Posted on 12/05/2003 11:43:40 AM PST by struwwelpeter
At 3:30 in the morning of August 31st, 1983, Korean Airlines flight 007 landed at Merrill Field in Anchorage, Alaska. An hour and a half later it took off from Runway 32 bound for Seoul's Kimpo airport. Aboard were 240 passengers, a cabin crew of 20, a three-man flight crew and six other KAL crew members deadheading back to Seoul.
Shortly after take-off, Flight 007 was cleared directly to the Bethel VOR beacon and then on to the Romeo 20 route. However, the aircraft started diverging from its intended course and passed 12 NM North of the Bethel beacon. The reason for this deviation is unknown. It is quite possible that the cockpit crew programmed the inertial navigation system (INS) computers incorrectly. In the era before GPS, aircraft used INS to calculate their courses and locations, most using several backups in case of malfuntion. The Boeing 747 used three independent INS, all of which depended on manual entry of the aircraft's starting location. Modern aircraft do not fly with true navigators, instead they rely on electronic navigation aids, such as GPS and INS, as well as radio beacons and ground controlled approach radars. In the 1980s, INS devices were heavily relied on to travel from point to point in the skies.
To set up an inertial navigation computer, a known, surveyed position at the airport is used. If the aircraft was not at this location, or moved during the INS set up, or the wrong coordinates were inputted, the result would be an error. FAA rules at the time required that each INS be loaded independently by a different member of the flight crew as well, but this probably did not always occur, especially on such a routine flight.
While the airline was flying from Alaska, a US Air Force reconnaissance aircraft was performing routine surveillance of the Soviet Union, evaluating Soviet compliance with missile treaties. The RC-135 S-model, codenamed Cobra Ball, was assigned to the 24th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 6th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. Its highly classified mission: await confirmation of missile launches from Soviet test ranges in Kazakhstan, then dash from its staging base at Shemya, in the Aleutians, and fly as close to the impact area on the Kamchatka penninsula as Soviet air defenses would allow.
On a normal mission eighteen crewmembers manned the "Ball." Up front sat two experienced pilots and two senior navigators - mistakes in location were simply not allowed in the dangerous areas where they were flying. Up to nine electronic warfare and reconnaissance systems officers, called "Ravens," sat at a bank of consoles running along the right side of the aircraft. The Ravens analyzed radar signals intercepted by the dozens of lumps and bumps protruding from the skin of their aircraft, as well as the special cameras which were to capture the images and spectra of Soviet missiles re-entering the atmosphere in route to the Kamchatka test range.
A few enlisted specialists sat to the Ravens' right, almost back to the tail. One Morse operator, a cryptolinguist, one to two tactical voice specialists, and their airborne mission supervisor monitored the Soviet air defense forces. One or two in-flight maintenace crew members were also assigned, to keep the sophisticated and crotchety electronics up and running.
Cobra Ball missions off the Kamchatka test range were generally short - usually loitering in the area only a few hours, in contrast to the eight to twelve hour missions other RC-135 models were tasked with. While the doomed Korean airline was entering the area, the military aircraft was already departing.
Once the crews of reconnaissance missions leave a "sensitive area," intensive monitoring of Soviet radio channels generally decreases, especially once the mission aircraft enters US airspace. Crew members might tune into FM music stations, stretch tired muscles, and either replenish their coffee mugs or turn their attention to the voluminous paperwork associated with their missions. A lucky few might even catch a quick nap before landing.
Despite the claims of the HBO movie Tailspin: Behind the Korean Airline Tragedy. , and Angela Landsbury's Shootdown, this mission reportedly did not pick up indications of unusual air defense activity as it left the area. At a ground station in Japan, however, there was plenty of activity. Morse and voice tracking specialists at Misawa airbase noted that a major alert underway at the Soviet air defense base at Petropavlovsk, and several urgent intelligent reports were sent to the National Security Agency at Ft. Meade, Maryland, as well as to national command authorities in Washington, DC.
From analyses of these reports, as well as from later debriefings of former Soviet officers who were involved with the tragedy, when KAL007 entered the Bering Sea Soviet radar operators at first assumed it was the reconnaissance aircraft returning to their area, and continued plotting its course. When the aircraft continued toward the coastline of the Kamchatka penninsula, toward their far east fleet's home port, the Russians were reported to be stunned. Some documents indicate that up to six MiG-23 fighters and Su-15 interceptors were scrambled to investigate.
