Posted on 08/17/2022 7:40:09 AM PDT by SeekAndFind
This is a really good question and has piqued my interest since it speaks directly to my doctoral research, rendering me somewhat qualified to answer this question from a behavioural scientific perspective.
To understand the psychological outcome of this war, we need to understand what it is that Putin wants and then determine his current mindset with regards to the attainment of those desires or preferences. And here we run into problems, because in spite of the copious amount of ink spilt on the topic, nobody knows exactly - perhaps not even Putin himself - what he wants.
The signalling from the Kremlin ranging from NATO encroachment through de-Nazification, the possible dangers of future attacks, to downright imperialism, etc., etc., leave Putin lacking a unified message to his armies and people, and this is one of the reasons why the Kremlin have lost the information war so comprehensively.
However, it presents Putin with the unique situation within which he can slip and slide his way through this war without ever admitting defeat. For instance, following Mariupol he could simply have declared the de-Nazification process complete, called it a victory and withdrawn his armies. He could, but of course he never did, suggesting that it was never a true motive for this war.
If not true motives, what can we discern of his desires from his direction? For me, the helter-skelter of the first hours of the war is a solid indication - Putin never expected this war to last as long as it already has. In spite of the vatniks assuring us that ‘Kyiv was only a feint’, the observations on those first three days of battle belie such an assertion, baseless as it is.
Putin wanted Kyiv and he was certain that just in Crimea in 2014, his forces would take it with the minimum resistance. Zelynskyy was anticipated to flee Kyiv (or be assassinated by FSB teams inside Kyiv) and all resistance was sure to collapse at the first sign of trouble. However, none of this happened and the elite of the Russian Army were punished mercilessly for their hubris, most notably at Hostomel Airport.
As it may, Putin wanted Kyiv and for whatever we can say of the absolutely catastrophic opening phase of Russia’s war (and by God, it was so incredibly bad), he desired the Ukrainian government to collapse. Since that never happened, Putin has had to revise his preferences for the war, and then revise these again, and again, and again - in the process relieving no less than five (possibly six) theatre commanders of their posts, a list that includes the Butcher of Aleppo, Aleksandr Dvornikov - the Kremlin’s blue-eyed boy for all matters relating to genocide.
As the Russian armed forces struggle to reach even the reduced objectives and as the Ukrainian forces are now counter-attacking, I notice that the Russian invaders have become entirely reactive - they no longer dictate where the fighting should occur and when. For instance, when Ukraine broadcasted their plans to counter-attack towards Kherson, Russia drew down the resources for their offensives in Donbas and rushed these to the south to counter the Ukrainian initiative.
As the Russians crammed forces across the River Dnipro, Ukrainians simply applied their long-range artillery to destroy the sole remaining bridge there (the Antonivskyy bridge) and the Russians on the western bank of the Dnipro are now stuck and cut off from their lines of communication. In the mean while, Ukrainian forces started counter-attacking towards Izium and Russia lack the reserves to respond. Nor can Russia redeploy their forces in Kherson, because the bridge is down and the entire area is now a death trap.
But how does all of this translate into a response on your question? On the one side of the coin, it is legitimate to argue that Russia have already lost the war and that it is purely their preponderance in materiel that afford them to continue purely as a face-saving effort. But I understand that the psychology of conflict outcomes resides in a rarefied atmosphere and there may be those who prefer a more concrete indication of outcome.
To those, I believe that the Russians’ lack of reserves and initiative will cause the issue to come to a head before the end of this year, perhaps even before winter. Whichever way, it is only a matter of time - Russia’s defeat in Ukraine is now inevitable and I’m sure that Putin regrets the entire affair deeply.
The only way Russia can win is if the west loses it's resolve and agrees to Russia's demands to negotiate a cease fire and lock in their territorial gains. I don't see that happening.
