The title doesn't match the article. The article is about the Iraqi Army and old Hussein-era officers.
The title is about Al Qaeda tactics.
Posted on 03/23/2006 5:29:29 PM PST by strategofr
Radical Sunni leader Saleh Mutloq is apparently being frozen out by more moderate Sunni political and religious leaders. Although not overtly committed to the armed attacks on the government, Mutloq's rhetoric is often very inflammatory, which more moderate Sunnis see as merely making things worse as they try to develop a role in the new government. Most Sunni Arabs want to make peace with, and avoid angering, the majority Kurds and Shia Arabs. More Saddam era army officers, for example, are offering to join the new army. When these officers go through a background check, more and more, it comes back clean. That means the officer's family is also behind their guy rejoining the army. It also means that the family is prepared, although not enthusiastic about, taking the heat from Sunni Arab and al Qaeda terrorists, who try to kill any Sunni Arab officers serving in the new army.
About 75 of the Iraqi Army's battalions are more or less capable of conducting operations without excessive oversight, though still needing logistical, heavy weapons, and other technical support. Maybe 8-10 brigade headquarters are up to coordinating multi-battalion operations. But only one or two of the ten or so divisions are good enough to conduct large scale operations. The main problem is the lack of trained and experienced senior officers. Few of the Saddam era officers proved competent, or loyal (to the Shia led government) enough to serve in the new army. The competence problem had two aspects. First, most Saddam era officers were selected primarily for their loyalty, not their military competence. Many, however, were effective military commanders. But they were trained in Russian style methods, which emphasized tight control from above, and little initiative at the bottom. This is just the opposite of the American/NATO style.
Many officers trained in the Russian style cannot, late in their careers, switch to American methods. This was encountered when the East European communist governments fell in 1989, and those nations joined NATO in the 1990s. This required that their armed forces learn NATO methods, so they could operate with West European NATO forces. Many of the communist era officers could not make the shift to the, to them, radically different methods.
The loyalty question is a bit more complex. Many of the Saddam era officers were loyal to Saddam because they were all Sunni Arabs, and if you wanted a military career, Saddam was your man. Saddam made much of his being a Sunni Arab. Saddam was also a brutal tyrant, and some Saddam era army officers got in trouble for commenting on that. After Saddam fell, there were many army officers glad to see him go. But most of these officers belonged to families or clans that wanted another Sunni Arab running Iraq. Thus family pressure kept a lot of very competent officers from joining the new army. And then there were the terrorists (both pro-Saddam and al Qaeda), who were quick to kill any Sunni Arabs who served in the new army. Despite all this, there are several hundred, very competent, Saddam era officers serving in the new army. But that is far less than the number needed to run a ten division force. You need over a thousand senior (Major and up) officers to man all those battalion, brigade and divisional headquarters.
Another problem is the political complications involved when you try to remove an incompetent commander. In the American practice, you quickly remove untried commanders who, in combat situations, prove incapable of doing the job. During American wars, it was not unusual for a battalion to have several commanders dismissed during several months of combat. When one was found capable of doing the job, he was definitely the real deal. But the only way to find the hot-shots is to quickly get rid of those who were not able to hack it. In Iraq, when you fire a military commander, you are insulting his whole family and clan. Trying to explain this as, "the more effective American way of running an army" does not always mollify the angry kin. Many Iraqi politicians understand that these dismissals are necessary, but the social and political blowback is painful, and sometimes, the dismissals are overruled. When the officer in question screws up again, you go through the dismissal drill once more, and often succeed in getting the guy out.
It's going to take several years of fighting, or 5-10 years of peace time training and evaluation, to fill all the command and staff positions with effective officers. In the meantime, the Iraqi army is going to be a work in progress.
Meanwhile, the better intelligence resulting from more Iraqi police on the streets, played a role in a commando raid that freed three Western kidnap victims. There were originally four captives, but one, an American, was murdered
The title doesn't match the article. The article is about the Iraqi Army and old Hussein-era officers.
The title is about Al Qaeda tactics.
"The title doesn't match the article. The article is about the Iraqi Army and old Hussein-era officers.
The title is about Al Qaeda tactics."
I know, but that's the way the strategy page posted it and I just copied it. We are not supposed to change titles, are we?
