Al Qaeda Reinvents the Banzai Charge

strategy page ^ | March 23, 2006

[Paleo Conservative]

But they were trained in Russian style methods, which emphasized tight control from above, and little initiative at the bottom. This is just the opposite of the American/NATO style.

Many officers trained in the Russian style cannot, late in their careers, switch to American methods. This was encountered when the East European communist governments fell in 1989, and those nations joined NATO in the 1990s. This required that their armed forces learn NATO methods, so they could operate with West European NATO forces. Many of the communist era officers could not make the shift to the, to them, radically different methods.

It's pretty hard for a dictatorship that doesn't trust its own people to adopt US/NATO methods that give soldiers at the scene the authority to use their own initiative. A military like that could be an internal threat to the regime.

[Marine_Uncle]

"...My God Bless such men."
Amen to that. And our women in uniform also. Some have paid the ultimate price for serving their country.

[justshutupandtakeit]

Indeed.

[strategofr]

"Thus, even as Al Qaeda was making a major military effort (for them), Iraqis turned out 60% to vote in January of 2005, then 63% in October of 2005 for their Constitution, then close to 70% in their December 2005 elections."

I don't think your analysis captures the current flavor of what is going on in Iraq. For three months in Iraq, the legislators have been deadlocked and failed to create a government. What led to this was that al-Sadr intimidated/influenced a number of legislators to vote for a very weak, inappropriate person to lead the government, someone the Shi'ite radicals wanted. This led to a deadlock, as so many people found this individual completely unacceptable.

This is not a good situation. According to a cover story in USA Today today or yesterday, the US has announced it is ending its attempt to rebuild Iraq and turning the effort over to the Iraqis. However, the Iraqis have no money with which to attempt this. Initially, I thought we said we were going to achieve a number of goals with the rebuilding effort. However, we have fallen far short.

Thing simply do not look good in Iraq at this time.

[strategofr]

"It's pretty hard for a dictatorship that doesn't trust its own people to adopt US/NATO methods that give soldiers at the scene the authority to use their own initiative. A military like that could be an internal threat to the regime."

Good point. Are you sure are the current government of Iraq is similar enough to a US/NATO government to be comfortable with the same type of military?

[Southack]

"Thing simply do not look good in Iraq at this time."

Nonsense. Things look great in Iraq. The Iraqi government is practicing politics rather than war (i.e. "civil war"). It doesn't matter if they form a certain government. What matters is that they jawbone their differences rather than shoot it out.

U.S. fatalities have fallen each month for the past 6 months (i.e. the October election/referendum).

Each Iraqi election has seen increased, not decreased voter turnout (from 60% in January 2005 to 70% in December).

Iraq's population, stagnant through the 1990's, has boomed from 24 million in 2003 to 27 million today.

Iraq's economy is booming. Iraq's hospitals and schools are the best-equipped and staffed that they've *ever* been.

Commerce flows on Iraqi streets and highways. Iraqis have more sanitary water and sewage disposal now than at any point in their History.

There's less overall violence in Iraq today than in Brazil, where police find 104 disposed bodies that have been shot dead each night before.

There are more fire-bombs each night in France than in Iraq.

The tipping point in Iraq came during their October referendum. Al Qaeda has since deployed their best assets out of Iraq into other areas. What's left in Iraq are some die-hards whose orders are to create as much damage as they can manage before they are killed off.

...but that sort of dying won't win a war for them.

[Marine_Uncle]

