Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".
Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.
Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.
Iran Update, February 3, 2025
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy sent the Shahid Sattar Mahmoudi flotilla to Port Khalid Sharjah in Sharjah City, the United Arab Emirates for a three-day port visit on February 3.[76] IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri stated that this is the first time the IRGC and Artesh navies have conducted a prolonged port visit to the United Arab Emirates.[77] Tangsiri added that this visit is part of several military cooperation events with Iran’s neighboring countries to ensure security in the Strait of Hormuz.[78]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-3-2025
The two intelligence officers—Mohammad Baseri and Ahmad Khazai—allegedly acted in their capacity as officials of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) during Bob's abduction, detention, and probable death.
Disappearance of Robert A. Levinson (Kish Island, Iran | March 9, 2007)
https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/disappearance-of-robert-a-levinson/
A tip
A tape apparently recorded by murdered Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko a year before he was poisoned has revealed he was digging up links between Vladimir Putin and one of the world's most dangerous terrorists.
A Telegraph investigation uncovered the audio recording, in which the dissident claims from beyond the grave that Russia's president had a “good relationship” with Semion Mogilevich - a Ukrainian crime boss who was on the FBI's most wanted list and whom Mr Litvinenko believed was selling weapons to al-Qaeda.
The apparent recording of Mr Litvinenko is published for the first time ahead of a public inquiry into his death, which begins on January 27.
In the tape, made in November 2005 in the same London sushi restaurant where Mr Litvinenko held one of his final meetings, he also connects Russia's foreign intelligence and state security services – the SVR and FSB - with a former KGB agent whom he believed had links to al-Qaeda.
US believes Iran looking at potential ways to quickly build nuclear bomb — report
Tehran has not chosen to break out toward nukes, but is secretly examining shortcuts to a weapon should it make that decision, The New York Times says
“US officials believe Iran has the know-how to make an older-style nuclear weapon, one that could be put together far faster than the more sophisticated designs Tehran has considered in the past,” the Times reported. “Such a weapon would not be able to be miniaturized to fit on a ballistic missile. It would also probably be far less reliable than any more modern weapon design… But such a crude weapon is the kind of device Iran could build quickly, test and declare to the world that it had become a nuclear power.”
Iran is conducting nuclear research that would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a period of months. The New York Times reported on February 3 that a “secret team” of Iranian weapons engineers and scientists is “exploring” a faster approach to build a nuclear weapon in a “matter of months.”[1] The engineers and scientists could be from the Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (SPND), which, under a different name, played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003. The new approach would decrease the time Iran needs to turn weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched to 90 percent) into a nuclear weapon. This approach would significantly reduce the time that the International Atomic Energy Agency would have to detect Iranian weaponization activity. It would also reduce the time that the United States or Israel would have to take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran currently possesses near weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched to 60 percent), but Western estimates indicate that Iran could further enrich this material to weapons-grade levels within days. Unspecified US officials said that Iran could build an “older-style nuclear weapon” using the new approach, but that such a weapon would not fit on a ballistic missile and would likely be less reliable than a modern weapon. CTP-ISW does not assess that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time.
Iran's nuclear weapons research comes as Israel has eroded key elements of Iran's deterrence since October 2024. The IDF has defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip and degraded Hezbollah.[2] The IDF also disabled Iranian air defenses and disrupted Iranian missile production capabilities in its airstrikes on Iran in October 2024.[3] The New York Times reported that Iran is exploring “new options” to deter US or Israeli strikes, citing unspecified intelligence.[4] Some Iranian hardliners have publicly called for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon to restore deterrence vis-a-vis Israel.[5] CTP-ISW has previously observed that some Iranian hardliners are trying to pressure the Supreme Leader to revoke his 2003 fatwa that bans the production and use of nuclear weapons.
US President Donald Trump ordered the re-enforcement of “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran on February 4 to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon. Trump signed an executive order that targets Iranian oil sales to other countries.[6] Trump previously withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran during his first term as president. Trump told reporters that he is open to a deal with Iran and would be willing to meet with Iranian officials.
