Carroll V. Glines, The Doolittle Raid
Posted on 01/31/2012 4:38:59 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson
Carroll V. Glines, The Doolittle Raid
http://www.onwar.com/chrono/1942/jan42/f31jan42.htm
Allied forces evacuated from Malaya
Saturday, January 31, 1942 www.onwar.com
Allies set fire to oil storage facilities before retreatingIn Malaya... The remainder of the British and Australian troops are removed from the Malayan mainland to Singapore.
In Burma... There is heavy fighting at Moulmein in which the Japanese force the British to retreat northward. The Japanese capture the town.
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/andrew.etherington/month/thismonth/31.htm
January 31st, 1942
UNITED KINGDOM: The British government recognizes the independence of Ethiopia. (Jack McKillop)
Submarine HMS Uther laid down.
Destroyer HMS Vigilant laid down.
Destroyer HMS Champlin laid down. (Dave Shirlaw)
FRANCE: RAF Bomber Command attacks four targets visually during the night: (1) 50 bombers attack the German fleet at Brest; five aircraft are lost; (2) 14 attack the port area at St. Nazaire; (3) six attack the port area at Le Harve; and (4) one attacks the port area at Cherbourg. (Jack McKillop)
GERMANY: Berlin: SS General Franz Stahlecker, the commander of the Einsatzgruppe in the Baltic states, reports that he has killed 229,052 Jews.
U-217 commissioned.
U-951 laid down.
U-443 launched. (Dave Shirlaw)
U.S.S.R.: Moscow: The Red Army’s counter-offensive is grinding on against fierce German opposition. A critical battle is being fought for Rzhev, as the Russians thrust south towards Vyazma in an attempt to trap the German Army Group South.
Similar battles are being fought further south as General Zhukov aims for Bryansk to sweep up behind Vyazma and Marshal Timoshenko fights towards Izyum in an attempt to recapture Kharkov.
In yet another Soviet attack General Vlasov has struck across the Volkhov river towards Leningrad. Despite atrocious weather Stalin is relentless in his demands for attack, believing that the Germans will break.
IRAQ: The U.S. Military Mission to USSR, which is to advise and assist Russians on lend-lease matters, arrives at Basra; the group subsequently proceeds to Tehran, Iran, where headquarters is established. (Jack McKillop)
INDIA: New Delhi: The fall of Moulmein in Burma, today threaten the major port of Rangoon which handles arms and supplies flowing along the Burma Road to Chiang Kai-shek’s armies in China. The Japanese assigned the task to their 15th Army which on 8 December entered Bangkok, in Thailand, and set about the task of seizing British airfield in southern Burma in preparation for air attacks on Rangoon.
One airfield fell to Japan, and Rangoon itself was attacked continually from 23 December. Allied fighter squadrons - British and American - forced the Japanese to carry put their bombing missions by night. Moulmein fell when the defenders were ordered to withdraw in river boats.
BURMA: The Allies have 35 aircraft against 150 Japanese.
The Moulmein garrison withdraws across the Salween River to Martaban. The 48th Brigade of the Indian 19th Division arrives in Rangoon and is held in reserve. Another brief lull ensues in ground action as the Japanese prepare for further attacks, infiltrating across the Salween and bombing and shelling Martaban. (Jack McKillop)
MALAYA: Allied defence forces complete their withdrawal to Singapore Island at 0800 hours and blows the causeway. There are 85,000 men from 38 battalions, 13 British, six Australian, 17 Indian, and two Malay, on the island; The Japanese are attacking with less than 40,000 men. For defence purposes, Singapore is divided into three sectors. The Indian 3 Corps, under command of Lieutenant General Sir Lewis Macclesfield Heath, consisting of the Indian 11th and British 18th Divisions and corps troops, is responsible for the North Area. The South Area, which includes Singapore town, is the responsibility of Major General F. Keith Simmons, commander of Singapore Fortress troops, who has under his command in addition to fixed defences, the 1st and 2d Malayan Brigades and Strait Settlements Volunteer Force. The West Area, under command of Lieutenant General Henry Bennett, General Officer Commanding Australian Imperial Force Malaya, is manned by Australians and the Indian 44th Brigade, with attachments. Activity from this time until the Japanese invasion is confined to artillery exchanges, air attacks, and patrolling. The chief targets for Japanese aircraft are the docks and Kalang Airdrome. (Jack McKillop)
SINGAPORE: Now that the remaining British and Imperial troops have withdrawn across the causeway to Singapore all eyes are on this island.
