Birthright Citizenship: Interpreting The Phrase "Subject To The Jurisdiction Thereof"

Birthright citizenship — the idea that anyone born in the United States is automatically a citizen, with full right to receive all benefits and vote when they come of age — has been a fixture of the administration of the laws in this country for my entire lifetime. But does the text of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution make the birthright citizenship rule apply to all cases, even the most extreme? Under the 14th Amendment, properly interpreted, do children born of illegal aliens subject to a deportation order really qualify for birthright citizenship? How about children born of an illegal entrant who has snuck across the border for a few hours just to have the baby and then immediately go home? How about children born of a Chinese billionaire who has hired surrogates in the U.S. to produce dozens of babies? Under the version of “birthright citizenship” implemented by the federal government for the last hundred years or so, all of these examples, and plenty more, qualify.

Advocates for the position that all of these extreme cases should qualify for birthright citizenship generally think that their position is exceedingly simple and obvious, so much so that anyone arguing the contrary, or for any exceptions or limits, must be either dishonest or crazy. Indeed, those were the very words uttered by Harvard Law Professor Gerald Neuman to describe the position of the Trump administration, as quoted in my previous post (December 15) on this subject ([the argument that children of undocumented aliens or those on temporary visas are not citizens by birthright under the 14th Amendment] “is either a crazy theory or dishonest interpretation of the Constitution.”)

But the language of the 14th Amendment clearly does not grant automatic citizenship to all children born on U.S. soil, no matter the circumstances. That is so because there is a qualifying phrase to the otherwise absolute grant of birthright citizenship: “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Those additional words must be given some meaning. (The full text of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment is “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”). The additional phrase must imply at least some exceptions to the rule of citizenship by birth. How do we figure out what those are?

Advocates for the broad version of birthright citizenship have a quick answer: there is one excluded category, and only one, namely children born to diplomats of foreign countries, while those diplomats are their spouses are in the U.S. Diplomats are entitled to what is called “diplomatic immunity,” which generally means that they cannot be held responsible for crimes committed while here, nor sued civilly in U.S. courts. Prosecuting people for crimes, or holding them responsible for civil wrongs, are forms of exercising jurisdiction over them; thus diplomats are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the U.S. By contrast, the argument goes, essentially everybody else, including all the most extreme cases of birthright citizenship claimants, can be prosecuted in the U.S. for crimes committed here, or sued here for torts committed here.

So is the case of diplomats the only exception to the rule of birthright citizenship? How might we tell?

The answer is that we get insights by engaging in constitutional interpretation. Over in the legal academy, scholars make careers by devising theories of how to do this. The theory that is currently most in vogue, particularly among the conservative wing of the Supreme Court that is likely to have the deciding voice in this case, is called “original public meaning.” The famous exposition of that theory, should you want to read about it, is found in the majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, in the 2005 case of District of Columbia v. Heller. That is the case that found that the Second Amendment to the Constitution conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.

Two decades since Heller, the “original public meaning” theory has largely supplanted the prior dominant theory of interpretation, which was often called “intent of the draftsmen.” Under the “intent of the draftsmen” approach, the key to interpretation was finding useful quotes in the statements of the sponsors in support of their amendment, or in the debates in the Congress or state legislatures considering adoption. Under the “original public meaning” approach, those statements of sponsors and from floor debates have been reduced to near irrelevance. Instead, courts following the “original public meaning” approach are looking to statements in the public square discussing or applying the language at issue, at or around the time of enactment. Of particularly relevance are legal authorities, decided in the context or framework of the disputed language, again during that time frame near enactment.

This is where the situation of Indian citizenship in the late 19th and early 20th centuries becomes critical to interpreting the 14th Amendment. I raised that subject in the December 15 post, and will discuss it further here.

There is a Supreme Court case from 1884, Elk v. Wilkins, that is highly informative. Elk, a member of an active Indian tribe, had left the tribe to go to live among the “white citizens” of Nebraska. He had been born within the territory of the United States. In 1880, he sought to register to vote as a citizen, based on the language of the 14th Amendment, but his application was denied, and he sued to compel the registrar to enroll him. The Supreme Court ruled against Elk. Here is the significant language:

The alien and dependent condition of the members of the Indian tribes could not be put off at their own will without the action or assent of the United States. They were never deemed citizens of the United States except under explicit provisions of treaty or statute to that effect. . . . This section contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The evident meaning of these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. . . . Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of and owing immediate allegiance to one of the Indiana tribes (an alien though dependent power), although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are no more "born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government, or the children born within the United States of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations.

