https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1880209620603662822
It was probably in its way to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran and Russia are not happy.
Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1880209620603662822
It was probably in its way to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran and Russia are not happy.
Both Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthi movement ceased military operations against Israel after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, which underscores that the October 7 War was a regional conflict between Iran and its Axis of Resistance and Israel. All elements of the Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi movement, began their offensive in support of Hamas against Israel's response to Hamas’s October 7 attack.[16] The opening attacks by the Houthis, the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, and Hezbollah were de-facto declarations of war against Israel that escalated and regionalized the war. Hezbollah only made a separate peace with Israel after the IDF compelled it to do so by defeating Hezbollah militarily.
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias officially suspended attacks against Israel after the ceasefire. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks against Israel stopped in November 2024, following Israeli threats. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary-General Akram al Kaabi announced the suspension of Iraqi militia attacks against Israel on January 15 and warned that the militias will react harshly to any Israeli “foolishness.”[17] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds similarly threatened that Iraqi militias would respond “forcefully” to any Israeli actions against Palestinian rights.[18] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Sarkhat al Quds are part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[19] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq consistently launched drone strikes that targeted Israel between February to November 2024.[20] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq dramatically increased its rate of attacks against Israel in September and October 2024.[21] This attack increase spurred the United States and Israel to warn the Iraqi government in early November 2024 that the IDF would potentially attack targets in Iraq if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to attack Israel.[22] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not claimed any attacks since November 24 at the time of this writing.[23]
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in Moscow on January 17 to deepen bilateral economic, political, and security ties.[36] The agreement does not represent a significant shift in Russo-Iranian relations and uses very similar language to Iran and Russia's 2001 agreement.[37] The new Iran-Russia agreement is largely a framework agreement, intended to outline terms for more detailed discussions and agreements on specifics in the future. Iran frequently pursues these vague framework agreements to establish strategic partnerships as it struggles to secure binding commitments with other nations. Such framework agreements have historically failed to materialize into significant outcomes for Iran, however.
The Iran-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement notably lacks a mutual defense clause.[38] The agreement outlines bilateral defense and security cooperation, including joint military exercises and operations, personnel training, port visits by military vessels, the exchange of military officers, and intelligence sharing.[39] The agreement, consistent with the 2001 agreement, requires both parties to refrain from aiding any aggressor that targets the other and to prevent their territory from being used to support actions that threaten the stability and territorial integrity of the other. The agreement does not include any collective security clause, however. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the agreement is “not a military alliance.”[40] Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalili similarly told Russian state media that the agreement differs from Russia's agreements with North Korea and Belarus which include collective defense provisions.[41]
The lack of a mutual defense clause in the Iran-Russia agreement indicates that Iran is unlikely to provide military personnel to support Russia's war in Ukraine. Russia similarly likely does not have the military and defense industrial capacity to support any significant military operations apart from its war in Ukraine.[42] Russia's willingness to offer security guarantees to North Korea suggests North Korea currently holds greater relative importance to Russia than Iran does, as North Korea has supplied soldiers to Russia while Iran likely neither wants to nor can provide such support.