In addition to the delay in launching fighters, there was a confusion of responsibility, since the MiGs were assigned to Soviet tactical air forces under the Soviet army, while the Sukhoi aircraft were under air defense command (aPVO-S). Another delay in receiving authorization from Khabarovsk and Moscow, allowed the airliner to continue across Kamchatka. At one point KAL 007 even flew right over one of the bases trying to stop the intrusion.
Once KAL 007 left Russian airspace over the Sea of Okhotsk and the fighters returned to their bases on Kamchatka. Now about four hours into its flight, the aircraft passed abeam the Nippi beacon, and Japanese approach radar showed it to be 185 NM off course and heading for the Soviet island of Sakhalin. Analysis of cockpit conversations on the airliner indicates that the crew wondered why other aircraft along their flight route were reporting different weather and winds than they were observing.
An excerpt from the communications of KAL 007 and another airliner along its flight path:
18:05:04 "Ask him how many knots?"
18:05:06 "THIRTY-FIVE KNOTS"
18:05:07 "Um which direction, which direction?"
18:05:12 "ZERO FOUR ZERO, ZERO FOUR ZERO."
18:05:15 "Thirty degrees? Thirty knots?"
18:05:18 "Thirty, um, forty degrees direction, THIRTY FIVE KNOTS
18:05:23 "Ah! You got so much! We still got headwind. Headwind two hundred fifteen degrees FIFTEEN KNOTS"
18:05:32 "Is it so? But according to FLIGHT PLAN wind direction THREE SIX ZERO FIFTEEN KNOTS approximately."
At 1742 and 1754, respectively, two Soviet Sukhoi Su-15 fighters were scrambled from their airbase at Dolinsk-Sokol, on the island of Sakhalin, to head off the aircraft. KAL 007 re-entered Soviet airspace at 1816. Consistent with their training, the Soviet pilots intercepted the airliner from the rear and below, thus positioning themselves in the airliner's 'blind spot'. One of the interceptors returned to base due to mechanical problems, while the other SU-15, commanded by Squadron Commander Major (soon promoted to Lieutenant Colonel) Gennady Osipovich, continued to stalk the airliner.
The airliner continued on, oblivious, with the Flagon interceptor following behind. During this time there was probably furious communications between Moscow and Khabarovsk, as to what should be done about the intrustion. No US reconnaissance aircraft had entered Soviet airspace since 1960, based on a promise made by President Eisenhower to Soviet Premier Khrushchev. Nothing like this had happened in decades.
At first, the Soviets were unsure if even this was the US aircraft - their intelligence showed that the US reconnaissance aircraft was requesting landing clearance at Shemya at the same time the unidentified aircraft was overflying Soviet air space. What it was clear to them was that, whatever the nationality of the unidentified plane, it was off course and heading toward a restricted area.
Such a dilemma had been easily solved in Brezhnev's day. On April 20th, 1978, another Korean Air passenger jet entered Soviet airspace over the Kola penninsula on the northwestern edge of the Soviet Union. This airliner was immediately shot down, but it managed to crashland on a frozen lake and minimize casualties. The new leader of the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, was attempting to put a 'kinder face' on the Soviet system, and in so doing to drum up support in certain circles in Western Europe and America. Destroying a civilian airliner would not fit well with the 'peaceful socialist republic' mirage he wished to create.
Letting the airliner go was probably the least palatable option. To allow it to leave Soviet air space would cause ridicule in Moscow and abroad. Who wanted to stand before the Politburo and explain why the vaunted Soviet military could not even defend the airspace directly above one of its largest airbases?
Forcing the wayward airliner down was also not an option; there was no way to signal the aircraft. Western civilian aircraft at the time communicated predominately in the UHF frequencies, while Soviet fighters used VHF. A former officer at the base also noted that during the overflight of the Korean airliner no one who spoke English could be located quickly enough, and that MiG and Sukhoi aircraft did not use tracer bullets that could have been used serve as 'warning shots'.
