Posted on 07/27/2009 6:31:14 AM PDT by Homer_J_Simpson
Gee, I wonder how well those talks worked out?
. . . there is good reason to believe such missions will come and that their conversations, paralleling those of the diplomats, may hasten the final decision as to the pact.
Wrong-o. The final decision has already been made.
bump
With all of the free world’s experience with tyranny, you’d think we would have learned by now that diplomacy with tyrants is casting pearls before swine.
I think that says it all right there. The Soviets are worried that Chamberlain will abandon eastern Europe again and the Soviets will be left holding the bag. Based on Chamberlain's track record up to this point that is not an unreasonable concern.
Stalin’s biggest fear was that the French and British intended to sit out the war behind the Maginot Line, while Stalin and Hitler bled each other to death. Normally Stalin was paranoid, but not this time. You’re not paranoid if your fears are valid.
As Homer posted, Stalin already made up his mind that diplomacy with the allies was a waste of time. He was only going through the motions, hoping that the Germans would offer him a deal, and he could use the sham negotiations with the allies to drive the best possible bargain.
I’ve read a lot about WW2, but as I re-read some books I have on Allied-Soviet wartime diplomacy, it will be interesting to examine whether Stalin’s prejudices against the west continued during the war, or whether he adjusted to changed conditions. Or both.
I think the answer to your question would be Yes. Especially at the end when everything clearly became a game of border drawing (setting the stage for the Cold War).
Tick, Tick, Tick,.........Tick
Tick, Tick, Tick,.........Tick
"The report is held to demonstrate that the uncounted millions in the British Emprie lead "a wretched, joyless existence," according to the Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondans, because of "lack of training and scarcity of all kinds of necessities.
"Colonial work that leads to such result certainly cannot be cited as exemplary," it continues, "whereas the German colonial policy in a relatively short time achieved many great successes in the field of hygiene -- for example, in sleeping sickness -- whose beneficent after-effects are still perceivable in the Dark Continent.
"...The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung suggests that "the British would have more than enough to do were they to care for the people in their own world empire, instead of interfering in Germany's living space in Central Europe."
Well, well... isn't it touching, the Nazis deep concerns for hygiene amongst colonial populations. Possibly these concerns will find future expression as the Nazis expand their "living space in Central Europe." Didn't I hear they are building factories to produce a potent new delousing chemical -- Zyklon B, right? No doubt it will do wonders "improving hygiene" in Central Europe... < /sarc >
What a guy Der Fuehrer is. A heart as big as all outdoors.
It was a well-founded impression. As the confidential British Foreign Office papers make clear, the political talks in Moscow had reached an impasse by the last week in July largely over the impossibility of reaching a definition of “indirect aggression.” To the British and French the Russian interpretation of that term was so broad that it might be used to justify Soviet intervention in Finland and the Baltic States even if there were no serious Nazi threat, and to this London at least – the French were prepared to be more accommodating – would not agree.
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
7/28/39 upate at reply #13.
Now there was a painter...he could paint an entire apartment in one afternoon...TWO COATS!
well documented that hitler believed that without russia, england would not respond to his poland invasion.
so chamberlains appeasement led directly to the war thru russia.
amazing to me that the US govt today doesnt seem to have learned anything from this experience in showing weakness.
I wouldn’t expect 0bama to know thing one about the politics that built up to World War II. He doesn’t even show the slightest understanding of situations directly in front of him that would only require a minute amount of common sense.
As for Stalin, he was a shrewd player not to be taken lightly. He really played both sides of the fence. He used his knowledge that Hitler needed him not allied to the west to grab up the Baltic states (Estonia et al) all the while considering that he would eventually be at war with Germany.
His moves stalled for time to get his army better prepared and I would say the only mistake he made was that he thought Hitler would not attack him until Britian was off the board. Even then when Germany did attack he traded land for time and the combination of the Russian Winter and the movement of the Siberian troops to the front (once they knew Japan was not going to attack them) sealed the fate on the Eastern front for Germany.
According to Herman Wouk's account, Stalin was taken by surprise by Operation Barbarossa June 1941. And since his opinion was the only one that mattered in the Soviet Union the Red Army was also surprised. That was nearly a fatal mistake for Stalin personally, and was fatal for millions of Russians. So Comrade Stalin was shrewd and ruthless but he slipped up big time there.
Please remove me from the Real Time +/- 70 Years ping list.
I view these at work, and photobucket is blocked.
Thus in the late-evening hours of July 26 in a small Berlin restaurant over good food and wine partaken by second-string diplomats was Germany’s first serious bid for a deal with Soviet Russia made. The new line which Schnurre took had been given him by Ribbentrop himself. Astakhov was pleased to hear it. He promised Schnurre that he would report it at once to Moscow.
In the Wilhelmstrasse the Germans waited impatiently to see what the reaction in the Soviet capital would be. Three days later, on July 29, Weizsaecker sent a secret dispatch by courier to Schulenburg in Moscow.
It would be important for us to know whether the remarks made to Astakhov and Babarin have met with any response in Moscow. If you see an opportunity of arranging a further conversation with Molotov, please sound him out on the same lines. If this results in Molotov abandoning the reserve he has so far maintained you could go a step further . . . This applies in particular to the Polish problem. We would be prepared, however the Polish problem may develop . . . to safeguard all Soviet interests and to come to an understanding with the Government in Moscow. In the Baltic question, too, if the talks took a positive course, the idea could be advanced of so adjusting our attitude to the Baltic States as to respect vital Soviet interests in the Baltic Sea.
William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
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