Here again is my partial listing of general warnings and acknowledgements by US officials regarding a possible Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
These general warnings should have sensitized and alerted all of the US chain of command to search carefully for any specific data on threats to Pearl Harbor.
Pearl Harbor Time-Line
General Warnings of Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor:
As time permits, I hope to add to this list, and also begin the list of specific warnings, not all of them related to US code-breaking successes.
I think you point out some good pieces of information here on the theme that there were general warning signs and beliefs that Pearl Harbor could be a target to a surprise attack, but those signs were misread or misinterpreted up and down the chain of command.
Looking at just what you have posted there are some interesting aspects.
1. Quoting the Army's Pearl Harbor Board: "We must...conclude that the responsible authorities...all expected an attack on Pearl Harbor...{but} when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it." From the Joint Congressional Committee Report on Pearl Harbor Attack (JCC PHA also known as PHPT, for Pearl Harbor Part), vol 39 page 77.
Here's that same quote in full context:
We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the Generals and Admirals in Hawaii, all expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor. As a general statement, when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it.
This is prefaced by quoting statements from Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and General Short which say:
Admiral Kimmel said:
We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese were going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor or even that any attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor. (R. 1771.)General Frank. "Was the attack a complete surprise to you?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir. (R. 1518.)General Gerhart. "Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you?
General Short. It was. (R. 536.)
So here we have the three men that were in theater in Hawaii, who all were worried about a surprise attack at least right now in March 1941, yet they still were caught off guard on December 7th. Sounds to me like these men made some serious errors in judgment.
But we can't just stop there with these men in Hawaii so to expand on this item I offer this. As I've said before, there is plenty of blame to go around. General Marshall is quoted on this very same page (Document #39 is the Pearl Harbor Hearings Findings Report for those who don't know, it is the determinations of those who conducted the hearings) that "air attack was his primary concern."
That's well and good and the February 7th letter by him does play that out, but at the same time he wasn't convinced that the Japanese would strike that far away from their home waters.
In a March 1941 letter that he sent to F.D.R. he states his belief that a "major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable." He also goes on to say that "In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage" (PHA 15-1635)
So while it can be said that the commanders in Hawaii dropped the ball in defending the island, their commanders up the chain of command were drawing wrong conclusions as well.
2. US intelligence worker: "For thirty-two years...Japanese naval strategy...envisaged [a naval] showdown with the Americans... For more than three decades the Japanese fleet trained and exercised for such an engagement...[specifically] an attack on the American fleet in Hawaiian waters at the outset of hostilities." JCC PHA volume 4, pages 1962-63.
I need some clarification here. PHA 4-1962-63 is testimony of Admiral Turner and does not contain these quotes. Can you double check this source and repost?
3. 1932, US Fleet Commander, Admiral Frank Schofield: "The Enemy [Japan] will strike where the fleet is concentrated. The enemy will use carriers as the basis of this striking force. The enemy may make raids on Hawaiian Islands." From Ladislas Farago, Broken Seal c1967, page 127
4. 1932 US war games "Japanese" carriers approached Oahu from the north, undetected, and "Japanese" planes attacked on a Sunday, achieving total surprise, destroying every battleship in the harbor and all US planes before they could take off. Victor page 33, quoting several sources including JCC PHA vol 2 pgs 821-22 and 866-67
I can cover both of these at once. First it is important to remember, that in 1932, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was not stationed in Hawaii so in that respect it is a different problem. But also, there have been many instances where naval exercises have simulated an attack on Pearl Harbor and since as of our current time line we are still watching the commanders voice their concerns over an attack on Hawaii, these 1932 exercises are not very surprising.
In the Victor references, they are of testimony of General Miles where he not only talks about war gaming on Hawaii in 1932, but also of actually landing troops in Honolulu Harbor on a Sunday morning (PHA 2-821). I don't have Victor's book (All I kept was my analysis on his use of source materials, but if necessary I can check it out of the library again) so I can't check to see if he misused this source too, this is a minor enough point that I don't see why he would.
5. 1938 War Department study: "there can be little doubt that the Hawaiian Islands will be the initial scene of action" by surprise attack. From Forrest Pogue George C. Marshall, c1966 page 172
This study is a report from Colonel Edward Markham to the Chief of Staff. In this report he stresses making Pearl Harbor as heavily defended as possible. Here is a bit more of that quote:
War with Japan will be precipitated without notice. One of the most obvious and vital lessons of history is that Japan will pick her own time for conflict. The very form of its government lends itself to such action in that its military and naval forces can, under the pretext of an emergency, initiate and prosecute military and naval operations independently of civil control. . . . If and when hostilities develop between the United States and Japan, there can be little doubt that the Hawaiian Islands will be the initial scene of action, and that Japan will apply her available man-power and resources in powerful and determined attacks against these islands.
