Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".
Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.
Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.
Iran Update, March 13, 2025
The United Kingdom (UK) threatened to impose snapback sanctions on Iran during a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting about the Iranian nuclear program on March 12.[53] A senior British official stated that the UK is ready to take “any diplomatic measure...including the use of snapback sanctions” to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[54] An unspecified Iranian deputy foreign affairs minister will meet with his Russian and Chinese counterparts in Beijing on March 14 to discuss the Iranian “nuclear issue.”[55] Iran may send Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, who serves as the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator. The meeting will likely cover the UNSC meeting as Russia and China are both members of the UNSC and attended the meeting on March 13. Russia and China are also both JCPOA signatories.
UK-based outlet The Telegraph reported on March 13 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the removal of Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif due to Zarif’s opposition to deepening Russo-Iranian relations.[56] Zarif reportedly opposed Iranian military support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zarif’s dismissal highlights Khamenei’s commitment to further developing Iran’s strategic relationship with Russia. The Iranian government previously shut down a major reformist outlet in 2023 for criticizing the government’s efforts to increase cooperation with Russia and China.[57]
The United States sanctioned Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad on March 13 as part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign.[58] The United States also sanctioned 17 shipping companies and 13 vessels for facilitating Iranian oil exports to China “worth billions of dollars.”[59]
Iran increased gold imports by 300 percent between January 2024 and 2025, according to an al Jazeera report.[60] Iranian reformist media reported on March 11 that “millions” of Iranians seek to buy gold.[61] The increased effort to obtain gold could indicate public distrust in the strength of the Iranian currency. The Iranian rial has depreciated to record-low exchange rates in recent months, reaching 923,050 rials to one US dollar on March 13.[62][63]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2025
Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement on March 14 effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran.[1] The statement came from a meeting of the Iranian, Chinese, and Russian deputy foreign ministers in Beijing.[2] The statement called on “relevant parties”—a reference to the United States—to “lift all illegal unilateral sanctions” on Iran. The statement described Iranian nuclear activities as “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” despite numerous indications that Tehran has restarted its nuclear weapons program.[3] Iran currently has enough high-enriched uranium to build six nuclear weapons, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.[4] The statement also emphasized the parties’ commitment to strengthening their cooperation through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Tehran wants to use these institutions to undermine US sanctions and build a parallel economic order to the US-led one.
The Iran-China-Russia statement underscores that Russia is unlikely to play a constructive role in mediating between the United States and Iran. Western media reported that the Kremlin has offered to mediate in recent days.[5] CTP-ISW has assessed that Russia is unlikely to secure US interests via such mediation, especially in negotiations focused on Iranian nuclear activities and the Axis of Resistance.[6]
Iranian authorities have grown increasingly concerned about popular unrest and anti-regime protests amid deteriorating economic conditions. Iranian leaders have held several “high-level meetings” recently to discuss possible widespread protests and measures to “head them off,” according to an unspecified Iranian official.[48] Another Iranian official told Reuters that Iran is “like a powder keg” and further economic issues could “set it off.” Economic issues have fueled widespread protests in Iran repeatedly in recent years.[49] Reuters spoke to some Iranian citizens who responded positively to the notion of an international nuclear deal that brings economic relief to Iran.[50]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2025
Iran Update March 17, 2025
Senior Iranian military officials have tried to distance Iran from the Houthi attack campaign against international shipping in the aftermath of the US strikes. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami claimed on March 16 that Iran does not determine the “national or operational policies” of its proxies.[14] Iran has provided the Houthis with intelligence to identify Israeli-owned vessels in the Red Sea and has helped the Houthis develop their drone and missile stockpiles in recent years.[15] US President Donald Trump stated on March 17 that the United States will hold Iran responsible for any future Houthi attacks.[16]
Iran appears unwilling to make concessions on its missile program, likely because it regards this program as Iran’s main deterrent against US and Israeli threats, particularly after the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated on March 8 that Western powers are trying to use nuclear negotiations to “set new expectations” for Iran’s missile range.[17] Khamenei emphasized that Iran “will not accept or comply” with such demands. Senior Advisor to the Armed Forces General Staff Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari echoed Khamenei’s remarks and stated on March 15 that Iran “will definitely not accept” new “expectations” for the ranges of its missiles.[18] Iranian Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharazi previously stated in November 2024 that Iran may increase its missile range.[19] Iran’s explicit unwillingness to limit its missile program suggests that Iranian leadership perceives that Iran’s missile program is Iran’s primary deterrent against US and Israeli threats. This is particularly true after IDF airstrikes on Iran in October 2024 disrupted Iran‘s ability to produce solid-propellant ballistic missiles and neutralized Iran’s most advanced air defense assets.[20] Iranian leaders likely recognize that Iran is increasingly vulnerable and may prioritize their missile program to establish deterrence against US and Israeli threats. Iran unveiled their latest precision-guided ballistic missile called the “Etemad” in February 2025.[21] The missile has a range of 1,700 kilometers. Iranian armed forces-run Defa Press published a piece on March 16 on the “Etemad” missile, referring to it as the “Israeli ballistic missile” that can reportedly hit key targets across Israel.[22] Iranian media is emphasizing that the “Etemad“ missile can hit Israeli cities likely to try to shape Israeli decision-making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran.