And thus, despite the 14th Amendment, Indians born in the U.S. remained non-citizens, and generally unable to vote unless naturalized, until the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.

But the situation of Indians in the 19th century U.S. was different from that of diplomats. Indians did not have diplomatic immunity. Although the situation was complex, and subject to gaps and exceptions, in general an Indian who committed a crime outside of an Indian reservation was subject to criminal prosecution in the regular (non-tribal) state or federal courts. In other words, the alleged distinction based on diplomatic immunity, to explain why diplomats do not get birthright citizenship for their babies but everybody else does, does not stand up to the case of Indians. Indeed, it’s even a little worse, because shortly after Elk, in 1885, Congress passed something called the Major Crimes Act, which authorized prosecution in non-tribal courts of Indians for certain major crimes (like murder) even if committed on a reservation. If this was equivalent to making Indians “subject to the jurisdiction” of the U.S., then this Act would have meant the arrival of birthright citizenship for the Indians. But that is not the way they acted in the 19th century. Despite the Major Crimes Act, the Indians were not accorded general citizenship until 1924.

Note that the proponents of the extreme version of birthright citizenship mainly rely on another late 19th century Supreme Court case, Wong Kim Ark (1898), which was discussed in my December 15 post. The Court in Wong Kim Ark distinguished it from Elk, but did not overrule Elk. Indeed, the two opinions were written by the same justice, Horace Gray, who clearly did not consider them to be inconsistent.

So consider how the combined cases of Elk and Wong Kim Ark apply to the situation of a tourist today. Most tourists are legal tourists with short-term visas. They carry a passport from a foreign government, which is essentially a request by that government to the U.S. to allow its citizen safe passage here. Can it really be said that they are “completely subject to [U.S.] political jurisdiction and owing [the U.S.] direct and immediate allegiance”? Or is their situation closer to that of the Indian who, in the words of Justice Gray, was not “completely” subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S., and did not owe it to “direct and immediate allegiance.”

And if the situation of the legal tourist is close to that of the Indian as characterized by Justice Gray, then how about the situation of the illegal alien? The illegal alien has made no gesture of “direct and immediate allegiance” to the U.S., and indeed has flouted our laws.

Note that I am not saying that this situation is without ambiguities, and that there are no reasonable arguments on the other side. However, I reiterate that I think the question of unrestricted birthright citizenship for all but children of diplomats is an open question. The question of how the 14th Amendment applies to illegal aliens has definitely not been decided by the Supreme Court, and there are reasonable arguments on both sides.

To those who say in this dispute that a President cannot change the Constitution, I say that the current institutional application of birthright citizenship is itself a creation of the executive departments (under multiple presidents) that has never been blessed by the courts. A new President can implement a new policy if the new policy is not precluded by prior court precedent.

One problem with with quoting what some Framers discussed is that the people never ratified Framer discussions. They ratified the black letter text of the Constitution itself. Neither Framers nor the Federal legislature ratified the Constitution or any of its amendments. That was done by States.

The purported intent of the lawgiver is irrelevant if the actual words of the law have a clear meaning. The words prevail even where the lawgiver's words are contrary to his intent. This is even so with legislation where the legislators voted to pass legislation. The words are ratified or passed into law, the intent is not.

Have a generous dose of case law.

Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 US 511, 519 (1993), Scalia, J., concurring

The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.
We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. As the Court said in 1844: "The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself...." Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 9, 24 (emphasis added). But not the least of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy. If one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole, was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a more promising candidate than legislative history. And the present case nicely proves that point.
Judge Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends.

Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845)

In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

United States v Union Pacific Railroad Company, 91 U.S. 72 (1875)

In construing an act of Congress, we are not at liberty to recur to the views of individual members in debate nor to consider the motives which influenced them to vote for or against its passage. The act itself speaks the will of Congress, and this is to be ascertained from the language used. But courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed, and this is frequently necessary in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it. Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 24; Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115, 120 [argument of counsel -- omitted].