Markham also goes on to say that it would be desirable to defend Pearl Harbor with an Army air force of 350 planes. This is a large force for what at the time is just a distance garrison. It makes it unfortunate that by 1941, in the letter to F.D.R. by Marshall previously mentioned that he expects that the island can be defended with a smaller force: "Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 33 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most modern type." This of course would turn out to be woefully inadequate even if the planes had been on alert and ready to take off in response to the approaching Japanese. Marshall is just wrong on this assessment.
6. January 27, 1941: US Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew reported: "My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass the information. Grew." JCC PHA vol 14 pg 1042.
To expand on this. It is important to note that this message was sent to the Secretary of State who then passed it on the the CNO. A letter from 1 February 1941 passes this on from Stark (CNO) to Admiral Kimmel:
From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific FleetSubject: Rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect:
"The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff."
2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future. (PHA 14-1044)
This is really unfortunate that naval intelligence downplayed the significance of this warning.
7. Early 1941, as reported by Representative Martin Dies, chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities: "Committee came into possession of a strategic map which gave clear proof of the intentions of the Japanese to make an assault on Pearl Harbor. The strategic map was prepared by the Japanese Imperial Military Intelligence Department... I telephoned Secretary of State Cordell Hull and told him... he directed me not to let anyone know... and stated that he would call me as soon as he talked to President Roosevelt. In about an hour he telephoned to say that he had talked to Roosevelt and they agreed that it would be very serious if any information concerning this map reached the news services... I told him it was a grave responsibility to withhold such vital information from the public. The Secretary assured me that he and Roosevelt considered it essential to national defense." From Martin Dies Assassination in American Opinion April 1964.
I can understand withholding it from the public. The question is, was it given to army or naval personnel anywhere in the chain of command. Do you have any other reference to this particular piece of data and where it ended up?
8. Early 1941, Korean agent Haan Kilsoo told US Colonel George Patton of a Japanese plan to attack Hawaii. From Toland Infamy p260-61
9. March 1941, Korean agent Haan Kilsoo sent a memo to Secretary of State Hull that Japan would attack Hawaii and other US territories. From Toland Infamy p260-61
Better cover both of these at once. This is one of those cases in which you have to be careful about the source material. Take a look at Toland's reference for these comments on p260-61 and post them if you would. I'll be happy to look into them further but here is my knowledge of Haan.
It is my understanding that Haan Kilsoo only claimed to have made these warning after the war. There is no mention of him in any of the Pearl Harbor Hearings or even in Patton's diaries as far as I can find. Honestly, I find the warning to Patton VERY suspect and recommend you do as well. Why would a man who was the Washington representative for the Sino-Korean People's League have information on an attack on Pearl Harbor, and more importantly why would he then give that information to General (he was never a Colonel in 1941 he was promoted to Brigadier General October 1st 1940) Patton, who at the time was just the commander of the 2nd Armored Division in Fort Benning, Georgia? That doesn't add up and makes me very suspect of the source in general.
10. 1941 there were three separate US war games in which "Japan" attacked the fleet in Hawaii. JCC PHA vol 5 pg 2136, also John Potter Yamamoto c1967 pgs 69-70
I'm still of the opinion that there were more than three.
11. 1941 General Sherman Miles, Army Intelligence G-2: "Now an air attack on Pearl Harbor or any other attack on Pearl Harbor had been...a source of study for twenty years in Hawaii and in the War Department [Washington]. It is not mentioned in this estimate of the situation because it was so obvious... That Hawaii could be attacked if Japan went to war was obvious to everyone." JCC PHA vol 34 pg 57
It's important to look at this entire quote in context.
