Posted on 01/02/2025 6:49:52 AM PST by MtnClimber
Unveiling the Truth: Boeing’s 737 Max Software Development Unraveled
In the realm of aviation technology, the Boeing 737 Max series has remained a topic of intense scrutiny and debate. Recent revelations have shed light on a pivotal aspect of its development, exposing a web of intricate details that could reshape our perception of the entire saga.
Boeing’s Strategic Outsourcing Approach
Startling reports have surfaced, divulging an unconventional strategy employed by Boeing during the development and testing phase of the 737 Max’s software. This strategy involved outsourcing crucial responsibilities to a pool of temporary workers and fresh college graduates. These individuals found themselves under the employment or contract of esteemed Indian technology firms, namely HCL Technologies and Cyient Ltd.
The Quest for Efficiency and Its Consequences
Intriguingly, the workforce engaged by Boeing for this pivotal task was comprised of low-paid professionals. This unconventional move, while seemingly aimed at enhancing efficiency and cutting costs, ultimately raised serious concerns within the industry. Veteran engineers who have had the privilege of observing this process firsthand have pointed out alarming irregularities in the code’s execution.
The Shadows of Imperfection
These seasoned engineers, with their wealth of experience, did not mince words when it came to assessing the work undertaken by the outsourced engineers. They assertively state that the code, which forms the backbone of the 737 Max’s software, was marred by inadequacies and inaccuracies. Their unanimous sentiment was that the code had not been meticulously crafted and executed in the manner it deserved.
Anatomy of the Flawed Software
While it’s essential to cast a discerning eye on the role played by the outsourced workforce, it’s equally imperative to understand the broader context of the software’s malfunction. The glitch-ridden software, which has become synonymous with the ill-fated 737 Max series, can be traced back to a fundamental design flaw embedded in the plane’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).
The Crucial Link: MCAS in Focus
MCAS, heralded as a pioneering advancement in aviation safety, was meticulously designed to avert potential stalls during flights. However, a single point of vulnerability within its architecture led to catastrophic consequences. MCAS was intrinsically engineered to depend on data sourced from a solitary sensor. This inherent design choice, while meant to streamline operations, inadvertently exposed the system to erroneous readings.
A Chain Reaction of Devastation
The vulnerability stemming from the sole reliance on one sensor spawned a chain reaction of events that would go on to haunt the 737 Max series. The discrepancies in sensor readings had the potential to trigger the MCAS into action, causing it to erroneously force the aircraft’s nose downward. This unsettling behavior played a pivotal role in the tragic sequence of events that culminated in two fatal crashes, shaking the very foundation of Boeing’s credibility.
Lessons Learned and the Path Forward
In hindsight, the calamitous outcomes attributed to the 737 Max’s software issues underscore the dire consequences of compromise in aerospace engineering. This sobering saga serves as a testament to the indispensable nature of precision and rigor in such critical endeavors. It compels the industry, regulators, and stakeholders alike to reevaluate their approach to safety, innovation, and quality assurance.
Conclusion: Navigating Turbulent Skies
The saga of Boeing’s 737 Max software development illuminates the intricate interplay between innovation, oversight, and accountability. The outsourcing strategy, though well-intentioned, cast a spotlight on the importance of striking a delicate balance between efficiency and excellence. As the aviation industry charts its course into the future, the lessons gleaned from this tumultuous chapter will undoubtedly serve as a compass, guiding the way towards safer skies for all.
In conclusion, the revelation of Boeing’s choice to outsource critical software development tasks to a contingent of low-paid workers and recent graduates opens a window into the complex world of aerospace engineering. The resultant issues that plagued the 737 Max’s software underscore the significance of maintaining an unwavering commitment to quality and precision in such a high-stakes domain. This introspection must steer the aviation industry toward a future that prioritizes not only innovation but also the unfaltering assurance of safety and reliability.
The article was written by a Hindu, just like the software they’re talking about. It ruined everything. They didn’t even bother to get the H1B visa people over here. They just sent the work over to India. This is disgusting who is going to fly Boeing ever again?
“Pilot training is the larger issue here.”
I simplistically picture a test pilot moving the controls and seeing how the plane behaves, including behaviors that stress the airframe and try to confuse the computer stuff that helps the pilot.
I’m sure the simulators are invaluable for many reasons but they aren’t the plane itself, so it is also invaluable to bang on the plane itself.
