Posted on 04/10/2017 12:28:35 AM PDT by Swordmaker
COLT SINGLE ACTION ARMY SN 5773 POSITIVELY PROVEN TO HAVE BEEN USED BY ONE OF CUSTER'S MEN DURING THE INFAMOUS BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIGHORN.
Estimate: $175,000 - $275,000
(Excerpt) Read more at auctionzip.com ...
Good stuff.
Why would someone pay that for an obviously ineffective weapon? :P
Hehehehe. I had occasion to open one of these up some 40 years ago. They are like a Swiss watch inside with loads of closely fitted parts and beautifully fitted small straw-colored pieces. It was so complex it did not survive contact with the shooting environment for long. Any amount of dirt, soot, dust, and it froze up. . . but they were beautifully balanced guns to shoot, when they shot.
No, no, no. . . You are misconstruing the test. It was effective. The guy who was testing the effectiveness of this gun just ran out of ammunition to complete the test. It wasn't that the gun was not effective, it was that there were just too many targets.
Reno
Man what a dark dishonoured name.....how did guys like that get company level command...
He lost a third of his troops
I wonder if the pistol belonged to a survivor...I would imagine
He was a West Point graduate and a career army officer. By the end of the Civil War he was a brevet Brigadier General. He fought at Antietam, Kelley’s Ford, Cold Harbor, Trevelyan Station, and Cedar Creek. He commanded a cavalry brigade hunting down John Morgan. After the war he reverted to the rank of Major in the U.S. Army. George Custer ordered him to take three troops of cavalry and attack the Lakota village. He was damn lucky to get any of his troops out of that fight alive. His 150-60 troops probably face 12-1800 really mad Lakota and Cheyenne warriors. Really nothing dishonorable in his service through the Little Big Horn. His army career after that battle was nothing to write home about and he was eventually dismissed from the army. Looking at the pistol, I would think that it belonged to one of the Troop M soldiers that made to Reno Hill and survived the battle. It appears to be in very good condition, like it was held in an arsenal for some years before disposal on the civilian market. It does not look like a gun that was in the hands of Lakotas for a few decades. JMO
The auction description says it has "blood pitting" on the metal in several areas. Apparently the antique firearm valuator could distinguish the pattern from other rust pitting. That implies at some point this gun was involved in an altercation in which someone was wounded or killed.
could have been from the Troop M soldier if he was wounded at the battle. The gun would probably gone several days without being cleaned or oiled during the siege on Reno hill. Googled blood pitting, lot of arguments as to is it real, what is it. Not enough of a fire arms type to distinguish.
“The Army tried to “save money” by continuing to use Civil war single shot muskets (converted many times to breech) ... The Indians bought repeating “civilian” rifles and were often better armed than the cavalry.
US Army rifles were very bad, very poorly built and managed up to and through the Spanish American war, until Springfield “copied” (er, stole) the German design to make the 1903A3 and its family of bolt-action rifles.”
In no sense were the muzzle-loading rifle-muskets made by United States armories at Springfield, Massachusetts or Harpers Ferry, Virginia poorly built. Nor were they poorly “managed” - if by his choice of words, Mr Cook indicates they were badly stored, modified, or maintained. Were they suited to the tasks at hand? That is a different question.
The quality and strength of US issue small arms dating all the way back to 1795 (the year the first official US musket models were adopted) was extremely high; the materials were the best, and the workmanship expert. A detailed examination of US issue arms from the 19th and 19th centuries will bear this out.
In fact, the arms were so good that over time they became a problem: stored and maintained adequately, they lasted for generations. Dominated by a tradition-bound hierarchy, a penny-pinching Congress, and a mulish American public (by turns indifferent or indignant), the question facing US Army Ordnance officials was, what to do with stored arms? Changing in a much greater hurry than ever before, technology, manufacturing, organization, and tactics were passing them by.
By 1865, US arsenals and storage facilities held some 1,200,000 muzzle-loading rifle-muskets that had never been issued; the American Civil War just ended had shown many that such weapons were obsolescent. Springfield Armory had decades of experience in converting flintlocks to percussion, and in rifling smoothbores.
What to do with the huge store of otherwise-serviceable arms no longer needed, and barely relevant? Converting them to breechloaders could extend their useful life, and save money.
The design ultimately selected was that of Erskine S Allin, master armorer at Springfield: what modern arms buffs have nicknamed the “Trapdoor”, for the front-hinged lifting action of its breechblock. Many 58 cal muzzle loaders were converted to fire metallic cartridges, in calibers from 58 rimfire down to 50-70 centerfire, using up spare parts stored at the end of the American Civil War.