The Iran-Russia agreement also focuses on economic, energy, and nuclear cooperation. The agreement emphasizes key transportation initiatives, including the completion of the International North-South Transport Corridor.[43] The agreement calls for opposing “unilateral coercive measures”—almost certainly referring to sanctions—and limiting their impact on economic relations. The agreement also expands energy cooperation in the oil and gas sectors.[44] Putin stated that Russian gas deliveries to Iran would start at 2 billion cubic meters per year but could reach 55 billion cubic meters annually.[45] The energy swaps would come amid one of Iran's worst energy shortages.[46] The agreement also covers joint “peaceful” atomic energy projects, including the construction of nuclear energy facilities.[47] Russia and Iran signed a joint nuclear cooperation agreement in 2014 to construct two new nuclear reactors at Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-17-2025
Iran Update, January 18, 2025
An unidentified individual, likely an Iranian Judicial office service employee, killed two senior Iranian Supreme Court judges, Mohammad Moghiseh and Ali Razini, at the Iranian Supreme Court in Tehran on January 18.[40] The suspect reportedly fled the scene and later committed suicide.[41] Iranian Judiciary spokesperson Asghar Jahangir described the attacker as an “infiltrator” who entered the offices of the two judges and carried out the attack using “a handgun.”[42] Jahangir rejected claims that the gunman injured another judge, but Jahangir confirmed that a judicial security guard also suffered injuries.[43] Both judges had long histories of handling political and security cases, including high-profile prosecutions and issuing harsh sentences against dissidents, minorities, and political prisoners.[44] Mohammad Moghiseh, known as “Naserian,” oversaw trials against Baha’i leaders, 2009 Green Movement protesters, and political prisoners in the 1980s and 1990s [45] The US Treasury sanctioned Moghiseh in December 2019 for his role in issuing harsh sentences against journalists, internet users, and Baha’is.[46] Ali Razini held multiple key positions in Iran’s judiciary, including Head of Tehran’s Department of Justice and Legal deputy of the Judiciary chief under former head of Judiciary Sadegh Amoli Larijani.[47] Anti-regime media called both Razini and Moghiseh “hanging judges” for their direct involvement in the late 90s mass executions of political prisoners.[48]
The official Iranian response to this attack has not yet materialized, but incidents like this often trigger paranoia about infiltration and foreign plots. The way Iran responds to the incident will indicate whether it perceives a broader security threat. Iranian authorities could frame the attack as an operation by the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) or foreign intelligence rather than an isolated act, for example.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025
Iran and its partners in Iraq are continuing to try to gain control over the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). The Iraqi parliament passed the National Intelligence Service Law on January 19.[23] This law reportedly grants oversight of the INIS to the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee, which is headed by a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[24] The passage of this law comes after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani appointed Hamid al Shatri as head of the INIS in December 2024.[25] Shatri previously served as an administrative assistant to Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh and supported Fayyadh during the Iranian-backed crackdown on the Tishreen protest movement that began in October 2019.[26] Shatri is also reportedly affiliated with the Badr Organization.[27] Iranian-backed figures have increasingly infiltrated the INIS since Sudani came to power in late 2022.[28]
The current energy crisis in Iran has had a major negative impact on the Iranian economy.[101] Iran has faced a severe energy crisis in recent weeks marked by electricity and natural gas shortages. The shortages have caused frequent power outages and blackouts. An Iranian businessman told Bloomberg on January 19 that the current energy crisis is the “most disastrous” energy crisis he has experienced in 25 years. Another businessman told Bloomberg that he “[does not] feel optimistic about the future” and may shut down his business. The Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines, and Agriculture has estimated that the blackouts have cost the Iranian economy around $250 million per day. The energy crisis comes as Iran is facing dire economic conditions, with inflation at around 30 percent and the value of the rial reaching record-low levels. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the energy crisis, compounded by the dire economic conditions, could trigger internal unrest.[102]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-19-2025
Iran has continued to conduct military exercises to prepare to counter external and internal security threats. Iran has conducted a flurry of exercises across the country in recent weeks and will continue for the next several. The latest involved the Artesh Ground Forces 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade conducting a two-day counterterrorism exercise along the northeastern border with Afghanistan.[78] The Artesh Ground Forces artillery, armored, aviation, drone, electronic, and missile units and other supporting units supported the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade in their heliborne operation to storm a hypothetical terrorist headquarters.
The Tehran-based 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, also known as NOHED, consists of 5,000 personnel and is Iran's most elite special forces unit, according to a US's Defense Intelligence Agency report in 2019.[79] NOHED is responsible for counterterrorism, hostage rescue, reconnaissance, espionage, telecommunications, among other irregular warfare operations.[80] The Iranian regime sent out NOHED forces, alongside the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) personnel, to Syria in 2016 as advisors and to gain experience with Iranian proxies.[81] Iranian media reported NOHED personnel presence on the Iranian Afghan border in 2021.[82] NOHED also participated in the search and rescue operation for former President Ebrahim Raisi and former Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, after they died in a helicopter crash in May 2024.[83]
Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri pad an official visit to Pakistan on January 20. Bagheri met separately with Pakistani Army Commander General Asim Munir, Air Force Commander Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Babar Sidhu, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, President Asif Ali Zardari, and Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif in Islamabad.[84] Bagheri said that the most important discussion in these meetings was improving border security “in various dimensions.”[85] Bagheri announced that Iran will participate in the Aman-25 multinational exercise hosted by Pakistan's Navy. Bagheri added that his delegation also discussed coordinating to address matters relevant to Afghanistan. Iranian Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi discussed border security with Munir in Islamabad in November 2024.[86]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-20-2025
Pakistan has problems with TTP in Afghanistan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistani_Taliban and Iran has a dispute with Afghanistan regarding water.