At 1822 the Korean airliner was leaving Soviet airspace for the second time, and a decision finally arrived at. Linguists at Misawa airbase, Japan, were stunned to hear the Soviet tower controller at Dolinsk-Sokol' broadcast on 130.75MHz: "Unichtozhit' tsel', unichtozhit' tsel'." (A recording of this was played at the United Nations immediately following the shootdown.) In clear, unencrypted Russian VHF single-sideband transmission, Major Osipovich was ordered to 'destroy the target'. Osipovich stated that he confirmed the order, then launched two "Anab" air-to-air missiles in a salvo, one or both of which struck the Boeing at 1826 GMT.
Data from the recovered "black box" data recorder on the 747, as well as the crew's last words transcribed on the cockpit voice recorder, record the missiles' deadly effect.
Cabin pressure was immediately lost and the aircraft suffered severe control problems. It pitched into a steep climb, followed by a stall and unrecoverable rapid descent into the Gulf of Tartary just of Sakhalin island. Of the 269 passengers and crew, there were no survivors.
Andropov's military chief of staff, Marshal of Soviet Air Forces N. V. Ogarkov, gave a press conference soon after the shootdown, claiming that the US Air Force surveillance plane was extremely similar and flying alongside the Korean airliner, which 'confused' the Soviet air defenses. At one point, he tried to claim that the airliner was itself performing reconnaissance for the Americans. A Boeing 747 is almost twice as large as the 707 airframe on which the RC-135 is based, and at the time was flying in a straight line while the RC-135 was flying a figure-8 pattern until it turned away from Soviet airspace and headed back to Shemya. Ogarkov, interestingly enough, admitted to failings in the Soviet air defense radars' range and accuracy, which has been coroborated by former Soviet officers working in this field.
At the UN Security Council, US representitives played the tape of ground-controlled intercept chatter, and President Reagan in his address to the UN asked: "What can be said about Soviet credibility, when they so flagrantly lie about such a heinous act? What can be the scope of legitimate mutual discourse with a state whose values permit such atrocities? And what are we to make of a regime which establishes one set of standards for itself, and another for the rest of humankind? The brutality of this action [must] not be compounded through silence or the cynical distortion of the evidence now at hand..."
President Reagen soon escalated the rhetoric: "There is no way that a pilot could mistake this for anything other than a civilian airliner. They deny the deed, but in their conflicting and misleading protestations, the Soviets reveal that, yes, shooting down a plane, even one with hundreds of innocent men, women, children and babies, is a part of their normal procedure, if that plane is in what they claim as their air space. This was the Soviet Union against the world, and the moral precepts which guide human relations among people everywhere. It was an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life, and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations."
Not surprisingly, the courts concluded that the Soviets were not completely to blame:
Families of victims of the 1983 downing of a Korean Air Lines jumbo jet by a Soviet fighter may collect unlimited compensatory damages from the airline because of the crew's "willful misconduct" in straying over Soviet air-space, a Federal court jury in Washington ruled yesterday . . . The term is legally defined as an intentional act performed with knowledge of likely injury to passengers or "with reckless disregard of the consequences."Judge Robinson earlier dismissed lawsuits against the Soviet Government; the Boeing Company, the builder of the 747; Litton Industries, which made its navigation systems; and the United States Government, which employed the traffic controllers involved in the first part of the flight.
New York Times, Aug. 3, 1989 (Richard Witkin)
Much has been made of the presence of one VIP passenger - Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald, Republican Representative from Georgia's 7th District. A conspiracy theory has been woven around this staunch, anti-communist's death at the hands of his biggest foes, but all indications are that his appearance on KAL 007 was only a coincidence, the congressman merely flying to South Korea to make a routine tour of US bases there.
The pilot who destroyed this airliner, then newly promoted to lieutenant colonel, gave an interview to the Soviet newspaper Izvestia in 1990, during Gorbachev's glasnost period, one year before the misinformed movie Shootdown. Osipovich claimed that at first they thought the aircraft was military, and radioed that he could see the intruder's navigation lights and flashing beacon. He said during his post-mission debriefing he was queried extensively about the lights, and that another officer later mentioned to him that the intruder "might be a passenger aircraft". Flying with lights on hardly fit the profile of a secret reconnaissance flight. Osipovich claimed in this interview that we was ordered to warn the intruder to land by flashing his lights and firing his cannon. Later he denied that this was the case, and as stated earlier, at 40,000 feet this provides little warning to a sleepy cockpit crew, since they shells were not tracer. The transcript of the cockpit voice recorder gives no indication the crew knew that an interception was in progress.