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 254 (1901)

In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 86, 108-09 (1925)

The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary. They were familiar with other forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated in their discussions earnest study and consideration of many of them, but when they came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily understood.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 9, 188-189 (1824), Marshall, CJ

As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor if retained by himself, or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee, but is an investment of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose, which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connexion with the purposes for which they were conferred.

"A Matter of Interpretation," Federal Courts and the Law, by Antonin Scalia, 1997. This book contains an essay by Antonin Scalia and responses to that essay by professors Ronald Dworkin, Mary Ann Glendon, Laurence Tribe, and Gordon Wood. There is a final response by Antonin Scalia.

Laurence Tribe, pp. 65-6

Let me begin with my principal area of agreement with Justice Scalia. Like him, I believe that when we ask what a legal text means — what it requires of us, what it permits us to do, and what it forbids — we ought not to be inquiring (except perhaps very peripherally) into the ideas, intentions, or expectations subjectively held by whatever particular persons were, as a historical matter, involved in drafting, promulgating, or ratifying the text in question. To be sure, those matters, when reliably ascertainable, might shed some light on otherwise ambiguous or perplexing words or phrases - by pointing us, as readers, toward the linguistic frame of reference within which the people to whom those words or phrases were addressed would have "translated" and thus understood them. But such thoughts and beliefs can never substitute for what was in fact enacted as law. Like Justice Scalia, I never cease to be amazed by the arguments of judges, lawyers, or others who proceed as though legal texts were little more than interesting documentary evidence of what some lawgiver had in mind. And, like the justice, I find little to commend the proposition that anyone ought, in any circumstances I can imagine, to feel legally bound to obey another's mere wish or thought, or legally bound to act in accord with another's mere hope or fear.

Antonin Scalia, responding to Dr. Tribe, p. 133

He is correct that we both regard as irrelevant the intentions of the drafters....

Beginning on page 30 Scalia writes:

Extensive use of legislative history in this country dates only from about the 1940s. It was still being criticized by such respected justices as Frankfurter and Jackson as recently as the 1950s. Jackson, for example, wrote in one concurrence:
I should concur in this result more readily if the Court could reach it by analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of Congress. When we decide from legislative history, including statements of witnesses at hearings, what Congress probably had in mind, we must put ourselves in the place of a majority of Congressmen and act according to the impression we think this history should have made on them. Never having been a Congressman, I am handicapped in that weird endeavor. That process seems to me not interpretation of a statute but creation of a statute.

The LOSING Briefs from the precedent setting U.S. Supreme Court case of Wong Kim Ark reveal the slightest tinge of racism involved in the attempt to save the nation from Yellow Peril. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), at the U.S. Supreme Court. Brief on Behalf of the losing Appellant (United States), by George D. Collins, Of Counsel for Appellant, and also signed by Holmes Conrad, Solicitor General; at page 34:

For the most persuasive reasons we have refused citizenship to Chinese subjects; and yet, as to their offspring, who are just as obnoxious, and to whom the same reasons for exclusion apply with equal force, we are told that we must accept them as fellow-citizens, and that, too, because of the mere accident of birth. There certainly should be some honor and dignity in American citizenship that would be sacred from the foul and corrupting taint of a debasing alienage. Are Chinese children born in this country to share with the descendants of the patriots of the American Revolution the exalted qualification of being eligible to the Presidency of the nation, conferred by the Constitution in recognition of the importance aud dignity of citizenship by birth? If so, then verily there has been a most degenerate departure from the patriotic ideals of our forefathers; and surely in that case American citizenship is not worth having.

Birthers have taken to wasting the time and resources of the legal system with scores of frivolous lawsuits in Federal and state courts. Charles Gordon, in his paper “Who Can Be President of the United States: the Unresolved Enigma,” 28 Maryland Law Review, Number 1, Winter 1968, observed at page 29:

Since interpretation of the presidential qualification clause involves a federal constitutional question, such an issue would unquestionably wind up in the federal courts, by removal of actions commenced in state courts, or by Supreme Court review of a state court’s decision. [Footnotes omitted]

Several actions seeking an ancient writ of quo warranto to oust the sitting President have predictably failed. In his paper cited supra, at page 30, Charles Gordon observed,

In the first place, a person seeking to launch such a contest would have to overcome the seemingly insuperable hurdle of legal standing to sue. In the federal practice his lack of direct interest would seem fatal.

