Midway: Extraordinary Leadership and Brave Men

In late December 1941, Navy Secretary Frank Knox and FDR met and selected Chester Nimitz to command the Pacific Fleet, which at that time the public perceived as residing at the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt said, “Tell Nimitz to get the hell out to Pearl and stay there until the war is won”. Knox informed Nimitz by saying, “You’re going to take command of the Pacific Fleet, and I think you will be gone a long time”.

On Christmas Day 1941 Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived alone by Catalina flying boat to take command. When the door opened he was assailed by a poisonous atmosphere from black oil, charred wood, burned paint, and rotting flesh. The boat ride to shore engulfed the party in the panorama of sunken hulls and floating wreckage, punctuated by the bodies of dead sailors still surfacing from the blasted ships.

He spent the first days learning everything he could about his new assignment and confirmed the public’s perception was wrong. The dry-dock, repair shops, and tank farm were intact. The carriers, their escorts, and the submarines stood ready to take the offensive. He immediately sent submarines into Japanese waters, and conducted carrier operations thwarting Japanese Initiatives. Admiral Raymond Spruance said of Nimitz, “The one big thing about him was that he was always ready to fight….And he wanted officers who would push the fight to the Japanese”.

Nimitz decided some very good men had taken a terrible beating and were now suffering terrible reminders and apprehensions. When he officially took command December 31, he told the assembled staffs he had complete and unlimited confidence in every one of them. As head of officer personnel in Washington, he knew they had been selected for their competence. But if any wanted to leave, he would individually discuss their futures and do all he could to get them the assignments they wanted.

However, there were a few key staff members he wanted to stay with him. They included Commander Joe Rochefort, Jr. and Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton. These men did not provide warning of the Pearl Harbor attack, but later provided the key intelligence allowing Nimitz to take the calculated risks for the Midway battle.

Midway began with this gracious, determined leader bringing the fight to the enemy at long odds. It finished with the fearful sacrifice of a few brave men on June 4, 1942. To understand Nimitz’s and the flyers tenuous position consider that gathering every available U.S. Navy ship achieved an order of battle for Midway, where they were outnumbered more than three to one.

This abbreviated narrative now excludes the contribution of thousands, whose combined efforts provided the vital margin needed for victory. Preparing Midway for invasion and assembling the task forces at point “Luck” to attack the Japanese required prodigious achievements in logistics, ship repair, and naval intelligence. This narrative also does not describe how making more and/or paying the more bitter price for mistakes contributed heavily to the Japanese defeat.

The Japanese transport group was discovered on June 3, but the next morning the curtain rose for the carrier battle. At 5:30AM the PBY patrol by Lieutenant Howard Ady radioed discovery of the Japanese carriers. Fifteen minutes later the PBY patrol by Lieutenant William Chase radioed in the clear, “Many planes headed Midway. Bearing 320, distance 150”. These warnings enabled the 120 aircraft crammed onto Midway to get into the air and Admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher to launch carrier attacks. All Midway aircraft made attacks against the carriers except for 21 Marine Brewster Buffalos and 5 Wildcat fighters dedicated to repel the attackers.

In the ensuing Japanese attack on Midway beginning at 6:16AM, 14 of the 21 pilots died prompting Captain Philip R. White to say, “It is my belief that any commander that orders pilots out for combat in F2A-3’s (Brewster Buffalo) should consider them lost before leaving the ground”. Captain Francis McCarthy, flying one of the Wildcats, was also killed after shooting down one of eight Zeros attacking him and Lt. Roy Corry Jr.

The attacks by land based planes on the Japanese carriers began at 7:48AM. First six TBF Avenger torpedo bombers lead by Navy Lieutenant Langdon K. Fieberling of Torpedo 8 made their attack. These were some of the new torpedo bombers that should have replaced the hopelessly outdated Devastators Lt. Cdr. John Waldron had onboard Hornet, but they were 24 hours in Hawaii.) The planes obtained no hits, but five of six aircraft were destroyed including Fieberling’s and only two of 18 men survived to return to Midway. Ens. Bert Earnest and Radioman Harry Ferrier became with Ens. George Gay the other two “lone survivors” of Torpedo 8.