Was money saved? Don’t know.
By 1873, US Army leaders standardized small arms caliber at 0.45 inch for rifles and handguns. A new centerfire rifle cartridge was adopted, and newer, lighter, sleeker rifles were built, using fewer leftover parts.
Along with the Krag-Jorgensen repeaters, these Trapdoors (M1873-1888) are the best-made, best-fitted, and most finely finished US issue arms ever made. They were very accurate and the effectiveness of the round - 45-70 - cannot be doubted. Most of their poor record (such as it was) has since been traced to the immature state of ammunition manufacture: in the early 1870s, cartridge-case metallurgy was still primitive. Not until the late 1870s did British innovations in deep-drawing and heat-treating of brass bring improvements: case head separations and extraction failures were reduced.
While it is true that numbers of American Indians armed themselves with repeating rifles (Henry, Winchester M1866 and M1873) it is not correct that they were thus “better armed” than US troops. Mr Cook has identified a tradeoff: should troops be armed with short-range, high-volume weapons? Or with long-range, deep-penetration, slower-firing weapons? It’s a decision that has bedeviled people who select arms, and train troops, for a long time.
In the period 1865-1892, Senior US Army leaders chose the latter.
They did not want to arm troops with repeaters for several reasons: in the 1870s, no repeating rifle chambered a standard military rifle cartridge. All were underpowered. They also believed that troops issued repeaters would fire off all their ammunition prematurely. Finally, no repeater was available, that held a useful number of cartridges while remaining light enough for the average soldier to carry and use.
Ever handle a Winchester M1876? It’s huge, and gruesomely weighty. Even before being loaded. It was the first repeater to handle cartridges coming anywhere near shot-for-shot performance of the 45-70. But it still fell short.
There are no magic solutions. There are only tradeoffs, some good, some not so.
thanx
Ping
Reno fan club must be lonely
The Henry, Winchester '66 and '73 were ideal guns for the horseback riding Indian shooters. . . but the single shot Trapdoor Springfields require both hands to load and were a problem on horseback.
Ever handle a Winchester M1876? It’s huge, and gruesomely weighty. Even before being loaded. It was the first repeater to handle cartridges coming anywhere near shot-for-shot performance of the 45-70. But it still fell short.
The 1876 Winchester chambered .45-90, a more powerful round than the .45-70, but the weight was the deciding factor. Even the "saddle-ring carbine" 1876 was a cumbersome, long muzzle heavy full fore end rifle (you had to protect that tubular magazine from denting with those long cartridges and stiff spring or they wouldn't feed!). Add that the military honchos wanted to add a bayonet to the military version of the rifle (musket) and you had one very weighty, barrel heavy gun when fully loaded. . . but under-powered, no. However, the longer cartridges of the .45-70 would not fit in the standard issue .45-70 cartridge cases issued to the soldiers either and would have required another order of leather belt case, not to mention ordnance stores for two different cartridges.
Strangely, in the civilian market, Colt was offering their 1873 Single Action in .44-40 Winchester and .38-40 Winchester, and even some in .25-20 Winchester, to match the Winchester 1873 rounds so that customers would only have to buy and carry one cartridge. . . but the Army never seemed to get the idea that side arms and rifles could be useful with identical calibers with savings all along the supply chain. This coordination of Rifle and Revolver calibers from Colt continued with the Model 1892 Winchester.
Not a fan per se, just not much into character assassinations without a very in depth understanding of the individual involved.
Indians would have taken any weapons from Custer’s troopers. Only the living would have left the field with weapons (Reno survivors would likely have been able to get some weapons out.) )
“The Henry, Winchester ‘66 and ‘73 were ideal guns for the horseback riding Indian shooters. . . but the single shot Trapdoor Springfields require both hands to load and were a problem on horseback. ...”
Swordmaker has nailed one serious drawback of single shot rifles. The military decisionmakers of those days did not care about such problems, however.
I’m more inclined to put it down to inescapable limitations on horse cavalry: managing a steed and a firearm demands a lot of management expertise. Horse cavalry was outdated by 1865, not bright enough to realize it until the 1940s.
“The 1876 Winchester chambered .45-90, a more powerful round than the .45-70, but the weight was the deciding factor. ...”
Original chamberings for Winchester’s M1876 were 40-60, 45-60, 45-75, and 50-95. 45-70 was never included. One express purpose of the 45-75 was to offer performance equal to or better than the military’s standard round, but the 45-75 wasn’t quite up to it.
