Military Training; Is it killing our Troops?

Our enemies are many and with their presence ever looming, war will always be in the forefront of our great leaders minds, but as the faces of war change and new advancements in training through technology are made, the questions then become; will they be enough to combat the “War on Terror” or will the reliance of technological advancements take away from the institutional thought of “Train as We Fight”?

"We are committed to defending the nation. Yet wars are not won on the defensive. The best way to keep America safe from terrorism is to go after terrorists where they plan and hide”. (1) President George W. Bush November 16, 2002

The institution of war has evolved ten-fold since the indoctrination was written on how to combat the enemies of the cold war; why is it still in use today? The United States (U.S.) is known for its renowned fire power superiority; and although there have been major technological advancements in training and equipment, we as a country have yet to figure out how to combat the War on Terror, both at home and abroad; moreover, the enemy itself.

It is no secret, the enemies of the United States want to see us dead and they will stop at nothing to ensure their mission is complete. To combat the War on Terror is a necessary concept in order to protect our freedoms and the American way of life, this much is understood.

What is not clear, is the process by which both are achieved. The difficulty comes in understanding what type(s) of training are needed for Soldiers to successfully deploy, engage and destroy our enemies both foreign and domestic; even if they are one in the same.

There has been an overwhelming concern from keys leaders in the field, many of whom feel that in order to fight this non-conventional war in both Afghanistan and Iraq; the cold war doctrine and theories need to be revamped and restructured in order to fit the ever changing face of battle.

The War on Terror is a simultaneous multi-phase application, whereas Soldiers must deal with a multitude of war fighting layers; again with training taught from outdated doctrine. (2)

Soldiers are fighting in a war that has no clear cut battle lines, there is no front and no rear. They are relying on instinct and a cross between old doctrine and new technological training in order to combat the unknown enemy, an enemy that has been fighting for thousands of years in an irregular manner and one who has achieved great success with their tried and proven style.

If we as the “super power” do not change our training style and thought process on how this type of war should be fought and won, then it will become inevitable that history will repeat itself. (2) (3) This statement is based upon a known historical perspective, in 1980, during the cold war, Russia invaded a poor non-threatening country, with limited military resources, by the name of Afghanistan.

Russia went into Afghanistan with the idea of achieving a quick and decisive victory, however; eight years later using their same “Cold War” doctrine which was developed to combat the U.S., slowly proved to be ineffective against a non-superior fighting force which used an irregular and unknown style of warfare. (4)

This ultimately led to the near destruction of the Russian military war machine and this is identical to the same unconventional type of warfare which the Soldiers of today’s Army are combating. (4) That being said, with all of the advancements in technology, are today’s Soldiers being given the necessary training and proper tools to successfully accomplish their mission?

Could it be that we leaving them to their own demise when left to face the enemy in real life and not through that of a computer screen? It is my observation, that the implementation of modern computer technology in the form of simulation(s) has been used to take the place of what was once known as “real boots on ground training”.

The thought that a Soldier can become a proficient warrior through the use of a simulated video game is unrealistic. Practice does not make perfect. Perfect practice makes perfect as there is no replacement for actual sweat and tears.

A comparison could be an Air Force pilot learning how to fly through use of a flight simulator without ever actually flying the plane. Yet be expected to know its limitations and capabilities when used to conduct a real world mission.

The enemies of today do not rely upon superior hi-tech advancements to eliminate their targets; they have simple ideals in association with simplistic means. As each day passes, they continue to accomplish their mission with great success. On the other hand, the U.S. is viewed by many as the world’s foremost “super power” with astounding equipment and resources. Unfortunately; with all of our advancements, this seems to have detracted or limited the Soldier’s ability to conquer the enemy.“The military was so convinced that technology would enhance its training methods that more than 45 million dollars would be spent on the projects between the years 2000-2005”. (5) Modern tools have enabled the U.S. armed forces to take a more lackadaisical approach to training.