“Maximum pressure” sanctions will likely cause further deterioration of the Iranian economy. The Iranian budget relies heavily on oil export revenues. Iran previously exported around 2.5 million barrels of oil per day in April 2018—one month before Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[7] Iranian oil exports fell dramatically in the following years, but oil exports began to slowly increase beginning in 2020, though Iran still only exported 400,000 barrels per day in 2020.[8] Iran will likely try to continue to export oil illicitly but will likely not be able to maintain current oil export levels.[9] Oil exports are also insufficient to resolve the underlying issues that plague the Iranian economy. These issues will remain regardless of the imposition of sanctions. These economic issues include widespread corruption, nepotism, and the outsized role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and parastatal foundations, known as bonyads, in the economy.[11]
Iran is attempting to improve its air defense abilities possibly in preparation for a conventional conflict with the United States or Israel. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, with the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, appointed Artesh Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as the commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters on February 4.[12] Sabahi Fard will continue to serve as the Artesh Air Defense Force commander as well. Sabahi Fard replaced Brigadier General Ghader Rahim Zadeh, who had commanded the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters since April 2021.[13] Khamenei appointed Rahim Zadeh as an adviser to Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi.[14] Iran established the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters in 2008. Khamenei restructured the Iranian air defense structure in 2019, delegating air defense operations to the Artesh Air Defense Force and elevating the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters to a higher echelon of command. The Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and IRGC. Sabahi Fard previously commanded the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters from May 2018 to May 2019 before Khamenei restructured it.[15]
These military leadership changes come as Iran has conducted several air defense exercises in recent weeks, specifically around Iranian nuclear facilities.[16] The Artesh Air Defense Force most recently conducted an exercise in southwestern Iran on February 4.[17] The Artesh Air Defense Force tested Iranian-made radar systems, an expanded surveillance network, and the ”Majid” and “Joshan” missile systems, which Iranian media claims can intercept a large-scale drone attack.[18] These exercises reflect Iran's efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities and concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025
Thanks. With the whirlwind of news coming out of DC, I guess this got lost.
Iran Update, February 5, 2025
Iran is downplaying the significance of US “maximum pressure” sanctions while signaling some openness to nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said that the maximum pressure policy is a “failed experiment” in response to US President Donald Trump’s announcing on February 4 his intent to re-enforce extensive sanctions on Iran.[1] Senior Iranian officials separately expressed willingness to engage in nuclear negotiations, emphasizing the Iranian policy against building and using nuclear weapons. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director Mohammad Eslami similarly said that Iran has no plans to develop nuclear weapons.[2] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on February 5 that Iran is ready to give the United States a chance to resolve disputes.[3] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ultimately will decide whether Iran negotiates with the West or tries to build a nuclear weapon, however. Trump said on February 5 that he would like to pursue a “verified nuclear peace agreement” with Iran “immediately.”[4]
Reuters reported on February 5 that Trump ordered his administration to work with allies to “complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran,” likely referring to discussions with the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran.[5] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[6] The E3 previously stated that it is prepared to impose snapback sanctions on Iran.[7] The E3 has until October 2025 to do so.[8]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-5-2025
Iran Update, February 6, 2025
There are early indications of fissures between Iran-backed Shia political parties and figures ahead of the parliamentary elections in October 2025. Iraqi media reported on February 6 that the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework appears “divided” due to an ongoing dispute between Maliki and National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim.[10] The dispute is reportedly over Maliki’s outsized influence in the Shia Coordination Framework and the removal of the Dhi Qar governor, who is a member of Hakim’s party. Iraqi media reported on January 30 that Hakim has boycotted several Shia Coordination Framework meetings because Maliki orchestrated the removal of the Dhi Qar governor.[11] Unidentified sources told Iraqi media on February 6 that Shia Coordination Framework members discussed unifying Shia factions and resolving tensions with Hakim on February 5.[12] Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani reportedly convinced Hakim to resume his participation in Shia Coordination Framework meetings in return for the appointment of Hakim-backed figures to government positions.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2025
