“Mark of the Beast” --The Welfare Program That Led Directly To The Creation Of The US Constitution

Why do we have a constitution? How and why did it come into existence? Just what, exactly, prompted the calling of the Constitutional Convention, which gave birth to it? Most Americans believe, logically enough, that after we sent His Britannic Majesty packing, it was time to create a new government. This is false, and it entirely overlooks the fact that we already had a functioning government at the time of the Convention. That government had been in effect for the entirety of the Revolution and for six years following the final British defeat at Yorktown.

No, the Convention was prompted by internal strife, by domestic corruption, oppression, and chaos, all but forgotten today, that had nothing to do with the departure of the British. That crisis revolved around a welfare program fed by the printing of paper money in some of the newly independent states.

We must be very clear on this point. Though you’ve probably never heard of it, the paper money crisis is the reason we have the Constitution. No other causal issue even comes close. The words of the Framers themselves, and even those of their opponents, the Anti-Federalists, demonstrate this beyond any doubt.

Before diving into the specifics of the paper-money crisis—and it was a crisis, one big enough to warrant the overthrow of one government in favor of another—we’ll take a moment to look at welfare schemes in general, especially as they relate to democratic/representative governments.

Until now, I’ve avoided directly tackling the elephant in the room, that elephant being welfare spending. I’ve certainly discussed welfare spending when I mentioned multinational firms and special interest groups all bothering politicians to make sure that your money ends up in their pockets, but I’ve avoided the “W” word. No more. In this chapter, we will see that we owe the creation of our Constitution to the Framers’ disgust and loathing of a traditional welfare program. It was welfare in its most basic form—a bunch of poor people wanted the money of a smaller group of wealthier people, so they, empowered by democracy, stole it. The Framers’ revulsion at this state of affairs led them to make federal welfare programs unconstitutional.

I cannot undertake to lay my finger on that article in the Federal Constitution which granted a right to Congress of expending, on objects of benevolence, the money of their constituents.

I cannot find any authority in the Constitution for making the federal government the great almoner of public charity throughout the United States. [Such spending] would, in my judgment, be contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, and subversive of the whole theory upon which the union of these States is founded.

I feel obliged to withhold my approval of the plan…to indulge a benevolent and charitable sentiment through the appropriation of public funds….I can find no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution.

That this happened, (people using the government to legislate welfare for themselves) however, should come as no surprise. What did we learn from Federalist 10 in the previous chapter? It is property that divides society and drives the strife that makes government necessary. The Framers knew that the entire history of mankind was one long, sad saga in which those who rule—be they kings, aristocrats, or oligarchs, the many, the few, or the one—oppress those who are ruled.

As Madison noted, the oppression can and will take many forms, but, given that the unequal distribution of property is “the most common and durable” source of factional strife, we could easily guess what form this oppression would most often take. As if Madison needed to tell us: the powerful rob the powerless.

And history, both ancient and the history that they were living at the time of the Convention, informed the Framers that a democratic/representative government, a government of “the people,” without proper safeguards, would be no different.

Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many.

Yes, even under a democratic government, somebody rules and somebody’s about to get robbed. So, who was in charge in America in 1787?

People, especially people with power, are not to be trusted. This does not change just because those in charge are the majority, the “common folk.” Empowered people inevitably oppress those without power. In a democratic form of government, the rich minority will be powerless against the poor majority, and hence their property/money will be threatened.

And that’s exactly what was happening in America in 1787 with paper money. And the reason the Constitutional Convention was called was because indebted farmers were using the power of democracy to steal money from their creditors.

“Extend it [the vote] equally to all, and the rights of property or the claims of justice may be overruled by a majority without property or interested in measures of injustice. Of this abundant proof is afforded by other popular governments, and is not without examples in our own….

In civilized communities, property as well as personal rights is an essential object of the laws, which encourage industry by securing the enjoyment of its fruits….

In a just and a free Government, therefore, the rights both of property and of persons ought to be effectually guarded. Will the former be so in case of a universal and equal suffrage? Will the latter be so in case of a suffrage confined to the holders of property?

…On the other hand, the danger to the holders of property cannot be disguised, if they be undefended against a majority without property.”