The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s political bureau claimed on January 19 that the group would disarm only if Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani “frankly or directly” requested its disarmament.[23] Sistani is the highest Shia religious authority in Iraq. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Political Bureau head Ali al Asadi likely made this comment in response to Iraqi federal government efforts to convince Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to either surrender their weapons or join the official Iraqi security apparatus.[24] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi has previously said that this militia takes its political and religious direction from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei instead of Sistani. Kaabi’s previous statement that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba takes direction from Khamenei is inconsistent with Asadi’s invocation of Sistani’s authority.[25] Sistani said in November 2024 that arms should be confined to the Iraqi state.[26] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, denied that Sistani’s call was directed at the militias.[27] It is unclear if other Iranian-backed militias besides Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba would agree to disarm if Sistani directly requested that they disarm. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba is also implicitly bypassing and rejecting the authority of the Iraqi federal government by the invocation of Sistani’s authority. Sistani does not hold an official position in the Iraqi government.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasized the need to support private businesses during a visit to an economic exhibition in Tehran on January 21.[81] The exhibition displayed the Iranian private sector's “achievements” in the fields of satellite manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and aircraft repair, among others. Khamenei urged government officials to address structural challenges in the energy sector to resolve Iran's energy crisis. Iran has experienced severe electricity and natural gas shortages in recent weeks, causing blackouts, economic losses, and business closures.[82] The Iran Chamber of Commerce estimated that power outages have cost the Iranian economy around 250 million US dollars per day during the crisis.[83] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the energy crisis and dire economic conditions could trigger internal unrest. Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei ordered Iranian security forces to prepare for potential unrest in late December 2024.[84]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-21-2025
Sistani is a counterweight to Iran https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_al-Sistani
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened to resume rocket and missile attacks targeting US forces in Iraq if the United States extends its presence past the September 2025 withdrawal date or makes “sudden moves.”[12] Kaabi added that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will increase the pace of attacks targeting US forces if the United States delays its withdrawal from Ain al Asad airbase.[13] It is notable that US-led international coalition forces will withdraw from some areas in Iraq, including the Ain al Asad airbase, by September 2025 but will not withdraw completely from Iraq until the end of 2026.[14]
Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks.[15] The officials expect the vessels to arrive at Bandar-e Abbas port in southern Iran and deliver the material to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The ships are expected to carry more than 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate, which can be converted to slightly over 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate, the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Ammonium perchlorate needs to be mixed with other components to create solid fuel propellant for missiles. The unspecified officials estimated that 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can—if converted to solid fuel propellant—fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles, including the Kheybar Shekan and Haj Qassem. Iran used Kheybar Shekan missiles in both April and October 2024 missile attacks on [16]
Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran's missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however. Unspecified Israeli sources reported that the IDF strikes hit 12 planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[17] Iran can reportedly not produce the mixers domestically and remanufacturing the mixers could take at least a year. Iran needs these mixers to combine various components, including ammonium perchlorate, and create solid propellant for missiles. It is not clear if Iran has mixing facilities at other locations but the loss of 12 mixers has likely significantly degraded Iran's ability to produce missiles and mount a large-scale attack on Israel soon, regardless of Iran's supply of ammonium perchlorate.
Iran has previously used ammonium perchlorate for internal missile production and exported it to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iran engaged in secret negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire a Chinese supply of ammonium perchlorate for its solid-fueled missiles.[18] The US Navy also interdicted an IRGC shipment of 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate en route from Iran to the Houthis in November 2024. The Houthis could use ammonium perchlorate as a precursor for solid fuel propellant, but there is currently no evidence that the Houthis can manufacture solid fuel. The ammonium perchlorate can also be used to make explosives.