Next the Army Air Force made its appearance. Captain James Collins lead four Army Air Corps B-26 medium bombers rigged to carry torpedoes in the first ever attempt to attack enemy ships. Two of four planes with their 7 man crews perished, and no hits were obtained.

Marine dive bombers closely followed the B-26’s. At 7:55 Major Lofton Henderson (for whom Henderson Field at Guadalcanal was named) attacked with 16 Dauntless dive bombers of which 8 were lost with their two man crews. Henderson’s crews were untrained in dive bombing tactics and again no hits were obtained.

Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney lead 15 long range B-17’s over Nagumo’s position in a level bombing attack from 20,000 feet and obtained no hits on the carriers or escorts. One aircraft was damaged by Zero’s and one man was injured, but overall the Japanese were reluctant to attack the heavily armed bombers.

At 8:30 Major Benjamin Norris lead eleven Vindicator dive bombers considered so ancient pilots called them “wind indicators”, and displayed such fragility their fabric fuselage was wrapped with 4” hospital masking tape. They never reached the carriers and unsuccessfully attacked a battleship. Amazingly only two fell to enemy attacks and two more were lost at sea with their two man crews because of low fuel.

Next into the battle at 9:18AM-10:15AM came Torpedo 3, Torpedo 6, and Torpedo 8 from the USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise, and USS Hornet respectively. In all Lt. Commander Lance E. Massey, Lt. Commander Gene Lindsey, and Lt. Commander John Waldron lead 41 Devastator torpedo bombers. The squadrons had become separated from their dive bombers and fighters that were intended to accompany them for coordinated attacks. Waldron left deliberately replying to Ring’s order to follow him, “I know where the damn Jap fleet is. The hell with you”. Now alone these 100 mph torpedo bombers had to evade 300 mph Zero fighters, and withstand concentrated task force anti-aircraft fire before launching at less than 1,000 yards their 33 knot torpedoes against 30 knot aircraft carriers.

In pressing home their attacks, 35 aircraft with their two man crews were lost. Ens. George H. Gay, Jr., who crashed in the midst of the Japanese carriers, was the lone survivor of the Torpedo 8 attack and was rescued by a PBY the next day. The only fighters about were six from Fighting 3 lead by Lt. Commander “Jimmy” Thach that tangled with a horde of Zero fighters and lost one aircraft. Those from Fighting 6 lead by Lieutenant Jim Gray lost track of the torpedo bombers and kept circling at 20,000 feet to protect the dive bombers they never found. Eventually these fighters returned to the Enterprise in total frustration.

The USS Hornet fighters and dive bombers spent a fruitless morning. Commander Stan Ring lead Bombing 8, Scouting 8, and Fighting 8 exactly as ordered by Captain Marc Mitscher and then searched to the south until fuel was critical and each squadron proceeded independently. Lt. Commander Robert R. Johnson leading Bombing 8 was unable to find the Hornet and landed on Midway, but 3 of the 14 aircraft had to ditch on the way for lack of fuel. Lieutenant Stan Ruehlow leading Fighting 8 remained determined to find the Hornet, but all ten aircraft had to ditch, and Ens. Mark Kelly and Ens. George R. Hill were never found. That morning there were 29 empty seats in the Hornet ready room. Fifteen seats belonged to Torpedo 8 pilots slaughtered that morning by the Japanese. The 11 were for Bombing 8 that refueled at Midway and later returned to the Hornet.

The Japanese carrier task force had withstood six separate attacks over nearly three hours without a single hit. Not counting the B-17’s that stayed at 20,000 feet, Navy and Army flyers pressed home attacks with 78 aircraft. Of those 56 were destroyed, 128 of 182 men were lost, and no hits were obtained.

