Lawmakers join Weldon in calling for testimony on Able Danger (202 signatures)

Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) has gathered at least 202 Congress members’ signatures for a request that participants of an intelligence cell that may have identified some of the Sept. 11 ringleaders a year before the attacks be allowed to testify before Congress.

Weldon has been leading the crusade for months, but his colleagues, several of them prominent members of the GOP conference, now appear to be listening.

Weldon plans to send the letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the coming days requesting that he allow the participants in the cell known as “Able Danger” to testify in open congressional hearings.

So far, the officers involved in the intelligence cell have not been allowed to testify in the only hearing on the topic, which the Senate Judiciary Committee held in early fall.

Weldon, who has been waging a war against the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) almost single-handedly, now has the signatures of more than 100 GOP members and 80 Democrats for the letter. At press time, Weldon was still gathering signatures from his colleagues.

Weldon also hopes to obtain signatures from some Senators before the letter is sent, according to his spokesperson.

Among those signing Weldon’s letter are House Majority Leader Roy Blunt (R-Mo.), Homeland Security Chairman Peter King (R-N.Y.), Government Reform Chairman Tom Davis (R-Va.), Transportation and Infrastructure Chairman Don Young (R-Alaska), Small Business Chairman Donald Manzullo (R-Ill.) and Science Committee Chairman Sherwood Boehlert (R-N.Y.), as well as Reps. Henry Bonilla (R-Texas) and John Linder (R-Ga.).

There are also several members of the Armed Services Committee, including Reps. Trent Franks (R-Ariz.), Rob Simmons (R-Conn.), Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.) and Todd Akin (R-Mo.). By press time, Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), the panel’s chairman, was not among the signatories.

Among the approximately 80 Democrats signing the letter are Reps. John Murtha (Pa.), ranking member on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee; Ike Skelton (Mo.), ranking member of the Armed Services Committee; Mike McIntyre (N.C.); and Ellen Tauscher (Calif.).

Weldon has acused the DIA, a unit of the Pentagon, of trying to keep the information that the intelligence unit discovered under wraps.

The military revoked the security clearance of one of the officers, Army Reserve Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who was scheduled to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Pentagon said his clearance was revoked for a series of alleged violations of military rules, none of them related to whistle-blowing. Pentagon officials also have refused to allow Navy Capt. Scott Phillpott, another officer with knowledge of the Able Danger findings, to testify.

“Until this point, congressional efforts to investigate Able Danger have been obstructed by Department of Defense insistence that certain individuals with knowledge of Able Danger will be prevented from freely and frankly testifying in an open hearing,” Weldon wrote in the letter to Rumsfeld.

“We of course would never support any activity that might compromise sensitive information involving national security. However, we firmly believe that testimony from the appropriate individuals in an open hearing on Able Danger would not only fail to jeopardize national security, but would in fact enhance it over the long term.”

Weldon said he believes that the DIA stifled crucial information about Mohammed Atta, who became the lead Sept. 11 terrorist, and then destroyed related documents. He also said that the Sept. 11 commission, which was appointed to investigate the attacks and the intelligence failure involved in them, disregarded information it received from Able Danger members.

Weldon has said he learned that a secret program known as Able Danger was put into place in 1999 and 2000 by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the general in charge of the Special Forces Command. It was devoted to uncovering key cells of al Qaeda globally, giving the military the capability to destroy those cells.

Weldon told The Hill last month that he believes the DIA is carrying out a smear campaign against Shaffer, who spoke the truth about the cell.

http://curtweldon.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=37076

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

We the undersigned are formally requesting that you allow former participants in the intelligence program known as ABLE DANGER to testify in an open hearing before the United States Congress. Until this point, congressional efforts to investigate ABLE DANGER have been obstructed by Department of Defense insistence that certain individuals with knowledge of ABLE DANGER be prevented from freely and frankly testifying in an open hearing. We realize that you do not question Congress’s authority to maintain effective oversight of executive branch agencies, including your department. It is our understanding that your objection instead derives from concern that classified information could be improperly exposed in an open hearing. We of course would never support any activity that might compromise sensitive information involving national security. However, we firmly believe that testimony from the appropriate individuals in an open hearing on ABLE DANGER would not only fail to jeopardize national security, but would in fact enhance it over the long term. This is due to our abiding belief that America can only better prepare itself against future attacks if it understands the full scope of its past failures to do so.