Iran Update, February 7, 2025
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States during a speech to Iranian military personnel in Tehran on February 7.[1] This marks the first time Khamenei has so explicitly opposed negotiations with the United States since the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Khamenei stated that negotiations with the United States are “unwise, unintelligent, and dishonorable” and “no one should negotiate” with them.[2] Khamenei stated that Iran is not opposed to negotiations with any state ”except” the United States.[3] Several Friday prayer leaders echoed Khamenei’s statements and criticized negotiations with the United States as “futile.”[4] Friday prayer leaders receive guidance for the content of their Friday sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader, which suggests that their comments are likely a coordinated messaging campaign. Khamenei also stated that negotiating with the United States “will not solve any problems [in Iran], including economic and livelihood difficulties.”[5] CTP-ISW previously assessed that US “maximum pressure” sanctions would likely further deteriorate the Iranian economy, which is already facing underlying economic issues.[6]
Khamenei’s opposition to negotiations with the United States appears inconsistent with the hypothesis that Iran is expanding its nuclear program to gain leverage in future negotiations. Iran is conducting nuclear research and expanding its stockpile of enriched uranium, which are both steps that could enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a period of months.[7] One plausible reason for Iran’s continued development of its nuclear program is to strengthen its position and increase leverage for future nuclear talks in order to secure more favorable terms. This would, in theory, enable Iran to extract concessions (such as sanctions relief) during negotiations by offering to decrease its stockpile of enriched uranium. Khamenei’s recent statements are inconsistent with this hypothesis, however, because Iran has no reason to increase its leverage with the West if it does not intend to negotiate with the United States. Some senior Iranian officials have recently signaled a willingness to engage in nuclear negotiations with the West, but Khamenei ultimately will decide whether Iran will negotiate, try to build a nuclear weapon, or retain a rapid nuclear breakout capability.[8]
The Iranian Artesh Navy participated in the ninth multinational AMAN-25 naval exercise in Karachi, Pakistan, on February 7 alongside 60 other countries.[84] Pakistan holds the AMAN naval exercise every two years to display its naval and military capabilities. The exercise runs until February 11. This marks the first participation in the AMAN exercise for an Iranian naval vessel. The Iranian Artesh Navy delegation will also attend the AMAN Dialogue Conference on maritime cooperation and meet with Pakistani military officials. Iran and Pakistan last conducted a joint naval exercise in January 2024.[85]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-7-2025
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with senior Hamas officials in Tehran on February 8.[32] Hamas Shura Council head Mohammad Darwish called the fighting in the Gaza Strip a “great victory” for the Axis of Resistance. Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya described the victory as “shared” between Iran and Hamas. Khamenei reiterated his commitment to supporting Palestinian militias against Israel. Hamas Deputy Leader in the West Bank Zaher Jabarin briefed Khamenei on the situation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and expressed appreciation for continued Iranian support.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-8-2025
On the first day of the Iranian working week, the latest daily dollar rally pushed the greenback up 5.5% in just one week and 11% over the past month over US President Trump's refocused targeting of the country's oil exports and potential threats of “obliteration.”
https://www.intellinews.com/iran-s-rial-crashes-from-trump-maximum-pressure-366006/
❗️Moment of explosion in Lebanon that killed leader Hassan Nasrallah. Video shows an air bomb exploding underground, hitting a bunker.
https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1887765587801108694
Senior Iranian military leaders have urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in recent months to approve the construction of a nuclear weapon, according to an unspecified Iranian official speaking to the Telegraph.[1] The article reported that the military leaders have previously supported Khamenei’s policy against nuclear weapons but now feel that they are faced with an “existential threat” since US President Donald Trump entered office. The unspecified Iranian official said that “we have never been this vulnerable, and it may be our last change to obtain [a nuclear weapon] before its too late.” The official added that the Khamenei’s decisions to forbid nuclear weapons and negotiations with the United States is “driving the regime toward collapse.”[2] The official claimed that Iran has been “just a few button presses away from building a nuclear weapon for some time now.”[3] This article follows the New York Times reporting that Iranian scientists are exploring how to build a crude nuclear weapon quickly.[4] These reports are consistent with CTP-ISW assessment that Iran has restarted its nuclear weapons research but has not yet made a deliberate effort to build a weapon.
