The Battle of Midway

On Christmas Day 1941 Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived by Catalina flying boat to take command. He did not bring any staff with him. When the door opened, he was assailed by a poisonous atmosphere from black oil, charred wood, burned paint, and rotting flesh. The boat ride to shore engulfed the party in the panorama of sunken hulls and floating wreckage, punctuated by the bodies of dead sailors still surfacing from the blasted ships.

He spent the first days learning everything he could about his new assignment and confirmed the public’s perception was wrong. The dry-docks, repair shops, and fuel tank farm were intact. The carriers with their escorts, and the submarines stood ready to take the offensive. He immediately sent submarines into Japanese waters, and conducted carrier operations disrupting Japanese Initiatives. Admiral Raymond Spruance said of Nimitz, “The one big thing about him was that he was always ready to fight….And he wanted officers who would push the fight to the Japanese”.

Nimitz decided some very good men had taken a terrible beating and were now suffering terrible reminders and apprehensions. When he officially took command December 31, he told the assembled staffs he had complete and unlimited confidence in every one of them. He related that as head of officer personnel in Washington, he knew they had been selected for their competence. But if any wanted to leave, he would individually discuss their futures and do all he could to get them the assignments they wanted.

However, there were a few key staff members he wanted to stay with him. They included Commander Joe Rochefort, Jr. and Captain Edwin T. Layton. There intelligence unit had not unscrambled the new Japanese call signs or broken into the revised naval code to warn of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, these men later provided the key intelligence convincing Nimitz to hazard all his carriers at Midway.

For the Japanese the battle for Midway was part of their strategy for establishing the next line of their Pacific Ocean defensive parameter. They intended to conquer Port Moresby in New Guinea, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia, and the Western Aleutians. Thereby, Australia would be severed as a base for an American counter-offensive and the northern flank of the Home Islands would be protected. Specifically, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto considered this initiative would provide the opportunity to draw out Nimitz for the decisive naval battle contemplated by American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan.

This sea fight began with Chester Nimitz determined to meet the enemy in a major battle, but he faced long odds. Solid intelligence had discerned a complex plan disbursing Japanese forces, but Nimitz still had to consider the information could be a ruse, because the basic principle of U.S. intelligence that an enemy will act according to the best use of their capabilities. For Nimitz that meant giving weight to concentration as the best option. He was also troubled by the uncertainty of locating enemy dispositions expected because of storms west and northwest of Midway. In fact, weather was to play an important part in hiding Japanese carriers from detection. Both sides experienced Horatio Nelson’s admonition that “something must be left to chance; nothing is certain in a sea fight”.

His final instructions to admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher were, “In carrying out the task assigned in Op Plan 29-42, you will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you will interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without the prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy”. To understand Nimitz’s and the flyers tenuous position consider that gathering every available U.S. Navy ship achieved an order of battle for Midway, where they might be outnumbered more than three to one.

Author Gordon W. Prange compiled the order of battle for the navies. The Japanese had 4 heavy carriers, 2 light carriers, 11 battleships, 10 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and 53 destroyers for a total of 86 ships. The United States had 3 carriers no light carriers or battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and seventeen destroyers or a total of 27 ships.

To balance the odds somewhat Nimitz had decided to make Midway Island his fourth aircraft carrier. He crowded the island with 115 aircraft, including the untried (B-17 & B-26) and obsolete (Vindicator & Brewster Buffalo).

This abbreviated narrative now excludes the contribution of thousands, whose combined efforts provided the vital margin needed for victory. Preparing Midway for invasion and assembling the carrier task forces at point “Luck” to attack the Japanese required prodigious achievements in logistics, ship repair, and inspired assessments of naval intelligence. This narrative also does not describe how paying the more bitter price for mistakes in strategic planning, tactical execution, and operational doctrines contributed heavily to the Japanese defeat. Instead the narrative relates the fearful sacrifice of a few brave men, who in close combat attacked the four heavy carriers of the First Carrier Striking Force on June 4, 1942.