16 HIMARS is not a lot considering the length of the front. But it is allowing Ukraine to destroy Russia's command and ammo centers. And it's a start. I think we should ramp it to 100 HIMARS. I think I've heard the plan is 30 in the short term.
Dispite having gained control of 20% of Ukraine's territory, (Not sure if that counts Crimea or not), Several things are working against the Russians at this point:
Russia still has a couple of advantages:
My outlook:
Disclaimer: DannyTN has never served in the armed forces. Nor traveled beyond the USA's borders. But he plays an armchair General on FR.
RE: Define winning as far as Ukraine and Russia are concerned. What would it look like for both?
Here’s how I envision winning for both Ukraine and Russia.
I have always been a proponent of people deciding what they want for their own lives.
Therefore, for me, winning means the people in the Donbas region get to choose in a free and fair referendum, whether they want to be independent, part of Ukraine, or part of Russia. Same principle applies to Crimea.
And winning means, Ukraine and Russia agree to abide by the result of these free and fair referendums.
Russia will never give up Crimea, which it annexed in 2014 after the US/EU engineered coup of the duly elected government of Ukraine. It also spawned the separatist movement in the Donbas.
Really, well it was fun watching all the Russians fleeing Crimea in the past week.
Because there is no way in hell Putin will allow the humiliation of Russia losing a war with Ukraine. He will do whatever it takes. Europe is getting cold feet (no pun intended) as they face being starved of energy. At the the very least Russia will annex the eastern portion of Ukraine.
True. But no one believed Putin would invade to this extent.
In February I was arguing that he would just threaten and get his way, with Germany and France hastening to reassure him that they would not allow Ukraine to join NATO, with him recognising and then annexing DPR and LPR as a fait accompli. And with an impotent NATO and Zelensky sinking into irrelevance.
But he gambled big and lost big.
Ukraine wins by staying independent of Muscowy
Russia doesn’t want this war. Putin does.
Putin’s army controls less Ukrainian territory on August 16th than they did on March 16th.
And they have lost thousands of soldiers, hundreds of tanks, the flagship and their reputation and prestige. No one woll buy Russian weapons now as they are shown to be useless
Yes, that exercise is far away from the Ukrainian theatre.
China won’t risk its troops to fight on the losing side.
In 2008 Germany and France rejected Georgia and Ukraine request to join NATO,
They did that as that was supposedly a provocation for Putin.
Putin invaded Georgia a few weeks later and Ukraine 6 years later.
If they had joined NATO, then Putin would nit have invaded
You conveniently skipped the whole 2014 Maidan Coup and subsequent war on the Donbas, the "Right Sektor" beneficiaries of which then promised to fast-track entry into NATO.
Good question! Did America actually "win" WWII?
/ mordant sarcasm
Regards,
Who said anything about troops? They’ll use Russians the way we use Ukrainians, as cannon fodder. I’m saying Xi can mass produce the cannons and tanks and Putin has an unlimited supply of Chinese petrorubles. Guess who’s going to match whatever Chinese arms are introduced in the Eastern European quagmire? That’s right buddy, that guy in the mirror.
The Minsk II Agreement promised free and fair elections to the Donbas. It was never fully implemented. As far as Crimea is concerned, there was a plebiscite held in Crimea after the annexation in 2014.
The Crimean status referendum of 2014 was a disputed referendum concerning the status of Crimea, held on March 16, 2014 in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the local government of Sevastopol (both subdivisions of Ukraine).
The referendum was approved and held amidst Russia's annexation of Crimea. The referendum asked local populations whether they wanted to rejoin Russia as a federal subject, or if they wanted to restore the 1992 Crimean constitution and Crimea's status as a part of Ukraine.
The official result from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was a 97 percent vote for integration of the region into the Russian Federation with an 83 percent voter turnout, and within the local government of Sevastopol there was also a 97 percent vote for integration into Russia with an 89 percent voter turnout.