Khamenei’s Foreign Affairs Advisor Kamal Kharrazi previously told the Financial Times in July 2024 that Iran was open to pursuing nuclear weaponization if faced with ”an existential threat.”[5] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi alluded to the ”heated debate” on whether to build a nuclear weapon on January 28, when Araghchi threatened pursuing one if the E3 triggered snapback sanctions before October 2025.[6]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-9-2025
Iranian officials who had previously supported nuclear negotiations with the United States explicitly supported Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s decision to reject nuclear negotiations with the United States on February 10.[21] These officials included Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, who worked on nuclear negotiations with the West under the Rouhani administration and remained a key supporter of negotiations.[22] President Masoud Pezeshkian, who similarly signaled his openness to negotiations with the West, also indicated his alignment with Khamenei‘s stance.[23] Senior political officials and Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders also condemned US President Donald Trump‘s “maximum pressure” policy towards Iran and dismissed any potential US and Israeli “threats” to Iran.[24] The coalescence of top regime officials on the nuclear issue, including those previously supportive of negotiations, follows The Telegraph's report on February 8, which stated that senior Iranian military leaders have been urging Khamenei in recent months to approve the construction of a nuclear weapon.[25]
Saudi media reported on February 10 that Lebanese authorities are continuing to “closely inspect” planes from Iran and Iraq to Beirut to prevent Iranian cash transfers to Hezbollah.[58] Western media reported in December 2024 that Iran may seek to establish a new “ logistics hub” in the Beirut airport for military shipments to Hezbollah.[59] Lebanese airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah in early January.[60] The Wall Street Journal reported on January 31 that Israel accused unnamed Turkish citizens of moving money for Hezbollah from Istanbul to Beirut by air since the start of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[61]
Turkish Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin met with Iranian Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately in Tehran on February 8 and 9.[70] The officials reportedly discussed the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), ISIS in Syria, and the Israel-Hamas ceasefire.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-10-2025
The Iranian Parliament began interpellating Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Abdol Naser Hemmati on February 11.[65] Interpellation is a formal parliamentary request for a government minister to appear before Parliament to justify government policy, which may result in a vote of no confidence against the relevant minister.[66] Hemmati’s interpellation comes amid worsening economic conditions in Iran. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected nuclear negotiations with the United States in a speech on February 7, after which the value of the Iranian rial dropped to 940,000 rials per one US dollar.[67] Parliament frequently interpellates ministers and previously interpellated former Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Ehsan Khandouzi in 2021.[68]
Senior Iranian military officials emphasized on February 11 that the Iranian regime will resist US President Donald Trump's “maximum pressure” policy.[69] Supreme Leader Military Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi emphasized that Iran has increased non-oil exports by five percent and expanded the number of countries that it exports oil to despite international sanctions.[70] Safavi highlighted Iranian involvement in economic alliances, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, as well as Iran's strategic agreements with China and Russia. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Intelligence Organization Chief Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi separately emphasized this organization's willingness to help the Iranian regime and private sector mitigate the impact of sanctions.[71]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-11-2025
US sanctions on Iranian entities and vessels involved in Iranian oil shipments to China have made it more difficult for Iran to export oil to China. Reuters reported that Iran has struggled to acquire new vessels to replace those sanctioned by the United States.[93] A British shipbroker reported that the United States has sanctioned 57 percent of the 126 oil tankers involved in Iranian crude oil trade to China.[94] China's Shandong Port Group also banned sanctioned tankers from ports in Shandong Province on January 6, where many of the sanctioned vessels unloaded Iranian oil.[95] This has made it impossible for Iran to trade tens of millions of barrels of oil and has left the oil in floating storage. This situation may worsen under US President Donald Trump's ”maximum pressure” policy, which targets Iranian oil sales.[96] These oil shipment disruptions have caused Iranian crude oil prices to rise. One of the attractions of Iranian oil to China is its cheap cost.[97] A decrease in Iranian oil exports to China could badly damage the Iranian economy, which relies heavily on oil exports.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s rejection of direct negotiations with the United States may have caused further devaluation of the rial. Iranian opposition media reported that Iran's currency fell to its lowest value, reaching nearly 940,000 rials per USD on February 10, after Khamenei’s recent speech on February 7 about negotiations with the United States.[98]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei visited the Iran Armed Forces exhibition “Eghtedar 1403” in Tehran on February 12.[99] The exhibition displayed equipment and new technologies in air defense, ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, and naval vessels. Khamenei emphasized the importance of continuous innovation in defense.[100] Khamenei separately met with officials and experts in the defense industry and emphasized the importance of national defense and security. Khamenei’s visit likely highlights Iranian efforts to address air defense vulnerabilities and reinforce military capabilities amid potential external threats, particularly in light of recent setbacks for the Axis of Resistance.[101]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-12-2025