Iran and its partners are likely attempting to rebuild its smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon Border. Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers have continued to resist Syrian government efforts to prevent smuggling along the Syria-Lebanon border. Likely Hezbollah-linked Lebanese smugglers engaged Syrian forces on March 16 near Qusayr, on the Syria-Lebanon border. The smugglers kidnapped and killed three Syrian soldiers.[23] Hezbollah ”categorically denied” any involvement in the clashes on the Syria-Lebanon border, but the smugglers in the Qusayr area almost certainly cooperate with Hezbollah given that the Qusayr area is part of a long-time supply corridor from Iran to Hezbollah through Syria.[24] Likely Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers previously clashed with Syrian border security forces during a counter-smuggling operation near Qusayr in February 2025.[25] Iran almost certainly seeks to re-establish its overland smuggling network through Syria and rebuild its influence in the territory by promoting insurgent movements.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-17-2025
Iran Update March 18, 2025
The Houthis have reportedly rejected Iranian requests to halt attacks on international shipping and to reduce tensions with the United States and Israel.[31] The Houthis’ refusal to “dial down” tensions with the United States and Israel, despite Iran’s reported call for calm, demonstrates how the Houthis are aligned with Iran but do not answer directly to Iran.[32] The Houthis launched several drones and cruise missiles targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and a US destroyer in the Red Sea on March 17.[33] The Houthis separately resumed their attack campaign against Israel on March 18 by launching two ballistic missiles at the Nevatim Air Base in central Israel. The Houthis claimed that the attack was in response to Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[34] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi missile before it entered Israeli airspace.[35] Iranian officials may be trying to distance Iran from Houthi attacks against international shipping and Israel to try to prevent the United States from retaliating against Iran for Houthi attacks.[36]
Iran, Russia, and China continue to signal their intention to strengthen trilateral cooperation. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Grushko in Tehran on March 17 to discuss strengthening bilateral relations and trilateral ties between Iran, Russia, and China.[70] Iranian, Russian, and Chinese officials recently demonstrated their alignment by condemning the US “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran and defending the Iranian nuclear program during a meeting on March 14.[71] Iran, Russia, and China also conducted a joint naval exercise on March 11 and 12.[72]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-18-2025
President Trump’s letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included a two-month deadline for reaching a new nuclear deal, one U.S. official and two sources briefed on the letter told Axios. It isn’t clear whether the two month-clock begins from the time the letter was delivered or from when negotiations start. But if Iran rejects Trump’s outreach and doesn’t negotiate, the chances of U.S. or Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities would dramatically increase.
Trump’s national security adviser Mike Waltz said on Sunday that Iran needs to “hand over and give up” all elements of its nuclear program including missiles, weaponization and enrichment of uranium “or they can face a whole series of other consequences,” adding that “Iran has been offered a way out of this.”
https://www.axios.com/2025/03/19/trump-letter-iran-nuclear-deal
I’d like to know who around Trump is reporting to Axios.