I have been one that has written perhaps more then ten thousand lines of good news reports, echoing in some detail all the good things that have happened in Iraq since the invasion. Surely as far as I am concerned more good then bad has happened if one is carefull to weight all the activities.
Many of Southacks points some of us have given details many many times over the past two years with article references to back up what we have attempted to communicate to our Freeper readership.
So all S has commented on in his last entry I would back up, with out any reservation. And I am sure non in this particular reponse lists would have much objection to the validity in what S is saying.
However, strategofr's comment that things are not looking good in Iraq, please correct me if I am wrong, deals not with all the great things seldom published, that have come to be, the country is quiet as a frigen churchmouse in many areas, including many that where previously hell holes at best.
But I believe he is speaking about the current political atmosphere. In which we have no way around it, but to realize the main Shia parties within and supporting the UIA (United Iraqi Alliance), comprised in the majority by the large SCIRI and Dawa parties continue to fight the idea of sharing power in the future government.
They realize due to their majority that by numbers mostly Shia will be elected to ministry posts and other positions that represent leadership/control.
Clearly Jafarri is now back in the limelight. Where we thought he may just drop out, it now appears he will retain his PM post. If he retains the post, then by default, most of the ministry posts are going to go to Shia. Members of either the SCIRI or Dawa parties or affiliates that will lend allegience to a Shia (Sadrist/Hakim) philosophy, e.g. Sharia law and as little secular government as possible.
In short. Along the lines of what we see in Iran.
Seeing this will come to past, guys like Talabani the current president, of course a kurd, will go along with things once he sees the point of no return has been reached simply to hold onto his position. And I would not be the least bit surprised if these things come to be, we shall see changes whether constitutional or not, that will split the country into three parts as many have wailed and moaned about and others have championed for whatever reason I cannot phantom, other then it could somehow bring about a sort of peace, by splitting them up, and letting them each self govern.
But that is totally against the prefered end goal of having one Iraq under a federal government that will govern fairly for all Iraqis. Whereby, it can become a US partner, rebuild, start pumping a lot of oil for the world market, with the aid of large influxes of foreign investments.
Gain a point in time it could be accepted into NATO for instance. In short become a good allie in the ME, for many good reasons.
I am being a bit verbose to cover some bases as to why a single Iraqi secular government for all Iraq with minimal influence by the sectarian elements represent the best end goal.
Now. Is this going to happen if the Shia take over? I doubt it. By virtue of what we see in the SCIRI and Dawa parties it is evident they want sectarianism (theocracy) to end up being the form of government in Iraq. They will arrange for it to come to past. A little deviation here, a little there, and presto in no time all hopes of having Iraqi become a strong secular industrialized country that we can work with will go out the window. Think Iran less a super hard Mullah controlled government. But on that eventually could come to past.
Of course that will entail over a period of time further breakdowns in how their constitution is viewed and interpreted. The dominant Shia Supreme Judicial Council will eventually turn from a position of being a supreme court into a new theocratic government as things are changed, to prevent future elective processes from taking place, or the secularist always being in a minority, as well as the Sunni, commie, and some other minor parties will never make a dent in anything that goes on. The majority Shia will rule with an iron hand.
And most likely they will not favor keeping good relations with the US and Britain. If anything they will invite the Russians back into the camp. And play both sides like a fiddle to a degree, while the Russian's and US try to do the same with them. A loss for what the US and it's allies had envisioned taking place. Figure China will get in the loop to if the Russians are invited back in.
So the issue of things not going well has nothing to do with how much or military has been able to accomplish.
It has to do with the current dangerouse conditions within the government as how the majority refuse to accept the concept of a balanced government.
And why should they. They by majority, yes there was provable voter fraud, that could have swung some totals, but the UIA has the country by the throat at present. The Kurds watch with interest to see what their move will be.
In my opinion. The Kurds have only gone along with things because they have the current presidency, and enough party blocks that can form less then a majority to in some cases with association from say Allawi's party etc., attempt to make an impact in the final result. But the final result is not going to favor them by all indications.
And they will pull out like flies subjected to bug spray if they see they cannot gain an equal say in the future Iraq, and take their chances to set up their own government fully independent from Iraq, and surely attempt to take over the northern oil fields and cities that once where mostly their peoples domain prior to Saddam displacing so many of them and putting Arabs into their lands, homes etc..
So I do not at this point see things going well for a future secular government that will represent all Iraqis on an equal basis. And that is what I believe Strategofr may have made comment to in far fewer words. Of course he must speak for himself on the matter.

[Southack]

"So I do not at this point see things going well for a future secular government that will represent all Iraqis on an equal basis."

Politicians say many extreme things over time, so I understand why you are noting the above situation.

But prior to a real "civil war," politicians typically do something simple: they leave. Witness Southern politicians' flight from Washington, D.C. in December of 1860.

On the other hand, if you ignore the utterances of vapid politicians and simply look at actions, Iraq looks to be in great shape.

The Kurds aren't declaring independence. The Shia aren't calling for wholesale genocide of their age-old Sunni oppressors.

And the minority Sunnis are *over-represented* in the new Iraqi government.

Keep in mind that Iraqi Shia are Arabs. In contrast, Iranian Shia are Persians. True, the Shia in both nations share the same religion...but so too do the Catholics of France share the same religion with Poles...as do Jews in Israel share with Jews in Ethipoia...yet entirely different races/cultures are in play anyway.

So while a cursory glance at Iraqi Shia could cause someone to claim that a Shia government in Iraq would be the lapdog of Shia Iran, a closer look will reveal that the Arab Shia have been at war with the Persian Shia for Millenia...before there even was a Shia the Arabs and Persians were engaged in race/culture wars that continue to this very day.

Which is to say, Arab Shia aren't going to be ruled by Persian Shia. In fact, that sort of Iranian influence is disdained by most Arabs. This is tribal. It's racial. It's cultural...and it pre-dates Islam itself.

So Iraq's Arab Shia want U.S. protection from Iran's Persian Shia. This protection can only be had in today's current climate so long as Iraq's Shia play ball with a non-fundamental government...which is what Iraq has had for decades...actually, centuries.

In the North, the Kurds want U.S. protection from Turkey's Army. The Kurds can bloody the Turks, but the Kurds can't win an all out war with the Turks...but with the U.S. offering protection, the Kurds are golden. All that the Kurds have to do is to play ball with the U.S. regarding the new Iraqi government...something that the Kurds have long done (e.g. to survive during Hussein's rule).