Yes, the Framers wrote the Constitution to safeguard against the chief defect of democratic/representative government—the oppression of the wealthy minority by the poor majority. This will become even more clear when we examine Article I, Section X of the Constitution.

Here is Richard Henry Lee (or possibly Melancton Smith) writing as the Federal Farmer in opposition to the new federal government explaining why the Convention was called.

Our governments have been new and unsettled; and several legislatures, by making paper money laws, have given just cause of uneasiness to creditors. By these and other causes, several orders of men in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a change of government. And this very abuse of power in the legislatures, which in some cases has been charged upon the democratic part of the community (the common man, the poor), has furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons, and those very means, with which, in great measure, they are rapidly effecting their favourite object….

The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and tender laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in government, which otherwise they would not have thought of.

James Madison wrote “Vices of the Political System of the United States” just before the Convention for the same reason: to explain why the Convention was being called and to lay out the national political “vices” that made a new government necessary. He wrote of 12 different vices. Paper money, only one of the 12, took up 1,200 of the 3,100 words, more than any other subject. This was nearly three times the number of words dedicated to the next leading subject. Freedom of speech, worship, and the press were not mentioned even once.

What concerned Madison most in “Vices” was not only that the states were flouting national regulations, but that they were treating unjustly certain minorities [the creditor class] within their own borders.

…Madison was especially troubled by the stay laws and tender laws and the paper money that so many of the plain people of the country were clamoring for. These laws, Madison believed, were “oppressing” the creditor minority.

There is a very good reason Madison “believed” paper money laws were “oppressing” the creditor minority, and that’s because paper money laws were oppressing the creditor minority. And yes, when the Framers speak of “the minority,” they are most often speaking of the wealthy, and that’s because it’s all about money. As John Adams said, “The great art of law-giving consists in balancing the poor against the rich.”

Notice the quotation about the creditor minority above. It’s not simply the age-old story of government favoring one group over another. It is more specific than that. It reflects what we’ve already noted as the central problem of a republican/democratic form of government—the less well-off majority using their power to take from the wealthy minority.

And the story of paper money reflects that perfectly. It is a simple tale of greed and corruption fueled by the power of democracy degenerating into oppression and turmoil. For the Framers, paper money was the manifestation of all their fears of mob rule and the chaos that comes with it. Yes, there were other issues and concerns, chiefly the tendency of the states to strangle interstate trade and the fear that the states might constantly war with each other, much like the European powers, or be weak in the face of foreign attack, but, other than the trade issue, these things were merely theoretical in nature, while paper money was all too real.

Without the impetus of the paper-money crisis, there simply would have been no convention in 1787. There just would have been no urgency in the states to bother with a convention lacking that critical spark.

As you read of paper money, you might wonder just exactly what the fuss was all about. After all, most of us have spent the entirety of our lives in a world where the feds spend staggering sums incomprehensible to the human mind on near numberless welfare programs.

When 50% of the federal budget is “income redistribution” of one form or another, the idea that the Framers would overthrow a government because of a single welfare scheme is surely inconceivable. But that is the fact of the matter, and it says all you need to know about the Framers’ views on your paycheck.

Furthermore, “paper-money schemes could not stand on their own and necessarily spawned a whole series of additional laws, each one more odious than its predecessor, to prop up the whole corrupt edifice.”

“The Colliers tell us that the paper money crisis began when debtors, usually farmers struggling to make loan payments, would turn to their state legislatures and push for the creation of paper money. That was welfare pure and simple, as the paper money had nowhere near the worth of the gold, silver, or other medium of payment specified in original loan documents, and that, of course, was exactly the idea behind the legislation. Debtors also forced the creation of such extraordinary measures as ‘stay laws,’ which postponed or even canceled debt collection. Then there were the awful ‘tender laws,’ and ‘ex post facto laws,’ which actually compelled unwilling creditors to accept the newly printed paper money regardless of what the preexisting contract specified. Printing paper money was one thing, but to actually nullify preexisting contracts and force creditors to accept it in payment was simply more than the Framers could tolerate.”