The 45-90 used a case longer than the 45-70, of the same diameter. It was chambered in Winchester’s M1886, the first repeater John M Browning made for them; it was offered in 45-70 as well. Despite its improvements over the M1876 in size and strength, it was still a heavy item. Marlin beat Winchester to the punch with their M1881: it chambered 45-70 years before Winchester.
Swordmaker was quite right in pointing out weight of these early repeaters as a limiting factor. The toggle action of early lever actions (Henry, Winchester 1866/1873/1876) were inefficient in terms of required space compared to cartridge length: even the beloved 73 is a very long, very heavy handfull. Toggle-joint actions attained greater success in machine guns: Maxim, Vickers, the Swiss Furrer. Space and weight constraints weren’t so tight.
“... Colt was offering their 1873 Single Action in .44-40 Winchester and .38-40 Winchester, and even some in .25-20 Winchester, ... . . . but the Army never seemed to get the idea that side arms and rifles could be useful with identical calibers with savings all along the supply chain. This coordination of Rifle and Revolver calibers from Colt continued with the Model 1892 Winchester.”
25-20 WCF was not one of the chamberings for Colt’s First Generation Single Action. Colt’s did offer its Single Action in 44-40, 38-40, and 32-20. Results were spotty: some First Gen SAAs are quite accurate in these chamberings, some are impossible. Chamber dimensioning in those days did not benefit from the standardized approach SAAMI has induced most of the industry to abide by these days.
Those who decided which small arms in what calibers would be issued to US Army troops (by the 1870s, the Ordnance Corps took it upon themselves) understood the tradeoffs very well, and rejected early lever-action repeaters because they lacked bullet mass and effective range compared to rifles then standard. They were certain that a body of disciplined troops trained to deliver accurate fire at long ranges would destroy any opposing force armed with repeaters firing what would barely make the grade today, as pistol rounds. Range, penetration, and delivered energy were key attributes and were considered to outmatch all others.
Was this a wise approach? We may question the judgment those leaders applied to the situation, but we’re not going to get any better answers, because all of them are dead.
What is known is this: scholarly and analytical thinking in US Army doctrinal circles resisted the trend toward smaller, lighter “intermediate” calibers until quite late. All the other major powers were switching to assault rifles and lower-powered cartridges, but US authorities held out until the 1960s. Then Army leaders went to the other extreme, adopting the 5.56x45mm.
Actual results in battle were unclear: in summer 1877, the Ottoman Turks dug in near Plevna and armed with Winchster M1866 rifles did quite a number on assaulting Imperial Russian forces, armed with Winchester M1866s. In 1901, the Boers caused serious loss to the British in South Africa, firing early Mauser bolt actions from long range. The latter incident, and earlier ones, may have made the deepest impression on designers of rifles, and on the bureaucrats who approved their creations. A number of military rifles adopted in the period 1880-1903 were equipped with magazine cutoffs: doctrine stated that the footsoldier force was to load single rounds into the chamber, firing volleys on command, while the magazine (fully loaded earlier) was to be held in reserve, to allow higher rates of fire in case of emergencies - enemy breaking through the lines and such.
Lever guns have never found much favor with military organizations: the US government never bought any in quantity, despite the offering of “musket” models by hopeful gun manufacturers. The only large production run for military use was made by Winchester: in WWI, the Imperial Russian government contracted for a large number of its M1895, in 7.62x54R. It was said to have been upopular with Russian troops.
The tubular magazine is indeed vulnerable to denting. Manufacturers realized as much and fashioned the tube walls to be very thick.
“The Henry, Winchester ‘66 and ‘73 were ideal guns for the horseback riding Indian shooters. . . but the single shot Trapdoor Springfields require both hands to load and were a problem on horseback. ...”
Swordmaker has nailed one serious drawback of single shot rifles. The military decisionmakers of those days did not care about such problems, however.
I’m more inclined to put it down to inescapable limitations on horse cavalry: managing a steed and a firearm demands a lot of management expertise. Horse cavalry was outdated by 1865, not bright enough to realize it until the 1940s.
“The 1876 Winchester chambered .45-90, a more powerful round than the .45-70, but the weight was the deciding factor. ...”
Original chamberings for Winchester’s M1876 were 40-60, 45-60, 45-75, and 50-95. 45-70 was never included. One express purpose of the 45-75 was to offer performance equal to or better than the military’s standard round, but the 45-75 wasn’t quite up to it.