What ever happened to the resonant phrase “Train as You Fight”? This has been the concept of military operations since the beginning of time. With this in mind one must argue, is this approach still pertinent in today’s Army? The answer should be a resounding YES; unfortunately, this can’t be farther from the truth.

The Department of Defense has over 25 million acres of land in its inventory set aside by Congress for maneuver and live-impact areas or buffer zones. Unfortunately, with the build-up of surrounding communities the undeveloped lands have become a nesting ground for those endangered wildlife and flora. (6) This has now left the land a protected environmental nightmare leaving most combat arms units unable to use the land for training purposes.

Realistic training is imperative to combat readiness, but more importantly to lives of those Soldiers who continue to fight for the American way of life and for the freedoms of others.

Is there a way to train modern technology and engage the “Train as You Fight” thought process in order to blend the two together for the advancement of battlefield success? The answer is yes; it will inevitably be a two-fold process to merge the old with the new.

It is imperative that senior military leaders listen to their Soldiers based on their current knowledge and combat experience as seen through their own eyes. This would enable military leaders to ensure that training standards remain current and viable. It would also allow the much needed doctrinal changes to be made. This will enhance the survivability and mortality rate of the Warfighter on the modern battlefield and will continue to combat the ever changing faces of war, which will increase and enhance our overall combat effectiveness.

Through it all the actions of 9-1-1 has ultimately awakened the “sleeping giant” (the American people). It has given the common citizen a broader perspective on what Israel has been faced with for years. It wasn’t until terrorists struck here on American soil and were successful did the public become full of rage; all but a select few of our government stood up and demanded retribution. Thus, the “War on Terror” began and it caught us unprepared. Our training from then to now has improved significantly but it is still a work in progress and it must progress. Train as You Fight, Fight as You Train.

1. Office of Management and Budget, The Executive Office of the President, Winning the War on Terrorism, Retrieved, 16 April 2008, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/winning.html 2. U.S. Department of Defense, American Forces Press Service News Articles, Terror War Demonstrates Need to Update Doctrine, by Donna Miles, Retrieved 15 April 2008, http://www.defense.mil/news/newarticle.aspx?id=26837 3. About.com, US Military, War Changes the Way the Army Trains, Rifleman First, Specialist Second, June 5 2004, Retrieved, 14 April 2008 http://usmilitary.about.com/od/armytrng/a/artraining.htm

Commanders of Combat Service Support (CSS) units and Non-Combat Arms MOS’s are relying to much on simulation training due to the ease and availability, and are not getting their troops out in the field.

Not trying to be difficult, but I still don't quite follow you. You can't take a Bradley battalion into the field for more than a day without taking your CSS assets with you, and they typically do their actual MOS tasks every single day, unlike combat arms guys.

Now, if you're saying that CS and CSS types need more training in light infantry tactics and in basic battle drills, I agree wholeheartedly. I was the BMO for a mech infantry battalion when I got out. You shoulda heard the maintenance section b*tch when I told them we were going to do 'react to ambush' and 'react to contact' battle drills, as well as weapons familiarization with soviet-bloc weapons. Then the Jessica Lynch thing happened, and they were a whole lot more interested.

What’s your point? The doctrine we developed in WWII and in Vietnam came from our failures in combat. We’re fighting a different enemy, we’re learning what we need to do and what doesn’t work. With far fewer lives lost than in previous wars, I might add.