Barring all these legislative efforts, armed farmer bands took to forcibly closing down sheriffs’ auctions of debtors’ property. They shut down and even burned courthouses, and finally, they fielded a rebel army that was quickly defeated in Massachusetts.

“But it was the example of Rhode Island that most horrified the Framers. The legislature, dominated by indebted farmers, circulated paper money that creditors naturally refused to accept. The legislature then made acceptance mandatory. Many creditors at this point actually fled the state to avoid the dreaded paper. The government’s answer was simply to pass more corrupt legislation, this time allowing debtors to legally discharge the debt by depositing money with courts and posting an advertisement attesting to such in newspapers.”

For those who might think that the wealthy will always be fine and need no protections, this is a sobering tale. For the creditor class of Rhode Island, their wealth was powerless in the face of unchecked democracy. Again, they fled the state—they actually left their homes—and still the mob stole from them.

“Things got nastier still. When Rhode Island’s supreme court declared the paper-money law unconstitutional, the legislature simply threw the court out of office and replaced the justices” with, according to Madison, “willing instruments of the wicked and arbitrary plans of their masters.”

“Property rights aside, the Framers believed that the baneful effects of all the legislative chaos, the internal turmoil, and the international ridicule and disrepute generated threatened the very existence of the nation.” It was long past time to fix things.

The following citations, virtually all from Madison’s Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, demonstrate just how consumed the Framers were with stopping “the democratic part of the community” from using the power of democracy to gang up on the rich and take their property through the use of paper money.

Amazingly, again and again and again, we see from these citations that proposed legislative schemes, philosophies of representation, and existing political arrangements are all judged good or bad based almost solely on whether or not they had prevented, would likely lead to, or had already led to the creation of paper money.

The simple fact of the matter is that virtually every single time the Framers seek to find an example of something “evil” or “wicked” to be avoided, something they wish their Constitution to repress, they turn to paper money. Mentions of the rights with which we are today so obsessed are conspicuous only in their total absence.

So frightening was the specter of paper money that Convention delegate George Read said that granting the federal government the power to issue it “would be as alarming as the mark of the Beast in Revelation.”

New Hampshire delegate John Langdon said he would “rather reject the whole plan” than see the federal government granted this power.

He was persuaded there was a better chance for proper elections by the people, if divided into large districts, than by the state legislatures. Paper money had been issued by the latter, when the former were against it.

He differed from gentlemen who thought that a choice by the people would be a better guard against bad measures than by the legislatures. A majority of the people in South Carolina were notoriously for paper money as a legal tender; the Legislature had refused to make it a legal tender. The reason was, that the latter had some sense of character and were restrained by that consideration.

The great evils complained of were, that the state legislatures ran into schemes of paper-money, etc., whenever solicited by the people, and sometimes without even the sanction of the people. Their influence, then, instead of checking a like propensity in the National Legislature, may be expected to promote it.

Mr. Gerry insisted, that the commercial and moneyed interest would be more secure in the hands of the state legislatures than of the people at large. The former have more sense of character, and will be restrained by that from injustice. The people are for paper money, when the legislatures are against it.

Speaking of a proposed federal veto power on all state laws that were contrary to the Constitution, Madison notes that during the Convention, Elbridge Gerry was generally against it, but that “He had no objection to authorize a negative to paper money, and similar measures.”

Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the power, that each may defend itself against the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper-money instalment laws, etc.

The internal police, as it would be called and understood by the states, ought to be infringed in many cases, as in the case of paper money, and other tricks by which citizens of other states may be affected.

In Rhode Island, the judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law [paper money law] were displaced; and others substituted, by the legislature, who would be the willing instruments of the wicked and arbitrary plans of their masters.

Rhode Island is a full illustration of the insensibility to character produced by a participation of numbers, in dishonorable measures, and of the length to which a public body may carry wickedness and cabal.

The check provided in the second branch [Senate] was not meant as a check on legislative usurpations of power, but on the abuse of lawful powers, on the propensity in the first branch to legislate too much, to run into projects of paper money and similar expedients.

Either bad laws will be pushed or not. On the latter supposition, no check will be wanted; on the former, a strong check will be necessary. And this is the proper supposition. Emissions of paper money, largesses to the people, a remission of debts, and similar measures, will at some times be popular, and will be pushed for that reason.