"Attacking a police station, to free your captured buddies, is a suicidal way to operate. It's reminiscent of Japanese tactics during World War II. American troops learned that, when the Japanese were cornered and out of options, there would be a last, desperate, and suicidal "Banzai" charge. Shouting "Banzai" ("Ten Thousand Years"), the Japanese troops would come straight at the Americans. The Japanese expected to die, but considered this kind of attack more honorable than waiting for the Americans to blow them out of bunkers and caves. Sometimes a Banzai charge would succeed, although the attackers were eventually wiped out. Such has been the case for those attacking Iraqi police stations over the last 18 months."
Further down in the article
Historically, there are two points where your forces are focused on freeing your captured POWs from your enemy:
1. When your captured POWs outnumber or form a pluralty of your remaining forces (e.g. Confederate Army/Navy in 1865), or
2. When your Army is wiping the field clean of all enemy resistance (e.g. U.S. Army in Germany in 1945).
I believe the first banzai charge in WWII may have been somewhat effective.
Thereafter, the Marines calmly set up mine fields, sited in the machine gun fields of fire, got the mortars ready and waited for them.
Later banzai charges might as well have walked into a meat grinder.
The insurgents had an initial foothold in Iraq due to Zarqawi being there prior to our 2003 invasion. They most certainly fought in some battles during our march to Baghdad.
The survivors managed a low-level of resistance until April of 2004, when they kicked it up two notches. April of 2004 to October of 2005 were the months in which Al Qaeda made its "big push" in Iraq.
But while Al Qaeda was making its big push, the U.S. was killing them in large numbers, plus the U.S. was bringing more and more Iraqis over to our side with combinations of intel, bribes, political power, triangulation, and infrastructure projects (as well as personal ambassadorship by our troops to the average Iraqi-on-the-street).
Thus, even as Al Qaeda was making a major military effort (for them), Iraqis turned out 60% to vote in January of 2005, then 63% in October of 2005 for their Constitution, then close to 70% in their December 2005 elections.
But by the end of October 2005, the tipping point had been reached. Each month after that has seen reduced U.S. fatalities in Iraq, and American casualties are down 60% from their peak.
Al Qaeda shifted from open combat (e.g. Fallujah, 2004) to kidnappings, assasinations (e.g. an Iraqi general), attempts to provoke civil war (e.g. the Samarra Mosque bombing), and finally to prison breaks (2 attempts in 2 days from 4 prison break attempts in 2 years).
Al Qaeda has been crushed in Saudi Arabia, is persona-non-grata in Yemin and Jordan, crushed in Egypt, crushed in Afghanistan, and wiped out of large portions of the Horn of Africa.
The reduced U.S. fatalities each month in Iraq hints that Al Qaeda's best has transfered. My guess is to Southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Some may have gone to Afghanistan or remote places in Africa.
Notably, we haven't heard from Al Qaeda in Chechnya or Kosovo recently. This might be political (e.g. they may not want to alienate some countries that are currently fence-sitting, or they may have even reached agreements or "understandings" with some powerful parties).
On the other hand, it might be that Al Qaeda is stretched too thin. They may have lost too many of their resources in Iraq and places at large (e.g. Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia).
The last time that the Chechnyans hit Russia was at Beslan. Have the Russians wiped out the Chechnyan resistance...or have the two parties reached an "understanding"...or have Al Qaeda's Chechnyan resources been sent to their demise in places like Baghdad?
This bears (old Soviet humor) watching.
Of note is that Israel just stopped a major Al Qaeda infiltration and bombing operation in the West Bank.
Another interesting trend seems to be a quiet Israeli-Southern-Lebanon border recently. Iran on the other side is making noise...but Hezbollah in Lebanon seems to be awfully quiet now that President Bush ordered Syria's Army out of Lebanon.
Also quiet is North Korea.
Heck, we don't even hear our treasonous "news" media bashing Bush for "not negotiating" with L'il Kimmy anymore.
The net effect right now is that Iran is isolated, globally. There are some great efforts bearing fruit by Secretary Rice to bring on board the entire Middle East, plus Germany and France, with a united "no nukes for Iran" stance.
For Al Qaeda, this is very, very bad news indeed. Al Qaeda lost Lebanon without a shot being fired...ditto for losing Libya's WMDs. Likewise for losing Liberia. L Qaeda lost their L's...and now they stand to lose Iran's nascent nuclear program.