On April 28, 1991, Osipovich told a Korean television network straight out that he knew he was firing at a commercial plane. He also charged that his superiors had ordered him to lie - to say that the intruder was flying without lights and that he tried to contact it by radio and warn it by firing tracers (either of which were impossible).
On the 13th anniversary of the KAL007 shootdown, Alvin A. Snyder, the disgruntled former director of television for the US Information Agency wrote a scathing article in the Washington Post. He claimed that he had produced a misleading video accusing the Soviets of shooting down the Korean airliner. Snyder alleges that he had learned of taped exchanges between the Soviet ground controllers and the pilot of the plane that downed KAL007, fantasy tapes which showed that the Soviets acted on the assumption that it was an American RC-135 spy plane. He also "apologized" for misleading the world.
Alvin Snyder is a fool and liar. He has no need to apologize - the charge made in his video and by President Reagan - that the Soviets knew that they were shooting down a civilian airliner - is completely true. At first they might have assumed that the intruder was an Air Force RC-135, but that assumption was proven wrong as soon as the inteceptors closed with the airliner.
Alvin Snyder ignores pilot Osipovich's statements in order to create a drama were the US is the culprit. Like many liberals, Snyder wants the American people to believe that the Soviets were telling the truth when they claimed that they destroyed KAL007 because it was thought to be an "American spyplane." The truth is that the Soviet Union killed 269 men, women, and children simply because they were about to escape unharmed.
If the intent was to kill one passenger, and they had no qualms about killing several hundred others in the process, and they had the means to fool around with the aircraft's navigation system, it would seem to me that having the plane crash in an "accident" would accomplish the same objective without drawing any attention to the Soviet Union at all.
Judging from the flight path, that may exactly be what happened along with some deception by the North Koreans.
With two INS aboard, you might think to set one at the airfield of departure and then not mess with it. The other INS you might adjust enroute.
Then of course, you may wonder which is correct ... on up until radio reports of aircraft that you'd expect to be traveling on your route, indicate wx conditions not on your route.
At that moment, you might strongly tend to believe the INS readout that you left untouched.
What could have happened, is that the North Koreans resorted to make the appearance of being the ATC long-range radio stations (shortwave) and caused the crew to believe faulty time and distance information. A little "black box" aboard the aircraft, in the right place, could alter the signals so that the crew would be thinking that they were in contact with legitimate ATC's, when in fact they were in contact with the North Koreans, and nobody else heard a darned thing, except the VHF/UHF communications.
The North Koreans are notorious, in certain circles, for trying to "short sheet the bed" here, there, everywhere. They're real pranksters.
I suspect that the story above is essentially true, but a major mystery is in its failure to mention the shortwave radio comm's.
Apparently the crew did not mention shortwave radio failure.
It's just possible that the North Koreans deceived them into thinking that their shortwave comm's were normal.
INS is preprogammed inertial navigation. You may be thinking of the radio compass which follows signals from radio beasons.
On September 2nd, 1958, an EC-130 was "lured" into Soviet air space by a technique known as "meaconing" (masking a beacon), and shot down with loss of the entire crew.
That passenger was Congressman Larry McDonald from Georgia.
He was a democrat, but he supported the Constitution, and was very outspoken against the communists, CFR, and other groups trying to overthrow the Constitution.
He was also probably going to run for President in 1988, and I think he would have won.
The enemies of the Constitution weren't going to stand for that so they killed him.
That's a very good theory. KORCOMs have great loathing for their southern brethren, once they even carryied out an assassination of ROK leaders in a third country.
KORCOMs are the acknowledged masters of MIJI - Meaconing (masking a radio beacon to lure aircraft off course), Intrustion (inserting false broadcasts into a radio conversation), Jamming, and Interference.
I've heard that they used to play fake 'May Days' on 121.50 & 243.00 MHz to try and stir up a rescue they could attack.
Look in the dictionary under bastard, and you'll find a North Korean.
I have no doubt the Russians tracked this guy's every move.
It is a documented fact that the Soviets tried to interfere with the 1980 election with the objective of stopping Reagan's candidacy. And it's also a documented fact that they had infiltrated our political system since the 1940s. So no one should be surprised that they would monitor politicians who posed a threat to them.
With Reagan, by the time he got on their radar screen, he was too popular, and as such it was too late for the Soviets to "deal with him".
They paid dearly for that mistake, but they also learned their lesson.