In the Sunni triangle, the Sunni's have much more difficult problems. If the U.S. leaves, then nothing is stopping the Kurds and/or Shia from wiping out the Sunnis...and no one would be urging the Kurds and Shia to continue sharing their oil revenues with the oil-less Sunnis.

Moreover, the Iraqi Sunnis aren't Wahhabists. They are mad about the U.S. invasion *not* because of religious reasons, but because the U.S. kicked them out of their priveledged jobs/positions in the old Hussein government...which is not the sort of thing that makes for generational warfare. Fighting about jobs seldom lasts even a single generation.

...And if the Sunnis divide up Iraq, then the Sunnis get no oil money. The Sunni triangle is oil-less.

In short, all 3 parties in Iraq need U.S. protection. The Kurds from the Turks. The Arab Shia from the Persians. The Sunnis from the Kurds and Shia.

If they play ball with the U.S., then the Kurds get a near autonomous homeland in Northern Iraq (they just have to play like Taiwan via China at never declaring an open independence). The Sunnis get to share the Kurds and Shia's oil money, and the Shia get to rule all of Iraq including all of the major Shia holy sites in the world.

If they don't play ball, then the Kurds are at war with Turkey, the Arab Shia with Persian Shia, and the Sunnis lose their oil money as well as have to fend off the 80% of Iraq that comprises the Kurds and Shia.

This is classic "carrot and stick."

Each party gets big-time rewards for playing along...and big-time wars and loss of monies if they don't.

And that's why the Iraqi politicians aren't just going home ala Southern politicians in 1860 U.S.A.

This is why they are talking out their differences and actually playing (gasp, shock, cough) politics with each other.

[Billthedrill]

There are more fire-bombs each night in France than in Iraq.

Now that's just nasty. ROTFLMAO!

[Mr. Jeeves]

I am being a bit verbose to cover some bases as to why a single Iraqi secular government for all Iraq with minimal influence by the sectarian elements represent the best end goal.

Meaning the US needs a Saddam Hussein, Friendly Edition (tm). ;)

[Marine_Uncle]

Perhaps surprisingly I have stated almost every point you made a number of times on this site. So there is not the slightest difference in opinion. Even to the extent that each is dependent for reasons listed. What I did not say, and it should be a mute point as to my current admission, is I did not mean to elude to a situation where the Iraqi Shia would align with the Persians. Again. I had over the past two years tried in rather verbose desertations to explain to some the vast differences between them dating back many thousands of years and into the more modern epochs.
What my key point was, is if the Shia dominate the government they are not going to give the Kurds and Sunni a fair shake. And I presented some possible scenarios which obviously have gone around the circle endless times as potentially coming to past.
If your assesment of the tri-dependency holds true, then all will be well. If it does not turn out to hold ground, and that does not mean what you said is inaccurate by any means, then other scenarios could develop. And is essentially what I brought out in my dooms day approach. I surely hope what I wrote does not come to past. But I think it could given forces we may be overlooking. What they are, not sure. Because again, I can believe the Shia may not want to play a nasty game on the Sunni. Just keep them under wraps. For which one cannot blam them.
Let me conclude with just this note. We probably agree that both Sadr and Hakim are both in the sack with the Iranian Mullahs to some extent. To much has been written as how they cohort together, pay visits to Iran etc..
They are the goons that if in control I based my statements on primarily. Then I can go back to what I just admit I have studied over the years and are in agreement with you on, regarding a lot of deep differences between the Arabs and the Persians. Their enemies for the most part just like the Saudi and the Emirites totally distrust Iran in every way. They only are tied loosely because of their common yoke under the cult, and distaste for westernization etc..
So OK S. Lets go along with your latest assesment. I have no problem with it.

[Marine_Uncle]

" Meaning the US needs a Saddam Hussein, Friendly Edition (tm). ;)"
No. A fully democratized willing secular ran government composed of a mix of ethnic/religious/secular people who will represent all Iraqis. Saddam was a dictator. His government turned from it's early days into a organization only to please the dictator. So I understand where you where coming from, which is OK. But we should be carefull in how we define what type of government could best serve all Iraqi's and at the same time slowly help bring positive change to the ME.

[Southack]

"If your assesment of the tri-dependency holds true, then all will be well. If it does not turn out to hold ground, and that does not mean what you said is inaccurate by any means, then other scenarios could develop. And is essentially what I brought out in my dooms day approach. I surely hope what I wrote does not come to past. But I think it could given forces we may be overlooking. What they are, not sure. Because again, I can believe the Shia may not want to play a nasty game on the Sunni. Just keep them under wraps. For which one cannot blam them. Let me conclude with just this note. We probably agree that both Sadr and Hakim are both in the sack with the Iranian Mullahs to some extent. To much has been written as how they cohort together, pay visits to Iran etc..."