Computer-controlled flying certainly moves the game way toward an exercise in software. I’m a software guy. Many times I’ve pronounced my piece of software perfect, but alas, it wasn’t.
Great analysis. thanks.
Even intelligent third graders from back in the day could have imagined up the flaws that led those planes to crash.
“Intriguingly, the workforce engaged by Boeing for this pivotal task was comprised of low-paid professionals.”
“Intriguingly”....my royal Irish A$%!!!
This article skips completely over the fact that the 737 MAX should have been a new type cert, because the new design had significantly different flight characteristics than a traditional 737.
It also ignores the fact that MCAS is most commonly designed using a voted-source scheme, where one bad air data sensor is outvoted by multiple good ones. The single-sensor design shouldn’t have been available, but the software isn’t at fault for the safety error.
I cannot vouch for the code that was created for the system. But the underlying causes of the crashes go far beyond bad software.
It is scary to think about the new Air Force 1 being built by Boeing.
Really? Hopefully that's part of what they're fixing.
The software did exactly what it was designed to do.
The problem does not lie with the coders; it lies with the engineering requirements analysis.
Even before the requirements were written, Boeing decided at a much higher level that they could eke out one last revision of the 737 at a much lower cost than building an entirely new aircraft to compete with Airbus. The larger, more economical engines that were required had to be mounted higher up and further forward, upsetting the aerodynamic stability of the 737 airframe. That was compensated for by creating the MCAS software. And they also decided to use just one angle of attack sensor, not two. Those were stupid systems design decisions at the very highest level, far above the programmers.
It sounds to me that the software met the design requirements perfectly and that somebody is trying to shift blame from the executive suite to the much lower level programmers.
“My recollection is that the two crashes could have been avoided if the pilots had the wits to disengage MCAS and fly the plane themselves.”
Correct. But also recall that Boeing did not even tell the pilots about the existence of the MCAS software and how it would react. Those pilots struggled against the MCAS system to get the aircraft back to a neutral orientation. They did not even know what they were fighting against.
“Why didn’t they just turn the damn system off?”
Maybe because Boeing did not even instruct any customers about MCAS or what it was designed to do? How do you turn off a system you don’t even know exists? Or where the off switch was for the system you didn’t know about?
And do that in real-time while you are fighting the aircraft to get out of a nose-down attitude caused by Lord knows what.
Boeing and their FAA auditors used to require a detailed and comprehensive Failure Mode and Effects Analysis report for the certification of any new system. The FMEA should show the possible effects of any single point failure and thus reveal design flaws.
“When you waste money on DEI you have to cut corners elsewhere.”
Not only DEI.
1) Obscenely paid executive positions and consulting deals for retired generals, politicians and bureaucrats who steered contracts to Boeing during their government careers.
2). Lucrative executive bonuses and stock option packages rewarding the cost cutting, DEI programs, and financial engineering
3). Over $68 billion for stock buybacks, instead of investing in the business, to pump the value of the stock price thereby increasing the value of executive stock options. https://www.commondreams.org/news/boeing-mass-layoffs
4). Untold tens of millions of dollars spent moving the corporate headquarters first from Washington state to Chicago and then to DC.
Boeing is another example of a US company where financial manipulators and attorneys wrested control of the corporation from the executives who knew how to design, make and sell products. The primary focus of these corporations is financial engineering to please Wall Street speculators, and maximize executive stock option compensation, not building innovative and safe aircraft. Once the finance people take over a corporation, making and selling great products becomes incidental to manipulating earnings to drive the stock price.
When a company spends billions on stock buybacks, instead of new product innovation, manufacturing quality enhancements, worker training, and modernizing production facilities, you know it is in the death spiral.
In 1974 Sears Roebuck was the largest retailer in the US and was respected by customers for its quality brands (Kenmore, Craftsman, DieHard, Weatherbeater). In 1974 Sears completed construction of the then world’s tallest building, the Sears Tower, to serve as its corporate headquarters. Its catalog operation was the Amazon of its day and notably was shut down by the financial executives at the company the same year Amazon was founded. If Sears had been run by visionary merchants, instead of financial manipulators, the catalog operation gave it the potential to dominate internet shopping. Instead, during the past 50 years Sears has been through bankruptcy and constant downsizing to where today it operates only 11 stores and those will be gone within the next two years. Over a 50 year period Sears was milked and gutted by financial geniuses who knew nothing about products, little about store operation, did not care about customers, and who refused to invest money in sustaining and growing the business.