On September 21, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary conducted a hearing on ABLE DANGER which Bill Dugan, Acting Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, certified did not reveal any classified information. Congressman Curt Weldon’s testimony at that hearing was largely based on the information that has been given to him by ABLE DANGER participants barred from open testimony by DOD. Their testimony would therefore closely mirror that of Congressman Weldon, who did not reveal classified information. Therefore we are at a loss as to how the testimony of ABLE DANGER participants would jeopardize classified information. Much of what they would present has already been revealed. Further refusal to allow ABLE DANGER participants to testify in an open congressional hearing can only lead us to conclude that the Department of Defense is uncomfortable with the prospect of Members of Congress questioning these individuals about the circumstances surrounding ABLE DANGER. This would suggest not a concern for national security, but rather an attempt to prevent potentially embarrassing facts from coming to light. Such a consideration would of course be an unacceptable justification for the refusal of a congressional request.

An Incomplete Investigation
Why did the 9/11 Commission ignore "Able Danger"?

BY LOUIS FREEH
Thursday, November 17, 2005 12:01 a.m. EST

It was interesting to hear from the 9/11 Commission again on Tuesday. This self-perpetuating and privately funded group of lobbyists and lawyers has recently opined on hurricanes, nuclear weapons, the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel and even the New York subway system. Now it offers yet another "report card" on the progress of the FBI and CIA in the war against terrorism, along with its "back-seat" take and some further unsolicited narrative about how things ought to be on the "front lines."

Yet this is also a good time for the country to make some assessments of the 9/11 Commission itself. Recent revelations from the military intelligence operation code-named "Able Danger" have cast light on a missed opportunity that could have potentially prevented 9/11. Specifically, Able Danger concluded in February 2000 that military experts had identified Mohamed Atta by name (and maybe photograph) as an al Qaeda agent operating in the U.S. Subsequently, military officers assigned to Able Danger were prevented from sharing this critical information with FBI agents, even though appointments had been made to do so. Why?

There are other questions that need answers. Was Able Danger intelligence provided to the 9/11 Commission prior to the finalization of its report, and, if so, why was it not explored? In sum, what did the 9/11 commissioners and their staff know about Able Danger and when did they know it?

The Able Danger intelligence, if confirmed, is undoubtedly the most relevant fact of the entire post-9/11 inquiry. Even the most junior investigator would immediately know that the name and photo ID of Atta in 2000 is precisely the kind of tactical intelligence the FBI has many times employed to prevent attacks and arrest terrorists. Yet the 9/11 Commission inexplicably concluded that it "was not historically significant." This astounding conclusion--in combination with the failure to investigate Able Danger and incorporate it into its findings--raises serious challenges to the commission's credibility and, if the facts prove out, might just render the commission historically insignificant itself.

The facts relating to Able Danger finally started to be reported in mid-August. U.S. Army Col. Anthony Shaffer, a veteran intelligence officer, publicly revealed that the Able Danger team had identified Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers by mid-2000 but were prevented by military lawyers from giving this information to the FBI. One week later, Navy Capt. Scott J. Phillpott, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate who managed the program for the Pentagon's Special Operations Command, confirmed "Atta was identified by Able Danger by January-February of 2000."
On Aug. 18, 2005, the Pentagon initially stated that "a probe" had found nothing to back up Col. Shaffer's claims. Two weeks later, however, Defense Department officials acknowledged that its "inquiry" had found "three more people who recall seeing an intelligence briefing slide that identified the ringleader of the 9/11 attacks a year before the hijackings and terrorist strikes." These same officials also stated that "documents and electronic files created by . . . Able Danger were destroyed under standing orders that limit the military's use of intelligence gathered about people in the United States." Then in September 2005, the Pentagon doubled back and blocked several military officers from testifying at an open Congressional hearing about the Able Danger program.