Iran Update, February 13, 2025
Lebanese authorities denied an Iranian Mahan Air flight permission to land at Beirut International Airport on February 13 after Lebanese authorities received unspecified warnings from Israel.[64] Tehran International Airport chief Saeed Chalandari said that Lebanese authorities have not yet issued a permit for a Mahan Air flight to Beirut scheduled for February 14.[65] Lebanese civilians waving Hezbollah flags blocked the road outside Beirut International Airport to protest the authorities’ decision.[66] The Lebanese Armed Forces deployed forces to disperse the protestors and reopen the road.[67] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson said on February 12 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force had used Beirut International Airport in recent weeks to transfer funds to Hezbollah.[68] Saudi media reported on February 10 that Lebanese authorities are monitoring air traffic from Iran and Iraq into Beirut to prevent Iranian cash transfers to Hezbollah.[69] Lebanese airport security forces searched a Mahan Air flight in Beirut in early January 2025 on suspicion that it was transporting funds to Hezbollah.[70]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-13-2025
Iran received a large shipment of a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant from China on February 13.[13] Western media reported on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels, Golbon and Jairan, carrying over 1100 tons of sodium perchlorate, will travel from China to Iran over the “next few weeks.”[14] The Golbon arrived at Bandar Abbas port, Hormozgan Province, on February 13 with “most” of the total shipment, according to two unspecified European intelligence sources.[15] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Procurement Department of the Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO) reportedly received the shipment. The SSJO is partially responsible for Iran's ballistic missile research and development and was sanctioned by the United States in 2017 for contributing to the proliferation and delivery of weapons of mass destruction.[16]
One thousand one hundred tons of sodium perchlorate can be converted to slightly over 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate, which is the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Unspecified Western officials estimated that 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can—if converted to solid fuel propellant—fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles.[17] These officials may be referring to medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), which have a range of between 1,000km and 3,000km. Iran used MRBMs to target Israel in April and October 2024. That amount of ammonium perchlorate can also produce larger quantities of other types of smaller munitions that require less solid fuel, including shorter-range ballistic missiles. It is unclear when the second vessel, Jairan, will depart from China.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Raphael Grossi stated that Iran will likely have 250kg of uranium enriched up to 60% by the next IAEA report in March 2025. This marks a significant increase in Iran's stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since the IAEA’s last report in November 2024.[18] The IAEA reported in November 2024 that Iran had 182.3 kg of enriched uranium, up to 60 percent.[19] 250 kg of enriched uranium up to 60 percent is equivalent to 6 significant quantities, marking over a 1.5 increase in significant quantities since the IAEA’s last report.[20] The IAEA defines a significant quantity as the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[21] Grossi also told Reuters that the IAEA would likely delay issuing a comprehensive report on Iran's nuclear activities beyond March, when the IAEA initially intended to release the report.[22]
The IAEA passed an E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) censure resolution against Iran in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[23] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lay the foundation for further action against Iran's nuclear program.[24]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-14-2025
Iran Update, February 15, 2025
The Special Envoy of the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry for Syrian Affairs, Mohammad Reza Raouf Sheibani, confirmed that Iran and the Syrian interim government communicate through intermediaries.[47] Sheibani stated that Iran communicates indirectly with current Syrian officials and has received messages from Syria. Sheibani separately met with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Special Representative for Syrian Affairs, Alexander Lavrentiev, and Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and North Africa, Mikhail Bogdanov, in Moscow on February 15.[48] The meeting covered developments in West Asia and Syria.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-15-2025
Iran Update, February 16, 2025
US National Security Adviser Michael Waltz stated that US President Donald Trump is “deadly serious” about Iran “never” having a nuclear weapon during an interview with Fox News on February 16.[24] Waltz stressed that Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon is an “existential” threat to Israel and could ignite a “nuclear arms race” in the Middle East. Waltz added that Trump is willing to take “whatever action is necessary” to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon but is still willing to negotiate with Iran “if they want to give up their entire [nuclear] program and not play games” as Iran has done in past negotiations.