Yes we are. However, our current training is several years old. The doctrine that is currently being used and taught is for the most part 5+ years old. I have direct involvement with the current pre-tain up for the deploying soldiers here at Ft. Bliss. They are still being taught to stop at all trash piles and Cordon due to IED’s. We need to take all key leaders immediately after their re-deployment, run them through a de-briefing, then take that info and change the Doctrine based upon the experiences that they encountered. By time the red tape gets lifted and it gets into the manual, it will be only 1 year old and not 5-7 years old. I keep seeing the same Pepsi Can loaded with C-4 on the handouts that I had in 04-05. I am not saying that the system is broken, but that it needs to be current. Also, you will never hear me say that “Simulation Training” is not a good thing, but it must be done along with actual “Boots on Ground” training. Imagine you only going through the EST2000, never stepped foot in a Stryker and going to war, then being issued your Stryker. This is simular to what the CSS Units are doing with their soldiers. They are even qualifying on the Weaponeer prior to rolling out. This is just wrong.

“Now, if you’re saying that CS and CSS types need more training in light infantry tactics and in basic battle drills, I agree wholeheartedly. I was the BMO for a mech infantry battalion when I got out. You shoulda heard the maintenance section b*tch when I told them we were going to do ‘react to ambush’ and ‘react to contact’ battle drills, as well as weapons familiarization with soviet-bloc weapons. Then the Jessica Lynch thing happened, and they were a whole lot more interested.”

That is exactly what I am saying. Everyone is now a Grunt, and doing Combat Patrols regardless of MOS. They must get in the field (”hands on, boots on ground” to learn combat techniques for survivability while at home.

My Personnel changes (Just some ideas I have):

• Don’t fixate on end strength. Recruit only the best. Become more selective but also better for the recruit, placing the right type of recruit in the right job.
• Expand basic and make what we call infantry training common across all MOS’s.
• Increase basic training length and allow this to be more of a weed out point, don’t make units have to deal with trash everyone knows won’t “hack it.”
• Roll back some of the social experiments and social engineering efforts within the DoD.
• Longer service contracts for officers and enlisted going into 6 or 8 years active, which allows for a much greater investment in the soldier and increases the average experience level.
• All combat arms officers do 3 years enlisted time in the MOS they will lead in on an accelerated promotion system to learn the jobs and gain the experience of a team/squad leader.
• Invest more in training the “individual” not just collective training with multi-million dollar contraptions. This may include foreign languages but also includes in house schools that have established programs, like sniper, airborne, ranger etc.
• Allow people to homestead, it saves money and allows specialization on top of making life semi normal for families.
• Phase in skills testing for enlisted (like in the USAF) E1-E7.
• Kill the officer evaluation system which breeds “kiss asses.” Make the officer evaluation system more objective and quantifiable like the enlisted system.
• Slow down officer rotations through PLT, CO, BN, and BDE command. By the time they figure out what the hell to do they are on their way out replaced by someone else who needs to punch a ticket as having been “in command.”
• Drastically reduce the officer corps size. Less people stepping on each others toes, less made up jobs while in holding patterns for commands etc. The few that remain stay in command longer, get repeat commands, and are more selectively chosen in the first place and better trained.

I keep seeing the same Pepsi Can loaded with C-4 on the handouts that I had in 04-05. I am not saying that the system is broken, but that it needs to be current.

OK... now I see the issue. "Doctrine" is different from "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures." Doctrine is how we *as an Army* fight in the big picture, and TTP is how individual soldiers and small units (brigade and below) actually execute doctrine. IOW, doctrine might be " paint the house" and the TTP is "start from the top and work your way down from left to right, using red paint."

What you're really saying is that the Army needs a better way to disseminate current TTPs from the combat theater into the training plans for deploying units, especially for CS / CSS units. That's very different from saying the Army is still using outdated doctrine, because they're not. The doctrine (big picture stuff, remember) SHOULDN'T be changed every time the wind blows, whereas TTP are constantly being modified to meet the most current threats.

If you were writing in 2002, you would have a point.

Our current Army knows more about counterinsurgency than any Army ever has before. Down to the lowest levels, they have expertise the likes of which would be anyone else’s wet dream.

My qualifications for writing this include a tour with them in Afghanistan last year. By 2007, the Army had become extremely good at counterinsurgency.