The March 16 referendum's available choices did not include keeping the status quo of Crimea and Sevastopol as they were at the moment the referendum was held. The 1992 constitution accords greater powers to the Crimean parliament, including full sovereign powers to establish relations with other states; therefore, many Western and Ukrainian commentators argued that both provided referendum choices would result in de facto separation from Ukraine. The final date and ballot choices were set only ten days before the plebiscite was held. Before, during and after the plebiscite was proclaimed, the Crimean peninsula was host to Russian soldiers to manage and oversee public buildings and Ukrainian military installations.
Following the referendum, the State Council of Crimea and Sevastopol City Council declared the independence of the Republic of Crimea from Ukraine and requested to join the Russian Federation. On the same day, Russia recognized the Republic of Crimea as a sovereign state.
The referendum is not recognized by most countries, mainly due to the presence of Russian forces. Thirteen members of the United Nations Security Council voted in favor of a resolution declaring the referendum invalid, but Russia vetoed it and China abstained. A United Nations General Assembly resolution was later adopted, by a vote of 100 in favor vs. 11 against with 58 abstentions, which declared the referendum invalid and affirmed Ukraine's territorial integrity. As the plebiscite was proclaimed, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People called for a boycott of the referendum.
And winning means, Ukraine and Russia agree to abide by the result of these free and fair referendums.
You appear to favor a negotiated solution, which ultimately is the only way to resolve the problems, or at least the fighting. But the reality is that NATO including the US are deeply involved in the fighting supplying weapons, money, real time intelligence, and economic sanctions against Russia. At various times Biden has called for regime change in Russia including assassination and calling Putin a war criminal. SecDef Austin has said the objective is to weaken Russia so it cannot initiate aggressive actions elsewhere.
The US has invested at least $60 billion in Ukraine and counting. Ukraine could not keep up the fight without this assistance. How long can we continue to borrow money to fund this war? Zelensky says it will take $800 billion to rebuild the country. Who pays for that?
Should the US allow Ukraine to hijack our foreign policy with an open-ended commitment to wherever they may take us? Shouldn't we use our leverage to force Zelensky to negotiate a solution? How much pain must be inflicted on the global economy over a war where we have no real strategic interests or treaty obligations? We are the world's biggest debtor nation. We can't afford these endless wars, which actually weaken us when it comes to the real threat from China.
How many are fleeing Crimea?
That is the status quo. Was Russia's real objective to occupy the entire country, the size of Texas, with 200,000 troops?
We can hope their ICBMs don’t work.
George Kennan, the intellectual father of America’s containment policy during the Cold War, perceptively warned in a May 2, 1998 New York Times interview about what the Senate’s ratification of NATO’s first round of expansion would set in motion. ”I think it is the beginning of a new cold war,” Kennan stated. ”I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else.”
George F. Kennan called the expansion of NATO into Central Europe “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.”
“From what I have seen, Russia will prevail.”
Because of the Russian victories in Kyiv, Odessa, Lviv, Snake Island, the Black Sea, etc?
The Oligarchs here and in Ukraine and some in NATO countries have stuffed their pockets with billions of dollars and will let things take their course.
NATO is going to be more concerned with their people staying warm this winter and preventing their industries from collapsing due to balancing their energy demands between the people and industry.
Ukraine is basically going to be on its own. IMO
RE: As far as Crimea is concerned, there was a plebiscite held in Crimea after the annexation in 2014.
and this:
RE: The referendum was approved and held amidst Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
I am not comfortable with a referendum under such circumstances. What is needed is a referendum WITHOUT Russian or Ukrainian interference, observed by neutral, disinterested, third party watchers.
Although I have no illusions that most Crimeans DO NOT want to be part of Ukraine ( Crimea’s merging with Ukraine was a forced Kruschev concoction in the 1950’s ). But still, a referendum accepted by all NOT UNDER RUSSIAN or UKRANIAN OCCUPATION is the best approach to this catastrophe.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.