Right. Don't get me wrong, civil war is a possibility when you go blow up a strong central government that has been "keeping the peace" via military force.

What we have to ask is why the Kurds didn't immediately declare independence in April of 2003...why the Shia didn't go for Sunni blood by May of 2003, and why the Sunnis are finally voting in Iraqi elections.

...And when I answered those questions in the posts above, I saw that there are some very powerful carrots and some very grave sticks that are in play.

The Kurds want U.S. protection from the Turkish Army. The Kurds want Iraqi oil and Iraqi political power and a nearly-autonomous region of "Iraq" for themselves.

Well, by playing ball with the U.S., with the new Iraqi government, the Kurds get all of that while avoiding a war with Turkey.

The Arab Shia gain control of Iraqi politics, of global Shia politics/holy sites, Iraqi oil, a prestigious place on the world stage, as well as U.S. protection from Persian shia...all for playing along with the U.S. plan and the new Iraqi government.

The Sunnis in Iraq gain an over-representation of their numbers in the new Iraqi government, a share of Kurdish and Shia oil that they'd otherwise not have, and U.S. protection from Kurdish/Shia slaughter of their ranks for playing along.

These aren't just financial or prestige types of carrots...these are also life and death of entire culture issues. Sticks. Big sticks. Carrots. Rich carrots.

And this is why civil war hasn't broken out all across Iraq en masse. Well, that plus outstanding geopolitics by the Bush Administration and an amazing military presence on the ground and in the skies over Iraq.

President Bush is going for a long-term solution to terrorism. Root causes in Afghanistan, Libya, Lebanon, Liberia, and Iraq have been addressed both for the short term as well as for the long term in a variety of ways (e.g. national alignments, democratic republics, constitutions, military training, infrastructure rebuilding, educational and medical assistance, etc.).

There are over 1,000 UAVs flying over Iraq today. Iraqi ground forces can call for these U.S. aircraft to strike targets on the ground. This gives Iraqis control, yet also builds their trust and appreciation for the U.S.

It's not quite a dependency...it's more of a bonding much like what individual soldiers experience in their units after their first combat.

Saddam is jailed. The UN sanctions on Iraq are lifted. Military, economic, and infrastructure aid is being given. Individual Iraqis can hold political office without debts of blood and bribes. International trade is legal for Iraqis now.

These are massive developments that Iraqis couldn't experience prior to 2003, and I suspect that they'll be more grateful to the U.S. over the long term than that of several countries that we liberated circa 1944/1945.

[Marine_Uncle]

Such an eloquent follow up cannot be ignored.
I have of lately made a course changed primarily based on news coming out regarding the Iraqi horse trading, or what could be perceived as lack of. Up till a few weeks back my statements have very much mirrored what you write. Just on the Kurdish scenario one can see the wisdom in the approach you take. The Kurds can have their cake and eat it to providing they play their cards carefully.
And if the day Iraq would become a candidate or accepted member of NATO, then the Kurds have even less fear from the Turks from a national view point. For many reasons either of us could elucidate on. Likewise, the Arab Shia, would be protected from further Persian influences in it's many forms. Many folks do not appreciate most of the Shia clergy in Iraq do not take marching orders from the Iranian Mullahs. And though say the Grand Ayatollah Sistani has roots in Persia, he left long ago because he did not see eye to eye with the Revolutionary Guard and Mullahs in general. And obviously is on record for clergy to stay out of politics.
As for the SCIRI's Abu Aziz Al-Hakim, and Muqtada al Sadr's backing of the NIC and UIA in general, they have displayed different resistive styles and represent different bodies of Arab Shia in Iraq. In short, they back say Ibrahim al Jaafari for different reasons that fit into their political/patriotic/religious psychic.
But by all indications none want to hold allegience to the Persian Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei.
So again. I am in agreement with your assesments as to why the three main Iraqi ethnic/religious groups have good reasons to not want Iraq to split up. It would put each at a distince disadvantage in relation to Iraq's neighbors.
Only an Iraq fully united will eventually benifit all Iraqis. And surely these horse traders must lay awake at night wondering just who the new Iraqi army would back if it where to stay united as one, if the country where to be divided.
So in summary. Perhaps my course change deals more with playing devils advocate, as well as pondering on reasons to surface as to why the horse traders are not at this point, based on the over all conditions, giving a little more to arrive at a balanced elective body. As Omar at ITM worries of lately, why are these leaders not yielding more to the realities/needs to form a stable government that will with the army and police forces show a united front against all the sectarian divide as well as the remaining insurgents both local and foreign. He obviousely groans in the spirit when he had talked about this new proposal for a National Security Committee, being purely a smokescreen.
It detracts from the energies required for the Interim Election Assembly to stay focused on the task at hand. That being bringing forth the final pick of future leaders, for vote and swaring in.
I just think they are all so bogged down, in petty quarrels and short term gains, that they refuse to admit the bigger picture is required for their mutual survival, assuming in their minds survival means a strong Iraq under a central government that will move Iraq forward both politically, industrially, and econonmically within the framework of a seculare framework of goverance. Put another way. Many of them just cannot see beyond their nose. They are stuck in the past. And they are not ready to take the really great leap in faith, mostly based on their lack of edcuation in westernized democratic governments. So they continue to horse trade, or lack of it, and bid their time, much like many of us may do, concerning a tooth that has to be pulled.
Do not feel obligated to respond. Surely what I write must be a generic concern many would adhere to, at least in principle. But do add if required.

