Trump NC, Cali visits live updates: President, first lady Melania to tour areas ravaged by hurricanes, fires

Schiffty should be chatting about his crimes and pardon.

Trump will get things done regardless if it’s a red or blue state.

Trump is talking to the crowd right now att the airport.

Not a single alphabet network airing this

I'm betting that Trump will order immediate construction of buildings to house anyone who needs it and the National Guard to bring in supplies and order Congress to provide additional funding.

Think Washington at Valley Forge.

Fema gets shut down.
He said that the states should manage these disasters now since Fema has failed.

I agree and each state should be able to call on immediate relief from neighbor states, which they do now, but a consortium of enjoinging states should plan on future disasters.

Family down the road had friends who watched their house get taken down a river. The guy called fema to register and the SOB at fema told them to start a go fund me page and hung up.

Shut it down and FIRE, every single one. Out with all of them.

I agree and each state should be able to call on immediate relief from neighbor states, which they do now, but a consortium of enjoinging states should plan on future disasters.

That's the way that Article IV "republicanism" was expected to work. The federal government was not expected to provide everything, they were there to enable the states to work together to respond to local domestic issues.

The following is James Madison's writings on invasion, insurrection, and domestic violence in the Constitution, but the same can be applied to responding to natural disasters.

When the Framers insisted that the states guarantee a republican form of government and protection from invasion, it was for the fear of larger states invading smaller states and expecting neighboring states to band together to repel the invasion. By extension, the Framers expected the states to police each other, as the federal government didn't have the expansive resources to act as a centralized ruling body with enforcement power. It was only supposed to act within its narrow delegated powers.

As James Madison wrote in Federalist #43, the states were expected to police themselves against invasion and insurrection:

6. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution?

Madison sets up the argument by pointing out that the several states are of like disposition. A "superintending government" (the federal government, in this case) is the natural home for the authority to defend the system (republicanism). The more alike the states are, the more interested the states will become in each other's affairs, and the more desirable it will be for each state to maintain its form of government in harmony with the others.

Madison then gives a brief history lesson of past confederacies of dissimilar city-states.

Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate republic of Germany,'' says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland. '' "Greece was undone,'' he adds, "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons.'' In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves.

Madison goes on to say that the federal government is not expected to enforce republicanism onto the states, it is enough to simply "guaranty" to the states a republican form of government, and the states will take care of enforcing it on each other.

These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority.
But the authority extends no further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.

This is how Madison disposes of the word "guarantee" in Article IV -- it is limited to the federal government issuing the guaranty to the states, but not enforcing it onto the states from above. The states were expected to police themselves based on their mutual common alignments, unlike how the "free cities and petty states, subject to different princes" of Europe behaved.

Regarding invasion, Madison expresses the fear that larger states will invade smaller states, but the other states will intervene to keep the peace.

A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and modern confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article. Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded;

Regarding insurrection, Madison writes that the federal government must support the state governments to quell insurrections because the federal and state constitutions are too interwoven to let domestic violence go unchecked. Madison thinks that the threat of federal involvement is sufficient to prevent an insurrection from starting.:

Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.

Madison writes about the fear of foreign influence in a state (an invasion of aliens) fomenting violence amongst the citizens, but that the remedy is the federal government organizing the neutral states to intervene on behalf of the rest of the nation.

...May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves. In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection of friends...
and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which no possible constitution can provide a cure. Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound."

We have to understand that the Framers were less concerned about foreign invasion than they were about one state invading another state. Madison discusses protection from invasion and protection from domestic violence as the same issue from a federal perspective.

...the history of [the Swiss cantons] informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded...
Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State...
there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other.
Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government.
It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest.

Madison then suggests that it is the neighboring states that should be the active bodies that quell domestic violence, not the federal government.

In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection of friends.

Finally, Madison summarizes the entirety of Federalist #43 with this plea to the states: that the obligations between states is more than just legislative ratification of a compact between states (like the Articles of Confederation). The several states can no longer take a breach of the Articles as an excuse to break the compact. the time has come to put effort into keeping the compact intact by mutually working to protect it.

PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictate.

Madison's point to Article IV Section 4 is this: The federal government wasn't expected to act directly, the states were empowered to mutually act on its behalf to protect against invasion. This was the expected intent of the federal government.

It's easy to see how this arrangement between the states would both support state sovereignty to work with their neighbors, and to localize responses to natural disasters while being supported by the federal government as needed.

What it does is get the federal government out of the critical path by making the states the first responders, not FEMA.

-PJ

Trump suggests he may be 'getting rid of FEMA'
By Josh Christenson
President Trump in a briefing with hurricane-hit residents of North Carolina suggested his administration may be "getting rid of FEMA."

"I think we're going to recommend that FEMA go away, and we pay directly," Trump said. "We pay a percentage to the state. But the state should fix this."

"FEMA has been a very big disappointment. They cost a tremendous amount of money. It's very bureaucratic and it's very slow," he added before joking: "Other than that, we're very happy with them."

"Some residents still don't have hot water or drinking water or anything else," the president said earlier of the state of destruction in western North Carolina around four months since Hurricane Helene.

I agree, of course.

You have no friggan idea what i have seen working on federal run disasters.

From clearing county road right of ways brcause these counties use Federal disaster funds to do work they are required to do themselves to watching fire fighting dip helicopters sitting and getting paid full pay...even equipment and men.
Then having been shot at in NO doing clean up..etc.
The whole thing is corrupt.

Was told the other day that there are still houses that are tarped in Joplin MO from that tornado that went through there years ago.

I didnt get a chance to work on that one.

The fact that he can walk up and down the stairs of Air Force One without tripping or needing a handler is already a 100% improvement.

No loss, nobody’s watching them anyway.

I wish he wasn’t going to Asheville. Too many hippies there.

Shelby would be a more representative place.

The airport is in Asheville, but are right about the hippies and dopers. I hope the President has time for Swannanoa, Spruce Pine, Burnsville, Chimney Rock, and Lake Lure.

👍
Well said.
I mentioned in another post that Trump is President to all citizens.

A LOT of local Helene victims will NOT ‘do business’ with FEMA, even though it is probably costing them money. I am one of them.

OF COURSE NOT!!!!!

IN ONE SINGLE TRIP HE WILL SHOW HOW ROTTEN FEMA HAS PERFORMED

THE SNOW DOWN SOUTH:

WISCONSIN SENT snowplows to those states. THAT IS A LONG DRIVE IN A SNOWPLOW!!!!

NOT FEMA

Governors helping governors. WITHOUT FEMA INTERFERENCE

DIDN’T ASHEVILLE GET THE MOST DAMAGE & THE LEAST HELP???

Brian Glenn asked about getting money to local orgs, right?

The people that are affected by this are Democrats and Republicans. It really doesn’t matter how they vote,” Schiff told MSNBC host Joe Scarborough.

_______________

Suddenly, they all matter! Just few weeks ago, only Democrats mattered!