— Gouverneur Morris, on the need of a strong judiciary to check the legislature

He had also known good produced by an apprehension of it [making less than a majority a quorum in both House and Senate]. He had known a paper emission prevented by that cause in Virginia.

He recited the history of paper emissions, and the perseverance of the legislative assemblies in repeating them, with all the distressing effects of such measures before their eyes.

Speculating that national legislators would thankfully not be driven by the same interests as their counterparts in the state governments, interests that had given rise to paper money, Madison notes that,

There has not been any moment since the peace at which the representatives of the Union would have given an assent to paper money or any other measure of a kindred nature.

So what did the Framers do to rectify this situation? Where is the constitutional salvation from the evil of paper money? Relief lies in Article I, Section X [appended at the end of this chapter]. It is in Section X that we find the relatively few things that that state governments may not do.” And on that list, of course, we find abridging contracts, issuing paper money, or making anything but gold and silver legal in the discharge of debts. Simple, done, finished, end of story.

But there are amazing things, incredible things, hidden in Article I, Section X, things not stated, words not written, that reveal more about how the Framers viewed your money than just about anything else you could name.

To fully understand this, we must revisit our old friend, the Bill of Rights. We must also understand that until well into the 1900s, the Bill of Rights did not in any way apply to the states. The Bill of Rights restricted the federal government and the federal government alone. Period. After all, the first words of the First Amendment read, “Congress shall make no law…” If you find this unbelievable, and almost everybody does, Google will reveal the truth of the matter in well under five seconds.

“In other words, until after the Constitution was amended following the Civil War, the states had absolute power to engage in censorship, regulate the press, suppress free speech, or even establish a state-supported church, which, in fact, many of the states actually did.” Forrest McDonald writes in Novus Ordo Seclorum that “At the time of the Revolution, for example, most of the colonies had tax-supported churches; all except Rhode Island imposed legal restrictions on various sects and penalties for dissenters, apostates, blasphemers and idolators were numerous and severe.’[ ]”

Furthermore, McDonald writes that these internal police powers left to the states were “nearly unlimited” and “were not affected by the subsequent adoption of the bill of rights.” McDonald notes that the states could “establish the mode and manner of religious worship and instruction, and they could levy taxes for the support of religion…[and] they could stifle dissent, stifle freedom of the press, of speech, of inquiry. They could regulate food, drink, and clothing.”

When we talk about regulating food, drink, and clothing, we are not talking about protecting the people from tainted meat, or ensuring that their woolens have a minimally acceptable percentage of wool. We are talking about sumptuary laws, defined by Britannica.com as:

Any law designed to restrict excessive personal expenditures in the interest of preventing extravagance and luxury. The term denotes regulations restricting extravagance in food, drink, dress, and household equipment, usually on religious or moral grounds.

Again, the U.S. Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, and Article I, Section X, did nothing to change any of that. The Framers did not lift a finger or write a syllable to alter that state of affairs, and the last state-established church in America didn’t vanish until the 1830s.

Can there be a stronger statement about how the Framers viewed your money? Paper-money welfare? Not a chance. State-sponsored church? Not a problem.

Before leaving paper money, let’s reexamine Madison from Federalist 10. In the previous chapter, we noted how the highlighted words came down to money, money, and money. Now we can be a bit more precise—these highlighted words actually come down to welfare, welfare, and welfare.

A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it.

Let’s give John Adams the last words on welfare, shall we? The below passages are so perfect and so stunning I’ll let them speak for themselves. Would it be terribly repetitive of me to alert you to the “frankly religious intensity” of the words to come?

Oh, and in case you’re like those government men from Raiders of the Lost Ark and Sunday school just was not your thing, “the lamb committed…” is a biblical reference. In that Bible passage, the lamb is Jesus. And in Adam’s words, the lamb is…money. Wow!

Property must be secured, or liberty cannot exist: but if unlimited, or unbalanced power of disposing property, be put into the hands of those who have no property, France will find, as we have found, the lamb committed to the custody of the world. In such a case, all the pathetic exhortations and addresses of the National Assembly to the people, to respect property, will be regarded no more than the warbles of the songsters of the forest. The great art of law-giving consists in balancing the poor against the rich in the legislature.

