[BroJoeK]

fso301: "The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence of air raids.
On the contrary they only served to emphasize in their minds the danger from sabotage and surprise submarine attack.
The necessity for taking a state-of-war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet an air-raid attack was not considered."

I think I'm at least somewhat familiar with all the messages and warnings sent by Washington to Hawaii and other commands.
So your data here is neither new to me, nor contradictory to my statements.

What I've said about it is that there was no -- zero, zip, nada -- specific warning to Hawaii about the coming air attack.
Indeed, warnings of attack only mentioned the Philippines and other Far East locations, not Hawaii.

But the warnings to Hawaii did specifically mention the likelihood of sabotage -- and that's why Kimmel and Short reacted as they did.

What Kimmel and Short obviously believed was: if a Japanese attack was likely then either Washington or their own Intelligence services would warn them.
Since they received no such specific warnings, they did not order higher levels of alert.

So the historical issue is whether Washington knew enough to have better warned commanders in Hawaii?
Some investigators have said "yes", others adamantly insist "no", a discussion which often results in name-calling or other disparaging references to people's ancestors... ;-)

[fso301]

What I've said about it is that there was no -- zero, zip, nada -- specific warning to Hawaii about the coming air attack. Indeed, warnings of attack only mentioned the Philippines and other Far East locations, not Hawaii.

You overlook the fact that in upon arrival in Hawaii in Feb 1941, both Kimmel and Short were specifically warned that

"If war eventuates with Japan, It is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor."

-snip-

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

But the warnings to Hawaii did specifically mention the likelihood of sabotage -- and that's why Kimmel and Short reacted as they did.

It's only reasonable that Kimmel & Short would focus on sabotage countermeasures if they already had precautions in place to prevent what they were warned were the higher probability events #1 and #2 of a surprise air attack. They didn't.

What Kimmel and Short obviously believed was: if a Japanese attack was likely then either Washington or their own Intelligence services would warn them. Since they received no such specific warnings, they did not order higher levels of alert.

All intelligence indicated the U.S. and Japan were on a collision course. Intelligence reports tend to be highly subjective and interpreting them can be more of an art than science. What was clear from the intelligence is that hostilities between Japan and the U.S. were imminent. That Kimmel & Short failed to take defensive precautions against a surprise attack they had been warned to be on the alert for is dereliction of duty.

Even if we focus on the recent sabotage warnings sent to Hawaii, a commander has to consider the reasons an enemy might want to sabotage aircraft; A.) In order to better achieve a surprise attack, B.) simply destroy equipment and personnel.

In preparing against sabotage, Kimmel & Short only considered B.), the simple destruction of equipment and personnel as reasons the Japanese might want to carry out acts of sabotage. They never considered that the Japanese might want to sabotage U.S. aircraft as precursor to a sneak attack. So, even in preparing against sabotage, Kimmel & Short were negligent in their duties.