The Japanese transport group was discovered on June 3, but the next morning the curtain rose for the carrier battle. At 5:30AM the PBY patrol by Lieutenant Howard Ady radioed discovery of the Japanese carriers. Fifteen minutes later the PBY patrol by Lieutenant William Chase radioed in the clear, “Many planes headed Midway. Bearing 320 degrees distance 150 miles. These warnings enabled the remaining 66 aircraft crammed onto Midway to get into the air. The updates provided by Ady enabled Admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher to launch carrier attacks. All Midway aircraft made attacks against the Japanese carriers except for 21 Marine Brewster Buffalos and 7 Wildcat fighters dedicated to repelling the attackers.

In the ensuing Japanese attack on Midway beginning at 6:16AM, 14 of the 21 Brewster fighter pilots died prompting Captain Philip R. White to say, “It is my belief that any commander that orders pilots out for combat in F2A-3’s (Brewster Buffalo) should consider them lost before leaving the ground”. Captain Francis McCarthy, flying one of the Wildcats, was also killed after shooting down one of eight Zeros attacking him and wingman Lt. Roy Corry Jr. Overall only 10 fighters survived the fight and only two were in shape to fly again.

The attacks by land-based planes on the Japanese carriers began at 7:48AM. First six TBF Avenger torpedo bombers lead by Navy Lieutenant Langdon K. Fieberling of Torpedo 8 made their attack. These were some of the new torpedo bombers that should have replaced the hopelessly outdated Devastators Lt. Cdr. John Waldron had onboard Hornet, but the Avengers were 24 hours late reaching Hawaii. The planes obtained no hits, but five of six aircraft were destroyed including Fieberling’s and only two of 18 men survived to return to Midway. Ens. Bert Earnest and Radioman Harry Ferrier thereby became with Ens. George Gay the other two “lone survivors” of Torpedo 8.

Next the Army Air Corps made its first appearance. Captain James Collins lead four Army B-26 medium bombers rigged to carry torpedoes in the first ever attempt to attack enemy ships. They had to launch at less than 1,000 yards to hit 30 knot aircraft carriers with 33 knot torpedoes. Also, most torpedoes failed when released at over 50 feet and at speeds exceeding 126 mph; a speed at which this aircraft often stalled and crashed when attempting to land. Two of four planes with their 7-man crews perished, and no hits were obtained.

Marine dive bombers closely followed the B-26’s. At 7:55AM Major Lofton Henderson (for whom Henderson Field at Guadalcanal was named) attacked with 16 Dauntless bombers of which 8 were lost with their two-man crews. Henderson’s crews were untrained in dive bombing tactics and again no hits were obtained.

Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney at 8:39AM lead 13 long range Army B-17’s over Nagumo’s position in a level bombing attack from 20,000 feet and obtained no hits on the carriers or escorts. One aircraft was damaged by a Zero and one man was injured. The Japanese were reluctant to attack the heavily armed bombers, but had no trouble evading the bombs dropped nearly four miles above them.

At 8:30AM Marine Major Benjamin Norris led eleven Vindicator dive bombers to the Japanese fleet. The aircraft were considered so ancient pilots called them “wind indicators”. These planes displayed such fragility their fabric fuselage was reinforced with 4” hospital masking tape. They never reached the carriers and unsuccessfully attacked a battleship. Amazingly only two fell to enemy attacks, but two more were lost at sea with their two-man crews because of low fuel. By June 6 only three were flyable. The Battle of Midway was this aircraft’s only combat use. The plane was pulled from service in 1943.

Next into the battle from 9:18AM to10:15AM came Torpedo 3, Torpedo 6, and Torpedo 8 from the USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise, and USS Hornet respectively. In all Lt. Commander Lance E. Massey, Lt. Commander Gene Lindsey, and Lt. Commander John Waldron lead 42 Devastator torpedo bombers. The squadrons had become separated from their dive bombers and fighters that were intended to accompany them for coordinated attacks. Waldron left the other Hornet aircraft deliberately replying to Lt. Commander Stanhope C. Ring’s order to follow him, “I know where the damn Jap fleet is. The hell with you”. Now alone these 100 mph torpedo bombers had to evade 300 mph Zero fighters, and withstand concentrated task force anti-aircraft fire before launching at less than 1,000 yards.