Now at 10:20AM Bombing 3 and Bombing 6 from the USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise respectively found the carriers. They arrived over the carriers while the Zero fighters were still at low altitude finishing off the last American torpedo bombers. The 17 planes of Commander Max Leslie’s Bombing 3 delivered three fatal hits to one carrier, probably the Soryu. For Bombing 6, Lieutenants Wade McClusky and Richard Best lead sections that obtained three hits on the Akagi and at least four hits on the Kaga. The Japanese task forces that had been impervious to harm from 7:48AM to 10:23AM saw three of their heavy carriers turned into burning wreckage in six minutes. However, a price had to be paid. Max Leslie’s planes returned safely, but Bombing 6 lost 8 of 18 two man crews.

The Japanese turn came at 11:52AM as Yorktown radar plot reported, “Bogeys 32 miles and closing”. In spite of fearful losses, the Japanese scored hits with three bombs and at 2:32PM their torpedo plane attack scored two hits and forced the Yorktown to abandon ship. The defending CAP lost one Wildcat compared to 22 of 30 aircraft lost to fighters and AA.

There was still one heavy carrier unaccounted for, and at 3:00PM Lieutenant Sam Adams of Scouting 5 radioed Admiral Spruance its location. The Admiral had no fighters or torpedo bombers, but ordered Lieutenant Earl Gallaher aloft at 3:30PM to lead 24 planes from three dive bombers squadrons. A half hour later the Hornet launched 16 dive bombers lead by reserve Lieutenant Edgar Stebbins. These 40 aircraft encountered anti-aircraft fire, lighting attacks from Zeros, and superb evasive ship handling. However, there were just too many planes and bombs. At least four hits and many near misses transformed the Hiryu into the fourth blazing funeral pyre of the day. All three dive bombing squadrons got hits and two aircraft were lost.

There were attacks before and after June 4 in the battle of Midway costing the Japanese Combined Fleet other ships. However, the loss of these four heavy carriers and their superbly trained, irreplaceable aircrews achieved by the fortitude, and valor of these few men proved fatal to Japanese initiative in the Pacific.

One could easily paraphrase Winston Churchill to say never have so many who fought in the Pacific owed so much to so few. Not counting the B-17’s, about 550 flyers closely engaged the Japanese and suffered nearly 300 deaths. Walter Lord and Gordon W. Prange considered this an incredible, miraculous victory. For Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, it was the battle that doomed Japan.

USNI Blog: http://blog.usni.org/?s=Midway Action Report: USS Hornet (CV-8) Midway http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv8-Midway.html

Battle of Midway, Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown, report of 18 June 1942 http://www.patriotfiles.com/index.php?name=Sections&req=viewarticle&artid=1096&page=1

Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942, Online Action Reports: Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, Serial 0133 of 8 June 1942 http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/mid6.htm MK XIII AERIAL TORPEDO http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1035 http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTUS_WWII.htm

Vindicator SB2U Dive Bomber http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=731

Douglas TBD Devastator http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TBD_Devastator I find no evidence the planes flew with bombardiers on June 4 or had Norden bombsights.

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_B-17_Flying_Fortress B-17 Crew Requirements and Standard Operating Procedures http://www.303rdbg.com/crewmen-missions.html

Midway Film by John ford http://video.staged.com/localshops/ww_iirare_film__midway__directed_by_john_ford

Valor: Marauders at Midway http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1986/April%201986/0486valor.aspx

The Nimitz Graybook http://usnwc.edu/Academics/Library/Naval-Historical-Collection.aspx#items/show/849

Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryū http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Hiry%C5%AB Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Kaga Japanese aircraft carrier Sōryū http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_S%C5%8Dry%C5%AB Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Akagi (Therefore average top speed 30.6 knots)

“...The dry-dock, repair shops, and tank farm were intact. The carriers, their escorts, and the submarines stood ready to take the offensive...”

And right there you see, even through the Havoc that Japanese naval air assets DID create, the mistake that they made.

There’s an amazing book that was published some years ago - “Descent into Darkness” - that details the salavage divers and their efforts to refloat and repair the battleships. Oklahoma was pulled right-side up by those same facilities that were not destroyed.