Iran Update March 19, 2025
US President Donald Trump warned Iran against sending supplies to the Houthis on March 19.[22] Houthi Foreign Minister Jamal Amer told Iranian media that ”Iran does not interfere in our [Houthis] decision-making” and refuted reports from March 18 that Iran requested the Houthis to de-escalate tensions with the United States and Israel in the Red Sea.[23] The Houthis are aligned with Iran and Iran is almost certainly still supplying them with weapons, but the Houthis sometimes act without direct Iranian approval.[24]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-19-2025
Iran Update March 20, 2025
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei highlighted Iran’s economic weaknesses and problems in his Nowruz speech on March 20.[22] Khamenei announced “Investment for Production” as Iran’s new year’s slogan, which is consistent with Khamenei’s economic-focused new year’s slogans in recent years. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately emphasized the issues of inflation and rising costs in his Nowruz speech on March 20.[23]Khamenei’s recent rejection of nuclear negotiations with the United States, which would potentially provide Iran with sanctions relief, will likely contribute to worsening Iranian economic conditions. The Iranian regime will also likely not be able to meaningfully improve the Iranian economy if it does not address underlying issues, such as rampant corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement, that currently plague the economy.[24] The value of the Iranian rial has depreciated around 103 percent over the past two years, highlighting how Iranian officials have either lacked the capability or willingness to meaningfully address Iran’s economic problems.[25]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-20-2025
Iran Update March 21, 2025
Senior Iranian officials are trying to obfuscate Iran’s role in leading the Axis of Resistance by denying that Iran exerts direct control over groups like the Houthis, likely to avoid escalation with the United States. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered a Nowruz speech to Iranian officials in Tehran on March 21 and claimed that the people of Yemen and resistance groups in the region “have their own motivation” and called Western claims that these groups act on Iran’s behalf “a big mistake.”[1] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami separately claimed on March 16 that the “Yemenis” are an “independent and free nation” and that Houthis make their own strategic and operational decisions that Iran does not direct.[2] These statements ignore that the Houthis have repeatedly highlighted their coordination with the Axis of Resistance prior to conducting operations.[3] Iran leads the Axis of Resistance and provides IRGC Quds Force (IRGC-QF) officers to advise the Houthis, including senior IRGC Quds Force commander Abdul Reza Shahlai.[4]
Khamenei and Salami’s remarks echo other Iranian statements that have come amid US threats to target Iran or key Iranian assets in the region. In early 2024, for example, IRGC-QF Commander Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad to direct Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to stop attacks targeting US forces in Iraq. Senior Iranian officials simultaneously attempted to obfuscate Iran’s own involvement in the attacks and avoid a US response against Iran for the January 2024 Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack that killed three US servicemembers in Jordan.[5] US President Donald Trump warned on March 17 that the United States could respond to Houthi attacks as if those attacks came from Iran.[6] Iran likely seeks to reduce the risk of a direct confrontation with the United States while maintaining its leadership of the Axis of Resistance—including the Houthis.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-21-2025
Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, said Iran used indirect channels to respond after the US president sent a letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei earlier this month.
“I’m not at liberty to talk about the specifics,” Witkoff said in an interview released Friday on The Tucker Carlson Show. “But clearly through a, you know, back channels, through multiple countries and multiple conduits, they’ve reached back out.”
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202503222231
Sounds circuitous
Another year ends with the erosion of Iran’s governing institutions
As the country’s economy sinks deeper into crisis, many challenges come from within his own conservative camp, where critics—often quietly—hold him responsible for the system’s failures, referring to him indirectly as the “political system.”
Throughout the year, Iran struggled with a broken economy and the looming threat of political unrest. Gas and electricity shortages have plagued both industries and households for months, while officials warn of an impending water crisis. Meanwhile, the US dollar has doubled in value against the rial. Most Iranians now see Khamenei as the primary figure responsible for these crises.
The Expediency Council has become so ineffective and paralyzed by intimidation that it has failed to issue a verdict on approving laws meant to improve Iran’s compliance with international regulation against money laundering. For years, Khamenei has not publicly assigned it any new responsibilities, instead making all key decisions himself.
Until five years ago, when these institutions functioned with a degree of quasi-efficiency, some Western observers described Iran’s system as resembling a democracy. Today, such a characterization is no longer plausible. Iran’s political landscape is now “unique” for all the wrong reasons.