In pressing home their attacks, 35 aircraft with their two-man crews were lost. Ens. George H. Gay, Jr., who crashed in the midst of the Japanese carriers, was the lone survivor of this Torpedo 8 attack and was rescued by a PBY the next day. The only fighters about were six from Fighting 3 lead by Lt. Commander “Jimmy” Thach that tangled with a horde of Zero fighters and lost one aircraft. Those from Fighting 6 lead by Lieutenant Jim Gray lost track of their torpedo bombers and kept circling at 20,000 feet to protect the dive bombers they never found. Eventually these fighters returned to the Enterprise in total frustration.

The USS Hornet fighters and dive bombers spent a fruitless morning. Lt. Commander Ring led Bombing 8, Scouting 8, and Fighting 8 exactly as ordered by Captain Marc Mitscher and then searched to the south until fuel was critical and each squadron proceeded independently. Lt. Commander Robert R. Johnson leading Bombing 8 was unable to find the Hornet and landed on Midway, but 3 of the 14 aircraft had to ditch on the way for lack of fuel. Lieutenant Stan Ruehlow leading Fighting 8 remained determined to find the Hornet, but all ten aircraft had to ditch, and Ens. Mark Kelly and Ens. George R. Hill were never found. That morning there were 29 empty seats in the Hornet ready room. Fifteen seats belonged to Torpedo 8 pilots slaughtered that morning by the Japanese. The 11 were for Bombing 8 that refueled at Midway and later returned to the Hornet.

The Japanese carrier task force had withstood eight separate attacks over nearly three hours without a single hit. Not counting the B-17’s that stayed at 20,000 feet, Navy, Marine, and Army flyers pressed home attacks with 79 aircraft. Of those 58 were destroyed, 126 of 174 men perished, and no hits were obtained. While the Japanese found satisfaction in thwarting the attacks, they faced complete frustration in efforts to re-arm and spot aircraft from the hanger decks to strike the American carriers.

Now at 10:20AM Bombing 3, Scouting 6 and Bombing 6 from the USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise respectively found the carriers. They arrived over the carriers while most Zero fighters were still at low altitude finishing off the last American torpedo bombers. The 18 planes of Commander Max Leslie’s Bombing 3 delivered three fatal hits to one carrier, probably the Soryu. For Bombing 6 and Scouting 6, Lieutenant Wade McClusky as group commander, and Lieutenants Earl Gallaher and Richard Best as section leaders attacked the Akagi and Kaga. Most of Best’s section incorrectly followed McClusky and Gallaher in attacks that inflicted five hits and five near misses on the Kaga. Best and his two wingmen attacked the Akagi. The two wingmen obtained near misses, but Best’s 1,000 lb bomb exploded amongst aircraft on the hanger deck to start an uncontrollable fire.

The Japanese task forces that had been impervious to harm from 7:48AM to 10:23AM saw three of their heavy carriers turned into burning wreckage in six minutes. However, a price had to be paid. Max Leslie’s planes returned safely, but Scouting 6 and Bombing6 lost 16 aircraft and 11 of 38 two man crews.

The Japanese turn came at 11:52AM when Yorktown radar plot reported, “Bogeys 32 miles and closing”. In spite of fearful losses, the Japanese scored hits with three bombs at noon and at 2:42PM their torpedo plane attacks scored two hits and forced the Yorktown to abandon ship. The defending Combat Air Patrol lost one Wildcat compared to 22 of 30 Japanese aircraft lost to fighters and anti-aircraft fire.

There was still one heavy carrier unaccounted for, and at 2:45PM Lieutenant Sam Adams of Scouting 6 radioed Admiral Spruance its location. The Admiral had no fighters or torpedo bombers, but ordered Lieutenant William E. Gallaher aloft at 3:30PM to lead 24 planes from three dive bombers squadrons. A half hour later the Hornet launched 16 dive bombers lead by reserve Lieutenant Edgar Stebbins. These 40 aircraft encountered anti-aircraft fire, lighting attacks from Zeros, and superb evasive ship handling. However, there were just too many planes and bombs. At least four hits and many near misses transformed the Hiryu into the fourth blazing funeral pyre of the day. All three dive bombing squadrons got hits and three aircraft with crews were lost.