Two members of Congress, Curt Weldon and Dan Burton, have also publicly stated that shortly after the 9/11 attacks they provided then-Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley with a "chart" containing preattack information collected by Able Danger about al Qaeda. A spokesperson for the White House has confirmed that Mr. Hadley "recalled seeing such a chart in that time period but . . . did not recall whether he saw it during a meeting . . . and that a search of National Security Council files had failed to produce such a chart."

Thomas Kean, the chairman of the 9/11 Commission, reacted to Able Danger with the standard Washington PR approach. He lashed out at the Bush administration and demanded that the Pentagon conduct an "investigation" to evaluate the "credibility" of Col. Shaffer and Capt. Phillpott--rather than demand a substantive investigation into what failed in the first place. This from a former New Jersey governor who, along with other commissioners, routinely appeared in public espousing his own conclusions about 9/11 long before the commission's inquiry was completed and long before all the facts were in! This while dismissing out of hand the major conflicts of interest on the commission itself about obstructions to information-sharing within the intelligence community!

Nevertheless, the final 9/11 Commission report, released on July 22, 2004, concluded that "American intelligence agencies were unaware of Mr. Atta until the day of the attacks." This now looks to be embarrassingly wrong. Yet amazingly, commission leaders acknowledged on Aug. 12 that their staff in fact met with a Navy officer 10 days before releasing the report, who "asserted that a highly classified intelligence operation, Able Danger, had identified Mohammed Atta to be a member of an al Qaeda cell located in Brooklyn." (Capt. Phillpott says he briefed them in July 2004.) The commission's statement goes on to say that the staff determined that "the officer's account was not sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or further investigation," and that the intelligence operation "did not turn out to be historically significant," despite substantial corroboration from other seasoned intelligence officers.

This dismissive and apparently unsupported conclusion would have us believe that a key piece of evidence was summarily rejected in less than 10 days without serious investigation. The commission, at the very least, should have interviewed the 80 members of Able Danger, as the Pentagon did, five of whom say they saw "the chart." But this would have required admitting that the late-breaking news was inconveniently raised. So it was grossly neglected and branded as insignificant. Such a half-baked conclusion, drawn in only 10 days without any real investigation, simply ignores what looks like substantial direct evidence to the contrary coming from our own trained military intelligence officers.

No wonder the 9/11 families were outraged by these revelations and called for a "new" commission to investigate. "I'm angry that my son's death could have been prevented," seethed Diane Horning, whose son Matthew was killed at the World Trade Center. On Aug. 17, 2005, a coalition of family members known as the September 11 Advocates rightly blasted 9/11 Commission leaders Mr. Kean and Lee Hamilton for pooh-poohing Able Danger's findings as not "historically significant." Advocate Mindy Kleinberg aptly notes, "They [the 9/11 Commission] somehow made a determination that this was not important enough. To me, that says somebody there is not using good judgment. And if I'm questioning the judgment of this one case, what other things might they have missed?" This is a stinging indictment of the commission by the 9/11 families.

The chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Arlen Specter, has led the way in cleaning up the 9/11 Commission's unfinished business. Amid a very full plate of responsibilities, he conducted a hearing after noting that Col. Shaffer and Capt. Phillpott "appear to have credibility." Himself a former prosecutor, Mr. Specter noted: "If Mr. Atta and other 9/11 terrorists were identified before the attacks, it would be a very serious breach not to have that information passed along . . . we ought to get to the bottom of it." Indeed we should. The 9/11 Commission gets an "I" grade--incomplete--for its dereliction regarding Able Danger. The Joint Intelligence Committees should reconvene and, in addition to Able Danger team members, we should have the 9/11 commissioners appear as witnesses so the families can hear their explanation why this doesn't matter.
Mr. Freeh, a former FBI director, is the author of "My FBI" (St. Martin's, 2005).

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