Iran Update March 17, 2025
Senior Iranian military officials have tried to distance Iran from the Houthi attack campaign against international shipping in the aftermath of the US strikes. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami claimed on March 16 that Iran does not determine the “national or operational policies” of its proxies.[14] Iran has provided the Houthis with intelligence to identify Israeli-owned vessels in the Red Sea and has helped the Houthis develop their drone and missile stockpiles in recent years.[15] US President Donald Trump stated on March 17 that the United States will hold Iran responsible for any future Houthi attacks.[16]
Iran appears unwilling to make concessions on its missile program, likely because it regards this program as Iran’s main deterrent against US and Israeli threats, particularly after the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated on March 8 that Western powers are trying to use nuclear negotiations to “set new expectations” for Iran’s missile range.[17] Khamenei emphasized that Iran “will not accept or comply” with such demands. Senior Advisor to the Armed Forces General Staff Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari echoed Khamenei’s remarks and stated on March 15 that Iran “will definitely not accept” new “expectations” for the ranges of its missiles.[18] Iranian Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharazi previously stated in November 2024 that Iran may increase its missile range.[19] Iran’s explicit unwillingness to limit its missile program suggests that Iranian leadership perceives that Iran’s missile program is Iran’s primary deterrent against US and Israeli threats. This is particularly true after IDF airstrikes on Iran in October 2024 disrupted Iran‘s ability to produce solid-propellant ballistic missiles and neutralized Iran’s most advanced air defense assets.[20] Iranian leaders likely recognize that Iran is increasingly vulnerable and may prioritize their missile program to establish deterrence against US and Israeli threats. Iran unveiled their latest precision-guided ballistic missile called the “Etemad” in February 2025.[21] The missile has a range of 1,700 kilometers. Iranian armed forces-run Defa Press published a piece on March 16 on the “Etemad” missile, referring to it as the “Israeli ballistic missile” that can reportedly hit key targets across Israel.[22] Iranian media is emphasizing that the “Etemad“ missile can hit Israeli cities likely to try to shape Israeli decision-making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran.
Iran and its partners are likely attempting to rebuild its smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon Border. Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers have continued to resist Syrian government efforts to prevent smuggling along the Syria-Lebanon border. Likely Hezbollah-linked Lebanese smugglers engaged Syrian forces on March 16 near Qusayr, on the Syria-Lebanon border. The smugglers kidnapped and killed three Syrian soldiers.[23] Hezbollah ”categorically denied” any involvement in the clashes on the Syria-Lebanon border, but the smugglers in the Qusayr area almost certainly cooperate with Hezbollah given that the Qusayr area is part of a long-time supply corridor from Iran to Hezbollah through Syria.[24] Likely Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers previously clashed with Syrian border security forces during a counter-smuggling operation near Qusayr in February 2025.[25] Iran almost certainly seeks to re-establish its overland smuggling network through Syria and rebuild its influence in the territory by promoting insurgent movements.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-17-2025
Iran Update March 18, 2025
The Houthis have reportedly rejected Iranian requests to halt attacks on international shipping and to reduce tensions with the United States and Israel.[31] The Houthis’ refusal to “dial down” tensions with the United States and Israel, despite Iran’s reported call for calm, demonstrates how the Houthis are aligned with Iran but do not answer directly to Iran.[32] The Houthis launched several drones and cruise missiles targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and a US destroyer in the Red Sea on March 17.[33] The Houthis separately resumed their attack campaign against Israel on March 18 by launching two ballistic missiles at the Nevatim Air Base in central Israel. The Houthis claimed that the attack was in response to Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[34] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi missile before it entered Israeli airspace.[35] Iranian officials may be trying to distance Iran from Houthi attacks against international shipping and Israel to try to prevent the United States from retaliating against Iran for Houthi attacks.[36]
Iran, Russia, and China continue to signal their intention to strengthen trilateral cooperation. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Grushko in Tehran on March 17 to discuss strengthening bilateral relations and trilateral ties between Iran, Russia, and China.[70] Iranian, Russian, and Chinese officials recently demonstrated their alignment by condemning the US “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran and defending the Iranian nuclear program during a meeting on March 14.[71] Iran, Russia, and China also conducted a joint naval exercise on March 11 and 12.[72]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-18-2025