Unfortunately, they are required to teach Doctrine and TTP’s that they are given to teach. Myself, I do that and then Stamp my foot on the ground and tell what really needs to be told. Stopping at trash piles is still supposed to be taught. I know, cause I have direct involvement with training up under 1st Army for the deploying National Guard and Reservists that come through. Just prior to that, I was OT/C for Deploying BDE Staff when I first returned from Theater. Thsi is not just something that I am making up, and that is what caused me to write this paper. Sometimes I get so frustrated with the red tape. I do appreciate your comment. Thank you.

They are still being taught to stop at all trash piles and Cordon due to IED’s.

That's the same "training" I got from those retards in Kuwait. The reality of how you deal with an IED threat doesn't brief well, so I doubt it'll ever change. That's not even an issue with training, that an issue with how the upper echelons of the Army work.

They are even qualifying on the Weaponeer prior to rolling out. This is just wrong.

That is very, very wrong. I have no doubt that some units finger-drill the basic Soldier tasks, and I have no doubt that CS/CSS units are at the top of the list. Given what I saw of a particular Cav BCT in Mosul (from Fort Bliss, btw) I have no doubt that some combat units do it, too. This is inexcusable, and their chain of command should be relieved. Of course, I know how the Army works, as I'm sure you do, too, and what needs to happen to such people will not happen.

I was in the .mil when a sea-change happened with respect to military reservations and the endangered species, OSHA, EPA, and that kind of thing was applied to the military.

In my job I noticed that certain solvents, in this case electrical contact cleaners and various chemicals used to treat aviation components were delisted and reformulated. The replacements were yet even more expensive and did not work, or not very well.

Now I was just a helicopter crew-chief but my theory illustrates the crap that’s going on. Remember the explosion of the space shuttle? NASA, even Feinman blamed the O-rings and cold weather on the solid rocket booster failure.

O-rings are called “packings” in the vernacular. Made of rubber, while they seal pretty good they aren’t going to take direct heat from any kind of propellent. That isn’t their function. What really sealed off the boosters was asbestos putty, not a rubber o-ring! Could be totally wrong on this, but it makes more sense than the official line?

Asbestos products were apparently, outlawed at some point. At least iirc the government contractor was enjoined from making it, or probably they voluntarily stopped because of impending litigation. I think by that point there may have only been one company left that actually made it. So, something INFERIOR was swapped in as ersatz.

Simulation Training is excellent, but without “hands on” with the real thing, you cannot expect to be considered fluent without actually flying the real thing and then prior to flying on an actual combat mission.

Nobody is making the claim other than you. As stated by Ladtx: the simulator can save a good deal of money and even equipment in training up flight crews

In other words, the simulator is nothing more than a training aid leading up to the actual cockpit training which you are obviously ignoring.

To support your argument, why don't you provide evidence showing that our military fighter pilots are entering the air in combat missions without extensive fighter training or just plain flight training in general which you are alluding to..........?

You shoulda heard the maintenance section b*tch when I told them we were going to do 'react to ambush' and 'react to contact' battle drills, as well as weapons familiarization with soviet-bloc weapons. Then the Jessica Lynch thing happened, and they were a whole lot more interested.

I'm a (very new) 27A, so the odds of me ever using infantry techniques is slim - but, as PFC Lynch demonstrated, if it ever hits the fan, that's what I need to know the most.

Good thread bump. Pretty much all of what Red6 has said. Added more small-unit' tactics - you're already involved in this. IMO, a scale-down of troop numbers with more concentration on intel gathering, interpretation and getting the results back out the door quick quick. The integrated indig is a proven benefit. It ain't pretty sounding, but hunter-killer squads are what, IMO, are required. No safe place for the terrs. Again, small unit..not blast and hope. Target target target. No Matter who they are and where they go. Eliminate the network.

Oh yeah, make training harder. Better to bleed in training than in the field.

Bless ya for your concern and I pray you'll heal-up and have purty scars to show...RLTW!

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