Nearly a half-century later, when courts found a lack of direct interest and a resultant lack of standing, birthers exclaimed that the judges were corrupt. The blackness of the President does not create standing.

First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee, 1993 OK 96, 859 P.2d 502, paragraph 40, footnotes omitted:

“Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did.” “There is no room for a pure heart, empty head defense under Rule 11.”

In Wong Kim Ark, at 169 U.S. 649, 674-675, the U.S. Supreme Court said:

So far as we are informed, there is no authority, legislative, executive or judicial, in England or America, which maintains or intimates that the statutes (whether considered as declaratory or as merely prospective) conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of citizens have superseded or restricted, in any respect, the established rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion. Even those authorities in this country, which have gone the farthest towards holding such statutes to be but declaratory of the common law have distinctly recognized and emphatically asserted the citizenship of native-born children of foreign parents. 2 Kent Com. 39, 50, 53, 258 note; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf.Ch. 583, 659; Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 371.
Passing by questions once earnestly controverted, but finally put at rest by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, it is beyond doubt that, before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment, all white persons, at least, born within the sovereignty of the United States, whether children of citizens or of foreigners, excepting only children of ambassadors or public ministers of a foreign government, were native-born citizens of the United States.

In Schick v. United States,, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904), the Court said:

“That,” said Mr. Justice Bradley in Moore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270, 91 U. S. 274, referring to the common law, “is the system from which our judicial ideas and legal definitions are derived. The language of the Constitution and of many acts of Congress could not be understood without reference to the common law.”
Again, in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 124 U. S. 478, is this declaration by Mr. Justice Matthews: “The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.”
In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 169 U. S. 654, Mr. Justice Gray used this language: “In this as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 114 U. S. 422; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 624-625; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465.”
See also Kepner v. United States, post, p. 195 U. S. 100; 1 Kent, Com. 336.
Blackstone’s Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the federal Constitution, it had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that more copies of the work had been sold in this country than in England, so that undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were familiar with it.

In Wong Kim Ark, Brief on Behalf of the losing Appellant [United States], page 22-23, the losing side argued:

“Subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is the language of the Constitution, and it is the most significant provision of the definition of citizenship there contained. Who are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States? Manifestly not those who are subject to the jurisdiction of any other nation, or who owe allegiance to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty. Such is the contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution’s definition by the very Congress that framed it, as is evidenced by what is now section 1902 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. It is there enacted: “All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States.” Clearly, then, it was never intended that children born in the United States of alien parents should be considered citizens.
Such children at the moment of birth would be subject to a “foreign power,” to wit, the country of the parent, for it is a principle of international law, and recognized by the United States (sec. 1993, Rev. Stat. U. S.), that the children born abroad of citizens or subjects are citizens or subjects of the country of the parent. So, in respect to this case, it is the law of the Chinese Empire that the children of subjects when born abroad are subjects of the Emperor, Therefore, when Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco of Chinese parents there domiciled he at the moment of birth became a subject of the Emperor of China, and for that reason could not have been born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.

At page 24, the losing Brief argues,

It is true, he was born in the United States; but he was not at the time of his birth, and certainly at no time afterwards, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof;” we mean, of course, the political jurisdiction of the nation; not the territorial jurisdiction, or which is the same thing, the jurisdiction, or more accurately, the operation of the laws. All the authorities agree that the provision of the Constitution's definition, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” has reference to the political jurisdiction of the United States in its international relation of a sovereign nation, and not to the operation of the laws. In other words, the sovereignty of the United States is of a dual nature—internal and external. The jurisdiction of the law pertains to the former; and the political power of the nation to the latter. All persons born in the United States and subject to the political power thereof are citizens—natural born citizens; it follows that persons born in the United States of aliens are not citizens.

At page 35, the losing side added,

It is said in the district court’s opinion that—
The doctrine of the law of nations, that the child follows the nationality of the parents and that citizenship does not depend upon mere accidental place of birth, is undoubtedly more logical, reasonable, and satisfactory.
* * *

Here is a more complete version of that quote from the district court:

The doctrine of the law of nations, that the child follows the nationality of the parents, and that citizenship does not depend upon mere accidental place of birth, is undoubtedly more logical, reasonable, and satisfactory, but this consideration will not justify this court in declaring it to be the law against controlling judicial authority.