There were attacks before and after June 4 during the Battle of Midway costing the Japanese Combined Fleet other ships. However, the loss of these four heavy carriers and the many superbly trained aircrews and technicians proved fatal to Japanese plans.

This splendid victory by Navy, Marine and Army Air Corps flyers over the First Carrier Striking Force permanently seized the initiative from the Japanese. One could easily paraphrase Winston Churchill to say never have so many who fought in the Pacific owed so much to so few. Not counting the B-17’s that stayed aloft, about 550 flyers closely engaged the Japanese and suffered nearly 300 deaths. Walter Lord and Gordon W. Prange considered this accomplishment incredible and miraculous. For Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, it was the battle that doomed Japan.

The Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy by Paul S. Dull U.S. NAVAL BASE, PEARL HARBOR, DRY DOCK NO. 2 lcweb2.loc.gov/master/pnp/habshaer/hi/hi0700/hi0748/data/hi0748data.pd

Action Report: USS Hornet (CV-8) Midway http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv8-Midway.html

Battle of Midway, Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown, report of 18 June 1942 http://www.patriotfiles.com/index.php?name=Sections&req=viewarticle&artid=1096&page=1 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv5-Midway.html

Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942, Online Action Reports: Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, Serial 0133 of 8 June 1942 http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/mid6.htm

MK XIII Aerial Torpedo http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1035 http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTUS_WWII.htm

Vindicator SB2U Dive Bomber http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=731

Douglas TBD Devastator http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TBD_Devastator I find no evidence the planes flew with bombardiers on June 4 or had Norden bombsights.

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_B-17_Flying_Fortress

B-17 Crew Requirements and Standard Operating Procedures http://www.303rdbg.com/crewmen-missions.html

Midway Film by John ford http://video.staged.com/localshops/ww_iirare_film__midway__directed_by_john_ford

Valor: Marauders at Midway http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1986/April%201986/0486valor.aspx

The Nimitz Graybook http://usnwc.edu/Academics/Library/Naval-Historical-Collection.aspx#items/show/849

Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryū http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Hiry%C5%AB Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Kaga Japanese aircraft carrier Sōryū http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_S%C5%8Dry%C5%AB Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Akagi (Therefore average top speed 30.6 knots) Japanese aircraft carrier Shōkaku https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Sh%C5%8Dkaku“8 May 1942 by dive bombers from USS Yorktown and Lexington which scored three bomb hits: one on the carrier’s port bow, one to starboard at the forward end of the flight deck and one just abaft the island. Fires broke out but were eventually contained and extinguished. The resulting damage required ShÅkaku to return to Japan for major repairs. On the journey back, the carrier shipped so much water through her damaged bow she nearly capsized in heavy seas, maintaining a high rate of speed in order to avoid a cordon of American submarines out hunting for her.

She arrived at Kure on 17 May 1942 and entered dry dock on 16 June 1942. Repairs were completed within ten days and, a little over two weeks later on 14 July, she was formally reassigned to Striking Force, 3rd Fleet, Carrier Division 1”.

At the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 8 dive bombers from USS Yorktown and Lexington scored three bomb hits on the Shokaku. The resulting damage required her to return to Japan for major repairs. She arrived at Kure on 17 May 1942 and did not enter dry dock until a month later on 16 June 1942.

In comparison the damage the Yorktown sustained after Coral Sea led to the Navy Yard inspectors estimating that she would need at least two weeks of repairs. However, Admiral Nimitz ordered that she be made ready to sail alongside TF 16. Yard workers at Pearl Harbor, laboring around the clock, made enough repairs to enable the ship to put to sea again in 48 hours.

Nice job, RetainMike -- and it inspired some fascinating comments following your lead.

Hey rlmorel, I picked up that 1985 book at UGA Library after seeing the Midway 2019 film.

The book's name is And I Was There by Edwin Layton, who was the intelligence officer advising Nimitz.

I found the first 100 pages plus the chapter on Midway well-worth reading. Clearly the book provided much background material for the film.