Please note that this estimate starts out with this sentence : "This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat." It was deliberately written that way. I was a little tired of certain defeatist attitudes among certain of my own people and I wanted to get out an estimate of the situation addressed to the objective of the defeat of the Nazis. Now an air attack on Pearl Harbor or any other attack on Pearl Harbor had been, I knew very well, a source of study for twenty years in Hawaii and in the War Department. It is not mentioned in this estimate of the situation presumably because it was so obvious. We had spent several hundred million in defense of Hawaii, we had our greatest fleet out there. That Hawaii could be attacked if Japan went to war was obvious to everyone. I reread that estimate yesterday. I regret that in stating the possibilities we stated an attack on the Philippines and did not state an attack on Hawaii, Alaska, West Coast, Panama, etc. It was an omission, but I think a rather obvious omission.
So first of all General Miles is talking about this "obvious omission" in reference of an estimate designed around the objective of defeating the Nazis. Secondly, and more importantly is this last two sentences on the omission. In this estimate they do mention an attack on the Philippines (which is also obvious in my opinion), but failed to mention Hawaii, Alaska, the West Coast, or Panama. All of these locations were potential targets but were not included in the report. Of these, with the exception of Puget Sound, Hawaii is the most heavily fortified and defended.
12. Admiral Richard Turner, chief of the navy's War Plans Division, testified that he himself, the Navy Department, and CNO Admiral Stark did expect an attack on Pearl Harbor. Sources beginning with JCC PHA vol 4 pg 1986, vol 5 pg 2213, vol 9 pg 4235 & others
You got to be careful here lest we get the wrong impression. Let's start with Admiral Turner. In the reference PHA 4-1986 that you give he does agree with the person questioning him that "Inherent in war with Japan was an attack on Hawaii and all through the entire time I felt that that was part of it." But also not that prior to this he was asked if he felt that the fleet at Pearl was ready for war in which he responded "Yes,sir". Also, he was asked where he believed an attack by the Japanese would come first to which he mentioned several places in the Southwestern Pacific. For the sake of context, here is that section of testimony:
The Vice Chairman. As a senior officer of the United States Navy of long experience and the Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy on December 7, 1941, it was your conviction that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was prepared for war?So Turner did have feelings on Hawaii getting attacked yet his eyes were still turned to the Southwest Pacific.Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, back for a moment to the question of your views or convictions as to the imminence of war, please, Admiral. You stated that during June or July of 1941 it was your conviction that war with Japan was imminent within a few months. Then I asked you, did you ever think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor. I understood you to indicate that your conviction on that point was not quite as definite and certain as that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable within a few months. Could you help me a little further on that point?
Admiral Turner. I am sorry, I think that is the wrong impression. I was concerned at this time with the over-all picture and not specifically concerned with parts of the picture. Inherent in war with Japan was an attack on Hawaii and all through the entire time I felt that that was a part of it.
The Vice Chairman. But in June or July, Admiral, you had the conviction that war with Japan was inevitable within a few months?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And that Japan would attack the United States?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Where did you think that first attack would come?
Admiral Turner. Well, I thought the major effort, the major part of the attack, would certainly come, I mean, the permanent amphibious, the conquest part, would certainly come in the Philippines and would come either against the Malay Peninsula, Kra Isthmus, or against Borneo, thence Java and thence westward to Singapore. The Japanese were strong enough by that time to launch two major efforts. I believed that they were pretty well convinced, by June or July, that they could not detach the United States, although they continued efforts to do so, from very definite military interest in the Far East.
For example, if they had attempted to go down to the China Sea and to have made a major effort against Malaysia without having a definite assurance from the United States that the United States would not intervene, they couldn't possibly have gone on down without the capture of the Philippines, because it would leave on their flank an extremely important position, which we could build up and later attack them and cut them off from the south.
So that I believe the whole diplomatic effort during that time, the summer and fall, was toward getting an arrangement with the United States for us to keep out of war while they went after the British and Dutch.
The reference to Stark also is pretty straight forward in that at some point in time, he discuss and or prepared for the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor. I don't think anyone disputes this anyway. Here is the testimony in which this reference is made:
Senator George. Admiral, there was a time, as you have testified about and others, other officers in the Army and Navy, when the possibility and strong, maybe, probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was discussed in Army and Navy circles, that is in 1940 and up during some early months even of 1941 and in your correspondence with the commander of the Pacific Fleet you did discuss the possibility of an air attack?Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
That's it on that page, but like I said, I think everyone agrees that the possibility of air attack was discussed by everyone up and down the line so that is not too profound.
The final reference here is relating to the testimony of Admiral Ingersoll also on the question of the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor only this was after the intercepted message of Nov. 29th stating that things would go going "automatically"
Admiral Ingersoll. The question of an attack on Pearl Harbor, of course, was always considered as a possibility.Mr. Gearhart. Remote or close?