In the past 20 years the naval base at Singapore has been the epicentre of British military power in the Far East. But the errors that pre-war planners made in believing that Singapore could only be attacked from the sea, have come home to roost now that Malaya is in Japanese hands. The great guns which were supposed to have made Singapore impregnable all face south to the open sea - but the Japanese are approaching from the north with only a narrow strait separating them from the island.
The question now is: should Singapore be held or abandoned to its fate? General Wavell recently appointed overall Allied commander in the region, has advised that the island cannot be defended for any length of time. However, Churchill has ordered that Singapore be held at all costs: not only would surrender betray the local people but, if Singapore falls, there is no hope for the Dutch East Indies.
A triumphant Japanese army, buoyed by the success of its Malayan campaign, is poised to deliver the final blow to this “City of the Lion”. A crushing defeat in Johore State forced Lieutenant-General Percival to withdraw all his forces from the coastal strip across the narrow strait from the beleaguered island. A British rearguard crossed into Singapore this morning after a gap was blown in the causeway linking the island with the mainland. British and Indian Army forces outnumber the invaders, but they are handicapped by Japanese supremacy in the air and in the sea.
None the less General Wavell, the overall Allied commander is under strong political pressure to stand firm - from not only Churchill but also the Australian prime minister, John Curtin, who says that the evacuation of Singapore would be an “inexcusable betrayal.”
NETHERLANDS East Indies: Moluccas: On Ambon Island 20,000 Japanese troops attack Laha late in the afternoon; they are repulsed by an outnumbered platoon of Australians on the northeast of the airfield. (Jack McKillop) Eventually the Japanese do overcome the Australian garrison defending Amboina.
BORNEO: The Japanese continue their conquest of Borneo; they occupy the town of Ngabang, and a battalion size unit with ca. 400 men lands in Adang Bay (Teluk Adang) without opposition before daybreak.. (Jack McKillop)
COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES: On Bataan, the Japanese begin an attack on II Corps in the evening after air and artillery preparation but are halted by corps fire. A Japanese regiment concealed in the bridgehead across the Pilar River begins withdrawing under cover of darkness. The I Corps continues the battle against enemy pockets in sectors of 1st and 11th Divisions, Philippine Army; the pockets are now cut off from supply. In the South Sector, operations against the enemy beachhead at Quinauan Point continue with little change in positions. Japanese reinforcements are ordered to the area. The U.S. 192d Tank Battalion (less one company) is sent to the west coast to help reduce the Quinauan Point beachhead. (Jack McKillop)
AUSTRALIA: Destroyer HMAS Quiberon launched. (Dave Shirlaw)
NEW ZEALAND: New Zealand continues to dig in for war by introducing air-raid shelter regulations, and inviting women to join the Emergency Precaution Service as fire-watchers. All men must register for the Emergency Defence Corps. (Jack McKillop)
PACIFIC: The destroyer USS Helm (DD-388) evacuates civilian radio operators and weather observers from Howland and Baker Islands; she is bombed by a Japanese reconnaissance flying boat off Baker, but is not damaged. (Jack McKillop)
The United States Pacific fleet severely attacked Japanese positions in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, destroying numerous Japanese ships, planes, and, shore establishments. (Dave Shirlaw)
TERRITORY OF HAWAII: Task Force Eleven (TF 11) (Vice Admiral Wilson Brown Jr.), formed around the aircraft carrier USS Lexington (CV-2), departs Pearl Harbor to cover the retirement of TF 8 (Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.) and TF 17 (Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher) from the Marshall and Gilbert Islands. (Jack McKillop)
CANADA:
Minesweeper HMCS Caraquet laid down North Vancouver, British Columbia.
Minesweeper HMCS Winnipeg laid down Port Arthur, Ontario.