https://www.iranintl.com/en/202503201649
Iran Update March 24, 2025
Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam.[40] The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.[41] Some demonstrators chanted slogans such as “Urumiyeh is Turkic and will remain Turkic.”[42] An Iranian professor told Iranian media on March 23 that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to “create divergences between different Iranian groups” and “create chaos” in Iran, likely in response to the recent demonstrations in Urumiyeh.[43] This statement reflects a broader, long-standing belief among Iranian officials that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to promote Azeri separatism in northwestern Iran.[44] The incident in Urumiyeh comes amid heightened tensions between Iran and Turkey over Turkish support for the fall of the Assad regime and growing Turkish influence in Syria.[45] Iranian police arrested 22 demonstrators in Urumiyeh for “promoting hatred and ethnic sedition.”[46] The Iranian culture and Islamic guidance minister warned on March 23 that “ethnic and religious faults in Iran should not be provoked [because] they can quickly turn into a melting and destructive flame.”[47]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-24-2025
Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to “advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States,” according to an Iranian expert close to the regime.[1] It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin “any diplomatic initiative,” but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would almost certainly make such a decision. Araghchi has historically taken a softer line on nuclear negotiations with the United States compared to the regime's hardline elements. Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States “through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[2] Former President Hassan Rouhani and former leading member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team Mohammad Javad Zarif were previously given “full authority” to advance nuclear talks during the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiations.[3]
The Houthis continue to supplement their Iranian-sourced weapons arsenal by acquiring additional arms and dual-use components through Russian and Chinese commercial suppliers, according to the 2025 Annual US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment report.[11] Local media reported on March 24 that Yemeni border customs seized 800 Chinese-made drone propellers in a shipment bound for the Houthis at the Sarfait border crossing with Oman in southeastern Yemen.[12] The Houthis have previously procured dual-use items for drone and missile components on the international market.[13] The Houthis smuggle these shipments through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and through land borders, particularly from the Omani-Yemeni border via the Yemeni government-controlled Mahra and Hadramawt governorates in eastern Yemen.[14] The United States sanctioned China-based electronics companies for selling dual-use components to the Houthis in October 2024.[15] The Houthis also imported hydrogen fuel cylinders from unspecified Chinese suppliers in August 2024, which were aimed to increase the range and payloads of the Houthis’ drones.[16]
The Iranian rial depreciated from 989,000 rials to one US dollar on March 24 to 1,024,100 rials to one US dollar on March 25.[74] Iran's currency dropped to a record low on March 25, reflecting Iran's deepening economic instability amid renewed US “maximum pressure” sanctions and diplomatic deadlock.[75]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2025
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0059
2018:This is the most likely scenario
Last fall I met several retired and serving F.B.I. agents who had worked with Levinson. I was reporting on a notorious Ukrainian-born businessman named Semion Mogilevich, who had earned the dubious distinction of making the F.B.I.’s Top Ten Most Wanted List. Mogilevich is, according to one Russian organized crime expert, the “high-end underworld financier of choice.” Before he retired, Levinson had become perhaps the most fearless, crusading agent against Mogilevich. “He's dangerous because he'll get anybody who gets in his way,” Levinson once said of Mogilevich, speaking to the BBC. “It's become just a little personal hasn't it?” the interviewer replied. “I'd like to finish the job,” Levinson said, smirking.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/who-is-holding-robert-levinson
Perhaps https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semion_Mogilevich made a deal with some Iranians that he met earlier:
An F.B.I. report on Russian organized crime said that when the Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from East Germany, many Russian generals sold their weapons to Mr. Mogilevich, who in turn sold them, at much higher prices, to countries like Iraq, Iran and Serbia.
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/19/world/activity-at-bank-raises-suspicions-of-russia-mob-tie.html
If these Iranians were his counterparts it might explain why the Iranian government is unable to trace Levinson.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Levinson
https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/3385870/posts?page=12#12
Annihilation would be more effective than investigation.
Interesting
Iran Update March 26, 2025
The Iranian rial depreciated from 1,025,000 rials to one US dollar on March 25 to 1,026,000 rials to one US dollar on March 26.[40]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025
Iran Update March 27, 2025
Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump’s letter proposing nuclear negotiations.[1] Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations under the current conditions. Trump sent a letter to Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, and Iran responded to the letter via Oman on March 26.[2] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States, though it rejects direct negotiations under the current US “maximum pressure” campaign and US-Israeli threat of military action against Iran’s nuclear program. US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated on March 25 that Trump’s letter to Iran proposed “direct talks” and emphasized that “there would be military consequences if there were no direct negotiations.”[3] It is unclear if Iran’s openness to indirect negotiations will fulfill US conditions to grant sanctions relief or avoid military action against Iran’s nuclear program.