Harvard and Wharton Ivy League business school financial MBA’s have dominated the executive suites of American companies for 50 years and have willingly sold off American’s manufacturing supply chains to foreign companies, making themselves multimillionaires through executive compensation plans rewarding the sell-off of assets and the temporary margin improvement from outsourcing. As long as the the financial executives , and lawyers, are running US corporations, returning manufacturing to the USA will only be empty words uttered by politicians to secure votes in election years.
DEI is only a minor part of the leadership problem in US industry. Until product visionaries and operations experts once again dominate executive suites and corporate boardrooms, once great US corporations will continue to fail, to shrink, and lobby for government subsidies and preferences.
As the 20th century began, America had eclipsed the British Empire as the greatest industrial power on the planet. Wall Street was ruled by the banker J.P. Morgan who financed factories, equipment, ships, railroads and other projects which would propel US industry through the first half of the 20th century and create a manufacturing infrastructure capable of producing the materials required to fight a world war. Today’s investment bankers and stock traders churn billions of dollars of securities in nanoseconds seeking to create opportunity to make a quick buck with the aid of computers as and artificial intelligences. This speculative trading, much of it done with the retirement savings (IRA, 401K) of average Americans, as well as pension money, creates no factories, transportation networks, or other “hard” assets which can be used by creative and industrious people to make products and create jobs. Instead it lines the pockets of billionaires and flows to politicians who rig the game for their benefactors.
In many ways DEI is a distraction in the big picture. Eliminating DEI will not result in the relocation of one factory from China or Vietnam to the USA. Reshoring manufacturing, and making American industry great again, will require a seismic shift in types of people reaching leadership positions in corporations, corporate executive compensation systems, a long term investment mentality, and the nurturing of visionary creative minds (Steve Jobs, Elon Musk) capable of imagining great products and entire new businesses.
“Correct. But also recall that Boeing did not even tell the pilots about the existence of the MCAS”
But 737s before MAX had an autopilot. MCAS was an enhancement to that autopilot, wasn’t it, to make the MAX behave like the pre-MAX. So I’m thinking pilots would already know about disengaging an autopilot. I’m guessing here.
Dirty angle of attack probe is the first thing I'd check.
Disengaging the MCAS turned off motorized power to the control surfaces. Pilots were reduced to using hand cranks.
Before the first MAX crashed pilots weren’t even told that MCAS existed or what it was designed to do.
Boeing’s downfall began when MBAs took control of the company away from the engineers.
You are correct.
And there was a previous money saving decision that led to using MCAS in the first place. The new MAX engines were too big for a 737 airframe and protruded above the wing surface, adding lift where it wasn’t wanted. MCAS was designed to counteract that lift. And as you say none of the pilots were told that it even existed.
“Have you ever seen a Boeing 737-400? Did you notice how oddly shaped the engine nacelles were?”
That’s where the problem all started. The MAX engine is too big and the nacelles protrude above the wing, adding lift.
If the 737 landing gear struts could have been lengthened then the MAX engines would have hung lower and not caused a problem. But it was impossible to make the landing gear longer.
Boeing could have used the 757 airframe instead. The MAX engines would have fit under the wings. But then the airlines would have had to retrain every 737 pilot to certify them on the 757. Or Boeing could have designed a brand new airframe. Instead the MBAs decided to cut corners and Rube Goldberg the MAX in order to call it a 737. The crashing part and wrecking the company was just an added bonus.
“But 737s before MAX had an autopilot. MCAS was an enhancement to that autopilot, wasn’t it, to make the MAX behave like the pre-MAX. “
Not an enhancement. ProtectOurFreedom is correct. MCAS was borrowed from Air Force tanker software in an attempt to jury rig the MAX in order to call it a normal 737 and avoid retraining pilots.
MCAS was something entirely new and pilots were not even informed that it existed or what it was doing.
“Since then the planes have been equipped with two sensors for redundancy. A second sensor was always an option. Perhaps Boeing should have made dual sensors mandatory.”
I believe the cheaper carriers opted for only a single AoA sensor. Yes, two ought to have been mandatory.
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