Corvette HMCS New Westminster commissioned. (Dave Shirlaw)
U.S.A.: In preparation for a bombing raid on Japan, Captain Donald B. Duncan, USN, flies to Norfolk, Virginia to make arrangements with Captain Marc A. Mitscher, USN, skipper of the USS Hornet (CV-8), to prepare to have three B-25 Mitchell medium bombers hoisted aboard on the next day for trial takeoffs. (Jack McKillop) (107)
Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell, in a memo to General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff U.S. Army, estimates his needs for China assignment and requests that his staff and any forces that may join it be called a task force. The War Department subsequently approves designation of Stilwell’s forces as U.S. Task Force in China. (Jack McKillop)
Major General Ira C Eaker is designated Commanding General, Bomber Command, U.S. Army Forces in British Isles (USAFBI) and ordered to proceed to the UK. (Jack McKillop)
The last pre-war automobiles produced by Chrysler, Plymouth, and Studebaker roll off the assembly lines today. (Jack McKillop)
Destroyer USS Barton launched. (Dave Shirlaw)
ATLANTIC OCEAN: While escorting Canadian troop convoy NA2 from St, John’s, Newfoundland, RN destroyer Belmont is torpedoed by U-81 and sinks with the loss of her entire ship’s company of Halifax, Nova Scotia at 42 02N, 57 18W. USS Satterlee (DD-190), was commissioned as HMS Belmont (H-46) on 8 Oct. 1940, as part of the bases-for-destroyers deal. (Ron Babuka and Alex Gordon)(108)
Banff class escort sloop HMS CULVER (ex USCGC MENDOTA) is torpedoed and sunk while escorting convoy SL.98, ex-USCG cutter CULVER is sunk by U-105 southwest of Ireland at 48 43N, 20 14W. (Ric Pelvin and Jack McKillop and Alex Gordon (108) )
At 2331, U-125 fired a salvo of four torpedoes at the convoy SL-98 and observed two hits and a large explosion. Schuch thought that he had hit an ammunition freighter, but in fact it was the HMS Culver (Y 87) (Cdr Gordon-Duff) that had blown up with the loss of the commander, seven officers and 118 ratings. (Dave Shirlaw)
Two British merchant tankers are torpedoed and sunk by German submarines: the first by U-107 about 590 miles southeast of New York City and the second by U-109 about 320 miles southeast of Atlantic City, New Jersey. (Jack McKillop)
Motor tanker San Arcadio sunk by U-107 at 38.10N, 63.50W - Grid CB 5478
German blockade-runner MS Spreewald accidentally sunk by U-333 at 45N, 25W - Grid BE 7142. Spreewald was disguised as the Norwegian ship Elg and was in the area ahead of schedule by mistake. (Dave Shirlaw)
Somebody thought that Stalin would let Doolittle’s raiders land at Vladivostok if we let him keep the planes.
http://www.britain-at-war.org.uk/WW2/Malaya_and_Singapore/html/body_chronology_of_malaya.htm
31st
The Causeway - Under brilliant moonlight 3rd Corps, the original northern defenders, departs Johore without incident. At 5 am Bennett is at the southern end of the Causeway to watch the last troops of his Westforce cross onto Singapore island. By 7 am the Gordons, and the Australian 22nd Brigade, the outer bridgehead forces, are being piped across by the last two surviving Argyll pipers. Shortly thereafter the Argylls themselves, led by the same pipers, make the crossing. Last man over is the Argylls’ commanding officer, Lt-Col I. Stewart as the skirl, “Blue Bonnets over the Border” fades in the early tropical morning air. At 8.15 am Indian sappers blast a 70-foot wide gap in the Causeway. The British have lost Malaya. The battle for Singapore begins.
Gen Persival was a wuss
he truly ‘snatched defeat from the jaws of victory’ he out manned and out gunned the japanese but did everything wrong from square one.
Actually, that’s not quite true. Percival anticipated Yamashita’s opening moves, including the landings in Thailand. His plan [Toreador] envisaged hitting the Japanese before they got ashore [a la rommel at Normandy]. BUT, higher ups dithered about sending troops into Thailand, worried it would be considered an act of war. By the time they gave the green light, the Japanese were already ashore.
Perival also faced the problem of being critically short [or non-existent] in two types of weapons: aircraft [too few and obsolete to obsolescent- newer aircraft types were reserved for Europe and Africa], and tanks [Percival had none, the Japanese had a bunch]. And once Kido Butai visited Pearl Harbor, and even before PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE were sunk, the Japanese had control of the seas.
Perival also took command a short time before the war started. the lack of training demonstrated by his troops was not entirely his.
Having said all that, I don’t think Percival was the best choice for such an important job. Yamashita was. And I don’t think anybody else would have stopped Yamashita at that time, in that place.
At that time, and at that place, Japan was the aggressor. When you’re up against a defender that underestimates your intentions and capabilities, you have a distinct advantage.
Only after reading the article a second time did I realize it was about a 1942 speech given by Hitler.
Nations Hail President at 60;
A Prayer From MacArthur..."
It's definitely understandable how Kimmel & Short were sacked for being dismissive of intelligence reports and not maintaining readiness.
And you can cite evidence where either Kimmel or Short ever "dismissed" a single intelligence report, or failed to order alert levels as ordered by Washington?