The book explains the business of breaking codes, cryptography. It mostly covered the US side, but also gave some perspective on Japanese coding methods. Some interesting tidbits:

Layton and Rochefort became friends when they were both sent to Japan before the war to learn Japanese. At that time, Rochefort was already a top cryptographer, a fact he kept hidden from Layton, who was a general line officer.
Layton's Japanese was good enough to actually have had some one-on-one discussions with Admiral Yamamoto (as the movie showed).
U.S. military cryptography was a political mess. Much time in the book is spent discussing this. Basically, key intelligence was kept from the folks at the Pacific command as Washington saying "we'll tell you what you need to know" -- even as Langford, one of the USA's top cryptography leaders was on the Pearl staff.
A woman "Miss Aggie" was one of the foremost code breakers and she trained many other people in her techniques.
There were periods when the Japanese totally switched their coding system and the Americans would require months to learn that new system. Fortunately we were successfully reading their code in the months leading up to the Battle of Midway. But just before the actual Battle, the Japanese made a switch and we were ignorant for some time afterward.

One other comment I'll make. Somebody remarked that it would "take generations" for a hated enemy like the Japanese to be trusted again.

That's not my experience. My Dad was a gunner's mate aboard an LST at the Battle of Okinawa -- a battle where we lost 5,000 American sailors, due in part to kamikaze attacks.

But I later was stationed in Sasebo, Japan and was always treated with respect as an American sailor. My wife is from that city and when we came back to live in the States my Dad, out of habit, would use the "Jap" word from time to time, but he grew to love my wife and there was a meeting of the minds and mutual respect.

We were married at my hometown on Cape Cod, but we also later held a second wedding reception for the Japanese side of the family at the U.S. Naval Base in Sasebo where I wore my uniform.

Near the end of the ceremony my wife and I received the traditional well-wishing send-off, a big both-arms-raised Banzai (which means "May you live a 1,000 years").

And one of most energetic of those Banzais was given by an older Japanese man who had only one arm.

Malfeasance and penny pinching.
Naval Station RI only live fired one Mark 14 before the navy bought them.

The Mark 14 went through several upgrades, including a larger explosive charge, moving the gyroscope and all other manner of changes that changed the weight and weight distribution of the torpedo. And then only one test of a torpedo with a dummy load instead of the heavier torpex.

Fortunately some pretty respected Admirals screamed all the way to the top and things got changed.

Pinching pennies cost more than it saved.

Incorrect. They did believe in damage control, to the point that every ship had heavily trained DC specialists aboard. It is just that their idea of it was different from the US Navy’s. The USN was far and away the navy with the best damage control of WW2 by a huge margin. The Royal Navy was a very distant second followed by the Germans then everyone else. The Japanese really weren’t the worst at damage control, they just hadn’t adopted it as a religion like the USN had - but then *nobody* did, not even the Royal Navy. The RN’s DC was good, but the USN’s DC was ridiculously better. US ships that had taken damage that even the RN would have written off and scuttled at a battle site routinely made it back to port despite being technically inferior to the RN’s designs in armor and armament, but having been designed from day one for damage control.

Look at how US damage control saved the carrier USS Franklin: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tJh-XkVyYA

Look into the story of USS Laffey (DD-724) - the *only* reason that thing stayed on top of the water long enough for help to get to what was left of the ship was because of US DC and to a lesser degree a design optimized for US DC.

Yes and no. Admiral Nagumo was a more complex officer than that - and he actually did rather well in the early war engagements. He completely evicted the Royal Navy from the Pacific and sent them fleeing back to East Africa, for example, and not because the Brits were poorly led in theater either. Though he was a cautious officer, he wasn’t completely hidebound; I think a better characterization would be that he was a competent but not great commander who was suffering from age and health issues. His defeat at Midway broke him; he was never the same after. Prior to Midway, the IJN opinion of him was solidly mixed; his appointment to command the Kido Butai was questioned not because of any innate lack of competence but because he was a surface warfare specialist. However, at the same time he did heavily promote and encourage the use and growth of naval aviation and was not afraid to listen to his younger aides or support his aviators.

