[Homer_J_Simpson]

Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept

[Homer_J_Simpson]

4 Key Towns Held – 2-3
The International Situation – 4
The Texts of the Day’s War Communiques – 5

[CougarGA7]

The letter from Nimitz to Kimmel contained a rather lengthy discussion on the problems with supplies as well. Particularly, ordinance and the effects of the soon to be passed Lend-Lease Bill:

The Bureau of Ordnance is so far behind the requirements of ordnance materials, and is continuing to fall further behind, that drastic measures are necessary if our fleets, even at present strength are to have the necessary ordnance supplies to carry on a war. That drastic measures have already been initiated may be surmised from personnel changes already made.

Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance problems through the administration of the Lend-Lease Bill is the task of procurement, inspection and delivery of enormous—almost astronomical—quantities of ordnance supplies for the British Navy and any allies which may survive to fight the Dictators. I do not know if you have been informed of all the new ordnance plants that are being erected in various parts of the country to start from scratch the manufacture of various items of ordnance.

...

As you well know, this country is confronted with a most difficult problem that of determining just how much of our total output shall go to Britain and her allies, and how much to keep for ourselves. A wrong guess may well make our own problem insoluble. The minimum help needed by Britain is, of course, that which will keep her actively fighting while we are building up our strength. No help at all or too little help to Britain resulting in her defeat will greatly increase and complicate our problems of the future.

[BroJoeK]

Prange: At Dawn We Slept

Here again is my partial listing of general warnings and acknowledgements by US officials regarding a possible Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

These general warnings should have sensitized and alerted all of the US chain of command to search carefully for any specific data on threats to Pearl Harbor.

Pearl Harbor Time-Line

General Warnings of Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor:

1. Quoting the Army's Pearl Harbor Board: "We must...conclude that the responsible authorities...all expected an attack on Pearl Harbor...{but} when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it."
   From the Joint Congressional Committee Report on Pearl Harbor Attack (JCC PHA also known as PHPT, for Pearl Harbor Part), vol 39 page 77.

2. US intelligence worker: "For thirty-two years...Japanese naval strategy...envisaged [a naval] showdown with the Americans...
   For more than three decades the Japanese fleet trained and exercised for such an engagement...[specifically] an attack on the American fleet in Hawaiian waters at the outset of hostilities."
   JCC PHA volume 4, pages 1962-63.

3. 1932, US Fleet Commander, Admiral Frank Schofield: "The Enemy [Japan] will strike where the fleet is concentrated.
   The enemy will use carriers as the basis of this striking force.
   The enemy may make raids on Hawaiian Islands."
   From Ladislas Farago, Broken Seal c1967, page 127

4. 1932 US war games "Japanese" carriers approached Oahu from the north, undetected, and "Japanese" planes attacked on a Sunday, achieving total surprise, destroying every battleship in the harbor and all US planes before they could take off.
   Victor page 33, quoting several sources including JCC PHA vol 2 pgs 821-22 and 866-67

5. 1938 War Department study: "there can be little doubt that the Hawaiian Islands will be the initial scene of action" by surprise attack.
   From Forrest Pogue George C. Marshall, c1966 page 172

6. January 27, 1941: US Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew reported:
   "My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities.
   He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass the information. Grew."
   JCC PHA vol 14 pg 1042.

7. Early 1941, as reported by Representative Martin Dies, chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities:
   "Committee came into possession of a strategic map which gave clear proof of the intentions of the Japanese to make an assault on Pearl Harbor.
   The strategic map was prepared by the Japanese Imperial Military Intelligence Department...
   I telephoned Secretary of State Cordell Hull and told him... he directed me not to let anyone know... and stated that he would call me as soon as he talked to President Roosevelt.
   In about an hour he telephoned to say that he had talked to Roosevelt and they agreed that it would be very serious if any information concerning this map reached the news services...
   I told him it was a grave responsibility to withhold such vital information from the public.
   The Secretary assured me that he and Roosevelt considered it essential to national defense."
   From Martin Dies Assassination in American Opinion April 1964.

8. Early 1941, Korean agent Haan Kilsoo told US Colonel George Patton of a Japanese plan to attack Hawaii.
   From Toland Infamy p260-61

9. March 1941, Korean agent Haan Kilsoo sent a memo to Secretary of State Hull that Japan would attack Hawaii and other US territories.
   From Toland Infamy p260-61

10. 1941 there were three separate US war games in which "Japan" attacked the fleet in Hawaii.
    JCC PHA vol 5 pg 2136, also John Potter Yamamoto c1967 pgs 69-70

11. 1941 General Sherman Miles, Army Intelligence G-2:
    "Now an air attack on Pearl Harbor or any other attack on Pearl Harbor had been...a source of study for twenty years in Hawaii and in the War Department [Washington].
    It is not mentioned in this estimate of the situation because it was so obvious...
    That Hawaii could be attacked if Japan went to war was obvious to everyone."
    JCC PHA vol 34 pg 57

12. Admiral Richard Turner, chief of the navy's War Plans Division, testified that he himself, the Navy Department, and CNO Admiral Stark did expect an attack on Pearl Harbor.
    Sources beginning with JCC PHA vol 4 pg 1986, vol 5 pg 2213, vol 9 pg 4235 & others

13. Colonel Rufus Bratton of G-2:
    "In various G-2 estimates submitted to the Chief of Staff [General Marshall] over a period of many months an attack on Hawaii had always been listed."
    JCC PHA vol 34 pg 18.

14. June 1941, US Major Warren Clear was sent to the Far East seeking intelligence about Japan's war plans.
    He visited British intelligence in Singapore and reported Japanese plans to attack Hawaii, Guam and other US islands.
    In 1967 he wrote: "my evidence will show that Washington, DC had solid evidence prior to P.H. [Pearl Harbor] that Japan would...[attack] Hawaii."
    Quoted from Toland Infamy page 261.

15. June 1941, US military attache' in Mexico City reported that Japan was building midget "submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor"
    JCC PHA vol 31 pg 3217

As time permits, I hope to add to this list, and also begin the list of specific warnings, not all of them related to US code-breaking successes.