Posted on 12/18/2025 8:34:02 PM PST by SeekAndFind
The United States, according to the New York Times, has a Maginot Line problem. In the first in a series of articles castigating the 21st century U.S. military for allegedly failing to adapt to modern military technology, the editorial board raises the specter of Monsieur Maginot’s infamous namesake fortification.
“It is an ancient and familiar pattern,” the editorial board laments. The French in 1940, ensconced safely—so they thought—behind their elaborate frontier wall, utterly failed, unlike the Germans, to pay attention to the new verities of armored warfare and airpower and paid the penalty in a catastrophic six-week defeat. The image of overconfident security is easy to grasp. The problem is that it has little to do with what really happened in 1940.
This is hardly the first time that L’Étrange Défaite (“the strange defeat”) of France in 1940, as historian Marc Bloch dubbed it, has been cited in U.S. punditry as emblematic of a profound societal failure to grasp the realities of the present when existential stakes are on the line. The so-called “Maginot mentality” epitomized, so it is routinely said, France’s inability to learn the proper lessons of the 1914-18 conflict.
In the words of U.S. Navy Lt. Cmdr. Leah Amerling-Bray, that lesson was “to perceive changes in the conduct of war and to adapt.
Daniel J. Mahoney writes that the campaign “was a direct result of this failure to adjust to the requirements of warfare in the age of the internal combustion engine.”
Sheltering behind a fortress wall “to stop a German attack that never came while failing to anticipate the one that did,” in Thomas Wright’s words , the French ceased to innovate while their enemies developed weapons and doctrine for a new epoch of war.
(Excerpt) Read more at foreignpolicy.com ...
France's fundamental problem though was the same as that posed for Britain and other countries. Although few experts saw the change coming in full, it was obvious before the outbreak of WW II, that new technology, equipment, weapons, organization, and tactics would tend to renew the potency of mobile warfare.
As it was, in the first phase of WW II, blitzkrieg war, or combined arms tactics as it is now usually referred to, make it possible to defeat much larger but unprepared armies and to go around or destroy even the most formidable of fortifications.
In the German invasion of Belgium, highly trained special forces quickly blew up or captured Belgium's border fortifications. And in the attack through the Ardennes, French resistance was quickly overcome through surprise and combined arms tactics. Even the main French mobile force in Belgium was easily defeated and put to flight.
What was your workaround?
Not that I need it here any longer, given the full thread, but, it might be useful in the future?
Not enough is said about how the deeply divided politics of France in 1940 undermined their will to fight. Socialists ran the government. A large percentage of France preferred Nazis to the socialists. After Dunkirk, France faced the same military situation as the first phase of WW I. The difference in WW II was that France gave up. France wasn’t worth dying for. Vichy France and Petain reflected the defeatist attitude that undermined the military.
In later years, the French were full of blame-shifting excuses and explanations for their surrender, but the plain truth was that the French army had been defeated by the end of May 1940, and, having lost their best formations, was no longer capable of sustained and effective resistance. Committing the RAF to the defense of Paris after that would have been both foolish and impractical.
“It’s a shame to hear modern people slander the French in that battle.”
The Germans actually suffered the same casualty rates as they later did in Barbarossa. Except for a few units and the “panzer scare” the French fought hard. I just like to stick it to those mouthy Frenchies when they try to lecture us about appeasement.
Agree. How history may have been different.
Donald Rumsfeld and Jed Babbin got the historical context right:
” “Going to war without France is like going deer hunting without an accordion - you’ll leave a lot of loud, aggravating noise behind.” “
The French should have invaded Germany in September 1939 when the German forces were in Poland. The western border of Germany was undefended and France could have blown through, ending the war early
- - George Patton
yep, the nazis just drove around the end of Maginot line ... i guess they ignored the sign at the Belgium end of the fortification that said “Do Not Drive Around” ...
[same tactic the USA used during against Iraq during Desert Storm]
Lots of good analysis on this thread. Missing though is that Hitler was bluffing and got away with it.
I searched for the article and went around the provided thread link.
Most pundits today fail to realize how important a large fleet of stealth attack are.
All this shouting about drones assumes ground forces are within 20 miles of each other and dug in. The only threat is the other side’s drones.
Laughable.
F-35’s and SDBs turn that model on its head. and after they’re done along comes the big freight haulers to drop tonnage...and more tonnage.
When they are done an army can advance in Subarus and Toyotas.
"paywalled"
“The French did not use the Maginot Line as it was meant, a buffer to allow forces to rally.“
This is it sorta. The Germans bypassed most of the Maginot line. The weakest sections didn’t give time for organized response. The French were completely disorganized after that, and what air power they had was never used effectively. I agree, they weren’t organized, and therefore never rallied, because they were prepared for the speed of the advance.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.