Suppose a nation, rich and poor, high and low, ten millions in number, all assembled together; not more than one or two millions will have lands, houses, or any personal property; if we take into the account the women and children, or even if we leave them out of the question, a great majority of every nation is wholly destitute of property, except a small quantity of clothes, and a few trifles of other moveables. Would Mr. Nedham[ ] be responsible that, if all were to be decided by a vote of the majority, the eight or nine millions who have no property would not think of usurping over the rights of the one or two millions who have? Property is surely a right of mankind as really as liberty. Perhaps, at first, prejudice, habit, shame, or fear, principle or religion, would restrain the poor from attacking the rich, and the idle from usurping on the industrious; but the time would not be long before courage and enterprise would come, and pretexts be invented by degrees, to countenance the majority in dividing all the property among them, or, at least in sharing it equally with its present possessors. Debts would be abolished, first; taxes laid heavy on the rich, and not at all on the others; and at last a downright equal division of everything be demanded, and voted. What would be the consequence of this? The idle, the vicious, the intemperate, would rush into the utmost extravagance of debauchery, sell and spend all their share, and then demand a new division of those who purchased from them. The moment the idea is admitted into society, that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence. If “Thou shalt not covet,” and “Thou shalt not steal,” were not commandments of Heaven, they must be made inviolable precepts in every society before it can be civilized or made free.

John Adams on why the Constitution was designed to keep poor people from stealing from rich people. Note the starkly religious tones he uses when talking about YOUR MONEY.

“Suppose a nation, rich and poor, high and low, ten millions in number, all assembled together; not more than one or two millions will have lands, houses, or any personal property; if we take into the account the women and children, or even if we leave them out of the question, a great majority of every nation is wholly destitute of property, except a small quantity of clothes, and a few trifles of other moveables. Would Mr. Nedham[ ] be responsible that, if all were to be decided by a vote of the majority, the eight or nine millions who have no property would not think of usurping over the rights of the one or two millions who have? Property is surely a right of mankind as really as liberty. Perhaps, at first, prejudice, habit, shame, or fear, principle or religion, would restrain the poor from attacking the rich, and the idle from usurping on the industrious; but the time would not be long before courage and enterprise would come, and pretexts be invented by degrees, to countenance the majority in dividing all the property among them, or, at least in sharing it equally with its present possessors. Debts would be abolished, first; taxes laid heavy on the rich, and not at all on the others; and at last a downright equal division of everything be demanded, and voted. What would be the consequence of this? The idle, the vicious, the intemperate, would rush into the utmost extravagance of debauchery, sell and spend all their share, and then demand a new division of those who purchased from them. The moment the idea is admitted into society, that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence. If “Thou shalt not covet,” and “Thou shalt not steal,” were not commandments of Heaven, they must be made inviolable precepts in every society before it can be civilized or made free.”

James Madison, chief author of the Cons. said it. Did you read the pieces.

Also, the anti-feds admitted it.

Here is Richard Henry Lee (or possibly Melancton Smith) writing as the Federal Farmer in opposition to the new federal government explaining why the Convention was called.

Our governments have been new and unsettled; and several legislatures, by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, have given just cause of uneasiness to creditors. By these and other causes, several orders of men in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a change of government. And this very abuse of power in the legislatures, which in some cases has been charged upon the democratic part of the community, has furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons, and those very means, with which, in great measure, they are rapidly effecting their favourite object….

The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and tender laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in government, WHICH OTHERWISE THEY WOULD NOT HAVE THOUGHT OF.”

Or, as the Colliers said in “Decision in Philadelphia”

What concerned Madison MOST in “Vices” was not only that the states were flouting national regulations, but that they were treating unjustly certain minorities [the creditor class] within their own borders.

Yes, it was.

New Hampshire delegate John Langdon said he would “rather reject the whole plan” than see the federal government granted this power.