Hence, they stopped McDonald before he got to the point where he was too big and important for them to do anything about.
| [Morse transmission audible, marked increase in volume of morse transmissions] | ||||
| 24.56 | 18:19:06 | CAM-3 | ... (unreadable) | |
| 25.10 | 18:19:20 | CAM-3 | ... (unreadable) | |
| 25.16 | 18.19:26 | CAM-3 | ... (unreadable) | |
| 25.30 | 18.19:40 | CAM-3 | ... (unreadable) | |
| 25.52 | 18.20:02 | TOKYO HF | CAM-1,2,3,4 | [ Selcal ] |
| 25.59 | 18.20:09 | 007 HF 1 | CAM-1,2,3,4 | KOREAN AIR ZERO ZERO SEVEN SELCAL. |
| 26.00 | 18.20:11 | TOKYO HF | CAM-1,2,3,4 | KOREAN AIR ZERO ZERO SEVEN CLEARANCE TOKYO ATC CLEARS KOREAN AIR ZERO ZERO SEVEN CLMIB AND MAINTAIN FLIGHT LEVEL THREE FIVE ZERO. |
| 26.11 | 18.20:21 | 007 HF 1 | CAM-1,2,3,4 | AH ROGER KOREAN AIR ZERO ZERO SEVEN CLIMB AND MAINTAIN AT THREE FIVE ZERO LEAVING THREE THREE ZERO AT THIS TIME. |
| 26.18 | 18.20:28 | TOKYO HF | CAM-1,2,3,4 | TOKYO ROGER. |
| 27.38 | 18.21:48 | F/D | CAM-3 | [ Sound: altitude alert ] |
| 28.45 | 18.22:55 | F/D | CAM-4 | [ Keyed microphone ] |
| 28.46 | 18.22:56 | 007 HF 1 | CAM-1,2,3,4 | TOKYO RADIO KOREAN AIR ZERO ZERO SEVEN REACHING LEVEL THREE FIVE ZERO. |
| 28.50 | 18.23:00 | TOKYO HF | CAM-1,2,3,4 | KOREAN AIR ZERO ZERO SEVEN TOKYO ROGER. |
| 31.45 | 18.25:55 | DYNASTY 312 HF | CAM-4 | TOKYO RADIO, DYNASTY THREE ONE TWO ON FIVE SIX. |
| 31.50 | 18.26:00 | TOKYO HF | CAM-4 | DYNASTY THREE ONE TWO TOKYO. |
| 31.52 | 18.26:02 | CAM-3 | [ Sound of eplosion?] | |
| 31.53 | 18.26:03 | DYNASTY 312 HF | CAM-4 | Dynasty three one two position Payon one eight two five level three three zero estimate Shemya one nine three five remainder ... remaining one two six decimal zero minus five zero ... one zero diagonal four zero go ahead. |
| 31.56 | 18.26:06 | F/D | CAM-3 | What's happened? |
| 31.58 | 18.26:08 | F/D | CAM-3 | What? |
| 32.00 | 18.26:10 | F/D | CAM-3 | Retard throttles. |
| 32.01 | 18.26:11 | F/D | CAM-3 | Engines normal. |
| 32.04 | 18.26:14 | F/D | CAM-3 | Landing gear. |
| 32.05 | 18.26:15 | F/D | CAM-3 | [ Sound: cabin altitude warning ] |
| 32.07 | 18.26:17 | F/D | CAM-3 | Landing gear [ Noise of possible selection ] |
| 32.08 | 18.26:18 | F/D | CAM-3 | [ Sound: altitude deviation warning ] |
| 32.11 | 18.26:21 | F/D | CAM-3 | [ Sound: autopilot disconnect warning ] |
| 32.12 | 18.26:22 | F/D | CAM-3 | Altitude is going up. |
| 32.13 | 18.26:23 | F/D | CAM-3 | [ Sound: cabin call ] |
| 32.14 | 18.26:24 | F/D | CAM-3 | Altitude is going up. |
| 32.15 | 18.26:25 | F/D | CAM-3 | Speed brake is coming out. |
| 32.16 | 18.26:26 | F/D | CAM-3 | What? What? |
| 32.17 | 18.26:27 | F/D | CAM-4 | (unreadable) |
| 32.19 | 18.26:29 | F/D | CAM-3 | CHECK it out. |
| 32.20 | 18.26:30 | F/D | CAM-2,3 | [ Sound: PA chime for automatic cabin announcment ] |
| 32.20 | 18.26:30 | TOKYO HF | CAM-4 | DYNASTY THREE ONE TWO ... CONTACT ANCHORAGE. |
| 32.23 | 18.26:33 | F/D | CAM-3 | [Sound: cacin call] |
| 32.23 | 18.26:33 | F/D | CAM-3 | I am not able to drop altitude now unable. |
| 32.24 | 18.26:34 | PA | CAM-2 | Attention emergency descent. |
He probably would have been elected President in 1988 if the Soviets didn't assassinate him.