The 45-90 used a case longer than the 45-70, of the same diameter. It was chambered in Winchester’s M1886, the first repeater John M Browning made for them; it was offered in 45-70 as well. Despite its improvements over the M1876 in size and strength, it was still a heavy item. Marlin beat Winchester to the punch with their M1881: it chambered 45-70 years before Winchester.
Swordmaker was quite right in pointing out weight of these early repeaters as a limiting factor. The toggle action of early lever actions (Henry, Winchester 1866/1873/1876) were inefficient in terms of required space compared to cartridge length: even the beloved 73 is a very long, very heavy handfull. Toggle-joint actions attained greater success in machine guns: Maxim, Vickers, the Swiss Furrer. Space and weight constraints weren’t so tight.
“... Colt was offering their 1873 Single Action in .44-40 Winchester and .38-40 Winchester, and even some in .25-20 Winchester, ... . . . but the Army never seemed to get the idea that side arms and rifles could be useful with identical calibers with savings all along the supply chain. This coordination of Rifle and Revolver calibers from Colt continued with the Model 1892 Winchester.”
25-20 WCF was not one of the chamberings for Colt’s First Generation Single Action. Colt’s did offer its Single Action in 44-40, 38-40, and 32-20. Results were spotty: some First Gen SAAs are quite accurate in these chamberings, some are impossible. Chamber dimensioning in those days did not benefit from the standardized approach SAAMI has induced most of the industry to abide by these days.
Those who decided which small arms in what calibers would be issued to US Army troops (by the 1870s, the Ordnance Corps took it upon themselves) understood the tradeoffs very well, and rejected early lever-action repeaters because they lacked bullet mass and effective range compared to rifles then standard. They were certain that a body of disciplined troops trained to deliver accurate fire at long ranges would destroy any opposing force armed with repeaters firing what would barely make the grade today, as pistol rounds. Range, penetration, and delivered energy were key attributes and were considered to outmatch all others.
Was this a wise approach? We may question the judgment those leaders applied to the situation, but we’re not going to get any better answers, because all of them are dead.
What is known is this: scholarly and analytical thinking in US Army doctrinal circles resisted the trend toward smaller, lighter “intermediate” calibers until quite late. All the other major powers were switching to assault rifles and lower-powered cartridges, but US authorities held out until the 1960s. Then Army leaders went to the other extreme, adopting the 5.56x45mm.
Actual results in battle were unclear: in summer 1877, the Ottoman Turks dug in near Plevna and armed with Winchster M1866 rifles did quite a number on assaulting Imperial Russian forces, armed with Winchester M1866s. In 1901, the Boers caused serious loss to the British in South Africa, firing early Mauser bolt actions from long range. The latter incident, and earlier ones, may have made the deepest impression on designers of rifles, and on the bureaucrats who approved their creations. A number of military rifles adopted in the period 1880-1903 were equipped with magazine cutoffs: doctrine stated that the footsoldier force was to load single rounds into the chamber, firing volleys on command, while the magazine (fully loaded earlier) was to be held in reserve, to allow higher rates of fire in case of emergencies - enemy breaking through the lines and such.
Lever guns have never found much favor with military organizations: the US government never bought any in quantity, despite the offering of “musket” models by hopeful gun manufacturers. The only large production run for military use was made by Winchester: in WWI, the Imperial Russian government contracted for a large number of its M1895, in 7.62x54R. It was said to have been upopular with Russian troops.
The tubular magazine is indeed vulnerable to denting. Manufacturers realized as much and fashioned the tube walls to be very thick.
I'd put it at October 25, 1854. . . "Into the valley of death rode the six hundred. . ." — Crimean War.
As for the Colt SA in .25-20 Win., I've seen two in 40 years. At a guess, probably special order.
On the 1876s, you're correct. It was not the .45-90 but the .45-75 I was thinking of. Brain fart. . . But if the action could handle the .50-95, it could easily have handled the military .45-70 cartridge, but Winchester suffered greatly from the "not invented here" syndrome when it came to cartridges in that era!
As for the antique pistol rounds' effectiveness, the .45 Colt, fired from a 7 ½" barrel turns in a Hatcher Relative Stopping Power Scale impressive number of 74, while much high velocity modern rounds, even hollow points, come in five to ten or more points lower due to their inability to often stop in the target to deliver all of the energy they're carrying, while the Mack truck bullet of the slower bullet stops and delivers its energy payload.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.