[Southack]

"As Omar at ITM worries of lately, why are these leaders not yielding more to the realities/needs to form a stable government that will with the army and police forces show a united front against all the sectarian divide as well as the remaining insurgents both local and foreign. He obviousely groans in the spirit when he had talked about this new proposal for a National Security Committee, being purely a smokescreen. It detracts from the energies required for the Interim Election Assembly to stay focused on the task at hand. That being bringing forth the final pick of future leaders, for vote and swaring in."

In the past, Zarqawi has attempted to exploit Sunni dissatisfaction with various political moves in Iraq (e.g. disbanding Hussein's Army, registering voters, the January 2005 elections, etc.).

Well, Zarqawi's new Shura Council doesn't have anything to exploit while Iraq's 3 major groups are still horse-trading...because no single Iraqi leader has yet been picked. The new Iraqi leader isn't Sunni, isn't Shia, isn't Kurdish.

So right now the Shura Council can't appeal to Shia (if Sadr/Badr were dissed by a Kurdish or Sunni leader) or to the Sunnis (if a Kurd or Shia was made the new Iraqi leader).

Isn't it interesting that as Al Qaeda in Iraq grows weaker with each passing day, that Al Qaeda has to *wait* for this grand political horse-trading to conclude?!

So let the Iraqi politicians talk. Let them jawbone this new leadership post for a while. Time favors us far more than Al Qaeda. Each passing day weakens the Shura Council...they have no boogeyman to demonize and attack right now.

[Marine_Uncle]

"So let the Iraqi politicians talk. Let them jawbone this new leadership post for a while. Time favors us far more than Al Qaeda. Each passing day weakens the Shura Council...they have no boogeyman to demonize and attack right now."
This Mahajadeen Shura Council of Iraq is a long term propostion. Powers that be most likely have redefined their rule not to include further open resistance. They morphed into a form that is more secretive in intentions. Al Qaeda as lead by zman is no longer. Zman went into hiding. As you know he no longer has command in Iraq.
As stated by this new form, their long term intention is to set up a Caliph state. As I have made remarks on some other very recent postings. They may be in for a long hard battle, that will simply fizzle out, if a united Iraq comes out of the horse trading. Because like every other Mid East country that now is going after all radical groups, their (radical groups) aims do not mesh with the governments/monarchies desires to play ball with the US and western nations to become very wealthy while under our military protection.
At any rate. Just in case, you did not connect with my reference to the proposed Iraqi National Security Committee, it appears it is a worthless effort by the major parties to appear to favor a national unity government, while not really working toward it. The committee would be comprised of the current mix. And it would appear to champion unity, while having no constitutional rights to exist, nor any teeth, other then presenting a mirage in the desert. That was all I was getting at. A smokescreen, that allows for the final agreement to let Iraq be ruled by Shia while at the same time appearing to the dumb, that somehow they would continue to work in the future toward a more unity government. Of course if this is the case. It is a joke. Some things are black and white. Either a unity government is soon to be elected or it will not happen in the future, most likely. And much of what the US administration has worked for will no come to past. In short, we gambled, and perhaps have lost in this respect. The idea all along has been to force a mix of different groups to work together as one in purpose where it comes to ruling Iraq in an equitable way. If only one or two major groups represent the government, and they turn out to be only Shia, then simply based on their histories, we cannot expect the other two major entities to feel comfortable. Who will represent their needs. Will they simply be tolerated but ignored were desired to do so. Of course I realize this is the case in most democratic nations. Regardless of form of government the majority and strong always end up on the top, the rest, for all practical purposes simply go along out of expediency.

[strategofr]

"In short, all 3 parties in Iraq need U.S. protection. The Kurds from the Turks. The Arab Shia from the Persians. The Sunnis from the Kurds and Shia."

This analysis is very nearly correct. In fact, you know a lot more about Iraq that I do and I appreciate the education I am getting here.

You are however overlooking one factor---a factor that ultimately outweighs all others. In November 2008, the American people will elect a new president. If it has not been made clear by that date that the United States is very much on the way out of Iraq, I believe one of the criteria a presidential candidate must meet to be elected will be convincing the American electorate that he or she will definitely get us out of Iraq quickly.

Furthermore, I think it will be difficult for any Republican candidate to do this and still get elected. By which I mean, a Republican candidate would probably alienate a large part of his or her base in doing so. In short, Hillary is likely our next president.

This would mean, not only no American boots on the ground, but a complete cut off out all military aid to Iraq.