This likely suggests that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has approved indirect negotiations with the United States. Araghchi said that Iran conducted such indirect talks under former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi. Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Adviser Kamal Kharazi, have also recently expressed willingness to engage in indirect negotiations with the United States.[4] That Kharazi spoke to state media may suggest that Iranian officials are concerned about internal unrest over Iran’s economic situation and want to signal to the Iranian population that the regime is willing to take steps to secure economic relief.[5]
US Strategic Command reported on March 26 that Iran’s nuclear breakout time is “presumably less than one week.”[70] This is consistent with the Institute for Science and International Security’s assessment, citing International Atomic Energy Agency data from May 2024, that Iran’s breakout timeline for producing a nuclear weapon is about one week.[71]
At least some Iranian oil tankers en route to China have slowed or stopped, likely due to US “maximum pressure” sanctions that have targeted Iranian entities and vessels involved in the trade.[72] At least 11 sanctioned tankers carrying nearly 17 million barrels of oil in total now sit idle or are moving very slowly off the coast of Malaysia, according to a Bloomberg report on March 27.[73] Bloomberg also reported that the current backlog is the largest since August 2024. The slowdown highlights growing logistical challenges in Iran’s covert oil trade. The sanctions and the shipment slowdown damage the Iranian economy, which relies heavily on energy exports and revenue.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-27-2025
Iran Update March 28, 2025
Recent statements from senior Iranian officials about indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States may aim to appeal to several domestic audiences. Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump’s letter proposing nuclear negotiations.[1] Iran signaled openness to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations under the current conditions. Senior Iranian officials expressing support for indirect negotiations likely aim to reassure the Iranian public that the regime is willing to take steps to secure economic relief amid Iran’s deteriorating economic situation. Senior Iranian officials have, however, heavily caveated that Iran should remain cautious in negotiations. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on March 28 that Iran’s response to Trump’s letter is “restrained” and emphasized Iran’s readiness to “confront” threats.[2] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly criticized US attempts to “impose [its] demands” on Iran.[3] Iranian officials have also explicitly rejected any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance.[4] These statements likely aim to appease hardline elements within the regime that oppose negotiations with the West.
Senior Iranian officials who have expressed support for indirect nuclear negotiations may be trying to avoid snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.[5] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[6] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi asked the E3 to “reconsider its approach” towards Iran during a phone call with his British counterpart David Lammy on March 28.[7] A Wall Street Journal reporter also reported on March 28 that Iran and the E3 held “technical talks” in Geneva this week.[8] Iranian efforts to signal openness to indirect negotiations and discussions with the E3 likely aim to deter the E3 from triggering the “snapback” mechanism.
Some Iranian officials may also be signaling openness to indirect nuclear negotiations to deter a US-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran has engaged in a concerted effort since at least January 2025 to shape US-Israeli decision-making and deter a potential military strike on Iran’s nuclear program. A senior Iranian military commander warned in February 2024 that Iran could attack facilities and bases that “assist” an Israeli attack on Iran, likely referring to US bases in Iraq and the Gulf countries.[9] Ghalibaf separately stated on March 28 that US allies and bases in the region “will be as vulnerable as a powder keg” if the United States and Israel threaten Iran.[10] Iran has recently unveiled new missile bases and conducted air defense exercises around nuclear sites, likely to highlight its missile capabilities and prepare for a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.[11] Iran may be signaling a willingness to engage in indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States to further shape US-Israeli decision-making and avoid a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. A senior US official stated on March 25 that Trump’s letter said, “there would be military consequences if there were no direct negotiations.”[12] It is unclear if Iran’s openness to indirect negotiations will fulfill US conditions to avoid military action against Iran’s nuclear program.
Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadiq said in an interview on March 27 that US President Donald Trump’s recent letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei urged Iran to dissolve the Iranian-backed Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and other Iranian-backed groups in the region.[77] Sadiq added that this request was “unacceptable” to both Iran and Iraq. Sadiq is a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[78] Khamenei told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved” during a meeting in Tehran on January 8.[79] Sudani separately denied in an interview on March 27 that the US told the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF.[80] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[81] Sadiq and Sudani’s interviews come as the Iraqi parliament debates the Popular Mobilization Authority Law, which designates the PMF as a ”parallel military force” alongside the Iraqi army and stipulates that senior PMF officials will receive high-level positions in the Iraqi federal government.[82]
The Iranian rial depreciated from 1,032,000 rials to one US dollar on March 27 to 1,042,000 rials to one US dollar on March 28.[88]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2025
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