— James Madison, speaking of George Mason at the Convention

— James Madison, speaking of Charles Pinckney at the Convention

— James Madison

— James Madison, speaking of Elbridge Gerry at the Convention

— Alexander Hamilton

— Gouverneur Morris

— James Madison

— Nathaniel Gorham

— Gouverneur Morris

— Gouverneur Morris, on the need of a strong judiciary to check the legislature

He had also known good produced by an apprehension of it [making less than a majority a quorum in both House and Senate]. He had known a paper emission prevented by that cause in Virginia.

— James Madison, speaking of George Mason at the Convention

He recited the history of paper emissions, and the perseverance of the legislative assemblies in repeating them, with all the distressing effects of such measures before their eyes.

— James Madison, speaking of Gouverneur Morris at the Convention

There has not been any moment since the peace at which the representatives of the Union would have given an assent to paper money or any other measure of a kindred nature.

From Decision in Philadelphia:
What concerned Madison most was not only that the states were flouting national regulations, but that they were treating unjustly certain minorities [the creditor class] within their own borders.

From Brave AI The French government was concerned about the stability of American paper money. The Americans used French funds to help pay back domestic loans and maintain financial credibility, as the French livres were a strong, recognized currency that encouraged people to lend money to the government, believing they would be repaid.

The French government provided loans totaling over two million dollars, primarily negotiated by Benjamin Franklin, and also supplied war materiel through secret corporations to avoid provoking Britain.

However, the American reliance on printing paper money, which could lead to inflation, was a concern, especially as the war progressed and the financial burden grew.

The French were aware that if the Americans failed to meet their financial obligations, faith in the economy could collapse, which would undermine the entire war effort.

Despite these concerns, France continued to support the Americans, providing both loans and gifts, including a final loan of three million livres in 1783.

The French ambassador to the United States after the American Revolutionary War, Edmond-Charles Genet, arrived in 1793 during George Washington's presidency and was concerned about the United States' financial stability, particularly regarding its paper currency and debt obligations. Genet sought American support for France's war against Britain and Spain, including funding for privateers to attack British shipping, and he hoped to secure repayment for French debts incurred during the American Revolution.

However, his actions were seen as a violation of U.S. neutrality, which President Washington had declared in April 1793 to avoid entanglement in European conflicts.

Genet's efforts to involve American citizens in the war and his demands for financial support were met with resistance from Washington and his cabinet, especially Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, who was wary of the U.S. financial situation and the risks of war.

Although Genet was eventually recalled, his mission highlighted the growing concerns about U.S. fiscal responsibility and the credibility of American paper money in international diplomacy.

Without trade, the USA was not going to generate ANY money to pay debts. Without a navy to protect that merchant shipping, those debts could not be paid. By the time of Jefferson's Presidency, payments to the Barbary Pirates were the largest line item in the Federal Budget.

Moreover, the principal source of Federal revenue were tariffs. No trade, no revenue. No navy, no trade. Ships aren't cheap. After the Revolutionary War, the US was broke and needed money. Nobody wanted to loan it when they were to be paid with paper.

All completely irrelevant.
Notice the last loan mentioned is in 1783.
The US central government under the AOC was NOT using Rhode Island’s or Maryland’s or Virginia’s money to repay war debt. Period. The term “war debt” appears in the Federalist Papers exactly... ZERO times.

From “Decision in Philadelphia”
What concerned Madison most was not only that the states were flouting national regulations, but that they were treating unjustly certain minorities [the creditor class] within their own borders.

Again: the STATES AFTER THE WAR began printing paper money to allow the poor to steal from the rich.

From the piece:
“The Colliers tell us that the paper money crisis began when debtors, usually farmers struggling to make loan payments, would turn to their state legislatures and push for the creation of paper money. That was welfare pure and simple, as the paper money had nowhere near the worth of the gold, silver, or other medium of payment specified in original loan documents, and that, of course, was exactly the idea behind the legislation. Debtors also forced the creation of such extraordinary measures as ‘stay laws,’ which postponed or even canceled debt collection. Then there were the awful ‘tender laws,’ and ‘ex post facto laws,’ which actually compelled unwilling creditors to accept the newly printed paper money regardless of what the preexisting contract specified. Printing paper money was one thing, but to actually nullify preexisting contracts and force creditors to accept it in payment was simply more than the Framers could tolerate.”

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