Admiral Ingersoll. It was considered, of course, as a possibility because there was no other reason for putting anti-aircraft guns there or stationing fighting planes on the island or having radar installation or anything of that kind except to keep Japanese planes away. That was the only reason for putting them there, so that is why I call it a possibility.
Mr. Gearhart, Why is that your position?
Admiral Ingersoll. Now, as to a probability as to whether or not they would attack is something else.
So unfortunately all of these are cases where there was discussion of the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor, but none of them take a position that they felt there probably would be an attack at this location.
Colonel Rufus Bratton of G-2: "In various G-2 estimates submitted to the Chief of Staff [General Marshall] over a period of many months an attack on Hawaii had always been listed." JCC PHA vol 34 pg 18.
In Colonel Bratton's testimony he make clear that there were possibilities of an attack by the Japanese on U.S. assets, including Pearl Harbor. Once again though, the likelihood is given a back seat:
Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you at this time. Colonel, consider it a capability of the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor ?Col. Bratton. Yes. Many of us considered and discussed the feasibility of such an attack—an attack on our West Coast, an attack on Alaska, an attack on the Canal Zone, an attack on Hawaii and other Pacific installations of ours, the Dutch or the British governments.
Lt. Col. Gibson. From a reading of these messages at that time did you come to the conclusion that the Japs were about to undertake an attack on some of the United States installations?
Col. Bratton. It was apparent that there was strong likelihood of some such attack. It was also apparent that the Japanese immediate major objective would be the British and Dutch possessions in the west Pacific. I believed at that time that any attack on any American installation would be in the nature of a diversion or have for its purpose the prevention of our going to the assistance of the Dutch or British.
Lt. Col. Gibson. Had you talked that thought over with Gen. Miles ?
Col. Bratton. I did.
Lt. Col. Gibson. General Kroner? Col. Bratton. As to Gen. Kroner, my memory is faulty, but I discussed this feature on many occasions with Gen. Miles, with Gen. Gerow and with the Chief of Staff when asked my opinion in the matter.
Lt. Col. Gibson. Did you inform the Chief of Staff that it was a capability of the Japs to attack Pearl Harbor?
Col. Bratton. In various G-2 estimates submitted to the Chief of Staff over a period of many months an attack on Hawaii had always been listed as one of the Japanese capabilities against us.
Lt. Col. Gibson. I notice in the estimate dated 29 November 1941 that the capability of the attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't included. I wonder how that happened, if you have any recollection of it?
Col. Bratton. In reply to that I can only say that those of us in the Army who were studying this situation always listed, mentally at least, an attack on Hawaii as a capability, but in our discussions of the situation with our counterparts in the Navy it was always emphasized by the latter that their forces in the Pacific were alert and so stationed as to make such a Japanese attack impracticable or suicidal, and we therefore relegated such an attack to the realm of remote possibility.
Again we have sign, this time by and intelligence officer but they still are seen as an unlikely scenario.
June 1941, US Major Warren Clear was sent to the Far East seeking intelligence about Japan's war plans. He visited British intelligence in Singapore and reported Japanese plans to attack Hawaii, Guam and other US islands. In 1967 he wrote: "my evidence will show that Washington, DC had solid evidence prior to P.H. [Pearl Harbor] that Japan would...[attack] Hawaii." Quoted from Toland Infamy page 261.
Again, I ask if you have the book on you if you can post the reference Toland uses for this one. I'm not familiar with it and would like to look into the source material further.
June 1941, US military attache' in Mexico City reported that Japan was building midget "submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor" JCC PHA vol 31 pg 3217
Here is the full section of that report:
The MA, Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
Here is a reference to another form of attack that they as a whole were concerned about. In fact this report will be even more bothersome in light of a decision made by Admiral Kimmel and Bloch that I will go over later on this month.
As you can see, I'm in agreement that there were many signs that trouble was brewing. We all know that the U.S. as a whole knew that war was imminent. As we move forward here I think we will see that the entire incident at Pearl Harbor was a culmination of mistakes made at all levels. This I know is where you and I diverge in that to me there is no smoking gun placing blame on a single individual and also no intentional motive to get the Pacific Fleet destroyed. Instead I see a litany of errors which in the end placed the Fleet at the greatest disadvantage at the worst possible time. I for one do not place the blame on a single individual. Each error played a part that added up to a disaster.