So Al Qaeda needs a success, and they need to take some heat off of Iran...yet they can't do much in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Will they go out in a blaze of attempted glory in Israel? Their one attempt their so far has already failed. But the stats point to their best having already left Iraq.
So will that core group of Al Qaeda attempt more Israeli mischief...or will we see Al Qaeda retreat into Africa or Indonesia to lick their wounds for a while?
Frankly, that last option is the most dangerous for us. An Al Qaeda that laid seemingly "dormant" for 3 years would get them past the Bush Administration as well as cause most of Europe to lower their guard.
It would in effect get them out of Iraq's roach motel killing fields...something that is not to our benefit.
So contrary to the title of this thread, the jury is still out on whether Al Qaeda will continue their Bazai Charges in Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia.
It would of course be good for humanity at large to see Al Qaeda idiotically continue more of their own self-suicides in such places...but there is some small chance that Al Qaeda decides that pushing down President Bush's poll numbers isn't worth their lives any longer.
Al Qaeda may retreat.
And while such a circumstance would bring well-earned pats on various allied backs, it could potentially pose a more grave long-term threat if Al Qaeda "goes dark" long enough for most of the West to drop our guard.
Good analysis in which I agree. May I add one note in support on the future of AQ in Iraq. I know I am not dreaming this up but we saw a letter from zman about two weeks back posted here that indicated he wrote to I believe Zawahiri, that he will be leaving Iraq to "go into hiding". The letter indicated he felt his work was done at this point. I taint dreaming this one up. Perhaps your memory will be jogged to it's validity. I know some of us, you, jmc1969, and others had made remarks to this post, as well as I. Some of us start guessing where he would head. I believe that is when you mentioned he might very well head for the Gaza or somewhere in Pali land during those exchanges, while I had offered he probably will make it out by NE Iraqi/Iranian border then head into Afghanistan where jmc1969 had also supported that few.
There was a letter written to Zarqawi that we captured in which Zawahiri told Zarqawi that the righteous pious must make sacrifices, and then went on to tell Zarqawi to yield command of Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Shura Council.
It was the Shura Council that took credit for the first of the two most recent prison break attempts.
As far as I know, we haven't heard anything from Zarqawi since the Shura Council took over Al Qaeda in Iraq.
If I run across what I am refering to I will run it by you. Thanks anyway for the additional info.
Right. In the dying days of the Confederacy, CSA Army officers spent significant time figuring out how to free captured CSA POWs for the very reasons that you cite above...
...but that was a complete digression from prosecuting the war itself. The CSA wasn't thinking about capturing Washington, D.C., saving Atlanta, or opening up the Mississippi again at that point.
Historically, the clear-cut winners and the obvious war-losers start looking at prison liberation operations in the dying days of a war.
Consider if you will, the the holder of POW's can move them around (less true for the losers, of course). Thus, you can manipulate where your enemy moves his forces once you see him shift to prison liberation operations. This has very obvious ramifications for the order of battle.
Anyone who claims these guys don't have any balls I will say he is a liar.
Bad as the Left is in this country at least those of us whose children join the military are not in danger of being blown limb from limb.
You raise several good points, but Al Qaeda doesn't need to capture Baghdad to win the war. Their most potent weapon is our lying, traitorous media. All they need to do is keep feeding the media a diet of crumbs and let the media fight the war for them.
Since there is no real need for large forces for operations as the terrorists have not been running any large operations there could still be a role for these officers. They may not be any good at operations but they do know things and people and can be useful as a social damper, sources of stability and intelligence sources.
I agree that our news media is the best ally that Al Qaeda will ever enjoy...I disagree that our news media is so powerful that it can repeat its Vietnam efforts.
Keep in mind that our news media has lost the 1994 elections, the 2000 elections, the 2002 elections, and has lost the 2004 elections.
Our news media lost its effort to keep us out of Iraq, too.
Each day that passes sees more Americans getting their news on-line...and fewer Americans getting their news from broadcast TV and print. Hollywood sells fewer tickets each year. Air America closes more radio stations.
They've been beaten in the past, and they are losing strength every day. Thus, we can beat them at various points in the future, too.
Great story! Our men are fantastic people. This is so like the way the best in this country are raised to be. My God Bless such men.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.