The truth of the matter is they were never warned of the coming air attack, and they did order and report to Washington alert levels appropriate for the warnings they actually received -- warnings against sabotage.
The truth of the matter is they were never warned of the coming air attack, and they did order and report to Washington alert levels appropriate for the warnings they actually received -- warnings against sabotage.
There is a boatload of evidence but for starters, I suggest you read the Jan 1942 Roberts Report summary. I pasted a few snippets from the summary here and linked to the report at the end.
In a letter of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy advised the Secretary of War that the increased gravity of the Japanese situation had prompted a restudy of the problem of the security of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor. The writer stated:"If war eventuates with Japan, It is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor."
The writer stated that the
"inherent possibilities of a major disaster "
warranted further speedy action to
"increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned * * *"
The letter proceeded:
"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."
It stated the defenses against all but the first two were then satisfactory, described the probable character of an air attack and urgent consideration by the Army of dispositions to discover and meet such attack and provision of additional equipment therefor. It concluded with recommendations for the revision of joint defense plans with special emphasis on the coordination of Army and Navy operations against surprise aircraft raids. It also urged the conduct of joint exercises to train the forces to meet such raids.
The Secretary of War replied February 7, 1941, giving the present and prospective status of the Hawaiian Department in respect of airplanes and antiaircraft artillery, and stating with respect to the other proposals of the Secretary of the Navy that a copy of the letter was being forwarded to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, with direction to him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making the suggested measures effective.
Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of these letters at about the time they assumed the commands which they held December 7, 1941. Rear Admiral Bloch also received copies.
-snip-
On the same day (November 27, 1941), the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days;
-snip-
The Navy Department sent three messages to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet; the first of December 3, 1941, stated that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents; the second of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only); and the third of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment.
The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence of air raids. On the contrary they only served to emphasize in their minds the danger from sabotage and surprise submarine attack. The necessity for taking a state-of-war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet an air-raid attack was not considered.
Around 1988 I spent a few days in Singapore with an Aussie expat who ran a seafood packing plant I was visiting...he drove me around the island and pointed out some of the facilities where many Brits were held captive by the Nippers.
I think I'm at least somewhat familiar with all the messages and warnings sent by Washington to Hawaii and other commands.
So your data here is neither new to me, nor contradictory to my statements.
What I've said about it is that there was no -- zero, zip, nada -- specific warning to Hawaii about the coming air attack.
Indeed, warnings of attack only mentioned the Philippines and other Far East locations, not Hawaii.
But the warnings to Hawaii did specifically mention the likelihood of sabotage -- and that's why Kimmel and Short reacted as they did.
What Kimmel and Short obviously believed was: if a Japanese attack was likely then either Washington or their own Intelligence services would warn them.
Since they received no such specific warnings, they did not order higher levels of alert.
So the historical issue is whether Washington knew enough to have better warned commanders in Hawaii?
Some investigators have said "yes", others adamantly insist "no", a discussion which often results in name-calling or other disparaging references to people's ancestors... ;-)
You overlook the fact that in upon arrival in Hawaii in Feb 1941, both Kimmel and Short were specifically warned that
"If war eventuates with Japan, It is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor."
-snip-
"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."
But the warnings to Hawaii did specifically mention the likelihood of sabotage -- and that's why Kimmel and Short reacted as they did.
It's only reasonable that Kimmel & Short would focus on sabotage countermeasures if they already had precautions in place to prevent what they were warned were the higher probability events #1 and #2 of a surprise air attack. They didn't.
What Kimmel and Short obviously believed was: if a Japanese attack was likely then either Washington or their own Intelligence services would warn them. Since they received no such specific warnings, they did not order higher levels of alert.
All intelligence indicated the U.S. and Japan were on a collision course. Intelligence reports tend to be highly subjective and interpreting them can be more of an art than science. What was clear from the intelligence is that hostilities between Japan and the U.S. were imminent. That Kimmel & Short failed to take defensive precautions against a surprise attack they had been warned to be on the alert for is dereliction of duty.
Even if we focus on the recent sabotage warnings sent to Hawaii, a commander has to consider the reasons an enemy might want to sabotage aircraft; A.) In order to better achieve a surprise attack, B.) simply destroy equipment and personnel.
In preparing against sabotage, Kimmel & Short only considered B.), the simple destruction of equipment and personnel as reasons the Japanese might want to carry out acts of sabotage. They never considered that the Japanese might want to sabotage U.S. aircraft as precursor to a sneak attack. So, even in preparing against sabotage, Kimmel & Short were negligent in their duties.
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