I think that's a bit of a stretch. He probably would have needed to make another career move before that -- Senators and Representatives are rarely elected to the White House directly from their seat in Congress. The vast majority of U.S. Presidents in recent decades were former governors.
DILBERT: I told you wrong in post #5. KAL 902 was flying from Paris to Anchorage, not London to Anchorage, when it was hit by a Soviet missile and forced to make an emergency landing on Korpiyarvoe ozero near Murmansk on April 20th, 1978. Two passengers were killed by shrapnel from an Anab missile launched by a Su-15 interceptor in what Pravda at the time called 'a warning shot'.
The Soviets at the time explained away their callousness with a familiar line: It was thought that the airliner was an RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. The success of this cover story probably led to Ogarkov's disastrous briefing five years later.
Alberta's Child: Perhaps you are right about the sloppy KAL flight procedures. Six years after the shootdown, KAL was held liable unlimited damages due to "willful misconduct" in straying over Soviet air-space. A US Federal court ruled that their misconduct was "an intentional act performed with knowledge of likely injury to passengers" and with "reckless disregard of the consequences."
And I used to think Iceland Air was bad ;-)
William Becker and Bethe Hagens, in "Antigravity and the World Grid," wrote about two jetliners that were shot down by Russian MIGs for straying into Soviet air space: KAL 007 on September 1, 1983 and KAL 902 on April 20, 1978. They claim that in both cases the geocompass in the autopilot’s guidance system was slowly pulled off its north bearing by energized ley lines. What Becker and Bethe found to be a common factor in both instances is that they occurred during religious feast days: 007 during a major Hindu feast for Vishnu, and 902 during Good Friday/Passover.
Any ideas on just what the heck a geocompass is?
25.52 18.20:02 TOKYO HF CAM-1,2,3,4 [ Selcal ]
That represents the record of a shortwave radio broadcast. The broadcast was a tone generation that causes the radio on board the aircraft, to come out of squelch, so to speak (to come out of sleep, in computer-ese).
Shortwave radio can make a racket, so the squelch is turned up to keep things sane in the cockpit.
The radio can be set to listen for a set of tones that are a recognition signal from the transmitter; the set of tones, being the "Selcal." Typically the crew and an ATC have briefly discussed by shortwave chat, what will be the "Selcal."
Tokyo High Frequency Radio is the transmitter, and it issued a Selcal to get the crew's attention.
So, you have done a good job of scrounging up the proof against my hypothesis; test completed; good work.
The human mind doesn't handle the fact that human beings die for essentially random reasons in horrible ways. But the truth is that they can and do.
When I was six years old, my 39 year-old mother suddenly dropped dead from a heart problem in a supermarket while I was in school. The KGB didn't kill her. An evil corporation didn't kill her. Global warming didn't kill her. She died of a medical condition that no one was aware of. It was essentially a random and unpredictable death. For that reason, I'm used to the idea that deaths don't have to have an important reason. I have no problem believing that an incompitent Soviet general ordered a pilot to shoot down a civilian airliner that had accidentally wandered into Soviet airspace before it could leave, which is what all the evidence that I've seen clearly shows happened. Sometimes good people die because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time or missed the clues that would have kept them alive. Sometimes they take a lot of other people with them. It happens, like it or not.
Ley lines are philosophical interpretations of geographic correlations --- you might say, finding reason after finding patterns in chaos.
Perhaps you should find a lawyer and take a shot at "life's lottery" now that the odds are in your favor (as long is you are not sure that an "evil corporation" did not kill her.
You might, this very evening, undergo a sudden recovery of your "long lost memory as to the events of that day."
Yet in all seriousness, I am very sad to hear of such a loss, and as it was your loss, and I pray that some tender happiness came your way, soon. God bless.
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