Iranian Civil Aviation Organization confirmed on February 16 that Iran had halted all flights from Iran to Lebanon until February 18 at the request of Lebanese authorities.[25] This comes after recent pro-Hezbollah protests outside Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport after Lebanese authorities prevented the landing of an Iranian Mahar Air flight, which was likely smuggling cash to Hezbollah, from landing in Beirut.[26]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-16-2025
Iran Update, February 17, 2025
Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.[1] The sources said that Russia is “close” to a deal that would keep at least some staff and equipment in Syria.[2] One of the sources said that Russia hopes to keep the same air and naval bases that it used prior to the fall of Bashar al Assad, likely referring to Hmeimim airbase and the naval base at Tartus.[3] Russia also previously held several other airbases within central and northern Syria, including a helicopter base in Qamishli, though it is unclear whether the agreement will cover these sites. Russian forces have fully evacuated all their former positions in Syria except for Hmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus.[4] Other forces, such as the Syrian interim government or US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have taken many of these bases following Russian forces’ evacuation.[5]
The tone of engagement between Russia and the Syrian interim government has notably become more cooperative in recent weeks, which supports the sources’ claims that Russia may be nearing an agreement with Syria. Shara emphasized Syria’s “strong strategic relationship“ with Russia during a recent phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[6] Interim Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra recently suggested that Syria could allow Russia to retain air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[7] It is not clear what “benefits“ Russia may be offering Syria in current negotiations. Russia delivered local Syrian currency to the Syrian central bank on February 12 in a gesture that likely sought to foster goodwill with the Syrian government.[8] This gesture followed Syrian officials’ demands that Russia pay its debts to the Syrian state and Putin’s offer to Shara to assist with Syria’s economy.[9]
Unspecified sources also told Bloomberg that Russia could help with the Syrian government’s counter-ISIS efforts.[10] It is unclear based on this comment whether the Syrian interim government has discussed Russian forces re-deploying to Syria to fight against ISIS. The Syrian interim government is likely eager to obtain manpower to assist in counter-ISIS operations as the government contends with the political and material realities of forming and training the new Syrian army. Russian participation in the Assad regime campaign against ISIS failed to effectively degrade ISIS in Syria, however. Russian aircraft proved to be far more capable in targeting Syrian opposition groups on behalf of the regime than it was targeting ISIS.[11] The scale of a future Russian deployment to Syria would impact the success of any Russian counter-ISIS operations, and it is unclear if a ”reduced” military presence would be any more effective against ISIS than Russian forces were at the height of Russian deployments to Syria. US CENTCOM recently announced in July 2024 that ISIS is attempting to reconstitute in Syria following several years of decreased capability.[12] Russia would by no means provide a suitable replacement for the United States or SDF in counter-ISIS operations in the face of ISIS reconstitution efforts.
Tehran University students protested for the fourth day on February 17 against Iranian security forces “inaction” in protecting students on campus and the “suppression” of protests on campus.[67] Two unknown assailants killed a student on Tehran University’s campus on February 12, which sparked the protests on campus.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Intelligence Organization announced that unspecified security forces arrested protesters on February 13 in Dehdasht, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province.[68] Iranian Human Rights Activists News Agency confirmed on February 17 that Iranian security forces arrested 12 protesters from Dehdasht.[69]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-17-2025
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