yet seen.
(* BASH = Battle Against Saddam Hussein, part of the WOT)
Good article.
It continues to annoy me to no end that so many conservatives and liberals take Rumsfeld and others as highly flawed Iraq operators.
The war in Iraq was at every level an astounding success.
Congressional critics such as Levin and Biden were way off the mark on dire predictions. Suggesting that at least 10,000 US troops would certainly die in the first six months of the invasion in Bagdad alone. The fact that five years later we are not near half that number for the entire country speaks volumes to the permissiveness that is given to critics of this war.
Where do they ever have to be vaguely correct in order to retain credibilty?
The answer seems to be never. So long as critics keep stepping up with the failure meme the public— including far too many conservatives are willing to concede ‘it has not gone well’ sigh.
That is total bull.
Iraq voted on and adopted a Constitution that the EU still cannot pass among their member states. The three elections in Iraq of 2005 were staffed by Iraqi security forces that Biden promised could not be created by our military— wrong again.
Critics have been wrong wrong wrong wrong wrong but still found so credible by the media.
AFPJus, my point was if Iraq is a disaster then so were D-day, the Bulge and the amazing Dunkirk evacuation (348,000 British, French and Belgian Soldiers evacuated using 900 civilian and military ships). My word, the US has managed to change the future of Iraq, eliminate tens of thousands of terrorists, take out the Libyan nuclear weapons program, slow down the Iranian nuclear program and yet all are calling Iraq a disaster.
Several months ago, just before the "surge" period started to show fruit, I got into a heated argument with a liberal friend of mine. Heated more perhaps by the several drinks we'd had by then. But he was giving the usual line about what a "disaster" the Iraq war was.
I challenged him to consider the speed and size of the operation, the number of casualties on ~both~ sides, military and civilian... and name for me just ONE campaign in the known history of warfare that has gone better.
I'm still waiting for the answer.
So true.
I often like to look at the centerpiece of anti Iraq war argumentation:
The Lancet study which suggests that upwards of 600,000 Iraqis have been killed.
Even if this is true— which I think the study is an absurd exaggeration— the studies own conclusions say that no more than 15-20% of those deaths were the result of Coalition military strikes.
This means that sadistic Jihadists were so annoyed by our success in Iraq that they were willing to suicide bomb tens of thousands of fellow muslims in the hopeless line of logic that they would join with them in resisting America.
We now know that this tactic has hopelessly backfired and it is little wonder thant more than 95% of the surveyed public in Iraq hates the jihadists— probably higher than here in the US!
It has been an incredible success.
I have read most of the book at my Barnes and Noble library.
Feith’s account is the most apolitical, un-nuanced, frank account I have read, on the run up to and running of the war; and he doesn’t take it or make it personal. Like Reagan, he is able to fault actions without trying to turn those involved into demons.
I would encourage all Freepers to read it.
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