As I said, the guy was more complex than the simple capsule description went. He certainly didn’t seem to be promoted to the position because of anything like ‘it was my turn’ or purely due to seniority. He was an older guy who supported new technologies and methods that he wasn’t completely familiar with - and doing better than a lot of his contemporaries at it.

That was a completely fascinating link. I had no idea. I read the "attitudes of personnel" that contributed to it, and was having difficulty figuring out what THAT could refer to, and then when I read this:

"...The greatest problem encountered was that of correctly installing the radios with proper wiring, shielding and grounding of the equipment. It seems that little attention was devoted to this problem until late in the war. Insufficient shielding of the ignition system of the aircraft caused interference with reception of signals to a great degree, as did static charges generated by the passage of the airframe through the atmosphere. It seems that there were very few officers at fighter group level who were familiar with radio systems or who cared to conduct effective programs to maintain them. The resulting poor performance quickly led fighter pilots to cease using the radios and resort to the old visual methods. In the case of some land-based groups, they removed all radio equipment to enhance the performance of the planes..."

That made complete sense. It sounds like they made the radios in a vacuum where they were simply handed to the aircraft manufacturer who shoehorned them in somewhere, and did it poorly. No shielding! That must have been frustrating in the extreme, especially to a culture that viewed them as a flimsy impediment towards fulfilling their manly Bushido code.

We had somewhat the same attitude towards radar directed naval gunfire, but Admiral Willis "Ching" Lee made his peers see the light, especially after the terrible defeat at Savo Island opened their minds to anything that could help.

Thanks, that was one of the most interesting war-related things I have read in a while, and that makes complete sense.

Good post.

I am going to check that book out if I can find it. As you said, at that time, cryptography was a fetid backwater of the military, I would guess nobody went into it if they had any choice in the matter.

In the movie, I was mistaking the dinner the American officers had with the Japanese (the film said 1937) for a later meeting with the officers of the USS Astoria in 1939 that had bought the ashes of Japan’s Ambassador (Hirosi Saito) back to Japan as a sign of respect. I expect the similarity between the two dinners was that the Japanese naval officers were generally openly hostile and dismissive of their American counterparts at both of them.

Love your story-I lived in Japan (Yokosuka) for a few years as a dependent, and I liked the Japanese. I was old enough (8-11) to know the things they had done in WWII, but it didn’t resonate with me enough to shake my amicable feelings.

However, we spent a few years in the Philippines (Subic Bay) after that, and the attitude there towards the Japanese was quite hostile. When I was in the Scouts, we did an annual hike along the route of the Bataan Death March, and while I was only able to ride in the support truck due to a medical issue, I saw all those white markers. That compelled me to read several books detailing both the Bataan Death March and the overall experience of our POW’s held by Japan, and my attitude did change somewhat after that. What they did to our men and the populations of people they occupied was appalling, and it left a mark on me for many years. I wonder if I had been a bit young to read that book in its entirety, and the descriptions in it of the conduct of the Japanese was difficult to reconcile with the firsthand encounters I had of them.

It reminded me of the cognitive dissonance that Judge Daniel Haywood (one of the three tribunal judges at the Nuremberg Trials played by Spencer Tracy in “Judgement at Nuremberg”) felt when he went into the court rooms, and saw the horrible shocking film footage from the Nazi death camps, then went out to a beer hall for dinner and saw these jovial Germans laughing and drinking. He couldn’t reconcile them with what he saw.

It was much the same for me.

I once knew a man who was assigned to be the US Army Provost Marshal for the Hiroshima district when the war ended, but after they dropped the bomb there, they thought he would be more useful in Korea. His job there was to get the Japanese military personnel out of Korea as quickly as possible before they were massacred by the Koreans who had lived under their abuse. When I visited him once and the topic shifted to Japan, his attitude changed, he clammed up, and then left the room. I asked a lifelong friend of his if he was okay, and he said that even to that day (back in the Nineties) he had a burning dislike of the Japanese as a result of what he saw firsthand in Korea back in 1945.

Love your story about your wife and marriage...I do respect the Japanese in many ways, and am glad we are an ally and not a foe. I hope it doesn’t come to it that we need to fight with them against China, but I feel more pessimistic about that as time goes on.

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