The Sunnis are no doubt still deeply tied in with the Russians, who basically set up Saddam Hussein in the first place, and the Iranians are obviously deeply tied in with the Russians who have provided them with nuclear reactors, intercontinental ballistic missile technology, and conventional arms.

While probably no one agrees with me, I am also quite certain that the Russians are tied in with al Qaeda. Admittedly, I cannot prove this, though I post my little bit of evidence below.

At any rate, as I see it, the Russians will hold most of the cards once we leave. I agree with Marine Uncle that the Chinese may also play a role, but as I see Russia and China as close allies---whose public disputes have been primarily fake since 1960---this is a minor factor. I'm not saying that there will be harmony in Iraq---or even that civil war will be avoided. I'm just saying that it looks probable to me that the Russians will end up in control.

In terms of your analysis specifically, I disagree about your valuation of the Iranian and an Iraqi Shi'ites. While I don't doubt that your history is correct (I'll admit mine is weak here), it seems clear that more recent history is outweighing the more distant past. The Shi'ites in Iraq have been badly oppressed by the Sunnis for 40 years or more now and have viewed the Iranian Shi'ites as their allies. (even Sistanni,who is generally acknowledged as the most influential Iraqi before the political process started had extensive ties with Iran.) Even if they, as a group, would wish---in an ideal world---to be independent of the Iranians---if there's one thing every Iraqi knows it's that he or she does not live in an ideal world.

I think everyone in Iraq realizes that the United States will be out soon and they are all trying to figure out who their allies are going to be. Unfortunately, for the Sunnis it's the Russians, and the Shi'ites will choose the Iranians, not realizing that the Iranians will essentially sell them out to the Russians---just like they have been doing over the past few years now---taking information the Iraqi Shi'ites give them and handing it to the Russians, who hand it to the Sunnis and Al Qaeda. That is why the Sunnis and Al Qaeda are so effective in the Shi'ite areas, but have no effect at all in the Kurdish areas.

As far as the Kurds, I cannot imagine what is on their minds at this point. I agree with your analysis vis-à-vis them---a long-term US presence would be their only hope---except I see no chance of that happening.






TERRORISM MONITOR



Volume 2 Issue 1 (January 15, 2004)
A RUSSIAN AGENT AT THE RIGHT HAND OF BIN LADEN?

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=23472
By Evgenii Novikov
The Arabic television channel Al Jazeera broadcast an audiotape on December 19, 2003, that was said to be from Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the right hand man of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. In it, Zawahiri claimed that his group was chasing Americans everywhere, including in the United States. This claim helped raise the terror threat level.

But where is Zawahiri, whose head now carries a price of US$25 million? Recent media reports have said that he is hiding in Iran, though Iranian authorities deny this. Yet it could be that Russian intelligence knows exactly where he is and may even have regular contact with the elusive Egyptian.

Zawahiri as Prisoner

There are many accounts of Ayman al-Zawahiri published in the press. These stories cover Zawahiri's childhood and his relatives, his study of medicine, his connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, his involvement in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, his close relations with Osama bin Laden, and his role in major terrorist attacks against the United States. But there are few authors who mention that Zawahiri spent half a year in close contact with representatives of Russian intelligence while in their custody.

Significantly, these contacts led to a change in Zawahiri's political orientation. Long talks with Russian intelligence officers "forced a critical change in his lethal planning. ...America, not Egypt, became the target... Freed from Russian jail in May 1997, Dr. Zawahri found refuge in Afghanistan, yoking his fortunes to Mr. bin Laden. [Zawahiri's group] Egyptian Jihad, previously devoted to the narrow purpose of toppling secular rule in Egypt, became instead the biggest component of al Qaeda and a major agent of a global war against America. Dr. Zawahri became Mr. bin Laden's closest confidant and talent scout." [1]

The story of Zawahiri's Russian experience begins on December 1, 1996, when he was traveling under the alias "Mr. Amin" along with two of his officers--Ahmad Salama Mabruk, who ran Egyptian Jihad's cell in Azerbaijan under the cover of a trading firm called Bavari-C, and Mahmud Hisham al-Hennawi, a militant widely traveled in Asia. The group was accompanied by a Chechen guide. They were trying to enter Russia between the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus Mountains in an effort to discover whether Chechnya could become a base for training militants. It was here that the group was arrested by Russian police for a lack of visas. They were soon handed over to the Federal Security Service, the successor to the KGB.

When Zawahiri's computer was later discovered in Afghanistan by two journalists, it provided insight into Zawahiri's side of the story. In short, it goes as follows:

The Russians failed to: 1) find out Zawahiri's real identity and the goals of his visit to Chechnya; 2) read the Arabic texts in his laptop, which would have revealed the nature of his activities; and 3) read the coded messages that he sent from custody to his friends.

