[CougarGA7]

One of the greatest obstacles to the conclusion of a three-power pact is believed by neutral observers to be Soviet fears that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain might revert to his appeasement policy, thus compromising Britain’s reliability as an ally, and these latest British moves look at this distance disturbing like appeasements.

I think that says it all right there. The Soviets are worried that Chamberlain will abandon eastern Europe again and the Soviets will be left holding the bag. Based on Chamberlain's track record up to this point that is not an unreasonable concern.

[henkster]

Stalin’s biggest fear was that the French and British intended to sit out the war behind the Maginot Line, while Stalin and Hitler bled each other to death. Normally Stalin was paranoid, but not this time. You’re not paranoid if your fears are valid.

As Homer posted, Stalin already made up his mind that diplomacy with the allies was a waste of time. He was only going through the motions, hoping that the Germans would offer him a deal, and he could use the sham negotiations with the allies to drive the best possible bargain.

I’ve read a lot about WW2, but as I re-read some books I have on Allied-Soviet wartime diplomacy, it will be interesting to examine whether Stalin’s prejudices against the west continued during the war, or whether he adjusted to changed conditions. Or both.

[beebuster2000]

i agree man. what seemed to have happened is that stalin went with what he perceived to be the stronger horse. his siding with hitler for the opening of the war with poland, triggered the war. without taking russia off the board, i dont believe hitler would have been as quick to invade poland.

well documented that hitler believed that without russia, england would not respond to his poland invasion.

so chamberlains appeasement led directly to the war thru russia.

amazing to me that the US govt today doesnt seem to have learned anything from this experience in showing weakness.