International Atomic Energy Agency Director Raphael Grossi stated on January 22 that Iran is currently producing at least 30 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% every month.[71] Grossi previously stated in December 2024 that Iran's production of 60% enriched uranium would increase by “seven, eight times more, maybe, or even more” than Iran's production levels in December 2024, which were 5 to 7 kg of 60% enriched uranium a month.[72]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-22-2025
Iran Update, January 23, 2025
Iran is continuing to try to expand economic and transportation cooperation with Azerbaijan. Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh signed a memorandum of understanding covering transportation, energy, and finance cooperation with Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev in Tehran on January 22.[72] Sadegh stated that bilateral trade between Iran and Azerbaijan reached 580 million US dollars in 2024, a 20 percent increase from 2023.[73] Mustafayev stated that the Aghband Bridge, which is part of the International North-South Transit Corridor, will open by the end of 2025. This bridge is meant to increase trade through the East-West Aras corridor along Iran’s northwestern border.[74] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported that the Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters will be responsible for the expansion of the Aras corridor over the next two years.[75] The Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters is an IRGC-controlled civil engineering and construction firm that dominates broad swaths of the Iranian economy. The Iranian and Azerbaijani delegations also discussed energy and water cooperation as well as efforts to integrate the Iranian and Azerbaijani electricity grids.[76]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-23-2025
Iran Update, January 24, 2025
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy continued the “Great Prophet 19” military exercise in the Persian Gulf near the shores of Bushehr and Khuzestan Provinces on January 24.[56] IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri said that the exercise demonstrates “peace and security” for regional neighbors while warning “transregional forces” against destabilizing actions. The exercise reportedly features high-speed missile boats, deployable naval mines, and precision-strike drones. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported Very High Frequency (VHF) radio challenges to vessels in the northern Persian Gulf, likely linked to the exercise, and warned mariners near Iranian waters about possible course change demands.[57] The IRGC Navy likely aims to showcase its ability to disrupt maritime traffic near the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, an approach Iran has previously used in response to international sanctions.[58]
Iran and Oman signed an economic Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) during the 21st Joint Cooperation Meeting in Muscat which includes preferential trade, tariff reductions, and customs cooperation.[59] Iranian Industry Minister Mohammad Atabak emphasized investment support, shipping routes, and expanded flights as key priorities. Iranian officials visited Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Oman in January 2025 primarily to strengthen economic ties as part of Iran’s broader neighborhood policy.[60]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-24-2025
Iran Update, January 25, 2025
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy continued the “Great Prophet 19” exercise in the Persian Gulf on January 25.[56] The IRGC Navy launched “Ghaem” and “Almas” missiles, which it claims are AI-guided, from Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones. The exercise included the Navab air defense missile launches, ballistic missile tests, and IRGC commandos conducting land and sea operations. The IRGC Navy also unveiled the Kowsar-222 air defense missile, which reportedly has a 17 km range and operates on ”Ashura“ and ”Zolfaghar” vessels.[57]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-25-2025
Iran Update, January 26, 2025
An unspecified Iraqi diplomat told a Kurdish journalist on January 26 that the United States informed the Iraqi federal government that it plans to sanction prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi actors in Iraq.[61] The diplomat claimed that the United States plans to sanction Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri. A separate unspecified senior Iraqi official claimed that the United States plans to sanction State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki.[62] CTP-ISW cannot verify this report, although the report comes as the United States has increased pressure on the Iraqi federal government to rein in and disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[63]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-26-2025
Iran Update, January 27, 2025