Zawahiri's Version Debunked

Yet based on my own twenty years' experience with Russian intelligence people involved in Arab affairs, these claims simply do not ring true. The Soviet KGB had good--albeit indirect--connections with Islamic fundamentalists, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Jihad. The curriculum of Arab terrorists who studied at Moscow International's Lenin School placed special emphasis on cooperation between Marxists and Islamists. Soviet instructors would encourage Arab terrorists to consider the Muslim Brothers and other Islamic extremists as "allies in class struggle."

Good contacts between the KGB and Islamic fundamentalists existed at the time of the Egyptian Jihad's 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat, after which Zawahiri was jailed by Egyptian authorities. Since the KGB followed these events very closely and may have even been indirectly involved in the plot, the KGB would have put Zawahiri's name into its records at that time. Therefore, when Zawahiri crossed the KGB's path again, that organization likely would have soon discovered his real identity.

Additionally, local Islamic organizations flocked to Zawahiri's aid during his detention and trial in such large numbers that the Russians and even Zawahiri's own lawyer were puzzled by the outpouring. [2] This would have been another tip-off to the authorities that they had more than just a mere merchant (Zawahiri's reported claim) in custody. Also, the fact that he was arrested along with a Chechen should have raised additional suspicions.

Perhaps most difficult to believe from Zawahiri's version is that his captors would not have read the Arabic information contained within his laptop computer. Russian intelligence has probably the best Arabists in the world. One of them--Dr. Evgeny Primakov--headed the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service from December 1991 until January 1996 and made a considerable efforts to bring many talented Arabists into this service. These individuals would have been able not only to read Zawahiri's Arabic text, but also to decode his encrypted messages without any problem.

Thus, with Zawahiri's true identity and purpose uncovered by the Russians, these authorities would have been faced with several options. One would have been deportation to either Egypt or the United States, with gratitude from those governments for Russian President Yeltsin, burnishing his image as a fighter against terrorism. But apparently the Russians decided not to do this, believing perhaps that their national interest was better served by another alternative.

One should bear in mind that at the time of Zawahiri's capture, Chechnya was enjoying a period of actual independence from Moscow. The Kremlin was having great difficulty finding "agents of influence" among the Chechen people. At the same time, Moscow knew that representatives of al Qaeda and other foreign Islamic fundamentalists were present in Chechnya and exercised strong influence on the Chechen leaders, especially on the military commanders. It would have been logical, therefore, for the Russians to try to persuade Zawahiri to cooperate with them in directing the activities of Arabs in Chechnya, in getting information about the plans and activities of Chechen leaders, and in influencing the Chechen leadership.

It may not have been too difficult for Russian officers to persuade Zawahiri to go along with such a plan. The prisoner would have been very frightened by the prospect of being deported to Egypt or remaining jailed in Russia. Furthermore, methods of torture during interrogation used by KGB officers would have truly almost scared Zawahiri to death. Execution very likely was just one threat.

Once made aware that the KGB knew of his true identity, Zawahiri would have realized that it would be useless to lie further. At a minimum, Zawahiri would have had to agree to cooperation with Russian intelligence to save his life and to buy his freedom. It is possible that the Russians also offered some form of assistance to Zawahiri and al Qaeda. This could have been in the form of explosive technology or other weaponry.

It is notable that Taliban and al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan received regular re-supplies of Russian arms. The man responsible for these deliveries was Victor Anatolievich Bout, the son of a top KGB officer. His father's connections helped establish Bout in the arms trade, which is linked to the Russian government and particularly to its intelligence services. Bout and his family currently reside in the United Arab Emirates. [3]

It is also not difficult to imagine that the Russians managed to get some information from Zawahiri about his colleagues that could have been used to blackmail him if he tried to avoid cooperation after his release. With an agreement reached between Zawahiri and the Russians, the authorities would have taken steps to make the Egyptian look "clean" to his Arab comrades and the Chechens. It would not have been difficult for them to stage Zawahiri's trial, at which the judge gave him only a six months' sentence, much of which he had already served.

A final note: Arabs are still very active among the Chechen militants today, and yet the Russians appear to turn a blind eye toward their infiltration and do not hunt them particularly. Even the most influential among the Arabs, Khattab, may well have been killed by his own people. Arabs have also never been listed as POWs. Perhaps the Russian forces have an order to kill Arabs on the spot: Nobody wants them to reveal unwanted information during interrogations. Thus left alone, the Arabs exercise significant influence over the activities of Chechen commanders according to orders from Zawahiri. Presumably they do so without understanding that they could well be the Trojan horses who actually execute the Kremlin's orders. For example, the Arabs apparently do not encourage Chechen militants to direct any attacks against Russian leaders in Moscow. This could be accomplished simply by refusing to pay for such operations.

In contrast, the Arabs do seem to encourage the taking of hostages from among the common people, as in the Moscow youth club Nord-Ost incident, thus making it easier for the Kremlin to stoke public anger against "Chechen terrorists." This in turn helps Vladimir Putin garner popular support for his own authoritarian actions as well as those of his former KGB colleagues who now occupy 65 percent of top governmental positions. Dr. Zawahiri may thus be the queen in the Kremlin's chess game not only in Chechnya, but also in Russia's power struggle at the highest levels. If so, it is not likely that the Russians would surrender him merely to help win the global war on terror.