The inconvenient existing and controlling judicial authority came from the Circuit Court for the 9th Circuit.

The existing judicial authority was from In re Look Tin Sing, Circuit Court, California, 21 Fed R 905 (1884), Opinion of the Court by U.S. Supreme Court Justice (1863-1887) Stephen Field, sitting as a Circuit Court justice.

At 21 Fed R 906:

The first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution declares that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside.” This language would seem to be sufficiently broad to cover the case of the petitioner. He is a person born in the United States. Any doubt on the subject, if there can be any, must arise out of the words “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” They alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws, and with the consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered; and only those thus subject by their birth or naturalization are within the terms of the amendment. The jurisdiction over these latter must, at the time, be both actual and exclusive. The words mentioned except from citizenship children born in the United States of persons engaged in the diplomatic service of foreign governments, such as ministers and ambassadors, whose residence, by a fiction of public law, is regarded as part of their own country. This ex-territoriality of their residence secures to their children born here all the rights and privileges which would inure to them had they been born in the country of their parents.

At 21 Fed R 908-909:

With this explanation of the meaning of the words in the fourteenth amendment, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” it is evident that they do not exclude the petitioner from being a citizen. He is not within any of the classes of persons excepted from citizenship, and the jurisdiction of the United States over him at the time of his birth was exclusive of that of any other country.

The Supreme Court rejected the pig slop that was offered up and ruled the direct opposite, affirming the District Court which had ruled according to the existing binding precedent set in the Circuit Court, extending that binding precedent to all state and Federal courts. That was in the 19th century. It is binding precedent today.

Ludlam v. Ludlam, 84 Am. Dec. 193, 26 New York 356 (1863), first Headnote at 193,

Common Law at Time of Adoption of Federal Constitution Determines Question of Citizenship, in the absence of any other law upon the subject.

Munro v. Merchant, 26 Barb. 383 at 384 (1858) headnote states,

“A child born in this state of alien parents, during its mother’s temporary sojourn here, is a native born citizen.”

At 400-401, Opinion of the Court

It is further contended, on the part of the defendant, that the plaintiff himself is an alien. He was born in Ballston Spa, in this state, while his father was a resident of Canada, and returned to his father's domicil, with his mother, within a year after his birth. His mother was temporarily there—without any actual change of residence, either on her part or that of his father. It is argued that, at common law, a natural born subject was one whose birth was within the allegiance of the king. (Bac. Ab. tit. Alien, A. Com. Dig. A. and B. 7 to 18. Bl. Com: 336, 74.) The cases of children of ambassadors, born abroad, and of children born on English seas were considered exceptions. Chancellor Kent, in his commentaries, defines a native born citizen to be- a person born within, and an alien one born out of, the jurisdiction of the United States. (2 Kent's Com. 37—50.) In Lynch v. Clarke, (1 Sand. Ch. B. 583,) the question was precisely as here, whether a child born in the city of New York of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn there, was a native born citizen or an alien; and the conclusion was, that being born within the dominion and allegiance of the United States, he was a native born citizen, whatever was the situation of the parents at the time of the birth.

Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. 583 (1844), as published in New York Legal Observer, Volume III, 1845

It is an indisputable proposition, that by the rule of the common law of England, if applied to these facts, Julia Lynch was a natural born citizen of the United States. And this rule was established and inflexible in the common law, long anterior to the first settlement of the United States, and, indeed, before the discovery of America by Columbus. By the common law, all persons born within the ligeance of the crown of England, were natural born subjects, without reference to the status or condition of their parents.
[...]
And the constitution itself contains a direct recognition of the subsisting common law principle, in the section which defines the qualification of the President. "No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President," &c. The only standard which then existed, of a natural born citizen, was the rule of the common law, and no different standard has been adopted since. Suppose a person should be elected President who was native born, but of alien parents, could there be any reasonable doubt that he was eligible under the constitution? I think not. The position would be decisive in his favor that by the rule of the common law, in force when the constitution was adopted, he is a citizen.

When will the birthers produce a court opinion stating that John Doe, born in the United States of one or two alien parents, is, or is not, a citizen based on the controlling authority of Emer de Vattel? They have over two centuries of Federal and state court opinions to work with.

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