Worth the read if you can find it.

Also, breaking their codes and being able to read the Japs’ mail helped big time.

My dad was just an infant at the time, so I was still many years from being born. But for some reason, the Pacific war … especially this battle … has always garnered my attention.

Thanks for posting this detailed article.

Thank you for posting this, especially on this day. I never get tired of reading about Midway.

I know that hindsight is 20/20, but it always amazes me how poorly thought-out the Japanese plan of attack was. Imagine if they had sent their second-string carriers (Junyo, Ryujo, Zuiho, and Hosho) against Midway Island, while keeping their primary fleet carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, and if they had delayed another month, Shokaku and Zuikaku) a little bit apart, tasked solely with dealing with the American carriers, whenever they showed themselves. If they had done this, I honestly can't think of how they could have lost this battle.

And while it wasn't particularly funny for us at the time, it seems almost comical to me how we kept on bombing the battleship Haruna, yet could never hit the little sucker.

I noticed that Shattered Sword was not listed among your references. If you haven't already read it, I highly recommend it. Next to Incredible Victory, it is without a doubt the best Midway book I've ever read.

Edwin T. Layton’s biography ‘And I Was There’ is a must read for background info on Pearl Harbor and Midway. In addition to intelligence information, Layton lays out the Naval bureaucratic infighting that got Joe Rochefort transferred to a dry dock command on the West Coast after his brilliant work predicting the Japanese attack on Midway (the worst sin is being right in the eyes of bureaucrats). Layton’s book shook things up to the extent that Rochefort finally got the official recognition he deserved, albeit in the 1980s.

Also, breaking their codes and being able to read the Japs’ mail helped big time.

I look at it as simply giving us something of a fighting chance. The Japanese had a vastly superior force, both numerically and qualitatively. In such a match up, good intel doesn't usually matter.

Remember that we did not win because of the element of surprise. Hours passed without a single hit on the Japanese. We won because brave men continued to press the attack into the jaws of death, from which few of their compatriots were returning.

It is said that the Japanese were overconfident. I don't think so. They had every right to be very confident and expectant of victory. They destroyed most everything that came at them. Japanese aircraft and flyers were world class. But the Americans chose to fight to the death to stop the Japanese, and that shear tenacity was enough to force an opening and deliver victory.

In the annals of warfare, Midway is not a matter of the lucky arrow, but of the inexplicably tenacious warriors.

Victor Davis Hanson, “Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power”

Has a very good chapter on the Battle of Midway.

Midway turned the war in the Pacific. After this decisive battle, it was island-hopping and a terrible terrible grind to August 1945. But the strength of the Japanese Imperial Navy was broken and they never recovered. Hats off to the brave men who fought this battle, especially to the many who did not return.

Yamamoto believed that Japan only had about 6 months of victories before the U. S. could fully respond. They believed they had a brief period to force the U. S. to sue for peace.

Yamamoto was dead on with his prediction. After Midway, Japan was basically on the defensive.

When I was a kid we had the nicest church member, just a sweet heart guy, when he died it was reported he was on those island hoping battles, including Okinawa. Those guys did their job, came back home and went to work and making families and communities the greatness they were in the 50s and 60s.

“...We won because brave men continued to press the attack into the jaws of death, from which few of their compatriots were returning....”

True that. On Dad’s side Two of my uncles were Pacific Marines, one was Army. One of Dad’s cousins, 22 years old Marine, never left Iwo Jima. Mom’s side had a Marine there as well.

Dad was Airborne in Europe, fighting the other maniacs.

Our family was well-represented there.

“...In the annals of warfare, Midway is not a matter of the lucky arrow, but of the inexplicably tenacious warriors. ...”

The image of dive bomber pilot Earl Gallaher, looking over his should and saying into the mic “Arizona, I Remember You!” as he watched his bomb explode on Kaga... That is indeed American, Tenacious, and courageous.

THAT’S our People... and always will be.

God bless them.

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