Dr. Novikov is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation.

Notes:
1. "Saga of Dr. Zawahri Sheds Light On the Roots of al Qaeda Terror;" Andrew Higgins and Alan Cullison; The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2002.
2. Ibid.
3. "International Business of Russian Mafia," Sueddeutsche Zeitung, February 1, 2001.

[Marine_Uncle]

Your concerns regarding long term commitments in Iraq are well received. And I have voiced similiar concerns in past posts.
Surely the current mix of Iraqi politicians are hedging so to speak certain commitments based on the uncertainty of who will be the US POTUS in 2008. Few Republican potentiates would consider undertaking a long term commitment in Iraq based on public opinion.
And this is a major problem we face. And it has been in my mind for a year plus. Why should Iraqi take the painfull steps required to unite, if the US will not fully back them.
And as we understand, the US has already announced in effect it shall provide far less aid to Iraq then has been planned.
The administration is slowly moving toward a position that it is now up to the Iraqi to embrace their future, take control. And this must scare the pee out of many of them.
As for your entry of the Russian part of the equation. It will be hard for many here to integrate it into their though processes, because it is a monster in itself. Not well understood by many, and quite frankly ignored simply as a bad dream that will not go away.
And that is OK. I hardly like to think about this part of the deal so to speak, but am always forced back into the realities of the region and who was really in control since the days of Nasar etc..
It is almost like throwing a curve ball to friends when the russkies are brought into the Iraqi/Iranian issues. People start to shy away. But that does not for a minute diminish the real realities. The Russians have big stakes in this game.
Oil/gas pipelines from both Iran and Iraq (north/south fields) are big time money in the future. Just to name one of the more obviouse economic issues at hand. And the Russians would love to once again sell weapon systems to the Iraqis. If the US pulls out, and our military is asked to leave, then the Russians will move in sure as hell. The Iraqi will as any nation want to re-arm. And since the US will not be in the picture, what better opportunity for the Iraqi to ask the Russians back in to rebuild their infrastructure. Oil refineries, petro chemical plants, new power stations, nuclear reactors for future Iraqi energy needs.
The whole bad dream once again. So naturally, you can see why you don't get responses from folks on some of your posts. Many here, know the score, but perhaps are at odds as how to express in a few sentences the ramifications of what the Russian are waiting to do once the US pulls out. Taint a pretty picture. As for Iran. No comments should be required. We understand how deeply the Russians are in bed with the Persians. And nuke em has no meaning in the reality of things. The Russians and Chicoms just sit by licking their chops.

[Southack]

"In short, Hillary is likely our next president."

Then you know nothing of American politics.

Senator Clinton can't flip a Red State over to Blue. Hillary can't win in Red States, that's why she is the Senator from New York instead of from Arkansas (where her husband was governor).

Without Red States, the Dems lose. Winning only Blue States gives the Dems the same thing that they earned in 2000 and 2004, losses.

Moreover, since 1964, the Democrats have only won Presidential elections when running Southern Evangelicals (e.g. President Johnson, President Carter, President Clinton), even if evangelical in name only.

The junior Senator from New York doesn't fit that profile.

[Southack]

"And this is a major problem we face. And it has been in my mind for a year plus. Why should Iraqi take the painfull steps required to unite, if the US will not fully back them. And as we understand, the US has already announced in effect it shall provide far less aid to Iraq then has been planned. The administration is slowly moving toward a position that it is now up to the Iraqi to embrace their future, take control. And this must scare the pee out of many of them."

I disagree. First, the Iraqis know that President Bush will continue his precise same policies for the next 3 years. Second, Iraqis want to govern themselves. Third, is technology.

Even with the U.S. Army fully withdrawn from Iraq, we'll still be able to offer the Iraqis more than 1,000 UCAV's in their skies for combat air support 24/7...flown remotely by kids drinking Jolt Cola in Nevada.

UCAV's are politically stealthy. No Americans are at risk in UCAV's, thus, even a Democrat would authorize their use (after all, no Democrat would want to be blamed for losing Iraq on his/her watch).

UCAV's can carry up to 16 air to ground missiles, and we're already flying more than 1,000 UAVs per day in Iraq now. This is a potent force that will forever be available to friendly Iraqi forces.

It will also aid our long-term bonding with Iraq. Our UCAV's will foster long-term good relations with Iraq...something that lip service or bribes from the French or Russians or Chinese can't easily match.

1,000 "Iraqi" UCAV's, when combined with a U.S. trained Iraqi Army, a democratic election process, a Republican Iraqi government, a viable Constitution, and a rebuilt infrastructure adds up to long-term Iraqi stability (as well as friendship with the U.S.).