Reuters cited a Student News Network interview on January 27 in which Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Khatam ol Anbiya Central Headquarters Deputy Coordinator Ali Shamdani stated that Iran had purchased Su-35 fighter jets from Russia.[84] Shamdani did not elaborate on how many Su-35 fighter jets or whether they had arrived in Iran, according to Reuters. CTP-ISW has not seen the original interview at this time. An Iranian Armed Forces chief of staff-affiliated news outlet published the same interview on January 27. The outlet cut the interview into three parts and may have omitted parts of the interview. Shamdani discussed Iran’s domestic military equipment production and ”foreign” purchases in the interview clips but did not include that Iran had purchased Su-35s from Russia.[85] The outlet did tag the altered interview‘s webpage with ”Su-35,” however. Iran likely reached an agreement with Russia in late 2022 to acquire Su-35 fighter jets, potentially as part of a trade that included Iranian military support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine.[86] Iran and Russia likely confirmed the Su-35 fighter jets sale, when they signed their comprehensive strategic agreement this month, which covered military and defense industry cooperation.[87] The acquisition of Su-35s could enable Iran to more readily and independently project air power relative to Iran’s current capabilities.[88]
The Iranian Artesh conducted two military exercises in western Iran on January 26 and 27.[89] The Artesh Air Force carried out the “100-helicopter Air Force” exercise at the First Air Force Combat base near Naftshahr city in Kermanshah Province. The exercise tested more than ten helicopter models, including Bell 205, 206, 209, and 214 helicopters. Artesh Ground Forces and Air Force Commanders Kiomars Heydari and Ghasem Khamoshi watched the exercise. The Artesh Ground Forces’ 35th Commando Brigade also conducted airborne and night counterterrorism exercises in Kermanshah Province.
The IRGC unveiled a new Iranian-made heavy-weight drone called the “Gaza” on January 26.[90] The “Gaza” drone has a range of up to 7,000 kilometers (km) and an operational radius of 4,000 km. The drone can carry up to at least 500 kilograms (kgs) for up to 35 hours with a maximum speed of 35 km per hour.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-27-2025
Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally shifted and intensified the Russo-Iranian relationship. Tehran has leveraged Moscow's growing material and financial requirements to sustain its war effort and support Tehran’s own domestic and foreign policy objectives. The core of the Russo-Iranian relationship is a mutually binding interest in challenging and eventually overturning the US-led world order. This shared ideological core allowed the Russo-Iranian relationship to weather and survive tensions and challenges that have arisen since 2022, and the United States should not expect this ideological core to weaken in the years ahead. Russo-Iranian cooperation is occurring along seven major axes that relate to and overlap in the defense, economic, and political spheres. It is also not a perfectly one-to-one relationship—Moscow and Tehran are seeking different outcomes from their collaboration. The interrelated nature of these nodes of cooperation should emphasize to the United States and its allies that the success of Russia cannot be separated from the success of Iran.
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens.pdf
40 pages
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi implicitly threatened that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon during an interview with Sky News on January 28.[5] Araghchi stated that Iran would ”have to look for an alternative” if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered snapback sanctions on Iran before October 2025. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[6] The E3 has until October 2025 to trigger snapback sanctions if it decides to do so. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a ”comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[7] The IAEA Board of Governors is next set to meet in March 2025.[8] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions.[9] Araghchi added that there is a “heated debate” in Iran about what an “alternative” to diplomacy would be.[10] Araghchi is likely referring to the debate among Iranian officials about whether Iran should revise its nuclear doctrine and pursue a nuclear weapon.[11] That Araghchi interviewed with British outlet Sky News in English suggests that his statements were directed at the E3.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2025
Iran Update, January 29, 2025
Unspecified political sources told Iraqi media on January 29 that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias seek to obtain “sensitive government positions that influence political decisions” in return for their integration into the Iraqi security establishment.[45] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment would facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector by further entrenching Iranian-backed groups into the Iraqi state.[46] The appointment of Iranian-backed militia members to “sensitive government positions,” which likely refers to ministerial or senior defense and security positions, would further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security and political sectors.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-29-2025
Iran Update, January 30, 2025
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with his British counterpart David Lammy on January 29 to discuss nuclear negotiations.[69] Araghchi emphasized Iran’s willingness to engage in negotiations “in line with [Iran’s] national interests.” Araghchi and Lammy likely discussed the possibility of the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggering snapback sanctions on Iran.[70] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.” [71] Araghchi separately held a phone call with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Raphael Grossi to discuss technical cooperation between Iran and the IAEA.[72] These calls come after Araghchi implicitly threatened on January 28 that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon if the E3 triggers snapback sanctions on Iran before October 2025.[73]
Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov on January 29 to discuss developments in Syria.[74] Jalali and Bogdanov likely discussed Bogdanov’s recent visit to Syria on January 28. Bogdanov and Russian Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev met with HTS-led interim government officials in Damascus to discuss Russia’s continued access to its military bases in Syria.[75]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2025
The Cipher Brief Iran & Trump 2.0: Imagining a New Deal
27JAN2025
Paula Doyle served as Assistant Deputy Director for Operations at CIA, where she oversaw worldwide HUMINT operations and activities that required the use of air, land, maritime, space-based and cyber technologies.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6p6Z0YaV8KE
17 min video
Iran is financially supporting the military reconstitution of Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel submitted a complaint to the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire committee, claiming that Iranian envoys are delivering “tens of millions of dollars in cash” to Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut to fund the revival of Hezbollah, according to an unspecified US defense official representing the ceasefire committee and people familiar with the content of the complaint.[1] Western media reported in December 2024 that Iran may seek to establish a new “hub” in the Beirut airport for military shipments to Hezbollah.[2] Lebanese airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah in early January.[3] The Wall Street Journal also reported that 28 branches of al Qard al Hassan—one of Hezbollah's main banking and financial arms—have resumed operations.[4] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has frequently struck al Qard al Hassan branches in Lebanon in recent months to isolate Hezbollah's financial networks. Unspecified sources familiar with Israel's complaint to the ceasefire committee stated that Israel accused Turkish citizens of moving money for Hezbollah from Istanbul to Beirut by air.
Israeli media reported in December 2024 that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmad al Shara decided to prevent Iranian civilian and military flights from transiting Syrian airspace, possibly explaining why Iran may now rely on access from Turkey.[5] Iran has historically moved materiel via Syria. CTP-ISW previously assessed that loss of access to Syrian airspace would severely limit Iran's ability to rearm Hezbollah and require Iran to establish other access routes.[6] Iranian cash deliveries alone will likely not be enough to reconstitute the group militarily without additional arms supplies, however. Shara’s decision—if true—to cut off Iran's supply route to Hezbollah via Syria will still make it difficult for Iran to help Hezbollah reconstitute militarily.
Hamas leadership is privately debating what role the group should play in the post-war Gaza Strip, according to The Economist.[7] Hardliners in the group reportedly seek to prioritize the reconstitution of Hamas’ military while selecting a group of technocrats to govern the strip. The Economist reported that other options that Hamas faces include trying to return to the pre-war status quo in the strip or pursuing a more pragmatic political reconciliation with Fatah, which governs the West Bank. Hamas and Fatah split from one another in 2007.[8]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-31-2025
Iran Update, February 1, 2025
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy unveiled a new underground missile depot in southern Iran on February 1. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri visited the site.[59] The IRGC claimed that the facility contains medium-range Ghadr-380 anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of 1000 km, reportedly with anti-jamming technology, smart guidance, and rapid launch capability. The IRGC previously unveiled an underground missile depot containing Emad, Ghadr, and Qiam ballistic missiles on January 10, which reportedly supported Iran’s missile attacks against Israel in April and October 2024.[60]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-1-2025
Iran Update, February 2, 2025
Iranian Supreme Leader’s adviser Ali Larijani continued to signal a lack of clarity on whether Iran is willing to re-engage with Western powers over nuclear negotiations.[50] Larijani stated that “now is the time to smooth the atmosphere through [nuclear] diplomacy,” but added that “it is too early to be eager for negotiations” with the United States during an interview with Iranian media on February 1. Larijani also stated that during previous nuclear negotiations, Iran did not have the unspecified technology but now Iran has “acquired nuclear knowledge in an atomic way.” Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi mentioned that there is a debate among Iranian officials about whether Iran should revise its nuclear doctrine and pursue a nuclear weapon as an alternative to a nuclear agreement in an interview with Sky News on January 28.[51]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2025
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